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Abstract: 
The thesis is a comparative analysis of the shared ideas and concerns in the works of 
Mikhail Bakhtin and Roland Barthes from the point of view of differences between 
French and Slavic literary structuralisms. Its background argument is that the 
structuralism developed in the later works of the Russian Formalists and by Prague 
Structuralists and Soviet Semioticians is more historically and socially oriented than its 
French version, defining the structure of a literary work as a system of all of its 
elements and effects (even those that take us outside of the text, like literary tradition 
and historical and political circumstances). In this sense, Bakhtin can be seen as a part 
of the Slavic structuralist tradition (and not opposed to it as is often claimed), and 
Barthes (seen throughout his career) is on the whole perhaps closer to the Slavic 
structuralism than he is to the French. 
The particular problems discussed are those of the relationship between 
literature and ideology, the notions of intertextuality, heteroglossia, dialogism and 
polyphony and the differences between them, and the role of the author. 
Barthes and Bakhtin shared a lifelong interest in the role of ideology in literature 
and the influence of authoritarian language or myth on culture in general and the literary 
text in particular. They looked for ways in which the deadening effect of the 
mythological (epic, monological) thought and word can be counteracted through 
literature, and different versions of what Kristeva termed 'intertextuality' played an 
important part in their treatment of the subject. They also both discussed the role of the 
author and their voice in the literary text, and the question of their power over the text, 
its characters (Bakhtin) and the reader (Barthes). 
The main thread of Barthes and Bakhtin's thought focuses on the problem of 
counteracting authoritarian language through literature, and the solutions they proposed 
can fruitfully be seen in the light of Slavic structuralism's notions of literary structure. 
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INTRODUCTION: THE EAST AND WEST OF EUROPEAN 
STRUCTURALISM 
'Like people and schools of criticism', writes Edward Said in his essay 'Travelling 
Theory', 'ideas and theories travel - from person to person, from situation to situation, 
from one period to another' (1991,226). Depending on the historical, social and cultural 
situations and periods in which they find themselves, as well as on the persons who 
adopt them, these ideas and theories can take different shapes, and develop in different 
directions. 
Structuralism is, undoubtedly, one of the best-travelled theories of this century. 
Generally perceived as being bom between 1907 and 1911 out of the lectures in general 
linguistics held by Ferdinand de Saussure at the University of Geneva, structuralism, 
indeed, travelled far and wide and influenced vast areas of human sciences. It is 
probably fair to say that its impact on linguistics, literary theory and cultural studies in 
general is such that even for anti-structuralists it would be almost impossible to imagine 
what it would be like to think without taking the idea of structure into account. What 
Edith Kurzveil wrote in 1980 (10) is probably still true today: 'Structuralism has left its 
mark on the intellectual tradition, and continues to influence scholars. ' 
And yet, the structuralist approach has not had a good press, and the 
stereotypical image of structuralism, as described by Scholes (1974,170), is that it 'has 
to do... with the reduction of literary texts to bloodless formulae'. For anyone who has 
read Terry Eagleton's book Literary Theory, his illustration of the structuralist approach 
will probably stay forever in their mind. According to Eagleton (1996,82), what a 
structuralist critic would do with a story would be to 'schematise' it 'in diagrammatic 
form', making it irrelevant what the story is actually about, and whether its protagonists 
are father and son, pit and sun, mother and daughter, or bird and mole, as long as some 
formal characteristics (in the case of his example, the opposition between 'high' and 
'low') are happily revealed. After which, 'flushed with triumph, the structuralist 
rearranges his rulers and reaches for the next story' (Eagleton, 1996,83). 
However, as Scholes has argued, and as I am going to argue in this thesis, 
structuralism is far from being some kind of a 'vampire approach' that sucks the life out 
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of its objects of study. I believe that the main reason why it is sometimes perceived as 
schematic, and ignorant of the conditions which shape a literary work's existence in the 
world, is because there is little awareness of its diversity, its comprehensive history still 
remains to be written, and its full corpus of texts still remains to be taken into account. 
That aim goes far beyond the scope of this thesis (which focuses on Roland Barthes and 
Mikhail Bakhtin in the context of structuralism), but a reassessment of structuralism is 
nevertheless a part of it, with the hope of a more comprehensive understanding of its 
history, aims and achievements. 
Jonathan Culler, whose Structuralist Poetics is probably one of the most well- 
known and influential books about the subject, considered structuralism to be a purely 
French phenomenon, and he used the term to designate 'the work of a restricted group 
of French theorists and practitioners', while reserving the term 'semiology' 'to any 
work which studies signs' (Culler, 1975,6). An even stronger sentiment about 
structuralism's Frenchness is expressed by Frangois Dosse (1998,1,393), who claimed 
that it was 'beneath the tricolour flag of France, and of France alone, that structuralism 
would flourish and fascinate other countries'. The idea that structuralism is a 
'specifically French product' (Ibid.. ) is accepted by most British and American authors 
who wrote surveys of structuralist thought, and even when the Frenchness is not 
explicitly stated, the list of authors taken into account shows that it is taken for granted. 
Obviously, Jonathan Culler's or anyone else's choice to cover only French structuralist 
thought, considering the scope of research that that entails, can well be seen as a rational 
assessment of how much of the structuralist theory one can pack in a single book and 
still make it digestible to even an enthusiastic and specialist reader. And yet, in most of 
these accounts, one can almost always catch a glimpse of what is missing, and the main 
name that provides a window into that different structuralist world is Roman Jakobson. 
Glimpses of a Less Known Story 
The paths structuralism took between its Geneva origins and 'world domination' appear 
well documented and reasonably well known. The way Dosse tells the tale (and his 
version is not that different from Culler's), after the publication of Saussure's students' 
notes of his lectures under the title Cours de linguistique ginirale in 1916, the next key 
event in the development of structuralism appears to be the historic encounter between 
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Roman Jakobson and Claude Uvi-Strauss in New York during the Second World War 
(1998,1, chapter 8). Uvi-Strauss, fascinated by Jakobson's account of binary 
oppositions in phonology, decided to apply the principle to his study of myth. 
According to Edith Kurzveil (1980,1), 'Levi-Strauss was first to adapt Saussurean 
linguistics to the social sciences', with the help of 'elaborations from linguistic theories' 
by Jakobson, Hj elmslev and Martinet (1980,4). And the rest, as they say, was history. 
And yet, Dosse gives us a glimpse of what is missing from the main narrative of 
his book. When Uvi-Strauss met Jakobson in New York, the Russian scholar already 
had years of structuralist experience behind him, and had worked not just on binary 
oppositions in phonology, but also on literary theory, literary history and literary 
criticism. He had worked with some of the most talented scholars from Russian 
Formalist and Prague Structuralist circles. He had used Saussure's terminology in the 
late 1920s and revised some of its elements, making them more suitable to literary 
analysis. Dosse at least has a vague idea about most of this, as he mentions Jakobson's 
involvement in the Formalist movement (1998,1,53-55) and in the Prague Circle (1998, 
1,54-58). However, his account is full of confusing inaccuracies, and so, for example, 
Shklovskii, Eikhenbaum and lakubinskii are listed as 'poets' rather than as literary 
scholars, and one of the greatest structuralists, Jan MukaYovsky gets his name spelt as 
Makarovsky (1998,1,55). Dosse also mentions the First International Congress of 
Linguists in Holland in 1928, where the members of the Prague Circle (Jakobson, 
Matbesius, Trubetskoy) and the Geneva School (Bally, Sechehaye) 'made common 
reference to Saussure in their description of language as a system' (1998,1,44). Dosse 
adds that 'Geneva and Moscow [he leaves out the Prague group, who were certainly at 
the Congress and to whom Jakobson had belonged since the creation of the Prague 
Linguistic Circle in 1926] were therefore at the beginnings of the definition of the 
structuralist program. Moreover, this was the first time that the term "structuralism" was 
actually employed' (1998,1,44-45). 1 And yet, driven by his idea that structuralism is 
essentially a French phenomenon, Dosse side-steps both the Moscow and the Prague 
Circle, Jakobson's work on literature and anything else that was not destined to 
influence the French, and quickly concludes that the 'Saussurean break', which was 
essential for the creation of structuralism, consisted of an insistence on synchrony, 
1 Jan Broekman, however, quotes 1935 as the year when the term 'structuralism' was first used (1974, 
19). 
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rather than diachrony (1998,1,47), of a 'linguistic closure', which meant that one 
looked only at the relationship between the signifier (the acoustic image) and the 
signified (the concept) (1998,1,48), excluding the referent, and of the 'elimination' of 
the (first speaking, and than any other) subject (1998,1,50-51). Anything that might 
have been said about. Saussure and the application of his terminology on disciplines 
other than linguistics by the Russians or the Czechs is completely ignored. 
However, considering that Roman Jakobson and lurii Tynianov (1971) wrote 
about 'structural laws' in the history of literature, using the terminology of the Geneva 
school of linguistics and demanding the elaboration of that terminology in literary 
studies as early as 1928, and that Jan Mukarovsky talked about the structure of a work 
of ad in 1934,2 the absence of Russian and Czech structuralists from most accounts of 
structuralist ideas can easily be seen as an example of Western European arrogance, or 
of lack of readiness to consider ideas which do not fit in with the relatively easily 
defined general tendencies of French structuralism. One would be more likely to agree 
with Culler's remark that 'one cannot define structuralism by examining how the word 
has been used; that would lead only to despair' (1975,3), had it not been symptomatic 
of the fact that Eastern European strands of structuralist approach have been left almost 
entirely to the sole interest of Slavic specialists, without much wider appreciation. 
For example, John Lechte, in his book Fifty Key Contemporary Thinkerý: From 
Structuralism to Postmodernity (1994) includes Jakobson (and Bakhtin) in his list of 
main structuralist thinkers, but none of the other Eastern Europeans - the rest are 
French. Selden and Widdowson's book A Reader's Guide to Contemporary Literary 
Theory (1993) lists Jakobson as the only non-French structuralist (Bakhtin is here listed 
as a formalist). Jean-Marie Benoist in The Structuralist Revolution states that 
structuralism's history began when Saussure's problem of the sign was carried over 
into ethnology (Ldvi-Strauss) and psychoanalysis (Lacan) (1978,1). The Prague School 
is ignored, as it is in Raymond Boudon's The Uses of Structuralism (197 1). Terrence 
Hawkes in his excellent book Structuralism and Semiotics (1977) does talk about the 
Formalists and mentions Mukarovsky a few times,. but he mostly concentrates on 
Shklovskii and Propp, and he does not mention anything that Jakobson or Mukarovsky 
said that does not tie in neatly with French structuralism. Fredric Jameson in his book 
on formalism and structuralism does a similar thing: Russian Formalism for him mostly 
'Art as a Serniotic Fact', in 1978ý pp. 82-8 8. 
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consists of the works of Shklovskii and Propp, Mukarovsky is not mentioned even in 
the bibliography, all the structuralists discussed are French, and he says in his preface 
that he has 'deliberately excluded from the present work any treatment of the very rich 
materials of Soviet Structuralism, as developed by Yuri M. Lotman and his colleagues 
at the University of Tartu'(Jameson, 1972, ix-x). Which brings us to another point: even 
when the Prague Circle gets the mention and the treatment it deserves (as it does, for 
example, in Jan Broeckman's Structuralism: Moscow-Prague-Paris (1974) and J. G. 
Merquior's From Prague to Paris: A Critique of Structuralist and Post-structuralist 
Thought (1986), the Soviet Sernioticians get completely excluded from most general 
studies of structuralist thought. 3 
This French-centred view of structuralism can be rather frustrating, and it is 
difficult not to sympathise with the anger of Leonard Jackson's book The Poverty of 
Structuralism, when, in a fit of rage not entirely untypical of the general tone of the 
book, he says that structuralism belonged to a 'marginal group of [French] intellectuals, 
poised somewhere between a very large Stalinist Communist Party and an even larger 
bourgeoisie'. Jackson adds that structuralism 'briefly succeeded existentialism as a 
group of popular philosophies' and When the struchiralist model collapsed in About 
1967, a variety of post-structuralisms succeeded it and were exported to marginal and 
lonely literary intellectuals all over the world' (1991,2). The title of the book is 
misleading, as is the above quote, since Jackson, who mostly attacks French 
structuralism (and poststructuralism even more), has full respect for Prague 
structuralism and for Chomsky's extension of structuralist linguistics. It seems that his 
main grievance is not against the basic notions of structuralism but against the literary 
part of it which at one point lost touch with developments in linguistics. 4 
3 Although, to be fair, Merquior mentions Lotman, and credits him with being the successor of the Prague 
School in that he tries to keep the balance between 'form and reality' in the study of literature (p. 27). 
4 What he calls 'the logical poverty of structuralism' refers to French structuralism's insistence on the 
notion of meaning as pure difference. Jackson claims that that notion never really worked in linguistics 
(i. e. could never adequately describe the fimctioning of language), and was eventually abandoned for the 
generative model (See pp. 215-35). 
In relation to this, see also Ruwet, 1966, where he says that we must remember that 'structural linguistics 
represents only a movement - now in the past, since the development of generative grammar - in the 
history of linguistics. There would be little sense in binding the destiny of literary studies to what is 
merely a transitory stage of a neighbouring discipline. [ ... I It seems to me that the status of linguistics, in 
relation to poetics and to literary study in general, can only be that of an auxiliary discipline, whose role is 
roughly analogous to that played by phonetics with respect to the whole of linguistics' (pp. 296-97). This 
essay is a clear response to Roman Jakobson's 1958 paper of the same title, where Jakobson argued the 
exactly opposite view, saying that 'since linguistics is the global science of verbal structure, poetics may 
be regarded as an integral part of linguistics' (Jakobson, 1996,63). 
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I would say that Jackson is somewhat given to exaggeration (to put it mildly) when he 
insists on the brevity and the intellectual insignificance of French structuralism, 5 but I 
agree with his main complaint that in the popular intellectual consciousness 'the long 
history of literary structuralism based on the linguistic model is truncated into a brief 
French prelude to the wonders of poststructuralism' (Jackson, 1991,39). 
A Tale of Two Structuralism 
It seems to me that, if one looks deeper through the cracks in these surveys of 
structuralist thought, mostly following the 'Jakobson lead', a story of two 
fundamentally different types of structuralism emerges. I shall call them 'Western' and 
'Eastern' structuralism. Each has its own story of 'origins' and its history of ideas, and 
they have each provoked different reactions and further developments. Both of these 
stories begin in some fashion with Russian Formalism, and I want to (briefly) address 
the question of how much of the Formalist work should be incorporated into the 
structuralist corpus. Following from there, I want to show how the two versions of 
structuralism differ on the basis of their attitude to history and diachronic studies (and 
although they have been generally seen as one and the same thing, I would say that 
there is a difference between the notion of history and the notion of diachrony). 
Although I believe that ultimately a more comprehensive vision of literary 
structuralism could be attempted only by assessing the two versions together, I shall for 
now keep them separate, and leave it to the rest of the thesis to gently do its work of 
'structuralist unification', as most of the problems raised in this chapter will keep 
reappearing throughout this study. It is not, however, my intention to give an extensive 
survey of Structuralism In All Its Glory; this is, after all, just meant to be an 
introductory chapter explaining the fundamentals of my approach to Barthes and 
Bakhtin. It best fits my purpose to concentrate on a few key texts and concepts which I 
5 Although Jan Broekman, talking about the sociological studies of the French structuralist movement, 
done by Am6ry, Furet, and Schiwy, says something that is not entirely dissimilar to Jackson's outburst 
against the French structuralists: 'structuralism should be seen as a philosophy of frustrated French leftist 
intellectuals. Nihilism is a constant companion to this frustration and finds excellent expression in the 
main thought of the structuralists. This main thought is reduced to three themes: the denial of history, the 
denial of the subject, and a denial of the individual and pessimistic view of the future of Western society, 
as developed by Ldvi -Strauss, Foucault, Barthes, and others'. It is interesting that Broekman does not 
deny this assessment of French structuralism, but simply reminds us that 'the development of 
structuralism is far from being exclusively French and post-war. It goes back to the Russian Formalism of 
the beginning of our century' (pp. 14-15). 
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think illustrate the differences between the two versions of structuralism most clearly. I 
also have to admit that I myself am going to be guilty in part of what I have accused 
others for, in that I shall not talk very much about the work of the Prague Circle and of 
Jan Mukarovsky. It should be taken as read, however, that what I have to say about the 
Eastern type of structuralism I believe to be largely true of the Prague Circle as well. 
It has to be stressed that my main interest is in literary structuralism, and the 
discussion will mostly concentrate on that aspect of structuralist thought. 
East to West: Synchronic Structures: Propp and the Prehistory of Structuralism 
The role of Vladimir Propp's 1928 Morphology of the Folktale in the history of 
structuralism is well established: Culler says that it 'has served as the point of departure 
for the structuralist study of plot' (Culler, 1975,207), and Scholes (1974,60-74), 
Hawkes (1977,67-69) and Broekman (1974, viii) all more or less explicitly treat Propp 
as the first structuralist, seeing Morphology as the crucial turning-point, the moment 
when Formalism grew into structuralism. Tzvetan Todorov quotes Propp's work as the 
first structuralist analysis, and the 'mythological' narrative with which it dealt as an 
archetypal subject matter for structuralist thought (Todorov, 1968,71). With this in 
mind, let us briefly look at Propp's work, and see how and why it should fit into the 
history of structuralism. 
Propp's purpose was to find a descriptive model for the Russian fairy tale, one 
that would be able to explain 'the two-fold quality of the tale: its amazing multiformity, 
picturesqueness, and colour, and on the other hand, its no less striking uniformity, its 
repetition' (Propp, 1968,20-21). His basic finding was that the tales 'possess one 
special characteristic: components of one tale can, without any alteration whatsoever, be 
transferred to another' (1968,7), and, judging that it is this repetitiveness and not the 
multiformity that require more urgent study, he concentrated on the former. 6 With the 
belief that 'what matters is not the amount of material, but the methods of 
investigation', Propp chose to look at a limited number of fairy tales (tales No. 50-151 
in the Afanas'ev collection), and justified this by stressing that 'the repetition of 
6 But see also Ch viii, entitled 'On the Attributes of Dramatis Personae and their Significance'. 
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fundamental components [ ... ] exceeds all expectations' 
(1968,24), even in such a 
relatively small body of material. 
The results of Propp's investigation are well known, and its main points can be 
summarised very briefly. He found that there are seven spheres ofaction (villain, donor, 
helper, princess and her father, dispatcher, hero, and false hero) (1968,79-80) which 
can be performed by different fairy tale personages (so, for example, the villain could be 
a bear, or a witch, or a dragon). He also found that 'all fairy tales are of one type in 
regard to their structure' (1968,23), which consists of a limited sequence of 'functions'. 
Propp defined function 'as an act of a character, definedfrom the point of view of its 
significancefor the course of the action' (Propp's emphasis, 1968,21), and found that 
there are exactly 31 functions, whose sequence is always identical, on which the fairy 
tale builds its plot. 
Hawkes claims that 'the major breakthrough represented in [Propp's] work 
derives from his insistence that in the fairy tale the all-important and unifying element is 
found, not on a quasi-'phonetic' level, within the 'characters' who appear in the story, 
but on a 'phonemic' level, in the characters'function; the part they play in the plot'. On 
the strength of Propp's definition of 'function' Hawkes (1977,68) finds that 'it is clear 
that Propp's position is truly a structuralist one'. 
What is often neglected when Propp's structuralist credentials are discussed is 
Propp's decision to leave aside 'the historical study of the tale', believing that 'to study 
genetics, without special elucidation of the problem of description [ ... ] is completely 
useless', and that, 'before throwing light upon the question of the tale's origin, one must 
first answer the question as to what the tale itself represents' (Propp, 1968,5). This is a 
distinction between synchronic and diachronic approaches, and I would merely like to 
point out that, also in 1928, Jakobson and Tynianov discussed Saussure's methodology 
(as we shall see later), so that it is conceivable that Propp had also read or heard of 
Saussure by then. Another possible answer would be that Propp was, like other 
Formalists, influenced by the work of Jan Baudouin de Courtenay (1845-1929), who, 
some 30 years before Saussure, drew a distinction between the study of the evolution of 
an individual linguistic element and the study of the whole of the language system at 
one point in its development (i. e., between diachrony and synchrony) (Ivid, 1970,85- 
87). Of course, it is also perfectly conceivable that Propp's methodological choice was 
based on the situation within his own field, which was similar to the state of linguistics 
criticised by Courtenay and Saussure ('the study of the tale has been pursued for the 
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most part only genetically, and, to a great extent, without attempts at preliminary, 
systematic description' (Propp, 1968,5), to which Propp responded with a similar 
solution in the form of the shift to the 'systematic', synchronic description. It needs to 
be stressed that, as with Saussure, Propp's decision to ignore genetic study is not laid 
out as a prohibition against it, but as a tactical decision until a better understanding of 
the structure of the tale is reached. And it must be noted that Propp himself later 
devoted himself to the historical study of the fairy tale, since in 1946 he published a 
book entitled The Historical Roots of the Fairy Tale, which he considered to be the 
second volume of 'one comprehensive work' (Propp, 1996). 
However, most interpretations of Propp's work as structuralist tend to disregard 
the fact that French structuralists have defined themselves and the purpose of their 
activity through their decision that Propp was their predecessor, even when his model 
was criticised, by Greimas and Uvi-Strauss, for being 'too close to the level of 
empirical observation' (Culler, 1975,213). It is not so much that, with hindsight and 
knowledge of French structuralism and its study of the narrative in particular, it is said 
that 'Propp was the first structuralist', it is more that the French structuralists said from 
the beginning 'Propp was the first structuralist and we shall base our structuralist study 
of the narrative on his'. 7 In the chapter 'Poetics of the Novel' of Culler's Structuralist 
Poetics, the section devoted to the study of plot to a large extent consists of French 
reactions to Propp's work and developments thereof, and both Hawkes and Scholes 
8 present things in the same way. As Culler, Scholes and Hawkes discuss different 
aspects of the relations between the ideas of Propp, Uvi-Strauss, Greimas, and 
Bremond, I shall just give an example of a fairly typical treatment of Propp's work by a 
French structuralist by looking at Greimas and his actantial models. However, I need to 
stress that I perfectly agree that Morphology can well be seen as a structuralist work; 
Propp himself uses the term 'structure' and makes some methodological choices which 
resemble those of Saussure. What I am pointing out is that French structuralism has 
defined itself through an interpretation of his work that disregards the material on which 
his study is based (i. e. the Russian fairy tale) and which generalises his basic 
assumptions, which were designed to deal with that particular material, making claims 
7 However, it is important to note that Claude L6vi-Strauss himself considered Morphology to be a 
formalist work. See Ldvi-Strauss, 1960. 
8 Culler, 1975,205-24. 
The works of particular interest arc: Brcmond, 1964; Claude Uvi-Strauss, 1960; and Greimas, 1966. 
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for his model which go well beyond the scope of its original aspirations. In particular, I 
am referring to Scholes's assessment that Propp's structuralist breakthrough is 
contained in his decision to look not at the personages of the fairy tale, but at the 
functions which they perform within the tale; this in turn implies that all structuralist 
study of narrative should follow his lead, and treat the characters in a story primarily 
from the point of view of their function in the plot, treating all characterisation as 
auxiliary to the basic ffinction. Propp himself responded to this kind of interpretation of 
his work by saying that 'the absolutely empirical, concrete, and particular character' of 
his research has not been grasped (Propp, 1996,230). 
According to Dosse, the moment when structuralism proper came into existence 
was when Uvi-Strauss applied linguistic categories to anthropology. Combined with 
Propp, Uvi-Strauss gives us an indication of why French literary structuralism made 
the methodological decisions that it did. 
West: Synchronic Structures: Uvi-Strauss 
Uvi-Strauss's influence on French structuralism has been great and the basic 
assumptions of his structural anthropology can be to a large extent taken as the basic, 
initial assumptions of French literary structuralism as well. Two of his essays have 
generally been seen as particularly influential on later structuralist development. 
In his 1945 essay Vanalyse structurale en linguistique et en anthropologie' 
(L6vi-Strauss, 1958,37-62) Uvi-Strauss claimed that linguistics, and more precisely 
Jakobsonian phonology, since it had a much more developed scientific status than other 
social sciences, could play a renovating part where the rest of the social sciences are 
concerned. He suggested that the main principles that can be taken over from phonology 
are, firstly, the decision to study not so much the conscious phenomena of language but 
their unconscious infrastructure; secondly, to study not the individual terms, but the 
system to which they belong; and, thirdly, to try to uncover the general laws which 
regulate the relations within the system (19 5 8,40). He considered that the problem with 
traditional sociology had been the same as the problem of old linguistics, in that it 
studied the individual phenomena but not their interrelations, and it never asked itself 
how it a system of, say, family relations in their present form could be just an accidental 
The dates of publication are a clear indication of the relatively early knowledge of Propp's work. 
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result of a meeting of heterogeneous social phenomena and yet function with such 
efficiency and regularity (195 8,41-2). 
The insistence on the study of the 'unconscious infrastructure' behind the 
directly observable phenomena has been particularly influential. The notion that 'the 
real structure of a cultural phenomenon cannot coincide with the spontaneous account 
given by the subjects themselves', was, according to Ren6 Girard (1970,18), very 
fruitful in literary studies. Girard suggests that it resulted in a 'literary criticism [ ... ] 
which seeks to define not the unity of the work and the organisation consciously 
designed by the author [ ... ], but a more comprehensive structure in which the intentions 
of this author and the generally accepted interpretation of his audiences are [ ... ] no 
more than elements in a total picture, and these elements can always be reinterpreted 
according to the requirements of the totalisation' (Girard, 1970,18-9). This in itself is 
not problematic; what is slightly more dubious is Uvi-Strauss's basic model of that 
'unconscious infrastructure', which is the Jakobsonian phonological model of binary 
oppositions. Edmund Leach (1982,88) takes issue with Uvi-Strauss's idea that 'the 
whole structure of primitive thought is binary', and says that although 'the human brain 
does have a tendency to operate with binary counters in all sorts of situations', 'it can 
operate in other ways as well'. Leach makes the same point later made by Jackson when 
he says that the linguistic model adopted by Uvi-Strauss had its own limitations and 
was later replaced by a more sophisticated approach; linguists 'have come to recognise 
that the deep level process of pattern generation and pattern recognition that is entailed 
by the human capacity to attach complex semantic significance to speech utterances 
must depend on mechanisms of much greater complexity than is suggested by the 
digital computer model which underlies the Jakobson - Uvi-Strauss theories' (Leach, 
1982,112-13). The concept of binary oppositions may be useful for the study of 
phonemes, but it is of a lot less use when we get to syntax. 
It is not just the model of binary oppositions which Uvi-Strauss took over from 
linguistics (and on which he based, for example, his analyses in Le Cru et le cuit), but 
he also used other notions such as langue and parole, as well as what he called 
/ 'stiuctural' and 'statistic' aspects of language. It is worth taking a closer look at the 
passages in our second essay, Ta Structure des mythes', where Uvi-Strauss discusses 
these distinctions, as it appears to me that his reading of Saussure is rather more creative 
than one would like, although I am not denying that the conclusions of the subsequent 
analysis of the Oedipus myth are extremely interesting (Levi-Strauss, 1958,226-55). 
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Uvi-Strauss starts his discussion of Saussurean terminology by saying: 
En distinguant entre la langue et la parole, Saussure a montr6 que le langage offrait 
deux aspects compl6mentaires: Fun structural, I'autre statistique; la langue appartient au 
domaine d'un temps r6versible, et la parole, A celui d'un temps irr6versible. (1958,230) 
It appears that Uvi-Strauss is bringing together two conceptually quite different 
distinctions: firstly, the distinction between langue andparole (language system and 
speech); and secondly, his distinction between 'structural' and 'statistical' aspects of 
language appears to refer to Saussure's distinction between the associative and the 
syntagmatic relations, combined with Saussure's principle of the temporally linear 
character of the linguistic signal (Saussure, 1995,69). What is problematic is that he 
puts the syntagmatic on the side of langue and associative on the side of parole. This 
would not make sense, firstly, because both axes are studied by Saussure as belonging 
to the study of langue, and secondly, it is the syntagmatic relations which are obvious in 
speech, while the associative are there as background possibilities which are not 
immediately visible. It could well be that Uvi-Strauss simply means that langue is 
governed by structural laws, while parole, being an individual use of the language, can 
only be studied by statistical means (for example, how many times certain combinations 
are used). 
What Uvi-Strauss makes of this initial mix-up, however, is most interesting. As 
his analysis of the Oedipus myth is probably the most famous part of his work, I shall 
not go into it in any great detail, but just summarise the method briefly: Uvi-Strauss 
proposes that for a structural study of myth we need to take into account all known 
versions of it, 9 and identify the key events recounted in each version, writing them down 
in the shortest possible sentences. He stresses that the analysis of myth, although linked 
with linguistic methods, cannot apply itself to linguistic units shorter than a sentence, 
but then betrays the principle of his own method when he takes into consideration the 
meaning of Labdakos's, Laios's and Oedipus's names (1958,233,236). Then we need 
to identify the similarities between these events in different versions and in different 
parts of the story, regardless of the order in which they appear; i. e., we establish clusters 
of meaningful relations (1958,233-34). The result can be graphically presented as 
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columns of clusters of relations, which we then interpret against each other and try to 
identify the binary oppositions at work: in the case of the Oedipus myth, Uvi-Strauss 
identifies the opposition between the negation and the assertion of human autochthony 
(1958,237-39). He asserts that the meaning of a myth cannot be understood by taking a 
single version of the story and following ('diachronically') the events told in it; the 
meaning of myth is found in the repetitions which point to its deeper structure; it is to 
alert us to this deeper structure that myths and fairy tales contain so many repetitions 
(195 8,254). Leach gives a very plausible explanation for this: 
Myth is not just a fairy tale, it contains a message. [ ... ] The novices of the society who 
hear the myths for the first time are being indoctrinated by the bearers of tradition -a 
tradition, which in theory at any rate, has been handed down from long dead ancestors. 
Let us then think of the Ancestors (A) as 'senders' and the present generation (B) as 
dreceivers'. 
Now let us imagine the situation of an individual A who is trying to get a message to a 
friend B who is almost out of earshot and let us suppose that communication is further 
hampered by various kinds of interference - noise from wind, passing cars and so on. 
What will A do? If he is sensible he will not be satisfied by shouting his message just 
once, he will shout it several times, and give a different wording to the message each 
time, supplementing his words with visual signals. At the receiving end B may very 
likely get the meaning of each of the individual messages slightly wrong, but when he 
puts them together the redundancies and the mutual consistencies and inconsistencies 
will make it quite clear what is 'really' being said. (Leach, 1982,59) 
Thus, according to Uvi-Strauss (1958,240), we can ignore the inconsistencies between 
different versions, and all additional details which appear in a limited number of 
versions. Strictly speaking, this is not so much the distinction between the synchronic 
and the diachronic, as Uvi-Strauss himself maintains, but a distinction between the 
syntagmatic and the associative axis, or in slightly later terminology, between the 
syntagmatic and the paradigmatic. Uvi-Strauss's clusters of relations are associative 
(paradigmatic), as opposed to Propp's syntagmatic functions (Dundes, 1968, xii). 
Leach stresses that Uvi-Strauss's interest in geology is revelatory with regard to 
his interest in the underlying structures of myth and human thought (and also revealing 
9 Controversially, he claims that, in the case of the Oedipus myth, even such very recent versions as 
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where his attitude to history is concerned). He quotes Uvi-Strauss's statement from 
Tristes tropiques: 
Sometimes ... on one side and the other of a hidden crevice we find two green plants of 
different species. Each has chosen the soil which suits it: and we realise that within the 
rock are two ammonites, one of which has involutions less complex than the other's. 
We glimpse that is to say a difference of many thousands of years; time and space 
suddenly commingle; the living diversity of that moment juxtaposes one age and the 
other and perpetuates them. (Leach, 1982,17) 
Leach points out that it is 'not really the green plants that arouse Uvi-Strauss's 
interest', and that 'his deeper concern is with what is underneath - something altogether 
more abstract' (Ibid. ). And although this kind of interest and the resultant procedure 
may be perfectly valid in the study of myth from an anthropological point of view, what 
happens if we translate the notion of deep structures and irrelevance of surface details 
into the study of literature (and even myth and folktale as literary texts)? Greimas may 
give us some indication of this. 
West: Synchronic Structures: Greimas' actantial models 
Starting from the assumption that what matters most in the study of narrative is the plot 
and the deep structure which supports it, Greimas used Propp's fairy tale and Etienne 
Souriau's drama models as a base for his actantial model (Greimas, 1966). It was meant 
to create a balance between the over- and under-formalisation that Greimas criticises 
both Propp and Souriau (1950) for. 10 To define a genre solely through the number of 
actants (Greimas's term for Propp's 'spheres of action'), abstracting all the content, 
argues Greimas, is to create an overly formal model. But to merely list different actants 
without defining their possible interrelations is to set the formalisation too low 
(Greimas, 1966,176). Greimas's solution is to get rid of Propp's 'false hero' and to 
rename Propp's and Souriau's loosely equivalent 'actants': 
Freud's one should be included (1958,240). 
10 Scholes also discusses the similarities between Propp and Souriau. 
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Propp Souriau Greimas 
hero Lion suJet 
sought-for person Soleil objet 
villain Mars opposant 
helper Lune adjuvant 
dispatcher/donor Balance destinateur 
Terre destinataire 
The big methodological difference between Greimas and Propp is that, whereas 
Propp's model is intended to describe 'spheres of action' in Russian fairy tales (and 
Souriau's is to provide a matrix for all dramatic situations possible), Greimas's model 
claims for itself to be able to deal with anything from a simple love story to 
philosophical paradigms. So, in a love story, 'He' is the 'sujet' and the 'destinataire', 
and she is the 'objet' and the 'destinateur' (1966,177), while in Marxism, 'sujet' is 
Man, 'objet' is the classless society, 'destinateur' is History, 'destinataire' is Humanity, 
sopposant' is the bourgeois class and 'adjuvant' is the working class (1966,181). And 
although Greimas, like Propp, stresses that the actants can find their incarnation in a 
great number of different 'acteurs', and that a single 'acteur' can act as different 
tactants' (1966,183-85), the very fact that his model can be applied to pretty much 
anything prevents him from discussing 'acteurs' in any significant detail. 
Propp's model is different: it is based on the concrete material of the Russian 
fairy tale and it is designed to explain the specific features of that particular material, 
and not to provide a model for all types of narrative discourse. Propp stresses several 
times that dual nature of the Russian fairy tale, which gives it great diversity and 
picturesqueness on the one hand, and obvious repetitiveness of functions on the other, 
which is precisely what made it possible for him to identify the thirty-one functions'of 
the Russian fairy tale. So when Culler says that 'a set of thirty-one functions cannot but 
seem an arbitrary array, and it is structurally much more satisfying to the analyst if he 
can make them transformations of three or four basic elements' (Culler, 1975,213), it is 
difficult not to respond to this like Mr Bingley when his sister suggested that it would 
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be 'much more rational if, at a ball, 'conversation instead of dancing were made the 
order of the day': 'Much more rational, my dear Caroline, I dare say, but it would not be 
near so much like a ball'. " It may be 'structurally more satisfying', but would not 
describe the structure of the Russian fairy tale nearly so well. Propp himself made a 
similar argument in his response to Uvi-Strauss's critique of his work by saying that 
his conclusions did 'not have that universal character which my distinguished critic 
would like to attribute to them. My method is comprehensive, but the conclusions are 
valid only for that well-determined type of folklore for which they are devised, namely, 
the fairy tale' (Propp, 1996,225). 
In some ways, Greimas is a typical example of what a structuralist working in 
the French context thought his work should be about. He defined 'structure' as 'the 
presence of two terms and the relation between them' (Greimas, 1966,19), and the 
principle of binary oppositions, along with the principle of looking at synchronic 
relations on the level of deep structures, formed the foundation of his work. 
West: Structure and History 
At the end of the 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s, more and more French 
philosophers, anthropologists, students of literature and psychoanalysts started reading 
Saussure and studying structural linguistics, which was already well developed. As 
Uvi-Strauss pointed out, linguistics appealed as it seemed more scientific and more 
advanced than other human sciences (for example, according to Dosse (1998,1,63), 
Leo Spitzer in 1960 criticised French literary scholars for not moving beyond 'the 
studies of genesis, of traditional literary history') and more and more social scientists 
started applying its principles to their own fields of interest. Thus Saussurean 
terminology, taken at face value, became more and more influential, preparing the 
ground for structuralism's triumph in the 1960s. 
By that time, the basic principles were already developed. Saussure's sharp 
distinctions between synchronic and diachronic analysis and between langue and 
parole, as well as the principle of binary oppositions, were well in place. Frangois 
Dosse in his History of Structuralism points out over and over again that French 
structuralists, following Saussure's distinction between synchronic and diachronic 
11 Jane Austen, Pride and Prejudice, ch. 11. 
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analysis, completely dismissed diachronic analysis, and 'history' became a word to be 
avoided. Terry Eagleton in his Literary Theory considers structuralism to be 
... hair-raisingly unhistorical: the laws of the mind it claimed to isolate - parallelisms, 
oppositions, inversions and the rest - moved at a level of generality quite remote from 
the concrete differences of human history. (Eagleton, 1996b, 95) 
This is not quite true, though. After all, Barthes in his Mythologies set out to prove the 
historical background of bourgeois myths, and Lucien Goldmann's 'genetic 
structuralism' rests on the proposition that 'all human behaviour has a meaning; that to 
understand this meaning one must refer to a larger context - to the biography of the 
individual in one case or to history in the other - which goes beyond the level of the 
manifest' (Goldmann, 1970,103). Goldmann further asserted that 'explanation is the 
assertion of the structure that we have described and understood into a larger structure 
in which it has its function and where I can understand the nature of its unity' (1970, 
104). Still, one could argue, if one was so inclined, that Barthes's book is still too 
'contaminated' by Brecht and Marx to be truly structuralist in the classical sense, and 
that Goldmann's position is an aberration. This latter view could be supported by Jean 
Hyppolite's intervention after Goldmann's paper from which I quoted above: 
When I take structure in the algebraic sense of the term, there I know what it means: 
there are commutative and distributive properties which belong to certain wholes; these 
are structures. [ ... ] The search for the totality in a structure is fundamental, but you 
abuse the word structure through a functionalism which is different from what we call 
analysis of structures. (Goldmann, 1970,111) 
This rather alarming 'we' brings us to another question: how has the structure been 
defined? 
West: Definition of structure: Piaget and Benveniste 
Raymond Boudon started his book The Uses ofStructuralism by saying that 'the variety 
of connotations characterising the term when employed by different authors raises 
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doubts as to the existence of a single meaning which could be attributed to it, or of a 
single method [ ... ] which could be termed structuralist' (Boudon, 1971,1). 
And yet, it would be difficult to imagine that any of the French structuralists 
would find fault with Jean Piaget's definition of structure: 
En premi&e approximation, une structure est un syst6me de transformations, qui 
comporte des lois en tant que syst6me (par opposition aux propri6t6s des 616ments) et 
qui se conserve ou s'enrichit par le jeu m8me de ses transformations, sans que celles-ci 
aboutissent en dehors de ses fronti6res ou fasse appel A des 616ments ext6rieurs. En un 
mot, une structure comprend ainsi les trois caract&res de totalit6, de transformations et 
d'autor6glage. (Piaget, 1972,6-7) 
It needs to be noted that what Piaget means by 'transformation' in his definition of 
structure is simply that elements coming together into a system change in accordance 
with its laws, not that structure itself changes. Combined with this is an ideal of intrinsic 
intelligibility based on the postulate that structures are self-sufficient (Piaget, 1972,7- 
8). 
We can add to this Benveniste's definition of linguistic structure, with its this 
principle of hierarchy: 
(1) it is a global unit embracing various parts; (2) these parts are in a formal 
arrangement that obeys certain constant principles; (3) that which gives the character of 
a structure to the form is that the constituent parts serve a function; (4) finally, these 
constitutive parts are units on a certain level, in such a way that each unit of a specific 
level becomes a subunit of the level above. (Benveniste, 1971,20-1) 
Let us also look at the definition quoted by Boudon (1971,2): 
A structure is a sum of elements related to one another, such that any modification in 
one element or in one relationship entails a modification in other elements or 
relationships. 
Boudon suggests (1971,5) that most such concepts of structure are 'crude and banal', 
and rather unhelpfully argues that 'the concept of structure is a collection of 
homonyms'. However, most of his proposed definitions support the idea that French 
22 
structuralism developed a concept of structure that excluded history, as well as 
extraneous links and elements. 
With this in view, it would be difficult not to sympatbise with Eagleton when be says 
that: 
Having characterised the underlying rule-systems of a literary text, all the structuralist 
could do was sit back and wonder what to do next. There was no question of relating the 
work to the realities of which it treated, or the conditions which produced it, or to the 
actual readers who studied it, since the founding gesture of structuralism has been to 
bracket off such realities. (Eagleton, 1996b, 95) 
Let us first provide further evidence for this claim before we try to refute it. 
West: Genette's Definition of Structuralism 
This highly static and abstract concept of structure undoubtedly had its limitations, and 
G6rard Genette in his essay 'Structuralisme et critique litt6raire' (1966,155) defined 
them quite clearly. According to Genette, structures are not directly encountered objects 
(Objets de rencontre); they are 'des syst6mes de relations latents, congus plut6t que 
pergus, que Vanalyse construit A mesure qu'elle les d6gage, et qu'elle risque parfois 
d'inventer en croyant les d6couvrir'. They are not so much deeply buried in the 
textuality of a literary work, but stand behind it as a blueprint for its most abstract 
interrelations. As such, far removed from the ordinary perception of an artistic work, the 
structure of a text bears no direct influence on how this text will be perceived and 
interpreted by an 'average' reader, or, indeed, by a literary critic. Following Georges 
Poulet and Paul Ricoeur, Genette makes a difference between hermeneutics, as an 
intersubjective criticism which 'relives' the ideas and emotions of a literary work, and 
structural analysis as a 'distant, 'objective' analysis 'penetrating' into the flesh of a text 
in order to reach its 'bone-structure'. Structural analysis exerts 'une sorte de r6duction 
inteme, traversant la substance de I'ceuvre pour atteindre son ossature: regard non pas 
certes de surface, mais d'une p6n6tration en quelque sorte radioscopique, et d'autant 
plus exterieur qu'il est plus p6n6trant' (1966,158). 
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In this distinction, hermeneutics is decidedly a more 'human and humane' 
analytical approach in which 'la pens6e critique devient la pens6e critiqu6e, ofl elle 
r6ussit a re-sentir, A repenser, a re-imaginer celle-ci de l'int6rieur' (Ibid. ). Compared 
with this description of a perfect intellectual love affair (a love affair that we have all 
experienced at least once in our lives as readers) structuralism seems to resemble 
praising a beautiful human being for the grace of their skeleton. Positioning and 
defining the two approaches thus, Genette can only conclude: 
... partout oA 
la reprise herm6neutique du sens est possible et souhaitable, dans I'accord 
intuitif de deux consciences, I'analyse structurale serait (au moins partiellement) 
ill6gitime et non-pertinente. On pourrait alors imaginer une sorte de partage du champ 
litt6raire en deux domaines; celui de la litt6rature 'vivante', c'est-A-dire susceptible 
d'8tre v6cue par la conscience critique, et qu'il faudrait r6server A la critique 
herm6neutique [ ... 
]; et celui d'une litt6rature non pas 'morte', mais en quelque sort 
lointaine et difficile A d6chiffrer, dont le sens perdu ne serait perceptible qu'aux 
op6rations de l'intelligence structurale, comme celui des cultures 'tot6miques', domaine 
exclusif des ethnologues. (1966,159) 
These literatures 'which are not exactly 'dead', ' and which, according to Genette in this 
essay, would from the hermeneutic point of view constitute structuralism's legitimate 
field of study, would be literatures distant in time and place, children's and popular 
literature, everything which can be treated 'like anthropological material' and studied 
'in great bulk' (1966,159-60). 
In his discussion of this paper, Scholes (1974,7-12) claims that Genette defends 
structuralism from the role thrust upon it by the hermeneutics of Ricoeur and Poulet, 
and says that it is not so much that structuralism can only study distant literatures, but 
that its method distances its object of study. In his desire to see Genette defend 
structuralism, Scholes fails to acknowledge that, although the distinction between 
hermeneutics and structuralism is not as strong as it would look from the hermeneutic 
point of view, it nevertheless retains its basic premise: that structuralism treats its object 
like a kind of an x-ray machine. Structuralism's activity in relation to a literary text still 
seems, in words of Eagleton, 'rather like killing a person in order to examine more 
conveniently the circulation of the blood' (Eagleton, 1996b, 95). 
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For Genette, structuralism as an approach can help us only where an anatomist's 
help would be needed to reconstruct the living beauty of a human body out of a skeleton 
which has been found at an ancient archaeological site. It is not needed where that 
beauty can be seen in its living and breathing glory; and even when we might need an 
anatomist's expertise to tell us about the bone structures of living organisms, the voice 
of an anatomist can never coincide with the voice of a lover: 
A propos d'une m8me ceuvre, la critique herm6neutique parlerait le langage de la 
reprise du sens et de la recr6ation int6rieure, et la critique structurale celui de la parole 
distante et de la reconstruction intelligible. Elles d6gageraient ainsi des significations 
compl6mentaires, et leur dialogue Wen serait que plus f6cond, A cette r6serve qu, 'on ne 
pourrait jamais parler ces deux langages A la fois. (Genette, 1966,16 1) 
In his own defence of structuralism, Scholes (1974,9) adds that Genette does not 
mention 'that the 'subjectivity' of hermeneutic criticism can never be entirely 
subjective. The critic who 'recovers' the meaning of any given work always does so by 
establishing a relationship between the work and some system of ideas outside it'. 
Scholes adopts Piaget's definition of the structure or system as 'a complete, self- 
regulating entity that adapts to new conditions by transforming its features while 
retaining its systematic structure' (1974,10), but, then, discussing formalist tendencies 
in structuralism, he stresses that 
The [formalist] fallacy does not lie in this necessary isolation of certain aspects of the 
material being studied, it lies in the refusal to acknowledge that these are not the only 
aspects, or in the insistence that these aspects function in an entirely closed system 
without influence from the world beyond literature. Structuralism, properly understood, 
far from being cut off from the world in a formal prison, approaches it directly at 
several different levels of investigation. (Scholes, 1974,11) 
His assessment goes directly against Eagleton's critique of structuralism as a discipline 
which springs from 'the ironic act of shutting out the material world in order the better 
to illuminate our consciousness of it' (Eagleton, 1996b, 95). Although Eagleton is 
aware, as much as Scholes, of Jakobson's, Bakhtin's and later Formalists' work (and 
even of Lotman's, whom he presents in a very favourable light) his account and his 
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vision of what structuralism represents is conditioned not by his knowledge of its full 
history, but by the general belief that structuralism is (or was) what the French thought 
it was and how they practised it. 
For, looking at the way French structuralism developed, and with Greimas as its 
most radical practitioner in view, it would probably be fair to say that it did what 
Genette thought it should do; at the same time, it needs to be stressed that the 
structuralism of Genette himself, particularly in his later work, is quite different from 
the structuralism practised by Greimas. 
West: Genette's Structuralist Practice 
Genette's 1972 'Discours du r6cit', which was published as a part of Figures III, 
according to Jonathan Culler, filled the 'need for a systematic theory of narrative', being 
'the most thorough attempt we have to identify, name, and illustrate the basic 
constituents and techniques of narrative' (Culler, 1980,7). In this book Genette focused 
on the work of Proust with the intention to elucidate those basic constituents and 
techniques; II years later he commented that the 'duality of object' (i. e. the focus both 
on Proust and on the general study of narrative at the same time) troubled him more 
later than at the time of writing "Discours du r6cit', for it was responsible for some 
'distortions', like the excessive attention to matters of time, or relative neglect of 
phenomena of mood whose role in the Recherche is minor (Genette, 1983,9-10). 
Genette also remarked that at the time of writing 'Discours du r6cit' he had 'cette 
imp(r)udente pr6tention' to emulate the sovereign manner in which Erich Auerbach, 
deprived of a library, wrote Mimesis one day (1983,9). Authorial scruples aside, Culler 
rightly notes that 'the fact that ['Discours du r6cit'] uses Proust so voraciously gives it 
great theoretical power, for it is forced to take account of all the complexities of 
Proustian narrative' (Culler, 1980,9) although it is probably true that the question of 
time takes over a larger proportion of the book than it would be normal for a book 
dealing with a purely general discussion of the study of narrative. 
Genette himself addresses the question of the emphasis which should be given to 
the study of the particular in addressing a general problem: 
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Cette paradoxe est celui de toute po6tique, sans doute aussi de toute aetivit6 de 
connaissance, toujours ecarte18e entre ces deux lieux communs incontoumables, qu'il 
West d'objets que singuliers, et de science que du g8n4ral ; toujours cependant 
riconfortee, et comme aimant8e, par cette autre verit6 un peu moins r6pandue, que le 
g6neral est au cccur du singulier, et donc - contrairement au pr6jug6 commun - le 
connaissable au cccur du myst8re. (Genette, 1972,68-9) 
With the principle that, although the specificity of Proustian narrative on the whole is 
irreducible, it is not undecomposable Genette (1972,68) enters into a detailed analysis 
of Proust's work with the ambition to show how narrative in general functions. Based 
on the assumption that any narrative is a linguistic undertaking to tell of one or several 
events, which can thus be seen as the expansion of a verb, Genette (1972,75) defines 
his basic classes of determination according to categories borrowed from the grammar 
of verbs. 
Thus the basic zones of interest are the narrative tense, mood and voice, which 
replaces the term 'person' because its has fewer 'psychological connotations' (Genette, 
1972,76). 
The problem of tense deals with the order, duration and frequency of the 
narrated events; whether the events are told in their chronological order, how much 
narrative time is devoted to them and the relationship between repeated events and their 
narration or repeated narration and the narrated event. 
Mood is defined with the definition of verbal mood in mind: 'nom donn& aux 
diffirentes formes du verbe employ6es pour affirmer plus ou moins la chose dont il 
s'agit, et pour exprimer... les diff6rentes points de vue auxquels on consid6re 
1'existence ou Faction' (Genette, 1972,183) and its study is divided into the study of 
'distance' and 'perspective'. 'Distance' deals with the amount of 'narrative information' 
the reader is given about the narrated events and the world to which they belong, as well 
the manner in which characters' speech is presented (whether it is 'narrativis&, ou 
raconW, 'transpos&' in indirect style, or straight-forwardly mimetic, reported speech) 
(Genette, 1972,191-93). 'Perspective' deals with narrative 'focalisation', the term 
Genette used in order to replace the older notion of the point of view with its 
accompanying question 'who seesT. As he explains in Narrative Discourse Revisited, 
the notion of the point of view presupposes only visual perception, while he wanted to 
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create a term which would cover perception in general, 12 and also one which would not 
be tied to the notion of a person (be it author or character) in which the 'point of view' 
is located (the notion presupposed in the question 'who sees? ') (Genette, 1983,43). On 
the basis of the types of focalisation, he divides narratives into 'nonfocalized' (or 
narratives with 'zero focalisation', which are closest to the old idea of the narrative with 
an omniscient narrator), narratives with 'internal facalisation' or focalisation through a 
character or characters, and narratives with 'external focalisation', in which we are 
presented with characters whose thoughts and feelings we are never allowed to know, 
being able only to observe their behaviour (Genette, 1972,206-7). 
Narrative voice is defined as the 'narrating instance', the position from which 
narration is conducted. Temporally, it can be 'ult6rieure' (the classical past-tense 
narrative), 'ant6rieure' (predictive, future-tense narration), 'simultan6e' ('narrative in 
the present contemporaneous with the action') and 'intercal6e' (between the moments of 
the action) (Genette, 1972,229). The problem of voice also addresses the problem of the 
'level' of narration; according to Genette, any event recounted is at a diegetic level 
immediately higher than the level at which the narrating act producing that narrative is 
placed (Genette, 1972,238). In the case of a narrative which presents a story within a 
story, the first narrative is the embedding one, not the embedded, and Genette terms the 
level of narration of the first narrative 'extradiegetic', the level of the events presented 
in it is 'diegetic' or 'intradiegetic', while the events of the diegetic narrative are 
'metadiegetic' (Genette, 1972,238; 1983,558). As for the 'person' of narration, 
Genette asserts that the question is not about whether a narrative is told in the 'first 
person' or in the 'third person', but about whether it is told by a character in the story 
(homodiegetic narrator) or by a narrator outside of it (heterodiegetic narrator) (Genette, 
1972,251-52). 
Even this brief survey of Genette's theory of narrative should suffice to show 
that his terminological apparatus is far from concentrating just on the 'deep structure' or 
'skeleton' of the text, and that it is perfectly capable of dealing with its subtleties; the 
method is designed to elucidate the structure of the narrative on all of its levels. The 
decision to use an analysis of Proust as the vehicle for the theory not only adds a certain 
gravitas to the theory itself, but also adds a voice of the literature lover to the whole 
12 1 think that Genette may be too pedantic here; 'point of view' is more often than not used as a general 
term, not necessarily connected with vision alone. For a very productive use of the 'point of view' as a 
structuring force in art, see Uspensky, 1973. 
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proceedings; while reading Narrative Discourse it is difficult not to realize that Genette 
really likes Proust and that he loves literature in general. And yet, many of the main 
elements of French structuralism are still to be found even here. 
The first is, obviously, the use of the linguistic terminology which underlies the 
theory (i. e., the use of the analogy with verbal tense, mood and person); although, it 
could be argued that linguistic terrýinology is here used as a constructive analogy rather 
than as guiding light which will show us the way, and the analysis which follows is so 
refined and well developed that it is difficult to doubt that, had Genette not had the 
analogy with the grammar of verbs in mind, he would have come up with something 
similar himself. 
Secondly, the whole underlying logic of the analysis is that the sequence of 
events is the most important thing about a narrative. Connected with this, the treatment 
of characters in Narrative Discourse is minimal, practically non-existent, and Genette 
later explained why this was so, by saying that characters are only carriers of the action, 
and that the study of characterisation is the greatest concession narratology in its strict 
sense can make to the study of character. Moreover, Genette stressed that 
characterisation is only one 'effect' among others, and that we would be making too 
much of a concession if we granted it the privilege of shaping the analysis of narrative 
discourse (Genette, 1983,93-4). This is clearly the legacy of Propp misread as the 
theorist of all narrative; what may be true of a fairy tale (or of an epic) is not necessarily 
true of a novel by Dostoevsky, or indeed of any other novel. Can we really say that the 
plot of, say, Madame Bovary is the most important element of the novel; could it not be 
the character of Emma herselP 
Thirdly, Genette refuses to talk about mimesis or representation; he argues that 
the narrative of events can only ever be an illusion of mimesis, because all narration is a 
fact of language, and language signifies without imitating (1983,186). Genette stresses 
this point even more in Nouveau discours du ricit, where he explains that he used the 
term 'information' so as not to use representation, which he saw as a hypocritical, 
'bastard' compromise between information and imitation. And he continues: 
Or, pour de raisons mille fois expos6es (et pas seulement par moi), je ne crois pas qu'il 
existe d'imitation dans le r6cit, parce que le r6cit, comme tout ou presque en litt6rature, 
est un acte de langage, et qu'il ne peut donc y avoir davantage d'imitation dans le r6cit 
en particulier qu'il n'y en a dans le langage en g6n6ral. Un r6cit, comme tout acte 
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verbal, ne peut quinformer, c'est-A-dire transmettre des significations. (Genette, 1983, 
29) 
But is it true that language does not represent the world in some fashion, obviously not 
by physically imitating it, but by recreating at least some of its structural aspects? 
Benveniste, for example, is categorical that it does: 
Language re-produces reality. This is to be understood in the most literal way: reality is 
produced anew by means of language. The speaker recreates the event and his 
experience of the event by his discourse. The hearer grasps the discourse first, and 
through this discourse, the event which is being reproduced. (Benveniste, 1971,22) 
Genette's anti-mimetic stance also presupposes the refusal to talk about any relationship 
with reality that the literary text may have: what is the vision of the world expressed in 
it? How true is it to our experience of the world? The literary text so intricately analysed 
in Narrative Discourse is closed up in its own textuality, or at least in its own state of 
being an act of language. No questions reaching outside of that immanent view of the 
literary text can be posed, and so the questions of literary history or relationship 
between literature and other cultural and historical phenomena remain unanswered 
because they had not even been posed. 
So with these three main points in mind, let us now go back to the year 1928, 
and see how things can be done differently. 
East: How to avoid poststructuralist revolt 
If one were to search for the beginning of the structuralist approach in literary studies, 
one could do worse than read lurii Tynianov's and Roman Jakobson's short 1928 article 
'Problems in the Study of Literature and Language'. 13 This piece is an extremely 
important and interesting historical document, as well as an infinitely sad reminder of a 
scholarly programme that in the years that followed was not allowed to be developed to 
13 One could also look at the Theses of the Prague Circle, which were written around that same time. The 
basic ideas in Jakobson's and Tynianov's article arc similar to the Theses. 
(On this, see Broekman, 1974,50-64). 
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its full potential by Russian Formalists themselves, but which was brought to its fruition 
by the Prague Linguistic Circle. A veritable swan song of mature Formalism which was 
already starting to shape itself as a very interesting version of literary structuralism, 
Tynianov's and Jakobson's article was published in the same year when the first 
widespread Stalinist purges began. Jakobson had already been living in Prague for 
several years when the article was written, and he was thus able to pursue further the 
ideas outlined in the article in the company of his fellow Prague Structuralists. 
Tynianov, on the other hand, in order to avoid clashes of opinion with the increasingly 
powerful (and dangerous) Soviet Marxist critics, chose the path that most Formalists 
decided to choose in order to stay out of harm's way: he abandoned the study of literary 
theory and dedicated himself to specialist studies and to writing of monographs. In 
Russia itself, the problematic of Tynianov's and Jakobson's article would have to wait 
for the rise of Soviet Serniotics (with Iurii Lotman as its most talented representative) in 
the 1960s to get its second hearing and a new lease of life. 
'Problems in the Study of Literature and Language' is a very dense short text, 
organised into eight main points. Although the title suggests an overview of a wide 
range of topics connected with the study of literature and language, the article itself 
focuses on two main themes: the problems of literary history and the differentiation 
between linguistics and the study of literature as seen through Saussure's linguistic 
project. 
The first point of the article is the obligatory Formalist call to systematic 
scientificity, a rejection of 'naYve psychologism and the other methodological hand-me- 
downs' disguised in the new, Formalist, terminology, as well as of 'academic 
eclecticism, scholastic 'formalism' - which replaces analysis by terminology and the 
classification of phenomena' (Tynianov and Jakobson, 1971,79). Obviously, the 
relatively young Formalism had already encountered the perils of cheap terminological 
mimicry of its less talented followers. 14 
The next two points relate the history of literature with other historical series and 
demand that the correlation between these different historical series be investigated by 
elucidating the 'complex of specific structural laws' that characterises each of these 
14 Boris Eikhenbaum also remarked on this in his article 'The Theory of the Formal Method': 'We are 
hedged round with eclectics and epigones who have turned the Formal method into some sort of rigid 
system, a 'Formalism' that stands them in good stead for manufacturing terms, schemes and 
classifications' (Eikhenbaum, 197 1 b, 3). 
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series. In order to do that, every element, literary or extraliterary, which is introduced 
into the investigation, must be considered 'from a functional point of view'. 
Point four introduces the Saussurean distinction between synchronic and 
diachronic axis of investigation, and suggests that, since 'this fruitful hypothesis' has 
shown that language has a systemic character at every point of its existence, the same 
might prove to be true of diachronic series as well, the study of which must also begin. 
It is worth noting that Russian Formalists, and Tynianov in particular, had by that point 
already been working on the idea of a systemic nature of literary evolution, and of the 
way the very concept and corpus of literature changes through history and through its 
relation with other historical series. 15 What is significant for us here is the way that idea 
is expressed: by their reference to Saussure and his terminology, as well as by their 
demand for the elucidation of structural laws, Jakobson and Tynianov, from our post- 
structuralist perspective, definitively enter into the Structuralist mode of thinking. 
Nevertheless, at this very dawn of Structuralist thought what later became a defining 
method of French Structuralism was already rejected. Saussure's 'fruitful -, yorking 
hypothesis' in the study of language, namely the sharp opposition between diachronic 
and synchronic series, as well as the decision that the latter be viewed as the only 
acceptable field of study (the very method which French Structuralism later adopted as 
its own dogma), is viewed not as a foundation stone but as a starting point. And as such, 
it is open to theoretical revision. According to Jakobson and Tynianov: 
The history of a system is in turn a system. Pure synchronism now proves to be an 
illusion: every synchronic system has its past and its future as inseparable structural 
elements of the system: (a) archaism as a fact of style; the linguistic and literary 
background recognised as the rejected old fashioned style; (b) the tendency in language 
and literature recognised as innovation in the system. (Tynianov and Jakobson, 1971, 
79-80) 
However, it is not just the presence of archaisms or innovation in an individual work 
that cut across the division between synchronic and diachronic series, but (as point five 
of the article tells us) literary periods also contain in themselves not just their own 
present but also their own past and intended future. The distinction Jakobson and 
15 Eikhenbaum's article is also quite informative here; see also Tynianov, 1971b, as well as Eikhenbaum, 
197 1 a. 
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Tynianov make is not one of diachronic and synchronic series any more, but one of a 
synchronic literary system and 'a naively envisaged concept of a chronological epoch'. 
While the later consists of the works written in that chronological epoch, the former 
'embraces not only works of art which are close to each other in time but also which are 
drawn into the orbit of the system from foreign literatures or previous epochs' (1971, 
80). Thus, for example, while Classicism draws into its orbit classical Greek and Latin 
literature, Romanticism rejects these and embraces medieval and folk artistic tradition. 
However, as the 'rejected' types of literature do not just simply disappear from the 
general cultural corpus in a certain epoch, 'an indifferent cataloguing of coexisting 
phenomena is not sufficient; what is important is their hierarchical significance for the 
given epoch' (Ibid. ). 
Point six deals with another crucial distinction of Saussure's linguistics: that of 
langue and parole. While admitting that this distinction has been 'exceedingly fruitful' 
for linguistics, they insist that the relationship between 'the existing norm and 
individual utterances' (Ibid. ) must be reworked independently for the purposes of 
literary study. As Jakobson and Tynianov put it, in literature 'the individual utterance 
cannot be considered without reference to the existing complex of norms'. What is 
implied in this assertion is that, while linguistics defines itself through its study of 
langue, literary studies are defined by their interest in literary texts, in literary parole, 
which, however, cannot be understood properly without the knowledge of the 'existing 
complex of norms' in and through which they are constructed. It is clear from this that 
for Jakobson and Tynianov the need for the study of literary langue comes not from the 
desire to understand literature's system of signification for its own sake (as it does in 
French structuralism), but from the desire to comprehend individual utterances through 
the language in which they were written. The reason why they insist on the importance 
of the study of the complex of literary norms is that they believe that any study of a 
literary work which disregarded this complex would 'inescapably deform the system of 
artistic values under consideration, thus losing the possibility of establishing its 
immanent laws' (Ibid. ). 
As we can see, what matters to Jakobson and Tynianov is the understanding of 
concrete literary phenomena (be it individual texts or synchronic literary systems), not 
abstract systems of literary signification, divorced from their material and literary- 
historical reality. Furthermore, the final point of their article introduces what is 
effectively a final and resolute rejection of the early Formalist hypothesis, advanced by 
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Shklovskii, that a science of literature can develop successfully as a discipline only if it 
views literature as an autonomous, self-regulated and self-sufficient phenomenon. 16 
While point seven of the article suggests that 'an analysis of the structural laws of 
language and literature and their evolution' will 'inevitably' lead to 'the establishment 
of a limited series of actually existing structural types (types of structural evolution)' 
(Tynianov and Jakobson, 1971,80), point eight insists on stepping beyond immanent 
analysis. As Jakobson and Tynianov put it, 'a disclosure of the immanent laws of the 
history of literature (language) allows us to determine the character of each specific 
change in literary (linguistic) systems' (Ibid. ). It is probably quite significant that the 
linguistic part of their investigation is at this point left in parentheses, almost as an 
afterthought, as what they say next possibly applies much more to literary than to 
linguistic studies; and what they say is that immanent laws are certainly not all we need 
to know in other to understand the way literature functions and changes: 
These [immanent] laws do not allow us to explain the tempo of evolution or the chosen 
path of evolution when several, theoretically possible, evolutionary paths are given. 
This is owing to the fact that the immanent laws of literary (linguistic) evolution form 
an indeterminate equation; although they admit only a limited number of possible 
solutions, they do not necessarily specify a unique solution. The question of a specific 
choice of path, or at least of the dominant, can be solved only by means of an analysis 
of the correlation between the literary series and other historical series. This correlation 
(a system of systems) has its own structural laws, which must be submitted to 
investigation. It would be methodologically fatal to consider the correlation of systems 
without taking into account the immanent laws of each system. (Tynianov and 
Jakobson, 1971,80-1) 
In the context of the evolution of Russian Formalist ideas about literature, however, this 
methodological reversal from Shklovskii's early ideas comes as no surprise. Boris 
Eikhenbaum in his essay 'The Theory of the Formal Method' traced the path that 
Formalism took between Shklovskii's early pronouncements about the absolute 
16 Victor Erlich quotes Shklovskii say that 'art was always free of life and its colour never reflected the 
colour of the flag which waved over the fortress of the city' (Erlich, 1981,77). 
See also Hawkes, 1977,60-62. 
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autonomy of literary studies from other disciplines, 17 to mature Formalism's interest in 
literary history and realisation that what makes a text literary are not some intrinsic, 
independently recognisable characteristics, but differential ones, set against the 
characteristics of the texts of other cultural - historical series. What we also witness here 
is Jakobson's critique of an essay written by a slightly younger Jakobson, who said that 
literary study should be 'the investigation of the specific properties of literary material' 
(Eikhenbaum, 197 1 b, 7), studying 'not literature, but 'literariness', that is, what makes a 
given work a literary work'. In order to understand what literature is, one also has to 
understand what it is not; an immanent analysis alone will not do. 18 And a purely 
synchronic one will not do either; a suggestion, as Eagleton puts it mildly, which not all 
later structuralists took up (Eagleton, 97). At least in France; elsewhere was a different 
story. 
East: Mukar"ovsky's Definition of Structure 
It is only fair that Muka*rovsky should be at least briefly mentioned at this point, and I 
think that his concept of structure, based on this dynamic model of the literary system 
and its historical development, provides a clear contrast to definitions of structuralism 
quoted earlier. 
In his lecture entitled 'On Structuralism', which was given in Paris in 1946, 
V Mu arovsky defined structure firstly in the usual manner, as a 'whole, the parts of 
which acquire a special character by entering it', and added that 'it is usually said that a 
whole is more than the sum of the parts of which it is composed' (Mukar'ovsky, 1978, 
3). However, his further definition of artistic structure goes against the mostly static 
concept of the structures we have looked at so far: 
17 In words of Hawkes, the Formalists (but, in reality, it was just early Formalism, and Shklovskii in 
particular, not the whole movement) saw art as 'autonomous: a permanent, self-determining, continuous 
human activity which warranted nothing less than examination in and on its own terms' (Hawkes, 1977, 
61). 
18 We might just as well mention Eagleton, who, in the preface to the second edition of his Literary 
Theory, said that 'there is in fact no 'literary theory', in a sense of a body of theory which springs from, or 
is applicable to, literature alone. None of the approaches..., from phenomenology and serniotics to 
structuralism and psychoanalysis, is simply concerned with 'literary' writing. On the contrary, they all 
emerged from other areas of the humanities, and have implications well beyond literature itself. ' 
(Eagleton, 1996b, vii). This echoes Tzvetan Todorov's last sentences in his 1968 PoMque, that poetics 
can only play a transitory role, and that its true worth and path can only be in initiation of general study of 
all texts, and not just literary ones (108-9). 
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We designate interrelations among the components - relations dynamic in their very 
essence - as the specific property of structure in art. According to our conception we 
can consider as a structure only such a set of elements, the internal equilibrium of which 
is constantly disturbed and restored anew and the unity of which appears to us as a set 
of dialectic contradictions. That which endures is only the identity of a structure in the 
course of time, whereas its internal composition - the correlation of its components - 
changes continuously. In their interrelations individual components constantly strive to 
dominate one another; each of them makes an effort to assert itself to the detriment of 
others. (Muka! ovsky, 1978,4) 
Furthermore, Mukafovsky adds that such a dynamic structure should be studied as a part 
of even more dynamic social and historical context: 
The structure of a work of art, which appears as an event even when we look at a single 
work, appears even more as motion if we look at the contexts of which the work is a 
part. [ ... ] In the course of time, the author's attitude toward reality and his creative 
method change, and thus the structure of the work varies. Of course, this change is not 
independent of changes in the national literature as a whole, which, in turn, is liable to 
changes due to the development of the social consciousness. (Mukarovsky, 1978,5) 
As for the question of the referentiality of literature and art in general, in his paper of 
1934 'Art as a Serniotic Fact', Mukar"ovsky argues that a work of art evokes 'the total 
context of so-called social phenomena' (1978,84), and adds that, in order to understand 
the structure of a given work of art, it is 'very important [ ... ] that we know whether it 
treats its subject as 'real' (sometimes even as documentary) or 'fictive', or whether it 
oscillates between these two poles' (1978,86). And he concludes, much as Tynianov 
and Jakobson do: 
Only the semiotic point of view will permit theoreticians to recognise the autonomous 
existence and essential dynamism of artistic structure and to understand its development 
as a movement which is immanent but in constant dialectic relation to the development 
of the other spheres of culture. (1978,87) 
Eagleton has broader social and historical interests in mind, and Todorov is more interested in further 
textual study, but both predict a death of literary theory as an autonomous discipline. 
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We can see that later on Mukarovsky played down the idea of artistic structure's 
immanent nature and emphasised its dependence on the social and historical context. 
This shift of emphasis is a continuation of late Formalism's notion of the cultural 
system, which replaced the idea of literature's autonomy, and which, according to 
Broekman, happened partly out of a dialogue with Marxism, but also of the 'increasing 
[ ... ] complexity of the structural approach and of examining the connections between 
literary and non-literary orders' (Broekman, 1974,38). 
As for the fact that the linguistic part of Jakobson's and Tynianov's 
investigation is put in parentheses at the point when the importance of cultural and 
historical context is emphasised, a possible explanation for that gesture will come some 
thirty years later, in the work of Soviet semioticians. 
East: Lotman and The Structure of the Artistic Text 
One of the most able minds among them was Iurii Lotman, probably the greatest Soviet 
serniotician, who developed a highly sophisticated theoretical system which describes 
literature, arts and culture in general as systems of communication (languages) which 
have an essential, irreplaceable role in human society. According to Lotman, since 
tevery system whose end is to establish communication between two or more 
individuals may be defined as language', we can apply that term not only to natural 
languages (French, Russian, Serbo-Croat) or artificial languages (traffic lights, 
metalanguages of different sciences), but 'also to customs, rituals, commerce and 
religious concepts'. Therefore, according to Lotman, 'in the same sense, we can speak 
of the 'language' of the theatre, cinema, painting, music, and of art as a whole, as a 
language organised in a particular way'(Lotman, 1977,7). 
What distinguishes art and culture from natural or artificial languages, however, 
is their particular twofold structure: art, religion and culture are secondary languages or, 
to use the Soviet sernioticians' own term, they are secondary 'modelling systems' (we 
shall return to this term later). Lotman's definition of a secondary language is that it is 
4a communication structure built as superstructure upon a natural linguistic plane (myth 
and religion, for example)' (1977,9). As art is defined as one of the secondary 
languages, Lotman is fully aware that the this definition needs additional clarifications, 
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for the simple fact that there are nonverbal arts, arts which are not built as 
4 superstructures upon a natural linguistic plane' in the way that literature is. Thus, 
We should understand the phrase 'secondary in relation to language' to mean more than 
&using natural language as material'; if the phrase had such implications, the inclusion 
of nonverbal arts (painting, music, and others) would be clearly impermissible. The 
relationship here is more complex: natural language is not only one of the earliest, but 
also the most powerful system of communication in the human collective. By virtue of 
its very structure, it exerts a powerful influence over the human psyche and over many 
aspects of social life. Secondary modelling systems, like all serniotic systems, are 
constructed on the model of language. This does not imply that they reproduce all 
aspects of natural languages. (Ibid. ) 
As natural language is our first and most powerful system of communication, it is also 
the primary foundation on which human cultures are based. Natural language, with its 
'powerful influence over the human psyche and over many aspects of social life', is the 
structuring force of any cultural system: whatever belongs to the system, visual arts and 
music included, is refracted through the prism of natural language; even nonverbal arts 
are pulled into (or spring from) the verbal universe of human culture. 
Nevertheless, what makes literature into a special case is that its own secondary 
nature in relation to natural language is, quite literally, literal; literature uses language as 
its primary material and other arts do not. As Mukalrovsky pointed out, although 
language is a material in relation to literature, as stone is in sculpture, or paint and 
canvas are in painting, what clearly differentiates language from stone, paint and canvas 
or musical notes is they acquire meaning only when they enter a work of art. Language, 
as Mukarovsky (1977,9) pointed out, is already a system of signs, and these signs 
already carry meaning. 
This results in the extremely complex sign system in which two language 
systems are being combined into one, one participating as the 'raw material' and the 
other as the structuring force; at the same time, both these language systems retain their 
full signifying potential. This 'great complexity' of 'poetic speech' is precisely what 
makes it irreplaceable in human culture; as Lotman puts it: 
If the volume of information in poetic speech (verse or prose - here the distinction is 
unimportant) and in ordinary speech were identical, artistic speech would lose its right 
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to exist and, indisputably, would die out. But the case is somewhat different. A 
complicated artistic structure, created from the material of language, allows us to 
transmit a volume of information too great to be transmitted by an elementary, strictly 
linguistic structure. It follows that the information (content) given can neither exist nor 
be transmitted outside this artistic structure. (Lotman, 1977,10-11) 
Lotman clarifies his notion of the relationship between the idea of a work of art and its 
structure with the help of a metaphor, one taken from biology: 
For a graphic representation of the relation of idea and structure, we might ( ... ) imagine 
the bond between life and the biological mechanism of living tissue. Life, the main 
property of a living organism, is unthinkable outside its physical structure; it is a 
function of this working system. The literary scholar who hopes to comprehend an idea 
independently of the author's system for modelling the universe, independent of the 
structure of a work of art, resembles an idealist scholar who tries to separate life from 
that concrete biological structure whose very function is life. (Lotman, 1977,12) 
It is worth noting that this conceptual metaphor which likens a literary text to a living 
organism is one that was used by Russian Formalists (Propp and Zhirmunskii, for 
example)19, as well as by Mikhail Bakhtin in his later years; as Lotman's writing is 
discretely peppered with appreciative nods to both Formalists and to Bakhtin, his own 
use of it is probably not just a coincidence. The way Bakhtin uses 'the organic 
metaphor' is particularly telling, and provides us with a most suitable extension to 
Lotman's own use of it. 
In his 'Concluding Remarks' to the collection of essays on the representation of 
time and space in novelistic genres fforms of Time and of the Chronotope in the 
Novel') Bakhtin defines the relationship between the world of a literary text and the real 
world as a relationship between a living organism and its environment. Although a 
living organism never merges with its environment in the way that its dead body one 
day will, its life nevertheless depends on that environment; if separated from it, the 
organism will die. In the same way, argues Bakhtin, the world of a literary text enters 
into the real world and 'enriches it'; at the same time, the real world enters into the text 
both as an element of its production and as a factor that will determine the way it will be 
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perceived and received by its readers (Bakhtin, 1996a, 254). It is quite clear that this 
idea fits perfectly with Bakhtin's lifelong interest in the concepts of dialogue and 
polyphony; what is interesting about it is that Bakhtin wrote 'Concluding Remarks' two 
years after Lotman's book The Structure of the Artistic Text was published. It would 
certainly be worth investigating whether Bakhtin read Lotman's book before writing 
'Concluding Remarks'. At any rate, the two uses of the organic metaphor seem to me to 
be perfectly suited to each other, reflecting general similarities in the theoretical 
concepts of Bakhtin and Lotman. 20 
Apart from that, as we have seen already, the idea that a literary work of art can 
not be perceived in isolation from the literary system, cultural system and, ultimately, 
social system in which the work of art is produced or perceived, is one of the main ideas 
of mature Formalism, most notably expressed in the work of Iurii Tynianov. In his 
essay 'On Literary Evolution' from 1927, Tynianov unequivocally dismissed the 
possibility of immanent study of a work of art as a theoretical fantasy, sternly stating 
that 'the very existence of a fact as literary depends on its differential quality, that is, on 
its interrelationship with both literary and extraliterary orders' (Tynianov, 1971b, 69). 
Lotman himself restated the case in much the same way as did Bakhtin with his organic 
metaphor: 
A work of art, which is a particular model of the universe, a message in the language of 
art, simply cannot exist apart from all the other languages of social communication. Its 
meaning is extremely distorted for the reader who is trying to decipher the work with 
the help of arbitrary, subjectively chosen codes; but it has no meaning whatsoever for 
the man who would like to deal with the text totally apart from all its extra-textual 
relations. The entire sum of historically determined artistic codes which make a text 
meaningful is related to the sphere of extra-textual relations. (Lotman, 1977,50) 
Here we should perhaps return to the term 'modelling systems' which we encountered 
earlier, as it largely concerns that same monumental question about the relationship 
between the word and the world. Soviet sernioticians claimed that, apart from being 
systems of communication, languages (natural, artificial and secondary ones) also serve 
the function of modelling the world to which they refer. According to Ann Shukman, 
19 There is an extremely interesting discussion on the use of metaphors in the Russian Formalist theory in 
Peter Steiner's book Russian Formalism: A Metapoetics (1984). 
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the term 'modelling system' was first used at the 1962 Symposium of the Moscow- 
Tartu School in Moscow, and it was then defined by V. V. Ivanov as 'the apparatus 
through which a community or individual perceives the world, and which models the 
world for him' (Shukman, 1977,12). To use Lotman's example, in the language of 
chemical signs the signs can be divided into two groups: those designating chemical 
elements and those describing their relations. If we introduce a certain system for 
organising the signs that refer to chemical elements into groups (metals and non-metals, 
for example), we shall at the same time be adjusting the language of chemical signs to 
'model a particular chemical reality' (Lotman, 1977,14). According to Lotman and 
other Soviet sernioticians, every communicative sign system models reality in its own 
way; some modelling systems will be more abstract (like the one of mathematics, for 
example) or refer to certain narrow aspects of the real world (the 'stop-ready-go' 
universe of the language of traffic lights), and others will have a high modelling 
capacity, fit to deal with vast areas of human life and human society (religion, for 
example). Shukman notes that the Moscow-Tartu group already in 1964 (at the Summer 
School in Kaarika, Estonia) decided to focus on the secondary modelling systems 
(Shukman, 1977,11). 21 
What distinguishes literature from other communicative - modelling systems is 
not just its twofold structure comprised of two signifying systems, but also a special 
relationship between langue andparole, literary language and literary message, system 
and text. Lotman points out that for every communicative - modelling system the 
distinction between code and message is a useful analytical tool, and literature is no 
exception (Lotman, 1977,15). 
Moreover, in every language one can make a distinction between those linguistic 
elements which, as Lotman puts it, are 'characterised by the presence of extra-linguistic 
content' (Lotman, 1977,16-17) and thus carry meaning, and those which are purely 
formal (like, for example, grammatical gender). Although on the level of 'linguistic 
facts' these two elements are in the process of 'constant interpenetration' (Lotman 
quotes the example of 'the apprehension of grammatical gender as a sexually 
meaningful characteristic' in reference to, say, inanimate objects) (Ibid. ), on the abstract 
level the distinction can be quite successfully maintained. Lotman does not say this, but 
20 See also Allan Reid, 1990. 
21 For more general information on Soviet Serniotics, see Shukman, 1977,8-37. 
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we could perhaps add with some caution that in a more general treatment of the 
difference between langue and parole, the meaning belongs more to the domain of the 
message, and the formal elements are more a part of the language as an abstract system 
of sign interrelations. However, within both the language and the message, we can 
distinguish between formal and meaningful elements. 
These two distinctions (code and message, formal and meaningful) can also be 
applied to artistic texts, and Lotman particularly stresses the importance of maintaining 
a clear conceptual differentiation between language and message in dealing with art: 
The distinction of these aspects is also essential for the literary critic (and for any art 
critic). Here the problem lies not only in the constant confusion of an artistic text's 
aesthetic value (coupled with constant assertions that what is incomprehensible is bad) 
with the peculiarities of its language, but also in the failure to consciously analyse the 
problem to be researched, the refusal to ask what is being studied: the general artistic 
language of an epoch (its schools, its writers) or a particular message transmitted in that 
language. (Lotman, 1977,16) 
Nevertheless, Lotman observes that precisely this 'persistent identification of the 
problem of a language's specificity in some form of art with the problem of the value of 
the infortnation transmitted through it' shows that there is something peculiar in the way 
that differentiation functions in the artistic text (Ibid. ). Unlike natural language (as well 
as other communicative-modelling systems) in which, as we have seen, the difference 
between the meaningful and the formal in both language and speech is more or less 
strictly maintained throughout, art exhibits a tendency to formalise its content, to 
transform it into clich6, to transfer it 'to the conventional realm of code'. At the same 
time, our tendency to interpret everything in a work of art as meaningful (even its most 
'formal' elements, like meter, for example), as Lotman puts it, 'is so great that we 
rightfully consider nothing accidental in a work of art' (1977,17). Here we come back 
to the idea that every communication system is also a modelling system, that every sign 
system besides enabling us to create messages in it also models and reflects our 
conceptions of the universe which it describes. What happens, however, in an artistic 
text is, according to Lotman, quite different from any other ordinary act of 
communication in both natural and artificial languages. Since the language of the 
artistic text is at the same time the artistic model of the world which that text portrays, it 
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is a part of the text's content and carries meaning. Moreover, the language of the text, 
which models the world of that text in its most general categories, conditions the nature 
of the concrete phenomena depicted by the message of the text. Thus, according to 
Lotman, in literature 'the most important information is that which arises when a type of 
artistic language is selected' (1977,18). 
Obviously, what we have here is the not just the collapse of the old distinction 
between form and content (quite similar to the one performed by mature Formalism), 
but also the collapse of the distinction between language and message. This happens in 
particular when language itself becomes the basic content of a work, and thus, as 
Lotman puts it, 'closes in on itself'(as it does, for example, in literary parody) (1977, 
19). However, it is not just in the case of parody that language and message become so 
inextricably intertwined; according to Lotman, this collapse of language and message 
into one is one of the main distinguishing characteristics of literary language in general. 
As many of the Formalists were arguing as well, in literature 
It becomes difficult... to take the planes of expression and content and demarcate them 
in the usual structural linguistic sense of that word. A sign models its content. It is clear 
that the semantization of the extra-semantic (syntactic) elements of natural language 
occurs under these conditions in an artistic text. Semantic elements are no longer clearly 
differentiated; a complex interweaving takes place. What is syntagmatic on one level of 
the hierarchy of an artistic text proves to be semantic on another. (Lotman, 1977,21) 
And so, to sum up: according to Lotman, literature (verbal art) is a secondary modelling 
system which uses natural languages, as well as other secondary modelling systems 
(religion, philosophy, other arts, etc. ) - and, we might add, sometimes even artificial 
languages - as its material. This combination of two or more hierarchically structured 
sign systems results in an extremely complicated structure in which all of its elements 
come into play and 'balance off' one another, while at the same time maintaining the 
text's link with other literary texts and with extra-literary orders, making it impossible 
to understand its structure outside of these relations. A communicative modelling 
system like all other languages, the language of literature differs from them in that it 
becomes part of the message (or the 'content) of the work, rather than staying in the 
background purely as a system of abstract invariant relations. The idea of a work of art 
is rather like life in a living organism: inseparable from it and contained in all its cells 
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and their interrelations. A verbal work of art is form and content inextricably 
intertwined; its structure is one in which semantics and grammar are interwoven into a 
complex system; literature is the site of langue and parole collapsing into one. 
Some final thoughts on the difference between French and Soviet (or Eastern 
European) Structuralism 
As we have seen, one of the main differences between Western and Eastern 
structuralism is in the different view they take of their 'source discipline', linguistics. 
To make a sweeping statement, it seems that French literary structuralism based its main 
postulates on the idea of language as a system of abstract sign interrelations based on 
binary oppositions, and on the strict differentiation between langue and parole. Thus it 
is possible for Genette to make a distinction between structuralism and hermeneutics, 
the first exploring the codes of 'distant' literatures and the second grasping the 
messages of living works of verbal art. Soviet semiotics, on the other hand, seems to 
have paid more attention to the idea of language as a modelling system, the one which 
both reflects and shapes our idea of the world; hence its interest in the complex role that 
literature plays in modelling our view of the world and its participation in the overall 
system of culture. 
Speaking of the more literary sources, the general view of what structuralism 
can and should do in France, and in the West in general, seems to assume that the whole 
of the Structuralist approach where literature is concerned has its sole origin in Vladimir 
Propp's Morphology of the Folktale, but one which interprets its methodology quite 
narrowly and without taking into account the specific material which it had as its 
subjeCt. 22 
Propp's text, being, indeed, one of the key texts in the development of 
structuralism, did to its subject matter what the Russian Formalists and early 
Structuralists thought should be done in any case: adapting one's method of analysis to 
one's subject matter, however loose a principle it might be, was believed to be the key 
to a scientific, reliable and responsible approach to literary texts. As Propp 
demonstrated, fairy tales are repetitive in their plot, segments of plot appear in different 
tales in the same order, and the characters are very different from characters in realist 
22 See also Shukman, 1977,4. 
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novels. Propp applied his 'morphological approach' to Russian fairy tales, and not to 
Russian nineteenth-century novels; along with other Formalists he probably would have 
thought that it would be ridiculous even to try the same approach on Dostoevsky and 
Tolstoy. However admirably effective on its proper subject-matter, the conclusions of 
Propp's analysis are by no means representative of what the Russian, Soviet (and 
Eastern European in general) structuralist project in general thought happened within a 
literary text. But the spirit of the project was fully in keeping with that 'organic' 
approach which we have noted where Lotman was concerned. After all, Propp chose the 
title of his book in reference to Goethe's notion of 'morphology', 'a novel approach to 
the study of the laws that undergird and interpenetrate nature' (Propp, 1996,221). 
Broekman also stresses that Czech structuralism 'bears a decided functionalist stamp, a 
general legacy from biology'. Such a theoretical model rests on the analogy with 
organic life as 'an adoptive system reacting meaningfully by its own doing, upon 
changing environmental circumstances' (Broekman, 1974,64). 
Apart from the folklorist Propp, within the Formalist school (which in its late 
stage approached structuralist positions) also worked Boris Eikhenbaurn (with, for 
example, his study of the literary environment), lurii Tynianov (with his idea of cultural 
systemS)23 , Boris Tomashevskii (with, amongst other things, his paper on the relevance 
of biographical legend in poetry), and Roman Jakobson. The ideas these extremely 
talented theorists of literature developed about culture as a system and about the 
concepts of what was later on named 'intertextuality' fed into the development of Soviet 
Semiotics and the ideas of its greatest representative, lurii Lotman. Moreover, although 
I have used the year 1928 as my 'end of formalism and the beginning of structuralism 
year', it could well be argued that Formalism proper ended when 'the Formalists' 
original endeavour to pin down some particular constructional device and trace its unity 
through voluminous material had given way to an endeavour to qualify further the 
generalised idea, to grasp the concrete function of the device in each given instance' 
(Eikhenbaum, 197 1 b, 29). Propp himself made a similar distinction between formalism 
and structuralism, saying that for the formalists, 'the whole appears to be a mechanical 
conglomerate of heterogeneous parts', while the structuralist, 'on the other hand, 
23 See Todorov, 1968,92-97, for his discussion on Tynianov and the link between structure, literary 
evolution and 'intertextuality'. 
45 
examines the parts as elements of a whole; the structuralist sees a whole, a system, 
which the formalist cannot even discern' (Propp, 1996,23 8). 
1 would argue that the true structuralist manifesto of the 1920s would be 
Jakobson and Tynianov's essay 'Problems in the Study of Literature and Language', but 
also that some of the Formalists (like Tynianov, Eikhenbaurn and Tomashevskii) had 
been already working in the framework outlined by the 'Problems'. The very term 
'Russian Formalism' is useful as a name for a group of critics and theorists working 
together in Russia between 1915 and the early '30s, but to talk of the 'formalism' of 
their endeavour for the whole of that period is simply wrong. 
Frederic Jameson suggested that 'for the spirit of the Formalist enterprise, 
imagine the New Critics with collective enthusiasm taking apart the nursery rhymes of 
Mother GooseV (Jameson, 1972,82) 1 would say that, in order to understand the 
Russian Formalist spirit, 'formalism' as an approach should be seen as the initial 
hypothesis, later discarded; enthusiasm should certainly be imagined, but it is literature 
as a whole that should be seen as the object of its loving attention; and, as for the history 
of Formalism's further influence, culture as a whole became the object of Slavic 
structuralism's analyses. Scholes, polemicising with Jameson's assessment of 
Formalism, notes that 'formalism has lasted until now mainly because we have been so 
slow in assimilating it and so feeble in improving it. But in another sense the 
achievement of the formalists, like that of Aristotle, will be permanent because it will 
have to be incorporated in any later poetics of fiction. ' (Scholes, 1974,158). 
Furthermore, Scholes stresses that 'the formal method has given us virtually all the 
poetics of fiction we have' (1974,76-77). The polemic between Scholes and Jameson 
underlines the differences in the assessment of both Formalism and structuralism which 
spring from different Formalist-structuralist canons taken into account by different 
critics. For those who are inclined to believe that literature has some connection with 
the world at large and with culture, society, and history in general, and who see 
Formalism as exemplified by Shklovskii and Propp, and structuralism as consisting only 
of its French version, it is easy to be critical (as Jameson and Eagleton are). For those 
who also take into account Jakobson, Tynianov, the Prague structuralism and Soviet 
Serniotics, a very different picture is formed. Sometimes, as in the case of Eagleton, 
who read Lotman and obviously liked him, the image of the received Structuralist canon 
(Propp and the French) can distort the final assessment of the whole movement. 
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Amy Mandelker in her essay Togosphere and Semiosphere: Bakhtin, Russian 
Organicism, and the Serniotics of Culture' sums up the historical and theoretical 
differences between Western and Eastern structuralism, much in the spirit of this thesis. 
She is primarily talking about later stage in the development of Soviet serniotics, which 
happened soon after the serniotics and structuralism in the West evolved into their post- 
structuralist phase: 
The evolution in Moscow-Tartu school serniotic theory during the 1980s might be 
compared with the shift from Newtonian relativistic physics.. Western critical theory 
has comfortably assimilated serniotic theory in its earlier structuralist mode, yet this 
appropriation has often distorted the basic premises of Slavic theory, resulting in 
elisions, misreadings, or impoverished interpretations. (Mandelker, 1995,177) 
According to Mandelker, the later development of Slavic semiotic theory 'explodes the 
bipolar grid of significance erected to fit a Saussurean model and adopts a less 
mathematical-linguistic, more biologically based method of modelling, experimentation 
and inquiry' (1995,178). However, as we have seen, the biological model was there 
even in Propp, and certainly existed in both the Prague Circle and the Moscow-Tartu 
School from its beginning. Mandelker, on the other hand, suggests that because this 
later development happened at the same time as the post-structuralist phase in the West, 
and because the Soviet semioticians were happy enough to call themselves 
6structuralists', it becomes tempting to name this phase of Slavic semiotics as post- 
structuralist. However, this would probably create a completely wrong picture, and 
cause even more misunderstandings on the Western side, as the picture in the East is a 
lot more complicated than that (and Mandelker paints it so clearly that I shall refrain 
from paraphrasing her, and quote her at some length): 
Russian 'p ost- structural ism', however, is discontinuous from Western post- 
structuralism. So-called Slavic structuralism (Prague school structuralism) is more 
accurately a 'post-Formalist' movement, and Russian Formalism is arguably already 
structuralist in its intent, especially in the culminating publications of the Russian 
Formalists Jakobson and Tynianov. 24 By contrast, Western structuralism (especially 
24 Mandelker is here referring to 'Problems in the Study of Literature and Language', by Jakobson and 
Tynianov, which we have already looked at. 
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French structuralism, as represented by such figures as Roland Barthes and others of the 
Tel Quel school) more closely resembles early Russian Formalists. French structuralism 
in the practice of its adherents Girard or Guiraud is often more formalist than the 
Formalists themselves, in its reliance on the types of Proppian manoeuvres that can 
reduce texts to a series of functions and strategies. This type of mathematical textual 
analysis in a contextual vacuum provided an impetus for a recontextualisation of 
discourse analysis among the opening moves of what has become to be known as post- 
structuralism. But the term post-structuralism does a disservice to Slavic structuralism, 
which was way ahead of its European homonym. [ ... ] 
In fact, the Russian Formalists, in their last publications by Jakobson and Tynianov 
(1929), were already debating and probing the issues that became critical not only to 
structuralists but also to Western post-structuralist debates more than half a century 
later. Therefore, if we are going to fall in with the contemporary critical practice of 
'post'-al designations, Slavic structuralism would have to be considered equivalent to 
Western post-structuralism, since Slavic structuralism from its inception rejected 
isolationist heuristic methodologies, that is, critical focus on the structures of a text to 
the exclusion of all 'extraliterary' factors. (Mandelker, 1995,178-9) 
Mandelker here suggests that, in Eastern terms, Western poststructuralism can be 
considered as 'a persistent or an unreconstructed structuralism', since its main 
exponents (like De Man or Derrida) still 'operate within an essentially Saussurean 
conception of language'. In the light of all this, concludes Mandelker, 'a post- 
structuralist semiotics in the Russian context, which posits spherical enclosures and 
generative explosions that blast away the logocentrism of post-structuralist thought, 
would thus have to be registered as post-post-structuralist in Western terms' 
(Mandelker, 1995,179). 
There is also another difference between the Western and the Eastern literary 
approach as a whole, and Roman Jakobson's essay on Mayakovsky, entitled 'On a 
Generation That Squandered Its Poets' is probably one of the best illustrations of it. 
Jakobson, who is far too often portrayed as a dry and analytical linguist obsessed with 
phonological parallelisms in poetry, 25 wrote this bitter and passionate essay in 1931, a 
year after the poet's suicide. 'On a Generation That Squandered Its Poets' is an almost 
25 See, for example, Jonathan Culler's account of Jakobson's analytical method in his Structuralist 
Poetics: Structuralism, Linguistics and the Study ofLiterature (1975). 
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unbearably moving piece, combining a masterful analysis of Mayakovsky's poetry with 
Jakobson's personal account of the poet and his sense that he shares the blame for his 
death with the rest of those who believed that all those images of unbearable life and 
allusions to suicide in Mayakovsky's poetry were just a poetic device. Far from being 
an 'automatic discovery procedure' (as Jonathan Culler describes Jakobson's method), 
this essays shows clearly the amount of knowledge and intelligence and instinct (and 
even, if you will, ethical wisdom) which is necessary for a great literary analysis. 
That kind of essay is possible only where a close knowledge of a culture is 
interwoven with a personal sense of belonging and responsibility for that culture; and 
this brings us to another point. The majority of Eastern European theorists bring into 
their investigation their firm belief in the capital importance of literature and art for the 
life of a nation. The writers they are dealing with are very much alive in their culture's 
perception, and their work carries a fundamental importance in the way that culture 
defines itself. The sense of pride and passion for one's work and one's subject matter 
that one finds even in the driest of Lotman's formulations is quite unparalleled in the 
majority of Western scholarly works; not so much because of lack of personal love for 
literature amongst those Western scholars, but more because of the lack of a strong 
social and cultural need for that kind of love and that kind of need. Although this 
distinction between Eastern and Western approach to literature is of the most general 
and elusive kind, I believe that it influences scholarly discourse in a very real way. After 
all, there are very few Western scholars who would dare write as a conclusion to their 
book on literary theory what Lotman wrote at the end of The Structure of the Artistic 
Text, in that infuriatingly dry style of his that so unsuccessfully tries to disguise his 
passion for literature: 
We can declare with certainty that more than anything else created by man, the artistic 
text most clearly manifests those properties which draw the cybernetician's attention to 
the structure of living tissue. 
For this reason, the study of the structure of the artistic text is significant for all 
scientific disciplines. (Lotman, 1977,300) 
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Chapter 1: 
Locating Barthes and Bakhtin: Why Talk About Structuralism? 
Roland Barthes is one of the great French structuralists, whose name is mentioned in the 
same breath as the names of Claude L6vi-Strauss, Jacques Lacan and Michel Foucault. 
The question 'Why talk about structuralismT would be strange if applied to him alone. 
Mikhail Bakhtin, however, is an altogether different issue. Although in many 
respects structuralists helped bring him to the fore in Russia, France, and the United 
States, he has in recent years been mostly seen as an arch-antistructuralist, who 
preferred dynamic, exciting 'architectonics' and dialogism, to boring, static old 
structures. 
In this chapter I shall briefly present the main ideas of Barthes's literary 
structuralism, as well as discuss why it could be helpful still to think of Bakhtin as a 
structuralist of the Tynianov-Mukarovsky-Lotman kind. The two parts of the chapter 
will situate Barthes and Bakhtin in their respective contexts (French and Eastern 
European structuralisms) and briefly indicate why Barthes may be closer to the Eastern 
variety of structuralism than fitting in purely with the French, the argument which will 
be continued throughout the thesis. 
But, before we continue, three important remarks: 
Firstly, I have left the discussion of the question of the body out of the thesis, 
although both Barthes and Bakhtin wrote extensively about it. A comparison between 
their ideas about the body could certainly be very fruitful and interesting, but lies 
somewhat outside of the main topic of this thesis, which focuses on the inter-related 
problems of literature and ideology, social languages and their literary representation, 
intertextuality and the role of the author. The question of the body lies somewhat 
outside of that set of problems. 
Secondly, I consider only those of Bakhtin's texts that were originally published 
under his own name, leaving aside those originally published under the names of 
Medvedev and Voloshinov (and Kanaev). The arguments in favour of Bakhtin's 
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authorship of Voloshinov's Freudianism and Marxism and Philosophy of Language, 
and Medvedev's The Formal Method in Literary Scholarship appear very shaky indeed, 
and no material proof has so far been offered to support the claims that Bakhtin was the 
real author of these books. This subject has already been dealt with quite extensively by 
Caryl Emerson, Gary Saul Morson and Allan Reid, and I shall not repeat their 
arguments, as there is very little new to be said about an issue that should not have been 
raised at all. 26 
Thirdly, I have mostly referred to the English translations of Bakhtin's texts. 
This was done partly because most of the debate about Bakhtin to which I refer was 
conducted in English, but also in order to make the things easier for readers who are 
more likely to be familiar with the French part of the subject matter, and less likely to 
know Russian as well. The Russian editions can be found listed in the bibliography. 
Barthes the Structuralist 
Scholes lists Barthes as one of the 'high structuralists' (alongside Uvi-Strauss, Michel 
Foucault, Jacques Lacan, and Jacques Derrida); he calls him 'a star performer, an 
individual who must be approached as a system in himself, and understood for the sake 
of his own mental processes'. Scholes adds: 
Whatever contributions of these men are absorbed by the general culture, their texts 
will not suffer the same absorption but will remain - like philosophical texts, which 
they are, and literary texts, which some of them aspire to be - as unique objects to 
which later thinkers must return in order to grasp the ideas and methods that have been 
developed therein. This is what we may call 'high structuralism' - high in its aspirations 
and in its current prestige. (Scholes, 1974,157-58)27 
26 See Reid, 1990, and Morson and Emerson, 1990. 
For arguments in favour of Bakhtin's authorship, see Clark and Holquist, 1984. 27 He defines 'low structuralism' as 'practised by men whose intelligence and learning is considerable - 
often not inferior to that of the high structuralists - but whose aspirations are more humble... The low 
structuralist writes to be immediately useful, to be ultimately superseded'- like Genette, for example 
(Ibid. ). 
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And yet, Scholes lets us know that there is more to Roland Barthes than his structuralist 
fame: he is 'a literary critic, an advocate of le nouveau roman and a practitioner of la 
nouvelle critique, a student of popular culture, a scholar of Racine, a brilliant 
polemicist, a formidable rhetorician, an ingenious, mercurial man of letters'. Scholes 
continues: 
He is an essentially unsystematic writer who loves system, a structuralist who dislikes 
structure, a literary man who despises 'literature'. He loves to take up the outrageous 
position on any question and defend it until it becomes plausible, or - better still - 
attack the other views until they seem inferior. (Scholes, 1974,148) 
Barthes is not only a structuralist, then, and some of the surveys of his thought stress 
this quite forcefully. Andy Stafford, for example, quotes Culler's definition of Barthes 
as a 'Man of Parts' (Culler, 1990, ch. 1), giving us a list of things that Barthes was that 
is not that dissimilar to Scholes's (Stafford, 1998,13), and considers that 'Barthes's 
contribution to [the structuralist] mode of analysis was a highly ambiguous one' (1998, 
103). Rick Rylance makes a strong point of this, saying that 'although he did work with 
structuralist ideas for a time from the late 1950s to the late 1960s, it is essential not to 
isolate this period' (Rylance, 1994,32). However, regardless of Rylance's assertion that 
Barthes's 'most celebrated reputation [that of a structuralist] is probably spurious' 
(Ibid. ), Barthes is still enough of a structuralist for Jonathan Culler to adopt his 
definition of structuralism as (in Culler's own words) a 'mode of analysis of cultural 
artefacts which originates in the methods of contemporary linguistics' (Culler, 1975,3). 
Frangois Dosse in his History ofStructuralism pronounces Barthes 'the mother figure of 
structuralism', 'a mythic figure' and 'structuralism's best barometer' (Dosse, 1998,1, 
71). And in his introductory essay to Textual Strategies: Perspectives in Post- 
Structuralist Criticism, J. Harari uses Barthes's Vintroduction a Fanalyse structurale 
des r6cits' in order to 'put in perspective the aims and achievements of 'literary 
structuralism' (Harari, 1979,23). 
Although structuralism and serniotics were something he did for only a part of 
his life (arguably for about 15 years, between 1956 and 1970), it is one of the great 
intellectual systems (apart from existentialism, Marxism and psychoanalysis) which had 
influenced Barthes profoundly, and he, in return, greatly influenced its course in the 
West. Leonard Jackson, however, would not agree with this, as he sees Barthes's 
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significance not so much in the importance and originality of his ideas, but more in his 
4representative quality' for French structuralism. He claims that Barthes is essentially an 
essayist, and not a creator of theoretical systems, at least none of any real interest (he is 
talking primarily about The Fashion System) (Jackson, 1991,145). He sees Barthes's 
structuralist 'rigour' as a form of masochism 'at the level of unconscious fantasy': 
Structuralism, to the extent that it is conceived of as a net to bind desire, is a 
masochistic fantasy: literally, a bondage fantasy. So far as it is a net to bind other minds 
and bodies, it is a sadistic fantasy. (Jackson, 1991,146) 
The works which Barthes himself lists among his 'semiotic' works are Mythologies (to 
be more precise, their theoretical postscript 'Le Mythe, aujourd'hui'), Systime de la 
mode (to which Jackson's comment could largely apply), E16ments de simiologie, and 
'L'introduction a Panalyse structurale des r6cits' with SIZ as a turning point which 
changed the focus of his research from the work to the text, from aesthetic product to 
aesthetic activity, and from structure to structuration - in other words, away from 
structuralism and into post-structuralism (Barthes, 1974a, 37-39). As Barthes himself 
was quite clear about which of his works should be considered as representative of the 
structuralist movement, one would expect little debate about this. However, whereas 
Michael Moriarty pretty much follows Barthes's own classification of his own work, 
interpreting SIZ as a radical departure from the structuralist programme, but also adding 
Sur Racine to the discussion of Barthes's structuralist and serniotic studies (Moriarty, 
1991,53-143), Jonathan Culler, on the other hand, in his own book on Barthes claims 
that the alleged break with the structuralist model in SIZ is not as radical as is often 
claimed, since many of the basic structuralist assumptions still inform its theory (1990, 
87-90), and that the true departure began when Barthes discovered the 'body' as a 
critical tool. Furthermore, George Wasserman, having defined structures as 'the systems 
of relations human beings construct, consciously or unconsciously, in order to endow 
things with meaning', suggests that it could be said that Barthes was always a 
Structuralist (1981,58-59). In a similar vein, Steven Ungar suggests that, although 
6structuralism is but one of a number of phases in his writing' (1983,55), after the 
'critical break' with structuralism, Barthes nevertheless 'still remains somewhat of a 
structuralist - un structuraliste encore - who seeks self-knowledge by trying to make 
himself into a kind of text: a body to be observed, analysed, and ultimately understood' 
53 
(1983,56). Roland Champagne claims the complete opposite of any of the above, 
claiming that Barthes's structuralism was just a mask for much deeper concerns: 'while 
Barthes maintained that he was a "structuralisf '(perhaps there was some security in that 
identity) his research and writing took him into explorations beyond the linguistics of 
structuralism into how meaning is transferred from one person to another' (19 84,11) - 
thus Champagne turns Barthes into Bakhtin's perfect double, a most encouraging claim 
in the context of this thesis, but, unfortunately for me, as we shall see later, one that is 
not necessarily true. 
The story of Barthes's belonging to the structuralist movement is further 
complicated if one looks at it from the point of view of 'Slavic structuralism', as we 
discussed it in the introductory chapter. 
How can he be located, not so much within French structuralism, for his 
belonging there can hardly be seriously disputed, but within the larger history of 
structuralist thought? I shall not attempt to give the full answer right away, and at least 
some of the problems raised by the question shall be tackled in the following chapters. 
For the beginning, let us just look at some of Barthes's pronouncements on 
structuralism and try to see how his views might have changed and what impact they 
may have on the possible answer to our question. 
'Introduction A Panalyse structurale des r6cits' 
We have already mentioned that for Barthes, as well as for other French structuralists, 
linguistics was a discipline which provided a methodological framework for other 
humanistic disciplines. However, in his Structuralist Poetics, Jonathan Culler notes that 
there are two different understandings of the link between linguistics and structuralist 
study of literature as presented by Barthes: one that claims that 'the literary work offers 
structuralism the picture of a structure perfectly homological with that of language 
itself', and the other that suggests that structuralism aims at founding 'a science of 
literature, or, to be more exact, a linguistics of discourse whose object is the "language" 
of literary forms' (Culler, 1975,96) . 
28 Thus, there is, as Culler points out, a decided 
28 Culler is here quoting Barthes's 'Science versus literature' as it appeared in The Times Literary 
Supplement (28 September 1967); the French version of the article is entitled Te la science A la 
litt6rature', in 1, pp. 428433. 
This article was also the source of Culler's definition of structuralism. 
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ambiguity here: does a literary work as such function like language, or does literature as 
a whole function like language? Culler suggests that this ambiguity resulted in the 
creation of two types of structuralist research. The first aims to 'deconstruct and 
understand' the individual literary language found in a work or a group of works, and 
the second studies 'works as manifestations of a literary system and show how the 
conventions of that system enable the works to have meaning' (Culler, 1975,97). 
Barthes's Sur Racine belongs to the first type, and 'Introduction A Panalyse structurale 
des recits' would belong to the second. We shall leave Barthes's book on Racine aside 
for now, and glance at his work on narratology. 
Josu6 V. Harari, in his essay 'Critical Factions/Critical Fictions', looks at 
Barthes's 1966 'Introduction A Panalyse structurale des r6cits' from a post-structuralist 
perspective, and notes that 'one is struck by the rather modest claims Barthes makes for 
structural analysis in the literary domain' (Harari, 1979,26). He remarks on the 
'mildness of the tone' with which Barthes made his suggestion that, taking into account 
'the current state of research' (in Barthes's own words) 'it seems reasonable to elect 
linguistics itself as a basic model for the structural analysis of narrative' (Harari, 1979, 
24). Harari also stresses the pragmatic stance of Barthes's article, and argues against the 
more radical interpretations of it: 
Although Barthes emphasised from the beginning of 'Introduction to the Structural 
Analysis of Narrative' that a grammar of the narrative would have to rely on linguistics 
and linguistic categories, clearly he was never advocating in this structuralist project a 
wholesale transposition of grammatical structures into narrative. structures, that is, the 
kind of transposition which would make of narrative theory an applied linguistics. [ ... ] 
Linguistics and narrative theory must inevitably intersect as each one, in its own 
manner, questions language; but it is never a matter for Barthes of assimilating one to 
the other, or of confusing them. The analogy between them rests on the practical belief 
that a number of linguistic concepts can be borrowed to help generate a narrative or a 
literary model. (Ibid. ) 
Harari also stresses that for Barthes linguistics is not an absolute but simply a 
'hypothetical model of description', a phrase which, as Harari points out, Barthes also 
used in Critique et v&W when talking about the postulates of the 'science of literature' 
(Barthes, 1966a, 1,41). Thus, for Barthes, 'the aim is not a fixed, unchanging, a priori 
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model, but a pragmatic model, given the necessity to classify a great number of 
narratives' (Harari, 1979,25). Harari also points out that neither this model nor the 
discipline of narrative analysis was meant to 'explain all the articulations of narrative 
discourse' nor study the meanings of the text: 'to study the grammar of narrative is to 
attempt to specify the possibilities of meaning and not to fulfil them' (1979,26). And 
so, Harari claims that 'structural analysis can be seen to be schernatising only if one 
loses sight of its limited objectives, namely, to cause the possibility of a theory of 
structure to appear and to make the functioning of narrative discourse apparent' (Ibid. ). 
Lavers also notes Barthes's 'Saussurean' gesture, 'which accepts the limitations 
of the scientific attitude and thereby hopes to achieve a manageable object' at the 
beginning of 'Introduction' (Lavers, 1982,189). 
Let us now look at 'Introduction A Panalyse structurale des recits' itself. Firstly, 
Barthes's claim does not seem to be as modest as Harari suggests, as he stresses the 
presence of narrative everywhere and always, and remarks that the aim of structuralism 
is to 'master' the infinitude of narratives and to describe the language from which they 
issue (Barthes, 1966b, 74). An aim as grand as they come; however, this is where the 
pragmatism that Harari speaks of is introduced, as Barthes suggests that it is precisely 
the infinitude of narratives that forces their analyst to use a deductive method of 
description, and one which, for practical reasons connected with the current state of 
research, might just as well be derived from linguistics (I 966b, 76). 
The linguistics thus transposed onto the narrative would a create a 'second 
linguistics' whose subject matter would go beyond the sentence and into narrative 
discourse. Barthes suggests that discourse itself is organised and that its organisation 
makes it seem like a message written in another language, which is at a level above the 
language studied by linguists (1966b, 76). 
According to Barthes, what makes narratives resemble the messages created in 
(to use Lotman's handy term) the natural language, is the fact that, just like the 
sentence, the narrative can be divided into different levels. Although the elements of 
each of these levels (i. e., in a sentence, the phonetic, morphological, grammatical levels) 
has its own rules of combination, none of them can produce meaning on its own. In 
order for meaning to be created, all of the elements have to be integrated into the whole 
of the sentence or of the narrative according to a hierarchical order (1966b, 78-79). 
Barthes cites several examples of different ways of distinguishing between different 
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levels and the one he uses partially to create his own differentiation is Benveniste's 
distinction between two basic types of relation: distributional (relations on a single 
level) and integrative (relations which connect one level to another) (1966b, 78). 
Barthes notes that if one is to understand a narrative text, one cannot proceed purely on 
a horizontal axis, just by following how the story and its 'events' develop; one also has 
to establish vertical links of how different aspects of the story are related to one another. 
The 'provisional' model Barthes proposes here establishes three basic levels, which are 
then further subdivided: the level of 'functions', the level of 'actions', and the level of 
'narration'. Barthes stresses that the elements of each of the lower levels acquire 
meaning only when integrated into the higher level and into the whole of the narrative 
(1966b, 79-80). 
Barthes was clearly guided by Hjelmslev's Prolegomena when he devised his 
method for the study of narratives. According to Hjelmslev, 
Since linguistic theory starts from the text as its datum and attempts to show the way to 
a self-consistent and exhaustive description of it through an analysis -a deductive 
progression from class to component and component of component - the deepest strata 
of its definition system must treat the principle of analysis. (Hjelmslev, 1961,21) 
Hjelmslev also stresses that 'both the object under examination and its parts have 
existence only by virtue of these dependencies', that 'a totality does not consist of 
things but of relationships, that not substance but only its internal and external 
relationships have scientific existence' (1961,22-3). 
Following Hjelmslev's procedure, Barthes suggests that one must first isolate 
the smallest structural unit of the narrative, stressing that sense and functionality must 
be the main criteria for the definition of the unit. As he puts it, Vest le caractere 
fonctionnel de certains segments de Fhistoire qui en fait des unit6s', and, in an obvious 
nod to Propp, he calls these smallest types of units 'functions' (Barthes, 1966b, 79). He 
adds that the functional fullness of a narrative has nothing to do with the writer's 
intention, and has all to do with the structure of the artistic text (1966b, 80). 
The units of the narrative are not the same as linguistic units. Sometimes, a 
narrative unit can be longer than a single sentence, but sometimes it can also consist of a 
single word (1966b, 81-2); an important correction, it seems to me, of Uvi-Strauss's 
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methodological indecisiveness over whether it is just sentences that he takes as the 
smallest units of a myth or whether these units can also be names or the like. In other 
words, as much as linguistics can help us, we must not confuse its methods and subject- 
matter with those of the analysis of the narrative. 
To go back to 'functions', Barthes further divides them into distributional and 
integrative ones, and, confiisingly, the former are termed 'functions proper' while the 
later are named 'indices'. 
Functions proper are those which relate to the horizontal axis of the story; in 
order to find out what the role of such a function is, all we need to do is read further and 
see what happens later in the story. Indices, on the other hand, have no meaning on the 
level of the narrative events, and they need to be integrated into a higher level of the text 
in order to acquire meaning. Indices, according to Barthes, usually relate to 
characterisation, information on character's identity, notation of 'atmosphere' and so 
on. For example (to use Barthes's example, which he took from Tomashevskii), the 
purchase of a pistol is related to the moment when it is fired, and it can be seen as 
function proper. But, to extend the example, if a character possesses a pistol which 
remains at the back of a drawer, unused, then, depending on the general context of the 
story, it becomes an index of the character's 'nature' and/or of the atmosphere in which 
the story takes place. 
Functions proper are further divided into 'cardinal functions' (or noyaux) and 
'catalysers'. Barthes defines the cardinal function as one which opens up alternatives for 
the action that follows; it is the point of risk in the narrative (1966b, 83-85). Catalysers, 
in the words of Shlomith Rimmon-Kenan (1983,16), 'expand, amplify, maintain or 
delay' cardinal functions; in Barthes's own words, catalysers are still functional by 
virtue of their link with the cardinal functions, but their functionality is 'parasitic' and 
'unilateral'. As a matter of fact, catalysers' most important function is phatic, that is, 
they maintain the contact between the narrator and the narratee (Barthes, Ibid. ). 
Furthermore, catalysers have, as Barthes puts it, a purely chronological functionality: 
they are purely consecutive units, just filling in the time between two cardinal functions, 
while cardinal functions are at the same time consecutive and consequential. However, 
Barthes also adds that the consequentiality of cardinal functions is to a large extent the 
effect of their consecutiveness, which then gets misinterpreted according to the logical 
fallacy post hoc, ergo propter hoc (1966b, 84). A bit later, Barthes picks up on this 
problem of confusion between time and logic again, suggesting that the question is still 
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open as to what guides our sense of time in narratives: chronology of events or narrative 
logic which then gets reinterpreted as time? This time, Barthes suggests that, just as in 
language tenses do not represent real time but are an element of the system, 'real' time 
in narrative is a 'referential illusion' (1966b, 86-87): it does not belong to the narrative 
itself but is, as Michael Moriarty puts it, 'the projection of an atemporal logical matrix'. 
Moriarty quite convincingly un-picks this rather confusing conclusion: 
We read a narrative in time, and we encounter the order of its functions as successive. 
This gives us the impression both that time is a fundamental dimension of the narrative 
as it is of our experience (including the experience of reading) and that the events of the 
narrative are connected by the causal patterns we use to interpret our lived experience 
(outside reading). Whereas in fact the connections follow a peculiar narrative logic, 
unrelated to the time and even the causal r6gime of lived experience, even though 
certain types of text try very hard to make the link, or make us believe in the link: the 
link being nothing other than the referential illusion. (Moriarty, 1991,93-94) 
Thus, according to Barthes, functions proper open up logical alternatives for action, and 
we recognise the possible sequences of action which could follow from there partly 
because words which describe them form groups of semantic oppositions (a phone 
rings: a character answers it or he does not; if he does, he speaks, or is silent, listening; 
he does not, and the phone continues or stops ringing, etc. ), partly because of certain 
narrative conventions, and partly because of the strength of stereotypes (Barthes, 1966b, 
88,100). 29 What is problematic here is Barthes's assumption that readers really believe 
that real time is a 'fundamental dimension of the narrative'. Surely, all readers (bar the 
very naYve ones) know that the time and the events represented in the narrative are 
'nothing other than the referential illusion'. Having said that, the only way we can 
follow and enjoy a story is by playing along, by wilfully believing in that illusion, and 
making connections between the story and our lives that only the illusion makes 
possible. 
As Moriarty points out, the role of catalysers is quite important in establishing 
the illusion of real time, because they, 'as flesh on the skeleton of cardinal functions', 
mask 'the narrative's intelligibility by imparting to it something of the density and 
opacity of life' (Moriarty, 1991,94). Thus, if we were to take too seriously Barthes's 
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comments about the 'parasitical' nature of catalysers and disregard them as mere 'zones 
of security, of rest' and as narrative 'luxuries' (Barthes, 1966b, 84), we would seriously 
impoverish the narrative. As Barthes himself puts it, if we change a function proper, we 
change the story, but if we change a catalyser, we change the narrative discourse. 
To go back to Barthes's definition of indices, we also need to mention that he 
divides them into 'indices proper' (which refer to the character, sentiment, atmosphere 
or philosophy) and 'informants' (which serve to place the story in time and place). 
Barthes also notes that indices proper signify implicitly, by suggestion, and the reader 
needs to learn to decode them, while informants signify directly, telling us straight away 
and in full what we need to know (Barthes, 1966b, 84-85). 
Although Barthes from the beginning stressed the importance of all narrative 
units, he nevertheless makes the same point about informants that he made about 
catalysers: their functionality is much weaker than that of cardinal functions, and 
belongs to the level of the narrative discourse and not to the level of the story (1966b, 
85). Informants and catalysers are arranged around the basic plot, and can be added on 
or taken away without affecting it in any way. This plot-centred concern of 
'Introduction A Panalyse structurale des r6cits' is fairly typical of the rest of structuralist 
narratology, and owes a clear debt to Propp understood as the grandfather of the study 
of narratives. 
The importance of the plot is also carried over to the second narrative level, the 
level of actions. This is the level on which characters are structured, and, as, we can 
guess from that very fact, they are also to a large extent plot-based. According to the 
structural analysis of narratives, says Barthes, characters are not perceived as 'beings' or 
4personalities' in psychological terms any more, but simply as agents or participants in a 
'sphere of actions' (1966b, 91-92). A character is an agent which performs a certain 
number of actions within a story, and that is its most important aspect; again this is pure 
Propp and Greimas. Apart from giving us a very brief survey of some of the structuralist 
actantial models (namely, Greimas's and Todorov's), Barthes devotes hardly any time 
and space to the notion of the character on the level of actions, remarking simply that 
the character acquires its meaning only on the level of narration. The purely 
'functionalist' idea of a character's role in a narrative is even more stressed in 'Les 
suites d'actions', which also directly points to Propp as its originator (Barthes, 197 1 c). 
29 Also, Moriarty, 1991,94. 
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Discussing the level of narration, Barthes notes that there are three basic 
conceptions of the originator of the narrative. The first is that of the author, as 
psychological entity which expresses himself or herself in his or her art; the second is 
that of the impersonal narrator whose point of view is similar to that of God; and the 
third, more recent (Henry James, Sartre), postulates that the narrator should limit 
himself to depicting the points of view of the characters. Barthes claims that the 
problem with each of these models is, firstly, that they all see both the narrator and the 
characters as real persons 1966b, 94-95),, and he proposes to get rid of such naive 
notions by saying that, just as the character was conceived as simply a complex of 
actions performed, so the author is an arranger of signs. As Barthes puts it, the author is 
not any more the one who invents the prettiest stories, but the one who best masters the 
30 code which he shares with his audience (1966b, 97). 
Barthes also points out that the author and the narrator cannot both be discussed 
as the 'originators' of a narrative, for the question of the role of the author (is he 
expressing himself or is he just arranging the literary and social codes? ) is a completely 
different question to that of the role of the narrator. The two types of narrator that he 
mentions here (roughly, the omniscient and the 'unreliable' narrator) can in no way be 
talked of as being seen as the originators of the narrative, for they are its functions, and 
important elements of the text itself (Barthes, 1966b, 95). 
In the final part of the essay, Barthes points out once again that each of the units 
of the narrative has different functions, creating sequences of relations which intersect 
on different levels (1966b, 99-100). Furthermore, the narrative is pulled in two different 
directions: toward expansion by addition of more and more catalysers, and toward 
subtraction and r&sum&. According to Barthes, on one level, a narrative can translated 
from one language or medium to another without much damage done to it (19 66b, 10 1). 
On the other, the combination of horizontal distribution and vertical integration of 
narrative units establishes not so much a symmetrical architectonic structure, but a 
complex and dynamic 'wobbling' structure which presents itself like 'an incessant play 
of potentials', and which is situated between two codes, that of language and that of art 
(or, in Barthes's own terms, that of linguistics and that of translinguistics) (1966b, 102). 
It is this dynamism of the relations of all of its elements which makes a narrative what it 
is. 
30 We shall see that this view is carried over into the famous essay Ta mort de I'auteur' (1968). 
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According to Lavers, in 'Introduction' Barthes makes the point of proving that 
none of the elements of the narrative carries meaning independently, but only when 
integrated into a higher level, but then when we reach the higher level, it 
'retrospectively spreads its meaning over all its components, so that the meaning is not 
'at the end', as the law of suspense suggests, but pervades the whole system' (Lavers, 
1982,191). 
This concluding dynamic image of the narrative structure strikes me as 
completely surprising, and rather out of context with the rest of the text. We were led to 
build in our minds an image of an architectural object, and then Barthes suddenly ends 
the piece with a definition of a literary structure which is closer to Mukarovsky's than to 
any of the French structuralists. This is doubly surprising, considering the essay's status 
as the classic of French structuralism. However, as we shall see later in the thesis, it 
seems to me that Barthes through some of his ideas (which somehow seemed to have 
passed unnoticed or were not dwelt on too much) was often closer to Eastern 
structuralists than he was to his own intellectual environment. 
As for the point that it is naive to see either the narrators or the characters as real 
people, or to assume that the narrative has some kind of a referential function, all we 
can answer to that is: why read, then? Of course, only a very nalve reader would think 
that Emma Bovary really existed, only a staunch positivist one would look for a 'real- 
life' person on whom she might have been based, but we still read Madame Bovary 
because the novel can tell us something about the world and human life, because it can 
help us situate ourselves in the world, and because we like reading stories about people. 
We even read stories about animals because they can tell us something about human 
beings. And to repeat the criticism of the Propp-based types of narrative analysis well 
exmplified by the 'Introduction', although different characters with their different 
characteristics can fulfil the same function in a fairy tale, if we try to replace Emma 
with Anna, and what you get is not Madame Bovary but Anna Karenina. And I am 
pretty sure Tolstoy would argue that this in not so much because the story is different, 
but because the character and her motivation are not the same. And I would argue that 
we get drawn into both of those novels not so much because we want to see 'what 
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happened next' but because the characters and the world portrayed in them interest us in 
a way that a character in a fairy tale does not. 31 
But because Barthes chose Goldfinger as the main text on which to base his 
analysis, and because he is faithful to Aristotle, he cannot see this. Geoffrey Strickland 
(19 81,13 5) makes a more general point connected with this by saying that 'commercial 
fiction, of course, like folk-tales or children's stories, obeys the dictates of the genre far 
more readily than those works which have owed their success to their power to 
disconcert'. He also adds: 
What is absurd (though it may also seem attractive) is to see this arrangement of levels 
as corresponding to some other necessity than that of convention and the expectations 
of a particular public. This is not to deny the psychological or social interest in these 
conventions and expectations (which Barthes ignores). The absurdity lies in the view 
that a narrative, however conventional, could correspond to the same kind of necessity 
as the phonemes that make up a sentence. (Strickland, 1981,135-36) 
I think that Strickland is being rather unfair here, for, as we shall see later, Barthes was 
very much aware of the social and psychological role of conventions and expectations. 
Furthermore, even in 'Introduction', Barthes says that, although structural analysis can 
hope to describe different narrative strategies, that is as far as it can go, because 
narration receives its ultimate meaning from the world which consumes it. Barthes 
suggests that the term of the 'situation of the narrative' be adopted to define the set of 
factors which determine how a narrative is consumed by a society. However, in order to 
describe this process, Barthes adds, we would need another kind of semiotics (1966b, 
98). Although he does not say how this 'other semiotics' could be established nor what 
would its methods be, maybe it could still be claimed that he was already looking 
forward not only to Western post-structuralist developments, but also to those post-post- 
structuralist ones that Lotman brought about in the 1980s. 
31 We shall later see that Bakhtin proposed a theory of the novel which was based around the role of the 
character, their motivation and ideological position, and not on the primacy of the plot. 
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Against Mimesis 
We first have to say something about the status of the notion of mimesis in 
'Introduction'. I have already mentioned that Barthes dismissed the idea that a literary 
text had any referential function as essentially nSfve, with the suggestion that any realist 
aspiration in literature is just a further compounding of a literary myth (Barthes, 1966b, 
95). Veffet de r6el' (1968a) reads like an attack on Engels's idea that 'realism [ ... 
] 
implies, besides truth of detail, the truthful reproduction of typical characters under 
typical circumstances'. 32 Barthes argues that the 'reality effect' of realist novels' 
excessive attention to detail (which cannot be accounted for on the grounds of its 
function within the story itself) comes from the popular belief that 'life' cannot be fully 
accounted for, that not everything in it fits together or is fully intelligible. Instead of 
producing meaning within the world of the text, this type of non-denotative detail 
connotes 'reality' in all of its 'messiness'. This, says Barthes, although it claims to 
appeal directly to our experience of reality, is just as conventional a technique and just 
as dependent on the public opinion of what is vraisembable as any literary creation 
which, following one of Aristotle's suggestions, finds its justification in 'reference to 
33 what is commonly said'. At the end of 'Introduction', Barthes puts forward a similar 
argument against mimesis to that we saw Genette insisting on: a narrative cannot 
represent anything, as it is fully made up of language, and language alone. Part of the 
argument is the obvious point that a narrative does not create a 'vision', that it does not 
make us 'see' anything; instead, it produces a meaning. We believe in the 'realness' of 
its actions not because they recreate a course of real actions, but because we believe in 
the logic which makes them follow one another (Barthes, 1966b, 103) - which is largely 
the logic of 'what is commonly thought to be so'. 34 In Critique et v&W, Barthes argues 
that it is precisely this circular notion of the vraisembable which makes it impossible 
for some people to see that what they thought was, say realistic psychology of 
characters, is in fact just a literary convention which every pupil who studied Racine 
and Corneille at school will have absorbed (I 966a, 22). 
It seems to me that, and this is probably true of Genette as well, Barthes embarks 
upon such a strong critique of mimesis precisely because he identifies it with the idea 
32 Friedrich Engels, 'Letter to Margaret Harkness', 1888, in Marxist Literary Theory, 39. 
33 Aristotle, 'Poetics', in Classical Literary Criticism, 87. 
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that, in order to be truly mimetic or representational, literature would somehow have to 
make us see the world, to create a clear vision. Since it does not, it cannot be mimetic. 
In some ways, this critique of mimesis stems from too demanding an expectation of 
what language would have to do in order to be truly mimetic. 
But creating a vision is not the only way of representing reality, and I would say 
that Barthes knew this even as he was arguing against the usefulness of the notion of 
mimesis. 
Two Types of Structuralism and A Different Concept of Mimesis 
In his essay 'L'activit6 structuralistc' (1964a) Barthes proposed a definition of 
structuralism which is often referred to, and which lies at the basis of the more popular 
conceptions of what structuralism is. Structuralism, said Barthes in this essay, is to a 
large extent the question of the terminology used. And it is not so much words like 
'structure', 'function', 'form', 'sign', and 'signification' which makeup the structuralist 
discourse - these have become too widely used for that - but it is the more specialised, 
Saussurean terms and binary oppositions, like 'signifier'/ 'signified' and 'synchrony'/ 
'diachrony'. Barthes adds that this second pair is probably the more pertinent for 
identification of the structuralist discourse, because it refers to a specific notion of 
history (seen as a 'pure succession of forms') which is uniquely structuralist (1964a, 
1328). 
This is the notion of structuralism which lies behind EMments de semiologie 
(1965). The book explains the main semiological concepts going through the linguistic 
pairs of languelparole, sign ifiRsignifliant, syntagmelsysteme, and d6notationl 
connotation. It is important to note, however, that here the distinction between the 
synchronic and the diachronic is confined to the discussion of value in linguistics, with 
it being simply taken for granted that linguistics is a science which studies synchronic 
phenomena, much as economics does (1965,1495-96). 
However, continues Barthes in Vactivit6 structuraliste', structuralism is neither 
a school nor a movement (at least it was not yet at that point), and there is no need to 
limit it a priori to a certain set of ideas and terms. One should rather search for a 
broader definition, and assume that there are not only theorists and critics who can be 
34 Aristotle, Ibid. 
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considered structuralist, but that there are also artists whose art is an exercise in 
structure. Thus, a 'structural man' should not be defined through his terminology but 
through his imagination, that is, 'the way in which he mentally lives the structure' 
(1964a, 1329). 
Therefore, says Barthes, structuralism can essentially be defined as an activity, 
by which he means 'an ordered succession of a certain number of mental operations' 
(Ibid. ). Seen in this light, the aim of all structuralist activity is to reconstitute an object 
by means of exposing the rules by which it functions. Thus, the structure is a 
simulacrum of an object, but a simulacrum whose purpose is not to copy the object, but 
to make it intelligible, to impart a sense to it. As Barthes puts it, the simulacrum is the 
'intellect added onto the object'. The 'structural man' takes the real, decomposes it into 
functional units, discovers the rules of their relations, and then recomposes it again, 
producing a new object which is similar to the first, but which has in the process 
acquired a certain 'anthropological value'. Thus, art and structuralist activity share a 
common purpose: the imitation or mimesis of reality, one which is not based on the 
tanalogy of substance' (like in realist art), but on the analogy of function (Ibid. ). It 
seems as if, according to this definition, structuralism is less about finding out what 
things are, and more about finding what they mean for us, of what importance they are 
to us as human beings (1964a, 1332). Barthes makes the point that structuralism has a 
great deal to reveal to us about our own humanity, one of the most important things 
being the truly human manner in which we give meaning to things (I 964a, 133 1). It 
seems as if Barthes wants to argue that, far from being anti-humanist (the charge often 
heard against structuralism, and the identity which many structuralists embraced 
readily), structuralism is all about humanity. However, this is not the humanity which is 
full of ready-made meaning and which searches for the ready-made meaning in the 
world around it, but the humanity which continually produces new meaning. Homo 
significans is the true subject of structuralist activity; he is its active agent, but also, to a 
certain extent, its object of research (1964a, 1332). Furthermore, concludes Barthes, far 
from wanting to exorcise history from its sphere of interest, structuralism adds to our 
understanding of history, by explaining the role of the forms of intelligibility (of which 
structuralism is one) which influence or determine our understanding of history and 
historical change, and of our own place in it. 
This echoes Barthes's notion of structuralism from his essay 'Sociologie et 
socio-logique :A propos de deux ouvrages r6cents de Claude Levi-Strauss', where 
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Barthes claimed that structuralism's formal analysis is deeply socially and historically 
responsible, because forms themselves have a responsibility of their own (1962,975). 
As we shall see later, this in itself is a continuation of Barthes's main thesis in Le Degr6 
z&o de Vkriture. In 'Sociologie et socio-logique' Barthes argues that structuralism is 
profoundly justified as an approach because a society always structures reality through 
language, images and objects (1962,967). However, Barthes also stresses that in literate 
societies writing is the most important medium through which social structuring is 
carried out; it is the written commentaries accompanying images and objects that stamp 
them with a socially recognised meaning. This is the same argument behind the method 
of SyWme de la mode, where Barthes focused on the written representation of clothes 
and fashion, and not on the images or the actual garments, believing that it is the 
commentary that reveals the logic of the fashion system. In 'Sociologie et socio- 
logique' he also argues that structural sociology is better equipped to handle the rare, 
the exceptional and the particular than statistical sociology, which demands a 
considerable 'quantitative' presence of a social phenomenon before including it into its 
analysis (1962,969). The same principle holds for literary analysis, as he argued in Sur 
Racine: the role of a structural unit is not determined by its frequency, but by its 
position in the system of relations (1963,1097). Furthermore, in 'Sociologie et socio- 
logique' Barthes also argues that a system of binary relations alone cannot suffice to 
describe the complexity of a sociological (i. e. literate) society. A sociological society, 
according to Barthes, may be different from an ethnological society precisely through 
its ability to multiply the systems of logic by which it creates meaning and represent 
reality (1962,974). 
This notion of mimesis as recreating not substance but function, is, I think, the 
only kind of mimesis available to verbal art, for no literary work ('realist' or not) can 
recreate the substance of the world. It seems to me that this same notion of mimesis lies 
behind Soviet Sernioticians' notion of modelling systems and behind Benveniste's 
insistence that 'language re-produces reality' (Benveniste, 1971,22). And Barthes 
expresses a similar idea when he says in Critique et v&ite that 'ecrire, c'est deja 
organiser le monde, c'est d&jA penser (apprendre une langue, c'est apprendre comment 
l'on pense dans cette langue)' (1966a, 28). To organise a world by speaking about it 
through a certain language, to create its simulacrum, or to model it - these ideas seem to 
me quite similar. 
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The Dynamism of Literary Structure 
Let us now return to Barthes's idea at the end of 'Introduction', where he 
suggests that a literary structure is not as architecturally firm as he has led us to believe 
through the notion that the smaller units acquire significance only through their 
integration into the larger units. 
In Critique et v6ritý Barthes makes a distinction between a 'practical' and the 
literary use of language in relation to its intelligibility and context. In the practical use 
of language, according to him, any ambiguity in wording can be pinned down to just 
one meaning through intonation, gesture, or simply the context in which it appears. 
A literary work, on the other hand, is free from such a clear contextual frame, 
there is no clearly identifiable situation or context which can anchor its meaning (1966a, 
39). It is, literally, open to interpretation, and Barthes stresses that each age has its own 
favourite interpretation of literary works. This is because, Barthes says, a literary work 
is 'symbolic', i. e. its structure allows for the production of secondary meanings, 
depending on the historical and social circumstances which surround its reading (I 966a, 
37-8). 
Thus, Barthes proposes, a science of literature would not have as its task the 
interpretation of literary works; this he leaves to literary criticism, which he defines not 
as the 'uncovering' of the work's meaning, but as its covering with another language 
(1966a, 44; 1963,1098). If we know in advance that our interpretation in different 
cultural, social and historical circumstances is going to be seen in the same way as we 
see other interpretations - as conditioned by its cultural, social and historical 
circumstances - we might just as well consciously and openly put a stamp of our own 
time and context onto the work through our critical activity. 
But the role of the science of literature is different: it is not to search for 'the 
meaning', 'a meaning', or even past meanings of literary works, but to examine its 
signifying mechanism, its intelligibility (1966a, 43). Science's role is to describe 'selon 
quelle logique les sens sont engendr6s d'une manifte qui puisse 8tre acceplýe par la 
logique symbolique des hommes, tout comme les phrases de la langue frangaise sont 
accept&s par le "sentiment linguistique" des Frangais' (Ibid. ). 
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This is, of course, a famous methodological proposition, but it seems to me that 
it comes up against a serious problem, consisting of several conflicting issues. The 
French in general are capable of determining the 'acceptability' of a French sentence, 
but only if it is the French language which they themselves speak, and not, say, 
medieval French. The French could not judge the acceptability of a sentence in Serbo- 
Croat from the position of their 'linguistic feeling'. Since Barthes suggests that the 
interpretations of literary works change with the change in the context, how could a 
reader abstract himself or herself fully from those social circumstances and try to judge 
the intelligibility of a literary work from a position of general humanity? It could be that 
Barthes's analogy with the acceptability of French sentences for the French is 
misleading, and that the analogy with the Chomskian notion of 'universal grammar' 
would be better. 
Secondly, in order to study the potential of a work for the production of 
meaning, one would need to imagine what those possible meanings could be, but then 
one would be back to the beginning, into one's own historical context and its 
interpretative potential, possibly enriched by the knowledge of past interpretations. It is 
clear that Barthes wanted to open up a space where different interpretations can co-exist 
with equal validity, but how can we be sure that we could exhaust a work's 
intelligibility beyond what our age and context allows us to imagine? In other words, if 
we asked Aristotle whether he thought that Freud's interpretation of Sophocles's King 
Oedipus was acceptable to him as a human being, I would be very surprised if he were 
to say 'Yes'. 
But, still, the knowledge of the historical conditionality of our ability to 
understand literature is an extremely valuable one. It is this ability of the work to create 
secondary meanings that could explain why Barthes ends the 'Introduction' with that 
dynamic, 'wobbly' image of the literary structure: although the narrative may want to 
integrate all of its functions into a firm architectonic construction, readers' responses to 
each segment of the structure follow their own (historically conditioned) logic, which 
can throw the work off its balance. It also explains why some literary works seem 
&eternal' - it is precisely because they allow each historical period to make them fiercely 
their own, that is, very much historically relevant. 35 
35 On this, see also Lotman, 1977,23-25. 
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It was partly on this idea that Barthes based his definition of what literary history 
should be. 
Literary History 
In the 'Histoire ou Litt6rature' part of Sur Racine (1963), Barthes presented a new 
conception of literary history. Criticising the positivist literary-historical model, which 
focused its attention on the figure of the author and on the story of his life and work, 
Barthes suggested that a true literary history would have to be the history of the literary 
function, defined as the production, communication and consumption of literary works. 
Barthes claims that a historical study of literature should base itself on the premise that 
literature is a social institution, situated amidst a body of social beliefs, taboos, and 
values (1963,1091). Furthermore, there is the audience for whom a literary work is 
intended, and, according to Barthes, one should ask what the audience's expectations 
and demands were. Who was this audience and how did it (or they) perceive and define 
literature (1963,1092-93)? Barthes insists that by concentrating on the author and his 
immediate environment alone, positivist literary history leaves aside the properly 
historical part of its subject (1963,1093). What is needed, he argues, is a systematic and 
sociological approach to literary history. 
Patrizia Lombardo, in The Three Paradoxes of Roland Barthes points out that 
Barthes 'proposed a confrontation between history and literature', that is, bringing 
literary history in relation to history proper: 
[ ... ] because history is not a sequence but a constellation of forces, a process placing 
things in relation to each other and, one might also say, the point of contact between 
structure and event, between generality and particularity. (Lombardo, 1989,10- 1) 
We could compare this to Eikhenbaum's assertion that one of the most important 
literary-historical problems is 'the problem of the interrelationship between the facts of 
literary evolution and those of literary environment' (1971a, 59). Eikhenbaurn makes a 
distinction between literary evolution (of the literary system according to its own rules) 
and literary genesis (the question of sources and influences), and claims that after the 
initial period in Formalist theory, the time had come for the two notions to be combined, 
by 'incorporating the genetic facts into the theoretical-evolutionary system [... ] at the 
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very least, incorporating those facts which can and should be interpreted as having a 
historical bearing, as being connected with the facts of evolution and history' 
(Eikhenbaum, 1971a, 60). 
Barthes and Eikhenbaurn approach matters from two different positions: for 
Eikhenbaum, the theoretical model of literary evolution has already been developed, 
and is now in need of some positivism to 'help it along'. Barthes starts from a critique 
of positivism, and suggests that the development of a model capable of perceiving a 
system in the mass of disparate data is now in order (Barthes, 1963,1093). At the same 
time, it is clear from what Barthes says that literary history, in the context of his 
discussion about Racine, is not so much about literary evolution, but about a synchronic 
study of a literary-historical period. Roland Champagne, however, mostly bases his 
discussion of Barthes's ideas on literary history on the notion of 'mutations' of the 
literary text which are brought about by different readings of the same text by different 
generations (Champagne, 1984,9-10). 
The comparison between Barthes and Eikhenbaum may be simply another proof 
how close Formalism was to a very fruitful form of structuralism just before the purges 
began; and also, how far in 1963 Barthes felt there was still to go. 
The End of Structuralism? 
1970 is the year regarded by many critics as the year of Barthes's departure from the 
structuralist course. It was the year in which he wrote SIZ (which I shall look at later) 
and an essay entitled Vanalyse structurale du r6cit. A propos d' 'Actes' 10-11' 
(I 970a). 
In Vanalyse structurale du r6cit' Barthes claims that what is generally 
considered as 'structuralism' is a fabricated sociological notion, as there is no unified 
school of structuralist thought. He points out that there are profound ideological 
differences amongst structuralism's most prominent representatives (such as Levi- 
Strauss, Lacan, Derrida and Althusser), and warns against putting too much hope into a 
scientific method like structuralism, which can scarcely be considered as a unified 
method and which is certainly not a science (1970a, 842-43). 
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Nevertheless, he adds that there are some basic principles which would be 
acceptable to all who occupy themselves with the structural analysis of narratives, and 
these are the principles of formalisation, pertinence and plurality. 
The principle of formalisation or abstraction is derived from the Saussurean 
distinction between langue and parole. Barthes repeats the claim he made in 
'Introduction A Fanalyse structurale des r6cits': each narrative is a message articulated 
in the general language of narratives, and narrative analysis is there not to study and 
interpret the content of each of the narratives, but to compare their form and their 
relations to the shared ' narrative language'. Linguistics does not study this 'other 
language', and a new linguistics (which he calls translinguistics) should be established 
if we are to answer the question of what happens beyond the sentence. We still do not 
have the answer to this question, says Barthes; we once thought we knew, when rhetoric 
was still being studied, but now it has become outmoded and nothing has come to 
replace it. Narrative analysis should form a part of that future translinguistic discipline 
(1970a, 844). 
The principle of pertinence, says Barthes, has its origin in phonology, as it 
postulates that one should not seek to focus on the intrinsic qualities of an object or a 
phenomenon, but its differential value in relation to other objects or phenomena. One 
examines whether and what kind of implications formal variations can have on the level 
of content in order to decide whether a trait is pertinent or not. This is also connected to 
the specific use of the term 'meaning' or 'sense' in this context. Barthes here defines 
6sense' as 'all types of intra-textual and extra-textual relations', i. e. all traits in the text 
which link us to other traits of the same text or to other aspects of culture which are 
necessary for reading of the narrative. Thus, meaning is not defined as 'a full signified', 
but as a correlation or connotation (I 970a, 845). Barthes also adds that a good analyst 
must have an ear for alternative possibilities that a text implies but does not explore, an 
ear for aberrations and 'narrative scandals', which would help him not take the 
workings of the text for granted (1970a, 846). 
The principle of plurality implies that the aim of the structural analysis of the 
narrative is not to establish its meaning, but to point out the spaces in the text where 
meaning becomes possible. Furthermore, for Barthes, meaning is conceived not as just 
one signifying possibility among many, but as the very being of the possibility for the 
creation of meaning, the very essence of plurality. Because of this, structuralist analysis 
can never become a method of interpretation, and it differs radically from 6literary 
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criticism' (which searches for a meaning or for the meaning of the literary text) and 
from its different schools, which are always, at least to some extent, content-oriented 
(say, psychoanalytic or Marxist criticism) (1970a, 847). We can see that this is a toned- 
down and more acceptable version of the similar thesis put forward in Critique et v&U6, 
mostly because it makes no Uvi-Straussian appeals to human symbolic logic in general. 
The analysis of Acts 10-11. itself is based on a study of the codes through which 
the text's meaning is constructed. Barthes here looks at far more codes than he later 
used in SIZ, listing the narrative code (the code of narration), the topographic and 
chronological codes (which bear the logic of the vraisemblable), the historic code, the 
metalinguistic code, and several others, as the codes which contribute to the process of 
the text's structuration of meaning. Barthes points out the conventionality of the codes, 
their dependence on our culturally conditioned expectations and view of the 
vraisemblable. 
'L'analyse structurale du r6cit' is different from 'Introduction A Fanalyse 
structurale des r6cits' in that its focus moves away from the plot onto the general 
intelligibility of the text. The choice of the text analysed is a strong indication of the 
shift in itself. As Barthes points out, Acts is all about communication and the sending of 
messages; there is none of the what-will-happen-next suspense of Goldjlnger. 
Although this is a move away from the classical narratology as practised by Greimas 
and even Genette, it is at the same time a continuation of what Barthes already knew 
during his structuralist period: that the literary text has the ability to create a multitude 
of new meanings depending on the context in which it is read. 
There is a double movement in Barthes's structuralism. On the one hand, he was 
trying to stay within the bounds of French structuralism, with its love of Saussurean 
linguistics and closed synchronic structures based on binary oppositions. The 
structuralism of SyWme de la mode is an example of such a tendency; for the most part, 
so is 'Introduction A Panalyse structurale des r6cits'. This is Barthes's 'scientific 
delirium', in which it seemed important to stress over and over again that what one 
reads in stories is not real, that it is all just a logical matrix which we mistake for the 
image of the world, and that the textual mechanism by which meaning is made possible 
is what should be studied, independently of any actual interpretations of literary texts. 
On the other hand, the second strand of Barthes's structuralist thought was 
exploring the complexities of cultural and social contexts in which literary texts operate. 
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It defined structure as a simulacrurn of an object (in Vactivit& structuraliste) and 
stressed the social and historical responsibility of forms ('Sociologie et socio-logique'), 
while praising structuralism's ability to study the exceptional and the rare as a part of 
the social system. It believed that a society follows its own processes of structuration 
when representing the real, and it stressed the importance of language as a mediator in 
those processes of structuration. It is this second, socially, historically, and, as we shall 
see, ideologically aware strand which I find more interesting, and on which I shall 
concentrate in the following chapters. 
Let us now take a look at Mikhail Bakhtin and his structuralist credentials. 
But Is Bakhtin a Structuralist? 
The answer to this question will require a lot more space than the problem (or the 
relative lack of it) of Barthes's structuralist credentials. 
Discussing the early reception of Bakhtin's work in the States, Gary Saul Morson listed 
the circumstances which had contributed to 'the American misreading of Bakhtin': 
It was not inevitable, for instance, that his works were translated so that the least 
characteristic, Rabelais and His World, should have appeared first and his early writings 
last. If Jakobsonians had not been so well ensconced in American Slavic departments, 
would we have had to contend with the exceedingly odd view of Bakhtin as a 
structuralist serniotician? The unnecessary, unsupported, and arbitrary ascription to him 
of V. N. Voloshinov's and P. N. Medvedev's books created the weird impression that 
he was some sort of Marxist. Bakhtin, who saw life and history as fundamentally 
messy, would have appreciated the way the reception of his ideas has been shaped by 
contingencies. (Morson, 1995,35) 
Morson is here to certain extent repeating the claim he and Caryl Emerson made several 
years earlier about the weirdness and messiness of the reception of Bakhtin, caused by 
the ignorance of his early work and by the authorship debate (Morson and Emerson, 
19899 32ý 46-47). And although I would be perfectly happy to agree with Morson's view 
that the translation of the Rabelais book as Bakhtin's first in the American market was 
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one of those weird and messy events in life and history, and that the attribution of some 
of Voloshinov's and Medvedev's books and articles to Bakhtin was a veritable scholarly 
scandal, I find it a lot more difficult to concede Morson's second point that any view of 
Bakhtin as a structuralist serniotician would be 'exceedingly odd'. After all, it was 
through the eyes and in the context of structuralism and serniotics that Bakhtin became 
known and grew to be the intellectual phenomenon we know today, not only in the 
States, but also in France (through Julia Kristeva and Tzvetan Todorov) and to some 
extent even back home in the former USSR. 36 Had his own works not supported this 
6appropriation' to at least some extent, it would hardly have been possible for the 
similar kind of reading to occur in these three countries with their different scholarly 
and cultural traditions and contexts. However, since Morson and Emerson are probably 
the most influential Bakhtinian scholars, it is worth examining their arguments against 
the view of Bakhtin as a structuralist before I present the arguments why such a view 
may, indeed, be not only possible, but could also shed some interesting light on 
Bakhtin's ideas about literature. 
Before we do that, though, it is worth, remarking that Caryl Emerson may be a 
bit more sympathetic to the structuralist cause than Morson is. In her book The First 
Hundred Years of Mikhail Bakhtin, she places the late 1950s Soviet discovery of 
Bakhtin and the early debate about him (the 1960s) in the context of what Russians 
called the 'struggle between physicists and lyricists'. The 'physicists', according to 
Emerson, were 'young, high-tech linguists who advocated cybernetics, computer 
modelling, machine translation, and impersonal quantifications as the coming future of 
literary science', while the title of the 'lyricists', somewhat amusingly, was in this 
debate given to the 'old-fashioned Marxist-Leninist humanists' who believed that 
literature's 'ideal mission' was 'to reflect human being whole within a humane society' 
(Emerson, 1997,39). Emerson stresses that one of the most important subtexts of this 
debate was the rehabilitation of Russian Formalism, and, more concretely, the 
rehabilitation of 'the celebrated 6migW Roman Jakobson, 'the great paradigmatic 
Formalist' and one of the first structuralists, whose works became 'selectively available 
in his homeland' in the aftermath of his visit to Moscow in 1956.37 As Emerson points 
36 See, for example, V. V. Ivanov, 1976. 
37 See also Seyffert, 1985. 
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out, the 'lyricists' 'hastened to discredit' Jakobson, accusing him of non-Marxism and 
of indifference to history and class struggle; they were also complaining that in Russian 
Formalism one could scarcely 'find love, intuition, social justice, the humanistic horizon 
of art' (Emerson, 1997,41), and in many ways this criticism was extended to 
structuralism and semiotics as well. 
However, Emerson also notes that Dmitri Segal, 'one of the original 'physicists', 
'has strenuously insisted' 'that the Structuralist approach to literature, far from being a 
scientific straightjacket for ideas and values, was widely perceived at the time as 
Liberationist' (Emerson, 1997,39). In a rather Barthesian manner, Segal argued that in 
the Russian context, the ethical component of criticism was much more likely to be 
'subsumed by an absolutist politics', whereas 'an objective methodology like 
cybernetics (and later, serniotics), was equipped to demonstrate the conditioned nature 
of cultural value', and thus resist political myths (Emerson, 1997,40). Furthermore, she 
also notes that Soviet sernioticians were far from being indifferent to historical and 
social issues in art: 
The Tartu semioticians were 'specifiers' and 'segmenters', completely at home with 
quantification; in this sense their origins can be traced to the Formalists of the 1920s. 
But important differences obtain between them and hard-core early Formalism (as well 
as the more technically oriented Structuralists of a later day). The Tartu scholars were 
quantifiers who had been raised in a socialist ethos, however disfigured by Soviet 
practice. Not surprisingly, they insisted from the start that any sensible Structuralist 
approach to art also attend to thematic and social dimensions, that is, to authentic 
communication between real people with a cultural continuum. (Emerson, 1997,42) 
Thus, Soviet structuralists grew to be less interested in 'internally autonomous systems 
of signs' and dedicated themselves to 'the dynamic interplay of codes' 'that provide 
ground rules for personal honour, exchange of goods and values, and the reciprocal trust 
binding individuals within a society'. As Emerson points out, the Tartu sernioticians 
were not that far away from the 'familiar Marxist-humanist concerns' - to use her own 
words again, they promised 'Structuralism with a human face' (Ibid. ). 
Around the same time when the debate between 'physicists' and 'lyricists' was 
heating up, Bakhtin, who by then was living quietly in the provincial town of Saransk, 
teaching Russian and world literature at a local teacher's college, was rediscovered by a 
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group of graduate students from the Gorky Institute of World Literature in Moscow. As 
Emerson notes, the story of how it came about is now 'the stuff of legend'. In the late 
1950s, they chanced upon his 1929 book on Dostoevsky, and, to their great surprise and 
delight, discovered that its author was still alive. Throughout the 1960s the Gorky 
Institute group (among them Vadim Kozhinov and Sergei Bocharov, who were to 
become Bakhtin's literary executors) 'made numerous pilgrimages to Saransk', 
persuaded Bakhtin to rework his book on Dostoevsky, helped him publish his 
dissertation on Rabelais, generally encouraged him to continue working and start 
publishing, and, as Bakhtin grew older, increasingly took practical care of the frail old 
man. Apart from their passion for Bakhtin's work and their determination to make it 
better known, the Gorky Institute group, as Emerson puts it, 'was not without its own 
agenda' (Emerson, 1997,43). Namely, Kozhinov 'began to evolve into a neo- 
nationalist, ostentatiously Russian Orthodox in religious orientation while remaining in 
aesthetic matters an ambitious, conservative 'lyricist'. ' In 1965 he published a piece 
entitled 'Is a Structural Poetics PossibleT which attacked 'the entire idea of a linguistic- 
based methodology for literary studies', and in order to support his views, he 'evoked' 
those of Bakhtin's friends and colleagues (up till then pretty much unknown) 'who had 
written against Formalism in the 1920s' (Emerson, 1997,43-44). It is worth noting that 
he was only quoting Bakhtin's friends, and not Bakhtin himself. None the less, 
according to Emerson, 'with this move, Kozhinov began the practice - soon to become 
endemic - of selectively deploying the writings of Bakhtin and his circle, culled from 
archives available solely to him and other select disciples, in the struggle against the 
'physicists' and the Tartu school' (Emerson, 1997,44). 
At the same time, the Tartu sernioticians themselves were claiming Bakhtin for 
themselves, pointing out, as Emerson says, that 'in spirit' 'Bakhtin was not so anti- 
Formalist'. Emerson continues with the Sernioticians' arguments for claiming Bakhtin 
as one of their own: 
He [Bakhtin] was, after all, a technician, a generator of typologies, a thinker who had 
always resisted the simple 'refraction theory' of literary analysis in favour of more 
complex theories of cultural refraction. Like the Formalists, he celebrates craftsmanship 
and analysis; he constructs his literary theory not out of subjective categories such as 
genius or intuition but out of concretely observable devices (his 'dominant'just happens 
to be a hero's consciousness rather than a work's literariness). He had specifically 
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limited his Dostoevsky book to a discussion of the formal functioning ideas and words 
in a polyphonic novel, disregarding the suspicious ideology or content that fill them. In 
sum the Tartu scholars insisted that Bakhtin, despite all the nonquantifiable aspects of 
his thought, was still a 'scientist' - and to be scientific, nauchnyi, did not mean to 
dehumanise or de-historicize. Scientific criticism is dehumanized, Lotman intimated 
archly, only when it repeats itself, stuffs itself with stock phrases, and labels writers 
reactionary or progressive according to preestablished criteria. (Ibid. ) 
In 1973 the Tartu semioticians devoted an issue of their journal Trudy po znakovym 
sistemam to Bakhtin, and, as Emerson puts it, 'devoted much space in their journals to 
tidying up Bakhtin's unruly ideas' (Emerson, 1997,45). Their attempts to distinguish 
between 'shapeless, open, real-life dialogues and the highly organized dialogic relations 
that obtain in art (a line Bakhtin refused to draw)' and to 'stratify polyphony into 
discrete layers', came under criticism from 'many sceptics' (Ibid. ). These critics (whom 
Emerson does not name) claimed that in the semiotic analysis live dialogue is turned 
into 'the residue (what Bakhtin referred to as the 'sclerotic deposits') of a dialogic 
exchange', and that the most important element of Bakhtin's thought - the potential and 
promise of human activity - is lost in the attempt to translate his thoughts into the 
terminology and theoretical framework of semiotics. 
However, as Emerson noted, the Gorky Institute group had an agenda of their 
own in bringing out Bakhtin's writings (Emerson, 1997,45). According to Emerson, 
this group included not only the 'Marxist-Leninist brand of official 'lyricist', ' but also 
gneo-nationalist, mystical-religious brotherhood', who in the early 1970s founded a 
&counter- or antisemiotic journal, Kontekst' and 'began dribbling bits of his early and 
late unpublished manuscripts into print'. 'Naturally', says Emerson, 'they favoured 
those parts where Bakhtin's distaste of fixed codes and mechanical modelling combined 
with quasi-mystical, although often Aesopian, references to Christianity' - to the extent 
that Bakhtin's brief comments on what he saw as Dostoevsky's understanding of Christ 
became 'by extension Bakhtin's own convictions' (Emerson, 1997,46). Furthermore, 
'the politics of Kontekst became so inflexible and obscurantist that in 1982 even 
Pravda, a paper not known for its pluralism, reprimanded the journal's editorial board 
for intolerance' (Ibid. ). 
Nevertheless, Emerson considers the claim of the lyricists to Bakhtin to have 
been somewhat stronger, mostly because of his early and late comments against 
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'abstraction and system buildings of all sorts (what he called 'theoretism'), as well as 
because of the 'similar sentiments' 'reflected in the notebook jottings of his final half- 
decade' (Ibid. ). We shall return later to Emerson's interpretation of those 'jottings'; for 
the time being, let us quote the somewhat disturbing conclusion Emerson reaches on the 
Russian debate over Bakhtin: 
As Communism moved into the its final decade, then, it seemed that Bakhtin had been 
won for the 'lyricists' -a motley band of traditionalists, anti-Jakobsonians, 
antisernioticians, religious revivalists, and Russian nationalists. What had not yet been 
attempted was an impartial study of Bakhtin's life and texts relatively free of the 
reclamation wars. That task seemed to under way with much more vigour abroad. 
(Emerson, 1997,48) 
To a certain extent, Emerson is here presenting the intricately woven argumentation 
against the view of Bakhtin as a structuralist that she and Gary Saul Morson devised in 
their earlier joint work. This argumentation, which Emerson in The First Hundred Years 
ofMikhail Bakhtin presents with somewhat dampened enthusiasm and probably better 
awareness of Soviet Serniotics, has three main clusters of points as its basis. The first 
one is Bakhtin's youthful attack on what he called 'theoretism, which Morson and 
Emerson claim he maintained throughout his life. The second cluster of points is centred 
around Bakhtin's late attacks on Saussure and his criticism of certain structuralist 
notions, like 'code' and 'system'. The third argument is their very analysis of Bakhtin's 
own terminology and ideas, which they maintain to be incompatible with either 
structuralism or Russian Formalism. 
The argument whether the Soviet sernioticians were 'tidying up Bakhtin's unruly 
ideas' or developing them further is a topic for an entirely new thesis, and would not in 
any case prove whether Bakhtin himself was a structuralist or not. I would just like 
briefly to suggest that the sernioticians were prepared to engage actively with Bakhtin's 
ideas, rather than try to preserve their 'original' meaning, as the Gorky Institute group 
were (and are) trying to do. If 'the potential and promise of human activity' is the 
essence of Bakhtin's thought, than the promise and the potential of Bakhtin's ideas is 
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what people like Lotman and Uspensky were more than ready to pursue, by 
reinterpreting them and putting them into new contexts. 38 
Emerson highlights further the distortion vs. development aspect of this 
problem: 
Where the sernioticians really recuperating and explicating Bakhtin or where they 
transforming him into something else? The question is not trivial. For although good 
reasons can be found for desiring more preciseness in Bakhtin's thought, his entire 
phenomenology and discursive cast of mind appear to resist it. (Emerson, 1997,48) 
The last sentence brings us to a new question: whether Bakhtin's 'entire 
phenomenology' or even philosophy of life is relevant to every segment of his thought. 
Since this question is closely intertwined with my main question ('Is Bakhtin a 
structuralist? '), I shall first look at a work which has been seen both as Bakhtin's most 
anti-structuralist work, and as his most openly philosophical one. 
Toward a Philosophy of the Act: Theoretism 
Bakhtin's critique of 'theoretism' appeared in one of his early manuscripts (written 
probably between 1919-1921) which was discovered in 1972 and published for the first 
time under the title (chosen by S. G. Bocharov, the editor) K filosoflipostupka (Toward 
a Philosophy of the Act) in 1986 (Holquist, 1999; Bocharov, 1999). This long essay 
(together with another manuscript, later published under the title 'Author and Hero in 
Aesthetic Activity' in 4rt and Answerability) was discovered in 'a lumber room' in 
Saransk where it was 'severely damaged' by 'rats and seeping water', so that the first 
few pages were missing, and parts of it were difficult or impossible to decipher. 
Between its 'rescue' and publication it was accessible only to a small group of 
Bakhtin's 'disciples', literary executors and guardians of his 'chaotic, uncatalogued 
literary estate' (Emerson, 1997,46). So when these early essays were finally published, 
the effect was dramatic: as Michael Holquist and Katerina Clark argued all along in 
their 1984 book Mikhail Bakhtin (which was, as far as I understand, written at the time 
38 Just two examples of a constructive and interesting use of Bakhtin's ideas: Lotman, 'K strukture 
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when they alone among the American scholars had access to the manuscripts), Bakhtin 
was discovered to have had great interest in moral philosophy, and his early work bore 
witness to his early (and, Holquist and Clark claimed, enduring) devotion to ethical 
ideas and concerns. 39 One of those enduring and 'constant' concerns was, according to 
Morson and Emerson, Bakhtin's 'hostility to all forms of "theoretism", evident in 'The 
Philosophy of the Act'... His many attacks on "dialectics", his criticism of the 
Saussurean view of language, and his attempts to outline a theory of psychology 
inimical to both Freud's and Pavlov's all derive from his concern for the "eventness" of 
the event. They reflect as well his belief in the unsysternaticity of culture, the 
"unfinalizability" of people, and the centrality of genuine responsibility to human 
experience' (Morson and Emerson, 1989,29). 
So how is 'theoretism' defined and what objections does Bakhtin raise against it 
in Toward a Philosophy of the Act? Morson and Emerson propose the following 
definition: 
['Theoretism'] is described as a way of thinking that abstracts from concrete human 
actions all that is generalisable, takes that abstraction as a whole, transforms the 
abstraction into a set of rules, and then derives norms from those rules. But this process 
loses the most essential thing about human activity, the very thing in which the soul of 
morality is to be found: the 'eventness' (sobyffinost ) of the event. 'Eventness' is always 
particular, and never exhaustively describable in terms of rules (Morson and Emerson, 
1989,7) 
In stressing the importance of the notion of 'event' for Bakhtin, Morson and Emerson 
make it clear enough that it is a notion which is extremely important for his arguments 
on ethics and morality, but it is less clear why the critique of 'theoretism' in general 
(such as would implicate not yet existent structuralism and serniotics) would appear in 
the context of such a discussion. The first question, of course, is whether the notion of 
such a thing as 'literary theory' existed at the time, or whether literary scholars still 
simply talked about 'poetics'. Since Shklovskii published his 0 teorii prozy in 1929,1 
shall assume that the idea that one can write a 'theory' of literature was around in the 
dialogicheskogo teksta v poemah Pushkina', in 1995), pp. 228-236; and Uspensky, 1973 
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1920s, so that the assumption that 'theoretism' applies to literary theory is not 
immediately invalidated by an anachronism. 
The idea of the 'event' is central to Bakhtin's argument in 'Towards the 
Philosophy of the Act'; according to Bakhtin, real life is always in the process of 
becoming; it consists of 'never-repeatable' and unique events which we experience in 
unique and unrepeatable ways. In such a world, our every act, thought and word needs 
to be a responsible (in Liapunov's translation 'answerable ý), 40 active response to a 
particular situation, time and circumstances. As Michael Holquist points out in his 
'Foreword' to 'Towards the Philosophy of the Act', the essay is to a large extent a 
critique of Kant's notion of moral categorical imperatives: according to Bakhtin, there 
can be no universal rules in ethics which can be applied in each and every situation. To 
act ethically, we must respond to the unique and never-repeatable context in which we 
find ourselves, and act not purely on the basis of abstract rules and norms but also from 
our own individual feeling of what ought to be done in that particular situation. As 
Bakhtin puts it, 'any universally valid value becomes actually valid only in an 
individual context' (Bakhtin, 1999b, 36). From here Bakhtin develops his notion of 
what he calls 'non-alibi in Being' as an ethical category. Since each one of us is placed 
in a unique time and place which has never been and will never be occupied by anyone 
else, the only ethical thing to do is to take full responsibility to act from that particular 
and individual position, to develop fully the potential offered us by that position. 
Liapunov's translation of Bakhtin's argument for this, with its rhythms and repetitions, 
reads almost like a poem, so I shall quote it in its entirety: 
I, too, exist... actually - in the whole and assume the obligation to say this word. I, too, 
participate in Being in a once-occuffent and never-repeatable manner: I occupy a place 
in once-occurrent Being that is unique and never-repeatable, a place that cannot be 
taken by anyone else and is impenetrable for anyone else. In the given once-occurrent 
point where I am now located, no one else has ever been located in the once-occurrent 
time and once-occurrent space of once-occurrent Being. And it is around this once- 
'9 Morson and Emerson call Holquist's and Clark's approach to Bakhtin's ideas 'embryonic', 'because it 
describes the author's work as variants... of an initial idea or problem' (Morson and Emerson, 1990,6). 
40 Allan Reid, as well as Morson and Emerson, have repeatedly pointed out that the choice of the word 
'answerability' over the less suggestive 'responsibility' (which is what the Russian olvetstvennost' 
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occurrent point that all once-occurrent Being is arranged in a once-occurrent and never- 
repeatable manner. That which can be done by me can never be done by anyone else. 
The uniqueness or singularity of present-on-hand Being is compellently obligatory. 
(Bakhtin, 1999b, 40) 
The point Bakhtin makes is that this experience of uniqueness can never be expressed in 
abstract, theoretical terms - although one could easily argue that he has just done that 
within his philosophical essay (Holquist, 1999, xii). As Michael Holquist notes in his 
'Foreword' to Toward a Philosophy of the Act, 'Bakhtin is condemned from the outset 
by the nature of his subject to perform an impossible task ... Recognizing that all 
accounts of acts fundamentally differ from those acts as they are actually performed, he 
nevertheless seeks to describe - the act itself. It is a particularly complex way to 
demonstrate the truth of the old dictum that states you cannot escape theory, because 
any opposition to theory is itself ineluctably theoretical. Also, and not coincidentally, 
Bakhtin here reveals some of the existential pathos that sleeps in such ineluctability' 
(Holquist, 1999, xi-xii). 
Nevertheless, Bakhtin claims that there is a difference between the theoretical 
cognition of one's uniqueness and responsibility that comes with it and its 
acknowledgement and affirmation which can only come about in 'a unique and once- 
occurrent manner' (Bakhtin, 1999b, 40). If I simply recognise my uniqueness on a 
theoretical level, I also generalise it: 'everyone occupies a unique and never-repeatable 
place, any being is once-occuffent' (Ibid. ). Once generalised, the active sense of 
uniqueness is gone and with it the moral responsibility, and I become a 'pretender'. As 
Morson and Emerson point out, 'in Bakhtin's vocabulary... a pretender is not someone 
who usurps another's place, but someone who tries to live in no particular place at all or 
from a purely generalised, abstract place' (Morson and Emerson, 1989,19). Thus, my 
attitude toward my uniqueness and responsibility needs to be not only epistemological 
but also active, 'emotional-volitional', and 1, most importantly, must act upon it: 
I am actual and irreplaceable, and therefore must actualize my uniqueness. It is relation 
to the whole actual unity that my unique ought arises from my unique place in Being. I, 
the one and only I, can at no moment be indifferent (stop participating) in my 
means), collapses Bakhtin's 'pre-dialogue' and 'dialogue' phases into one, and implies dialogism where 
there is none. 
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inescapably, compellently once-occurrent life. I must have my ought. In relation to 
everything, whatever it might be and in whatever circumstances it might be given to me, 
I must act from my own unique place, even if I do so only inwardly. (Bakhtin, 1999b, 
41-42) 
Nevertheless, the role of 'theory' is not seen by Bakhtin as so irrelevant or obstructive 
to this process as Morson and Emerson claim. However, the problem is that it appears 
that those first few missing pages of 'Toward the Philosophy of the Act' were the ones 
which first dealt with the question of relationship between 'theory' and life in greater 
detail, so what we are left with what is (or seems to be) the centre of the argument 
without much exposition or definition of terms. However, what Bakhtin says about 
'theory' in the rest of the essay, at the beginning of the essay applies in fact to all, for 
want of a better word, 'cognising disciplines', i. e. 'discursive theoretical thinking (in 
the natural sciences and philosophy), historical description-exposition', and even art. 
And what Bakhtin says about them is that: 
The moment which discursive theoretical thinking (in the natural sciences and in 
philosophy), historical description-exposition, and aesthetic intuition have in common, 
and which is of particular importance for our inquiry, is this: all these activities 
establish a fundamental split between the content or sense of a given act/activity and the 
historical actuality of its being, the actual and once-occurrent experiencing of it. 
(Bakhtin, 1999b, 1-2) 
An action, which can be real 'only in its entirety'. participates fully in 'the unique unity 
of ongoing Being'; however, once its sense or content are extracted from it, they 
become part of a certain theoretical (scientific or artistic) discipline, which then 
develops and interprets the sense or content according to its own rules. As Bakhtin says, 
'the detached content of the cognition act comes to be governed by its own immanent 
laws, according to which it then develops as if it had a will of its own. Inasmuch as we 
have entered that content, i. e., performed an act of abstraction, we are now controlled by 
its autonomous laws, or, to be exact, we are simply no longer present in it as 
individually and answerably active human beings' (Bakhtin, 1999b, 7). As a matter of 
fact, the whole of culture seems to serve the purpose of extracting meanings from our 
living actions: 
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And as a result, two worlds confront each other, two worlds that have absolutely no 
communication with each other and are mutually impervious: the world of culture and 
the world of life, the only world in which we create, cognize, contemplate, live our lives 
and die or - the world in which the acts of our activity are objectified and the world in 
which these acts actually proceed and are actually accomplished once and only once. 
(Bakhtin, 1999b, 2) 
Faced with these two worlds, every act we perform is 'like a two-faced Janus', looking 
'in two opposite directions: it looks at the objective unity of a domain of culture and at 
the never-repeatable uniqueness of actually lived and experienced life' (Ibid. ). And it is 
only through the unity of an act of a responsible or 'answerable' consciousness with its 
cought' that these two worlds can be united - this unity can never be achieved from 
within the theoretical world alone. Talking about thought as an act, Bakhtin says: 
As a performed act, a given thought forms an integral whole: both its content/sense and 
the fact of its presence in my actual consciousness - the consciousness of a perfectly 
determinate human being - at a particular time and in particular circumstances , i. e., the 
whole of concrete historicalness of its performance - both of these moments (the 
content/sense moment and the individual-historical moment) are unitary and indivisible 
in evaluating that thought as my answerable act or deed. (Bakhtin, 1999b, 3) 
This does not mean that one cannot 'take its content/sense moment abstractly, i. e., a 
thought as a universally valid judgement'; it simply means that if one does that, then the 
historicity of the thought becomes irrelevant as it enters into the 'theoretical unity of the 
appropriate theoretical domain' (Ibid. ). Viewed in the context of a given theoretical 
discipline, the thought's 'place in this unity exhaustively determines its validity', and 
Bakhtin says explicitly that it is perfectly possible and justified to consider thoughts in 
this abstract manner (Bakhtin, 1999b, 3). As he says a few pages later, 'insofar as the 
abstractly theoretical self-regulated world (a world fundamentally and essentially alien 
to once-occurrent, living historicalness) remains within its own bounds, its autonomy is 
justified and inviolable' (Bakhtin, 1999b, 7). What is not justifiable, however, according 
to Bakhtin, is to either evaluate or perform an individual, historical act or a thought on 
the basis of its abstract content alone. What ought to be thought, said and done in a 
given moment must be determined by the moral subject, based on the possibilities 
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offered both by the historical, unique and unrepeatable circumstances and by the 
propositions as they appear in 'theory'. 'Theoretical veridicality is technical and 
instrumental in relation to the ought' (Bakhtin, 1999b, 4). It is the ought that can have 
no theoretical expression; it always has to be created anew by the responsible individual 
human subject for each of the situations in which they find themselves: 
On the whole, no theoretical determination and proposition can include within itself the 
moment of the ought-to-be, nor is this moment derivable from it. There is no aesthetic 
ought, scientific ought, and - beside them - an ethical ought; there is only that which is 
aesthetically, theoretically, socially valid, and these validities may be joined by the 
ought, for which all of them are instrumental. These positings gain their validity within 
an aesthetic, a scientific, or a sociological unity: the ought gains its validity within the 
unity of my once-occurrent answerable life. (Bakhtin, 1999b, 5) 
To repeat, Bakhtin does not deny the validity of theoretical knowledge in general; he 
just warns us that we are entering a dangerous ground if we ascribe to theory the power 
which it does not have - the power to help us navigate through the full complexity of 
moral action in an ever-changing world, and to regulate that action. 
However, Morson and Emerson shift the debate from action to understanding, 
and this is probably why they attribute to Bakhtin a much sharper and more hostile 
critique of 'theoretism' (which they, it seems to me, often take to simply mean 'theory') 
than the one he actually made. 'To understand human acts', say Morson and Emerson, 
6one must take into account unrepeatable "contextual meaning" (smyso. The failure to 
take this step beyond theoretism is utterly fatal for any understanding of ethics' (1989, 
8). However, it seems to me that the main question Bakhtin is asking is not: 'How can 
we understand the moral actions of others? ', but: 'Under what circumstances do I act 
ethically? When am I fully responsible for my actions? ' It is mainly a question of active 
morality, and the question of cognition and understanding is only secondary to it. 
When using the term 'theoretical knowledge' in this essay Bakhtin did not have 
just science in mind, but the whole world of culture, which, according to him, gives us a 
framework for the abstractions of sense or content out of once-occurrent and never- 
repeatable events. Thus, when Morson and Emerson talk of Bakhtin's enduring 'belief 
in the unsysternaticity of culture' (1989,29) they could not possibly have Toward a 
Philosophy of the Act in mind, as here Bakhtin talks of 'objective unity of a domain of 
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culture' as opposed to 'the ncver-rcpeatablc uniqueness of actually lived and 
experienced life' (Bakhtin, 1999b, 2). 
The essence of Bakhtin's argument is that theoretical knowledge (of any kind) 
has a tendency to organise itself according to its own rules and logic; in order to act 
responsibly, we must bring this theoretical knowledge back into the communion with 
the world-as-event; at the same time, if we choose to follow the abstractions of a certain 
theoretical discipline, we are justified in doing so, but only on condition that we are 
fully aware of what we are doing and that we take full responsibility for it. However, 
Bakhtin is giving us two different and rather contradictory ideas: the first is that 
theoretical knowledge has a tendency to pull our thoughts along a certain route whether 
we want it or not; but, the second is that, as he puts it in a footnote (which may or may 
not have been read accurately by his editor), 'the whole sense [? ] [I illegible word] of a 
judgement consists precisely in the fact that it usually does not remain a theoretical 
judgement, but rather is actually brought into communion with once-occurrent Being', 
i. e., 'any abstracting from one's actual participation is very difficult' (Bakhtin, 1999b, 
51). In short, theory, according to Bakhtin, is an inescapable dimension of human 
activity, but it ca never provide a key to specific situations. Furthermore, 'an answerable 
deed', says Bakhtin, 'must not oppose itself to theory and thought, but must incorporate 
them into itself as necessary moments that are wholly answerable' (Bakhtin, 1999b, 56). 
It is hard to see how this can be seen as a critique of any theoretical discipline or 
approach as such, structuralism included. 
Morson and Emerson, however, maintain that through this essay's insistence on 
the importance of the particular we encounter a 'problem that was to concern Bakhtin 
throughout his life': 
What can we say in general about particular things except that they are particular? What 
responsible discipline can be elaborated for the humanities, if the essential subject of 
those disciplines is all those things that are inevitably impoverished by being reduced to 
a system? (Morson and Emerson, 1989,29) 
First of all: what are 'all those things' that they have in mind? Bakhtin was talking 
specifically of moral action and moral philosophy's failure to deal with it, and not of 
the humanities in general. But even with this puzzling proposition, Morson and 
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Emerson come to a rather useful conclusion, that 'the concept of genre was to become 
central to that effort'. 
Genres of speech and literature, he was later to argue, provide specific complexes of 
values, definitions of situation, and meanings of possible actions. [ ... ] These 
6complexes' provide a relative stability, but they do not exhaustively define the 
members of the genre. Each act of speech and each literary work uses the resources of 
the genre in a specific way in response to a specific individual situation. The genre is 
changed slightly by each usage; it 'remembers' its uses, as Bakhtin was to put the point, 
anthropomorphically, in the Dostoevsky book. We need genres to understand specific 
acts, but in understanding genre we have not understood everything that is important 
about those acts. (Morson and Emerson, 1989,22-23) 
It seems to me that Morson and Emerson have a much bigger problem with 'systems' 
than Bakhtin ever did, and as Igor Shaitanov noted (1997,238-39), Bakhtin's and 
Tynianov's work on literary genres is not so very different. He even explicitly states 
that 'both Bakhtin and the Russian Formalists considered themselves to be working in 
the field of historical poetics, and in so doing, agreed on the verbal nature ofgenre and 
the generic nature of the word'. Morson and Emerson are probably right in identifying 
Bakhtin's later work on speech genres as, in effect, resolving some of the problems 
posed in 'Toward the Philosophy of the Act'. But I would not say that the main 
problem was how to describe the general aspects of the particular; it was much more 
how to bridge the gap, created in this early work, between culture and life, between 
abstract content or meaning and the eventness of Being. Furthermore, half way through 
Toward a Philosophy of the Act, Bakhtin had already found the path which he was later 
to follow, and realised that a theory of the utterance may provide him with a way to 
solve the problem: 
It would be a mistake to assume that this concrete truth (pravda] of the event that the 
performer of the act sees and hears and experiences and understands in the single act of 
an answerable deed is something ineffable, i. e., that it can only be lovingly experienced 
in some way at the moment of performing the act, but cannot be uttered clearly and 
distinctly. I think that language is much more adapted to giving utterance precisely to 
that truth, and not to the abstract moment of the logical in its purity. That which is 
abstract, in its purity, is indeed unutterable: any expression is much concrete for pure 
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meaning - it distorts and dulls the purity and validity in-itself of meaning. That is why 
in, abstract thinking we never understand an expression in its full sense. (Bakhtin, 
1999b, 3 1) 
In other words, the utterance is always full of concrete, contextual meaning that refers to 
a specific situation, time and place. I believe that it was from here that Bakhtin started 
his own theory of language and utterances. 
Ken Hirschkop notes (1999,13) that literary-critical readings of Bakhtin have 
tended to disregard the philosophical implications of his work, while philosophical 
readings have disregarded the more literary-historical aspects of it. There is nothing 
necessarily wrong in this, for a search for productive and fruitful ideas in Bakhtin's 
work, those which could be further developed through one's own interests, seems to me 
a much healthier order of procedure than the obsessiveness with which the 'Bakhtin 
industry' is searching for the 'real Bakhtin'. Is it really in the spirit of Bakhtin's very 
thought to limit it just what his own 'entire phenomenology' would allow for? 41 
But also, it has to be stressed one more time that Toward a Philosophy of the Act 
is a work that deals primarily with ethics, and that the term 'theoretism' refers to a 
tendency to contemplate an ethical problem in general and abstract terms, and not as a 
particular and unique event which demands our responsible action. As such, it is quite 
divorced from the specific problems of literary and cultural theory. 
The question of language and speech, however, is very close to the structuralist 
problematic, and here the anti-structuralist reading of Bakhtin is on a firmcr ground. 
'Speech Genres' and Other Late Essays 
There are two short paragraphs in one of Bakhtin's late 6essays', entitled (by the editor) 
'From Notes Made in 1970-71', which have been quoted by everyone who wanted to 
prove that Bakhtin was an antistructuralist and antisemiotician (including Morson and 
Emerson, 1989,29): 
` Michael Gardiner raises a similar appeal against Morson's and Emerson's refusal to discuss Bakhtin as 
in any way connected with Marxism, saying that 'Morson and Emerson seem determined (for whatever 
reason) to foreclose this potential dialogue from the outset, a closure which is seemingly at odds with the 
tenor of Bakhtin's own open-endedness and antidogmatism, (Gardiner, 1999,263). 
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Semiotics deals primarily with the transmission of ready-made communication using a 
ready-made code. But in live speech, strictly speaking, communication is first created in 
the process of transmission, and there is, in essence, no code... 
Context and code. A context is potentially unfinalized, a code must be finalized. A code 
is only a technical means of transmitting information; it does not have a cognitive, 
creative significance. A code is a deliberately established, killed context. (Bakhtin, 
1999a, 147)42 
None of it is really followed up by any clarifications, and there are no similar sentiments 
expressed in any of Bakhtin's earlier work (some of the other later essays, in fact, and in 
great detail, contradict the above quote). The claim that there is no such a thing as code 
in communication, apart from being startling, is also rather unclear, as the code is 
defined in the most unusual way: what can it mean to say that a code is a killed context, 
when, and not just in semiotics, those two notions are clearly separate and mean rather 
different things? Caryl Emerson, who quoted the above with approval and without 
questioning in 1989, expressed a rather more critical view of these two paragraphs in 
Bakhtin's notes in 1997, saying that 'to be sure, we should not make too much of this 
startling remark, a casual private jotting of Bakhtin's whose implications he never 
works out'. But, she also says: 
But it is also, of course, not true; codes can be cognitively and creatively significant to 
an enormous degree. For whatever reason, during fifty years of scholarly activity 
Bakhtin choose not to deepen or make more sophisticated his understanding of signs, 
codes, and their interaction with more inchoate human material - as so many 
contemporary sernioticians and socio-ethnographers (including Yuri Lotman himselo 
have done. Znak, 'sign', remained for Bakhtin the rather crude, binary Saussurean 
instrument that had been criticized by his circle in the 1920s. (Emerson, 1997,46) 
Is it then not remarkable how close Bakhtin came in his ideas to the work of Lotman in 
particular, without actually using much of the semiotic vocabulary or even knowing 
much, as Emerson claims, about the changes in the structural approach to language in 
42 There are actually three paragraphs that come one after the other, and they are usually quoted together; 
the second one, however, is used to prove that Bakhtin was not a Marxist, as it contains his critique of 
dialectics: "Take a dialogue and remove the voices (the partitioning of voices), remove the intonations 
(emotional and individualising ones), carve out abstract concepts and judgements from living words and 
responses, cram everything one abstract consciousness - and that's how you get dialectics'. 
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general? 43 However, with or without the serious consideration of the 'there is no code' 
and 'a code is killed context' paragraphs, Bakhtin's late essays, just like his early ones, 
are also supposed to be antistructuralist. I shall now examine some of the ideas put 
forward in some of those late essays, namely 'The Problem of the Text in Linguistics, 
Philology, and the Human Sciences: An Experiment in Philosophical Analysis', and 
'From Notes Made in 1970-71'. 1 shall leave 'The Problem of Speech Genres' for the 
next chapter, noting only that in it Bakhtin insists on the great complexity and diversity 
of our use of speech. 
'The Problem of the Text' 
So how is linguistics to cope with this complexity of speech genres and of the utterances 
which incarnate them? In no way, responds Bakhtin, in his notes which were published 
under the title 'The Problem of the Text': 
Language and the word are almost everything in human life. But one must not think that 
this all-embracing and multifaceted reality can be the subject of only one science, 
linguistics, or that it can be understood through linguistic methods alone. The subject of 
linguistics is only the material, only the means of speech communication, and not 
speech communication itself, not utterances in their essence and not the relationships 
among them (dialogic), not the forms of speech communication, and not speech genres. 
Linguistics studies only the relationships among elements within the language system, 
not the relationships among utterances and not the relations of utterances to reality and 
to the speaker (author). (Bakhtin, 1999a, 118) 
Although this could be read as a critique of one great structuralist, namely Roman 
Jakobson, who claimed that linguistics can be seen as dealing with the 'problems of 
relations between the word and the world' (Jakobson, 'Linguistics and Poetics', 1996, p. 
63), it can also be seen as ultra- Saussurean, resolutely keeping linguistics within the 
bounds given to it by the Swiss linguist. 'The Problem of the Text' retraces some of the 
43 See, for example, Allan Reid, 1990 and 1999; also, a dense analysis of the concepts Bakhtin shares 
with the Moscow-Tartu school of serniotics in Grzhibek 1995. Amy Mandelker (1995) gives an 
interesting parallel between Bakhtin's late work on the concept of the logosphere and Lotman's late work 
on the concept of the serniosphere. 
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problems tackled in 'The Problem of Speech Genres' (which we shall examine in the 
next chapter), but looks at them from a different angle. The title given to the piece is a 
fair description of that angle, as the problem of the text is one of the central to this 
section of Bakhtin's late notes. 
As Grzybek points out (1995) one of the (many) aspects of Bakhtin's thought 
which he shares with the Soviet Sernioticians is his understanding of the text (in 
Bakhtin's own words) 'in the broad sense - as any coherent complex of signs', which 
means that 'even the study of art (the study of music, the theory and history of fine arts) 
deals with texts' (Bakhtin, 1999a, 103; Grzybek, 1995,243-44). For Bakhtin, the 
distinctive characteristic of human sciences is precisely the fact that they deal with 
'thoughts about thoughts, experiences of experiences, words about words, and texts 
about texts' (Bakhtin, 1999a, 103). And the distinctive characteristic of the text is that it 
has two 'unconditional' (Bakhtin, 1999a, 107) and irreducible poles from which it can 
be observed: 
Each text presupposes a generally understood (that is, conventional within a given 
collective) system of signs, a language (if only the language of art). If there is no 
language behind the text, it is not a text, but a natural (non signifying phenomenon)... 
And so behind each text stands a language system. Everything in the text that is 
repeated and reproduced, everything repeatable and reproducible, everything that can be 
given outside a given text (the given) conforms to this language system. But at the same 
time each text (as an utterance) is individual, unique, and unrepeatable, and herein lies 
its entire significance (its plan, the purpose for which it was created). This is the aspect 
of it that pertains to honesty, truth, goodness, beauty, history. With respect to this 
aspect, everything repeatable and reproducible proves to be a material, a means to an 
end.. The second aspect (pole) inheres in the text itself... is linked not with elements 
(repeatable) in the system of the language (signs), but with other texts (unrepeatable) by 
special dialogic ... relations. (Bakhtin, 1999a, 105) 
We can see here a considerable presence of structuralist terminology and ideas. 
According to Bakhtin, this also means that, although languages (sign systems), which 
'have a common logic' (Bakhtin, 1999a, 106), can be ultimately all translated one into the 
other, the text, as seen from the second (dialogic) pole, in which it appears as an 
utterance, can never be fully translated (Ibid. ), as the context which the text addresses 
cannot be carried from one culture, or even one speech situation, to another. This also 
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means that there are two different ways in which a significative unit behaves, depending 
on whether we look at it as a language unit or a unit of an utterance (or of a text): 
Two or more sentences can be absolutely identical (when they are superimposed on one 
another, like two geometrical figures, they coincide)... But as an utterance (or a part of 
an utterance) no one sentence, even if it has only one word, can ever be repeated: it is 
always a new utterance (even if it is a quotation). (Bakhtin, 1999a, 108) 
And so, according to Bakhtin, and Saussure as well, we cannot and should not expect 
from linguistics to deal with such 'absolutely unrepeatable individualities as utterances'. 
That does not mean that we cannot found a science that could do it (Ibid. ), and Bakhtin 
is adamant that that science can never be linguistics. This should not be understood as a 
critique of linguistics, simply a very determined insistence that it should know its place. 
'The linguist is accustomed to perceiving everything in a single closed context (in the 
system of a language or in the linguistically understood text that is not dialogically 
correlated to another, responding text), and as a linguist, of course', says Bakhtin, 'he is 
correct'. The linguist is not correct, according to Bakhtin, when he tries to 'smuggle in' 
the problems of 'the relations of utterances to reality, to the real speaking subject, and to 
other real utterances - relations that first make the utterances true or false, beautiful, and 
so forth' into linguistics. As a (former) Yugoslav literary theorist put it to the linguists 
while making a relatively similar argument: Ne sutor ultra crepidam (Petrovic", 1972, 
103). 
The Notes from 1970-71 
In the notes from 1970-7 1, Bakhtin suggested that the dialogic relations of the utterance 
should be defined 'metalinguistically', and he briefly defines 'the area of 
metalinguistics' as including 'various kinds and degrees of otherness of the other's 
word and various forms of relations to it (stylisation, parody, polemics and so forth) as 
well as various methods of expunging it from speech life' (Bakhtin, 1999a, 133). 
Unfortunately, this is the part of Bakhtin's late work which is to a large extent 
unintelligible, and many of the thoughts are not fully thought through, or at least are not 
fully disclosed. There is only one other very sketchy mention of metalinguistics in this 
essay (Bakhtin, 1999a, 152), and as it is not mentioned anywhere else in Speech 
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Genres, it can be said that the idea of metalinguistics as a new science is only barely 
defined in Bakhtin's late essays, but that we can safely guess its subject and to a certain 
extent its methods from what Bakhtin has written about speech genres and the utterance. 
Nevertheless, many of the fragmented thoughts in 'From Notes Made in 1970- 
71' point to some great possibilities for literary scholarship and the human sciences in 
general. For example, close to the beginning of the essay Bakhtin makes a comment that 
'through the utterance, language joins the historical unrepeatability and unfinalized 
totality of the logosphere' (Bakhtin, 1999a, 134), and then picks up on that thought 
several pages later: 
The link between literary scholarship and history of culture (culture not as a sum of 
phenomena, but as a totality). Herein lies Veselovsky's strength (semiotics). Literature 
is an inseparable part of the totality of culture and cannot be studied outside the total 
cultural context... 
Science (and cultural consciousness) of the nineteenth century singled out only a 
miniature world (and we have narrowed it even more) from the boundless world of 
literature. This miniature world included almost nothing of the East. The world of 
culture and literature is essentially as boundless as the universe. We are speaking not 
about its geographical breadth (this is limited), but about its semantic depths, which are 
as bottomless as the depths of matter. The infinite diversity of interpretations, images, 
figurative semantic combinations, materials and their interpretations, and so forth. We 
have narrowed it terribly by selecting and by modernizing what has been selected. We 
impoverish the past and do not enrich ourselves. We are suffocating in the captivity of 
narrow and homogenous interpretations. (Bakhtin, 1999a, 140) 
And here we come across that idea of the 'boundlessness of culture', defined as the 
culture's ability to produce continuous interpretations of itself, to dig deeper and deeper 
in the search of new meanings and interpretations of its texts. The culture of 'Toward 
the Philosophy of the Act', which Bakhtin defined as severed from the eventness of 
Being, has by now become, through the particularity of the text and the utterance, linked 
to the infinite diversity and ever changing nature of life. At the same time, Bakhtin grew 
closer to semiotics and to the Eastern European brand of structuralism, sharing with 
them (sometimes, if his 'disciples' are to be believed, involuntarily) many of his 
concerns, problems, solutions to problems, and sometimes, but not always, the 
terminology as well. Lotman in particular shall stay with us for most of this thesis, 
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however, as many of his ideas I found extremely useful in my discussion of the relation 
between the ideas of Mikhail Bakhtin and Roland Barthes. 
But let us now return to Morson and Emerson, and to a more concrete example 
of how Bakhtin resolved the problem of the gap between life and culture. 
Bakhtin's Chronotope 
In his essays published under the title 'Forms of Time and of the Chronotope in the 
Novel' from 1937-38 (with 'Concluding Remarks' essay written in 1973), Bakhtin 
elaborated the idea that the presentation of time and the presentation of space in literary 
works of art are always intertwined and mutually dependent, and that one cannot be 
studied without the other. The term he uses to refer to this mutual dependence, 
chronotope (literally time-space), is taken from Einstein's theory of relativity 'as a 
metaphor (almost, but not entirely)' (Bakhtin, 1996a, 84); according to Morson and 
Emerson (1990,367), this 'cryptic comment' 'appears to mean that the relation of 
66chronotope" to Einsteinian "time-space" is something weaker than identity, but 
stronger than mere metaphor or analogy'. Within the context of literary theory Bakhtin 
employs it as a category which belongs to the domains of both form and content (insofar 
as these can be used as separate concepts) and which defines literary genres and 
deterinines their historical development. 
Although these essays carry the subtitle 'Notes toward a Historical Poetics', the 
development of the genres themselves, however, is not what interests Bakhtin most in 
this context. The historical development he is interested in is the complicated and 
interrupted process of capturing real historical time and space and the real historical 
man living in them in literary works of art (Bakhtin, 1996a, 84). The philosophical tint 
of this phrase has led critics like Morson and Emerson to see the essays on the 
chronotope as an example of Bakhtin's philosophy in disguise: while pretending to 
discuss 'only' literature, these essays really discuss ethics and deal with philosophical 
'discoveries about the relation of people and events to time and space' that 'have been 
made by narrative genres of literature' (Morson and Emerson, 1990,366). According to 
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Morson and Emerson, the chronotope essays can be seen as a continuation of the ethical 
problematic raised by Toward a Philosophy of the Act. 
Morson and Emerson are here partly arguing for their concept of Bakhtin as a 
philosopher (or a 'thinker') who never did straightforward literary theory. However, 
Bakhtin's terminology in the chronotope essays is quite different from the terminology 
in Toward a Philosophy of the Act, and his interest decidedly literary, which is 
something Morson's and Emerson's presentation of the later essays fails to reflect, or 
tends to gloss over to move on to the 'more interesting' political or ethical subtext. - 
For example, one of the definitions that they propose for the chronotope is that it 
is 'a way of understanding experience; it is a specific form-shaping ideology for 
understanding the nature of events and actions. In this sense, the chronotope essay may 
be understood as a ftirther development of Bakhtin's early concern with the 'act' (in 
Toward a Philosophy of the Act). Actions are necessarily performed in a specific 
context; chronotopes differ by the ways in which they understand context and the 
relation of action and events* to it' (Morson and Emerson, 1990,367). We can see that 
nowhere in this definition (nor in the preceding and following paragraphs) is literature 
mentioned, and the chronotope is presented almost as a purely cognitive-ethical 
category which can be firmly put in the context of Bakhtin's early ethical 
considerations. But between the chronotope essays and Toward a Philosophy of the Act 
Bakhtin had discovered the importance of language, developed the notions of dialogism 
and polyphony (in his book on Dostoevsky), and had turned more and more towards a 
literary problematic and the novel in particular. 44 I am not denying that one can uncover 
the underlying ethical concerns of the chronotope essays, I simply do not believe that 
they can be translated into pure ethical philosophy. 45 
As Bakhtin sees it, literature (that is, European literature) of different periods 
developed different ways of representing different aspects of time and/or space, but the 
art of representing historical time and man in it has only gradually been developed. 
Furthermore, although Bakhtin does not state this explicitly, it is clear from his remarks 
44 Morson and Emerson divide Bakhtin's career into four main periods: the first, philosophical, influenced 
by the Kantian tradition, concentrated on ethics; the second, in which Bakhtin discovers language and the 
dialogue (Dostoevsky); the third, divided into two parts, the first focused on the analyses of the novel, 
chronotope and heteroglossia, the second on Rabelais and the carnival; and the final, fourth, period, in 
which Bakhtin is looking at the speech genres, the nature of the humanities, and the problem of the text 
(1990,64-68). 
45 Although some of Bakhtin's ideas on the chronotope have proved useful for the critics dealing with 
moral problematic in works of fiction. See, for example, Eckstrom, 1995. 
96 
about the chronotopes in the novels of Tolstoy and Dostoevsky (or Goethe, whom 
Bakhtin considered to have been the first to discover 'historical time' alongside 
6personal time', and describe how the combination of the two made the individual 
human charactet46) that he believed that even the works of these giants of realism were 
capable of recreating only a limited and selective chronotope compared to the 
chronotope of the real historical proceSS. 47 Nevertheless, even with the awareness that 
real historical time and space can never be captured fully within a literary work of art, 
the history of the efforts to do so yielded some very interesting results which reflected 
the way man saw himself and his role in the world in the given historical moment. The 
role of language, as we shall see, is of considerable importance here, as the choice of 
words not only makes up the genre but also the world that that genre describes. And 
although Grzybek (1995,243) suggested that the concept of the modelling system was 
one of the few that Bakhtin did not share with the Tartu and Moscow school 
semioticians, there is, I believe, good ground for arguing that Bakhtin's genres and their 
chronotopes can be seen as modelling systems, as they shape reality (or certain aspects 
of it) in a particular way, through their particular use of language. I believe that there is 
also a link between the principle behind the notion of the chronotope and Barthes's 
notion of a literary work as a simulacrum, reproducing the world's structural elements 
through language. 
The individual chronotope essays look at several, historically quite distant, 
sources of the main chronotopes which developed in the European literature. Three of 
these are ancient Greek and Roman forms: the early Greek adventure novel, Roman 
satirical novel and Greek and Roman biographical and autobiographical forms. Apart 
from them, Bakhtin analyses medieval romances, different types of chronotope in 
' The essay on Goethe is a part of Bakhtin's early work on the Bildungsroman, which, having probably 
been written between 1936 and 1938 (Morson and Emerson, 1990,405. ), dates from the same period as 
the chronotope essays, and, as Morson and Emerson argue, can be read as their continuation. 
Unfortunately, the manuscript on the Bildungsroman was the one Bakhtin famously used as cigarette 
paper during the WW2, and we are left only with its beginning (Bakhtin, 'The Bildungsroman and Its 
Significance in the History of Realism (Toward a Historical Typology of the Novel)', in 1999a. ) 
47 'In Bakhtin's thought, Goethe and Dostoevsky represent two different impulses taken to their extremes. 
It will be recalled that Dostoevsky (as Bakhtin describes him) thought away development in order to 
present a world of pure simultaneity - 'the cross section of a single moment. Ile also tended to confine 
his heroes to small spaces (thresholds, corridors, and other locales for scandal). This way of visualising 
the world allowed Dostoevsky to create the most intense dialogues among people from different 
ideological camps, professions, backgrounds, even different eras... For Bakhtin, Dostoevsky was the 
extreme dialogist, even though his works lacked a sense of everyday life and historical development; 
Goethe, on the other hand, was the model of prosaics, even at the expense of some dialogic complexity. ' 
(Morson and Emerson, 1990,418-19) 
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folklore and the way they influenced Franqois Rabelais's writing and his chronotope; 
then idyllic chronotopes, as well as the role of the character of the fool, jester and 
buffoon in the history of the novelistic genre and its chronotopes. 
Morson and Emerson note that the ground covered by these essays ends, 
historically, with Rabelais, and argue that the chronotopes discussed in these essays 
should be seen against the much more developed chronotopes of the nineteenth-century 
novel. They claim that 'Bakhtin's main impulse is evidently to celebrate the novel since 
the eighteenth century', but, perversely, he chooses to talk of 'much earlier works' 
whose chronotopes he considers as 'most na*fve', and we are meant to construct 
Bakhtin's view of the novel 'by a cautious process of inverting the features of other 
[older] genres' (Morson and Emerson, 1990,373). 
However, I do not believe that this is quite right. As Bakhtin pointed out in the 
beginning, the development of the literary devices by which to represent time and space 
and their links was slow and complicated, and I would rather think that each of its steps 
should be, if not 'celebrated', then considered with the patience and respect. 
Furthermore, I believe that this is exactly what Bakhtin is doing: rather then discussing 
these earlier genres just in order to dismiss them as 'na7fve' in comparison with the 
nineteenth century novel, he talks of them as important milestones in our changing 
understanding of the world we live in, and in narrative literature's ability to reflect that. 
As Bakhtin himself stresses, these essays are meant to be just an introductory 
study of the history of genres and their chronotopes, and the list of chronotopes he 
proposes as having had the crucial role in shaping European literature, and the novel in 
particular, is neither exhaustive nor conclusive. Besides, the chronotopes which stand as 
the main topics of these essays are all 'macro-chronotopes'; they are the ones that create 
and define literary worlds in their broadest terms, and although they can help define 
different currents in the development of literary genres, they can only to a limited extent 
help explain the considerable differences between individual works within a single 
genre and describe the works' individual worlds. As Bakhtin stresses in the 'Concluding 
Remarks' to this collection of essays, every scene, every motif in a literary work of art 
is a small chronotope, and all of the chronotopes within a work of art enter into 
complex, dialogic relations with each other. However, in these essays he does not 
develop an interest in smaller chronotopes and their mutual relations, but concentrates 
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mostly on large chronotopes and the way their development has shaped the development 
of European novelistic tradition. 
So, for example, the first chronotope Bakhtin analyses is that of the classical 
Greek 'adventure novel', or, to follow more precisely Bakhtin's own terminology, the 
'adventure novel of ordeal'. The basic plot involves a love story between a boy and a 
girl, who get separated and have to go through a series of adventures and ordeals to find 
each other. Bakhtin terms the chronotope of this type of novel 'foreign world in 
adventurous time'. Adventurous time is characterised by the words 'sudden' and 
sunexpected'; everything that happens in it is a result of pure chance. The hero and the 
heroine do not do anything actively and intentionally, but everything just happens to 
them: unexpectedness and suddenness are the initiative - bearing elements in the plot of 
these novels. The main characters themselves do not show (or, in the whirl of 
unexpected and sudden events, do not have time to show) any signs of active initiative, 
but are just passive toys at the hands of blind chance. As they are separated by chance, 
so they will be reunited by chance; enemies might put obstacles to their love and friends 
might help them overcome them, but the hero and the heroine are 'passive players' to 
the end. And, as Morson and Emerson put it (1990,378), the historical process 'remains 
entirely abstract, just another source of random disruptive forces'. 
Furthermore, the world through which the hero and the heroine are carried by 
the whims of their fortune is a completely foreign world. It is full of strange animals and 
buildings and objects and customs; however, all these elements of strangeness and 
foreignness never cohere into an intelligible world, nor are they given any historical 
concreteness. They just remain strange and isolated in their strangeness. Moreover, this 
strangeness is not even set against the familiarity of their home country (besides, the 
hero and the heroine often come from two different countries); there is no sense of 
comparison between what is known and what is strange, but everything just remains 
perpetually and irredeemably fragmented and unfamiliar. The hero and the heroine seem 
unable to comprehend the world through which they are travelling, least of all in its 
historical and social aspects. Bakhtin suggests that it is precisely this absolute, 
fragmented, unintelligible foreignness of the world of the novel which makes the purity 
of its adventurous time possible. 
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According to him, a world that is known and understood in its social, historical 
and cultural concreteness could not fail to impart some of its causal laws onto the events 
of the plot. If everything remains incomprehensible in its fragmented strangeness, the 
bonds of cause and effect will not be able to establish themselves, and everything that 
happens will indeed appear to be a pure game of chance. It is as if the manner in which 
these plots are constructed (with their lack of causal relations and human initiative) 
locks both the readers' and the author's perspective to the characters' point of view. It 
would be possible to narrate the same story (whether in first or third person is of less 
importance) while indicating that events belong to the level of the world itself, while 
their randomness belongs to the level of the characters' perception. Everything that 
happens in that world could have been presented as only seemingly random, with a 
hidden truth (or at least explanation) behind that apparent randomness. Here, however, 
the two levels are indistinguishable, and the randomness of events intrinsically belongs 
to the world itself. The hero and the heroine are not the only ones who are lost and 
helpless in this incomprehensible foreign world; more disturbingly, we as readers are 
there on the same journey with them, bewildered, unable to tell a cause from an effect, 
subject to a game of chance in the world that cannot be known or understood (Bakhtin, 
1996a, 86-110). 
In contrast to this, medieval romances, which are in principle set in the same 
type of chronotope as Greek novels, that is, 'a foreign world in adventurous time', 
manage to place their protagonists into that chronotope in a completely different 
manner. The hero of medieval romances is, unlike the hero of Greek novels, entirely at 
home in this world of chance meetings and unexpected events. He is far from being a 
passive player in his adventures and a pure victim of frivolous chance, who will in the 
end be so fortunate as to go back to 'normal life' and marry his beloved outside the 
chronotope of his adventures; on the contrary, he throws himself into that strange and 
marvellous world and into his adventures like a fish into water. The chance world of 
medieval romances has its strangeness and wonder emphasised as its most appealing 
feature, and the hero, far from being perceived as a poor soul going through a series of 
misfortunes and catastrophes, is portrayed as experiencing fantastic, fascinating and 
enchanting adventures (interesting and enchanting even for himself). The world of 
medieval romances is full of strange and marvellous things, and its hero is just as 
wonderful and fascinating as it is; as Bakhtin puts it, far from being its victim, he is its 
essence and its best representative (Bakhtin 1996a, 151-58). 
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In addition to the bewildering and alienating strangeness of the chronotope of 
the Greek adventure novel, the space and time in it are linked in a purely mechanical 
manner. Space itself exists only in its expansiveness: the plot of the novels demands that 
its heroes travel great distances, that they be separated from each other by great 
distances, that they miss or find each other across great distances. What these distances 
cover in concrete terms is of far less importance. Thus the foreignness of the world of 
these novels is a sign of the great distances travelled; it is not of much interest in itself. 
The only likeness between the space and the time aspect of the novels' chronotope is the 
speed with which these distances are traversed. What matters is whether the characters 
make it on time to save each other from various misfortunes, or the fact that these 
misfortunes mostly happen because characters have the bad luck to be in the wrong 
place at the wrong time. The link between space and time is purely mechanical: the 
world is a map with a grid, and time matters only insofar as there could be no movement 
without it. 
However, there are other aspects of this chronotope which were, according to 
Bakhtin, extremely important for the development of the adventure novel as a genre. In 
that context, a particularly important aspect would be the peculiar private-biographical 
time frame of these novels. As Bakhtin points out, there are two main points on which 
the organisation of time is based in the novels of this type: the characters' first meeting 
and their falling in love from the point which sets the story going, with their fortunate 
union in marriage as the final point of the plot. What happens between these points is, as 
Bakhtin puts it, 'an extratemporal hiatus between two moments of biographical time' 
(1996a, 89-90). Characters come out of all those trials and tribulations completely 
unchanged; their love for each other has stayed the same, they themselves are as young, 
fresh and beautiful as they were when they first met. Had they changed, had the events 
they went through affected them in any way, it could be said that what they went 
through was a part of their real biographical time. As it is, this gap in biographical time 
can be as long or as short as the author or his audience desire. Lost between numerous 
tsuddenly's' and 'just at that moment's', the real amount of time it would take for all 
those adventures to take place remains unaccounted for. Bakhtin notes that in the 
seventeenth century novels of this type became ten or fifteen times longer than their 
Greek 'ancestors'. Voltaire in his Candide ridiculed the clich6s of those novels by 
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taking into account the amount of time it would take for a man or a woman to go 
through all these adventures and the traces they would leave on their character, psyche 
and body. Thus, at the end of Candide all the characters are old and scarred by all the 
misfortunes that befell them; Candide and Cun&gonde are both too old, and Cun6gonde 
too ugly, for their marriage to mean the fulfilment of their life-long desire for each 
other. 
Another element of this is that the heroes of Greek adventure novels have no 
links outside their private, biographical worlds and their love for each other; family, 
home, country, class, historical circumstances have no bearing on their identity. They 
are isolated, private individuals in a foreign world, and their love' is the axis of that 
world. Even historical, political and social events (like wars, religious rituals, existence 
of slavery) enter into this private time and space only insofar as they are relevant to the 
love story about the hero and the heroine. And the fact that the characters do not change 
as a result of all the misfortunes that they go through represents in fact their victory over 
that random, foreign world of blind chance and sudden encounters. They might have 
seen completely helpless and passive, toys in destiny's hands, but it was, in fact, 
precisely that passive resilience to the world's attempts to change them that proved their 
identity, character and love as strong and enduring. 
Thus, according to Bakhtin, Greek adventure novels paint a picture of a human 
being that resists the world's attempts to change him or her; they sing the praises of the 
resistance and purity of human nature. As Bakhtin puts it : 'The hammer of events 
crumbles nothing, and it forges nothing; it just tests the strength of the finished product. 
And the product endures the test. There lies the artistic - ideological meaning of the 
Greek novel' (Bakhtin, 1996a, 219). And in this plot of tests and trials lies the Greek 
novel's greatest legacy in the history of genres. 
However, Morson and Emerson (1990,382) claim that Bakhtin was principally 
interested in 'the great nineteenth-century novels' in which a new element was 
introduced - 'the idea of becoming'. As they put it: 
Novels of pure testing presuppose either a stable identity (as in Greek romance) or, in 
other variants, an identity that undergoes a single crisis of rebirth. What these novels do 
not contain is the concept of true development, by which Bakhtin means 'becoming, a 
person's gradual formation' (DiN, p. 392). In traditional novels of testing, the hero 
displays unchanging 'inert nobility' (Ibid. ), whereas in the nineteenth century, major 
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novels show a hero continually growing with experience, changing in response to 
external events and his or her own decisions. Choices not only reveal the hero and 
heroine, but make them. (Ibid. ) 
However, it seems to me that, if one chooses to read Bakhtin through his ethical subtext, 
there is another way of interpreting his analysis of the Greek romances. Although Greek 
novels of ordeal do not pay any attention to how a person might change, they do portray 
how a person might stay the same in a mad world of random chance. There is 
sometimes a merit in staying the same when the world around you seems a strange place 
which functions according to some inhumane and inexplicable laws; sometimes, one 
better not 'develop' and adapt to one's circumstances, because those circumstances are 
not worthy of being adapted to. I shall not pretend that I know that this is how Bakhtin 
felt in the Soviet Union during Stalin's rule, but it is possible that he, and many others, 
did. After all, he was probably arrested in 1929 just because his name was found in a 
wrong address book - by mere blind chance - and he afterwards chose not to participate 
in Soviet public life because he refused to compromise with his surroundings. And I 
believe that the achievement of Greek romances, if seen in this light, does not seem at 
all naYve or 'primitive'. It still tells a relevant story of human life; its chronotope, 
although sometimes seemingly quite abstract and unsatisfactory, offers a framework for 
an image of human personality which would be more difficult to convey, in a realist 
novel. 
Chronotope is defined as the organising centre of the main narrative events in 
the novel (Bakhtin, 1996a, 250), and as such it implies the notion of narrative 
structuration. This is obviously not the structuralism of Greimas and Genette, but a 
structuralism similar perhaps to that of Northrop Frye. A particular chronotope 
determines the logic of the events that can take place in it. The abstract, fragmented 
foreign world of the Greek adventure novel allows for little else but for random events 
to take place in it; its lack of coherence and logic determines the lack of causality, 
coherence and logic in its plot as well. Or to use a more familiar example, in nineteenth- 
century literature, the chronotope of the provincial town came to the fore. This type of 
chronotope presents us with a life monotonous and cyclical, without any changes or 
variations. Precisely because this chronotope is so static, it can never be the only 
chronotope in a novel, it always has to be contrasted with chronotopes of movement and 
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energy (Bakhtin, 1996a, 247-48). Thus, in The Dead Souls the mouldy atmosphere of a 
small provincial town is contrasted with the mad, frantic chronotope of Chichikov's 
journey; and even in Madame Bovary the grey province she never escapes is contrasted 
with the world in which she would like to live, with the chronotope of journeys and 
adventures, of strong winds, picturesque storms and fascinating landscapes. After all, 
we could say that the whole tragedy of Emma Bovary is that she ended up in a novel 
with the wrong kind of chronotope. 
If we compare this to the plot-centred analysis proposed by Barthes in 
'Introduction A Vanalyse structurale des recits' (and by structural narratology in 
general), it becomes apparent that, far from being functionally weak, Barthes's 
informants and catalysers serve a very important purpose indeed: that of creating the 
world in which certain types of things can happen and others cannot. In Bakhtin's 
scheme of things, 'flesh' carries more weight than bare 'skeleton'. 
As for the representation of time in the novel, Bakhtin gives us an alternative 
viewpoint to Barthes's assertion that time in the narrative is a referential illusion which 
misinterprets logical relations as temporal. Of course the time of the events in the novel 
is not 'real' time, but Bakhtin argues that language can represent different experiences 
of time, with their varying degrees of causality between events and different speeds with 
which they follow one another. Barthes seems to assume that all narratives try to create 
the illusion of the 'real' time of lived experience, of which causality is an important 
part, but he does not take into account that not all experience of time is linked to the 
experience of causality, and that, moreover, a narrative can be set in a completely non- 
realist, fantastic chronotope. Bakhtin's argument would be that the chronotope of the 
novel determines what kind of events are possible in it; the representation of time can 
either try to create a referential illusion of real time or create a completely fantastic 
world in which people can sleep for centuries while staying young throughout that time. 
Bakhtin's chronotope is Barthes's topological and chronological code combined into 
one (Barthes himself says (1970a, 850) that the two are connected through the creation 
of the rules of the vraisemblable), but the purpose it serves is to create the framework 
for the characters and the action, whether realist or not. Creating the illusion of the 
vraisemblable is just one of its many possible functions. 
Bakhtin also uses the notion of the chronotope to discuss the relationship 
between the author and the reader, whose worlds have their own chronotopes (Bakhtin, 
1996a, 252). The worlds and chronotopes of the author and of the reader can be 
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separated by many centuries and they can come from different countries, but, according 
to Bakhtin (1996a, 253), they still belong to the real, unfinished historical reality which 
is separated by a sharp border from the world represented in the text. This, however, 
does not mean that there is no connection between them; on the contrary, the real, 
historical world of authors and readers can be regarded, according to Bakhtin, as 'the 
creating world', as it helps the author create the world represented in the text as much as 
it helps the reader reconstruct that world. 
According to Bakhtin, we must never confuse the real world with the one 
represented in a work of art, and readers from one epoch with readers from another 
epoch, but, nevertheless must never forget that the two worlds (the real world and the 
represented world) are inextricably linked. To use the organic metaphor Bakhtin himself 
uses, between the two worlds there is a continuous exchange going on, similar to the 
continuous exchange of matter between the living organism and its environment: while 
the organism is alive, it does not merge with that environment; but if you separate it 
from it, the organism will die (Bakhtin, 1996a, 254). 
Bakhtin here somewhat exaggerates the continuity and universality of the 
experience of history that human beings have. Nevertheless, the idea that the context of 
reading as much as the context of writing influences our view of the literary work is 
undoubtedly here, providing us with another link with Barthes. In Sur Racine Barthes 
proposed that literary history should study literature as a social institution, that it should 
study the history of the literary function, defining it as the production, communication 
and consumption of literary works. In Critique et viritj he argued that the structure of 
the literary work allows for the production of secondary meanings, depending on the 
historical and social circumstances which surround its reading. The idea that a literary 
work owes its life to its ability to create connotative meanings and to engage readers 
across time and space is shared by both Barthes and Bakhtin. 
So, is Bakhtin a structuralist? Soviet sernioticians and other structuralists who 
actively engaged with his ideas certainly thought so; but their views have in recent times 
been replaced with a strong anti-structuralist sentiment among many of Bakhtinian 
scholars. We have seen that the arguments against Bakhtin's status as a structuralist 
which rest on his early work (Toward a Philosophy of the Act) are faulty to the extent 
that the y mistake an argument about ethics for an argument about literary theory. We 
have also seen that those later writings (on the problem of the text, for example) which 
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have been read as attacks on structuralism and structuralist linguistics, can also be read 
as productive dialogues with and developments of structuralist ideas. They also contain 
standard structuralist statements such as 'behind each text stands a language system', 
and maintain a strong distinction between the notions of speech and the language. 
Whatever Bakhtin says about the unrepeatable nature of the utterance (which has been 
read as a distinctly anti-structuralist notion) is in perfect agreement with Saussure's 
point that a word can be coloured by different meanings depending on the context and 
intonation (Saussure, 1995,106-7). Much of Bakhtin's supposedly anti-structuralist 
ideas can simply be read as extensions of structuralism, in the manner of Benveniste, for 
example. 48 As for his other works, one could argue that because he does not use a 
typically structuralist terminology or a set of ideas (synchrony/diachrony, 
signifier/signified, etc. ), they cannot be regarded as structuralist. However, as Barthes 
argued, a structuralist is recognised not by his vocabulary (Genette, for example, does 
not use those terms very often), but by a 'structuralist imagination'. For Barthes, a 
structure is a simulacrum of an object (or of a world) which recreates its inner relations 
and modes of functioning. Bakhtin, in his essays on the chronotope, provides us with 
just such a notion of the simulacrum of a world through a particular use of language. A 
chronotope is a blue-print of a world, a set of relations which outline the limits of all 
possible action within that world. Bakhtin may not have used structuralist terminology 
often, but his ideas rest on the distinction between speech (as dependent on its context) 
and the language as a system, and on the idea that each language shapes the world in a 
particular way (which is, again, a very Saussurean notion). Bakhtin's insistence on the 
importance of the context for the understanding of an utterance or of a literary work 
may not be in agreement with French narratology's view of the functioning of a literary 
text, but it is in perfect agreement with Tynianov's, Mukar'ovsky's, Lotman's and 
Barthes's more socially-oriented strands of structuralism. 
48 As for the seemingly anti-structuralist sentiments, as opposed to ideas, one would probably find that all 
great structuralists sometimes raged against the more dogmatic and simple-minded forms of structuralism. 
See, for example, Lotman (1977,32), probably attacking both the vulgar Marxist criticism as much as a 
dogmatic structuralism: 'Hardly anyone today would dispute the fact that a society's way of life 
determines the face of art. But does the repetition of this truism really compensate for our inability to 
explain how a text by Dostevskij differs from the one by Tolstoj? And why identical conditions give rise 
to different works of art? 
'Why, then, from a structuralist point of view, must a work be studied as a synchronically closed 
structure, and why is an immanent analysis of the text the natural result? Do not structuralists thereby 
ignore the non-aesthetic meaning in a work? ' 
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What Bakhtin also shares with Barthes is the idea that literature can never fully 
represent the complexity of the world, and they both studied the ways in which 
literature nevertheless tries to do it. Bakhtin, however, was more tolerant towards the 
multitude of attempts that at least shed a light onto a particular aspect of the world 
(whether through the chronotope of an adventure novel or the much more complex 
historical chronotope of a novel by Tolstoy), while Barthes focused more on the illusion 
of the real behind the 'reality effect', and on its hidden conventionality. Nevertheless, 
the idea that a society structures reality through language, and that literature is an 
important contributor to a society's view of itself and the world, is, as we shall see in 
more detail in the next chapter, shared by both. 
The structuralisms of Barthes, and especially Bakhtin, are far from being typical 
examples of the high structuralism of the 1960s France and its scientific dream. They 
are deeply ethically and socially engaged with the strong sense that things are worth 
studying only if they can tell us something about the forces that shape our world and our 
position in it. What I have already said about Barthes' structuralism also applies to 
Bakhtin: the main issue for them both is less about finding out what things are, and 
more about finding what they mean for us, of what importance they are to us as human 
beings (Barthes, 1964a, 1332). Barthes makes the point that structuralism has a great 
deal to reveal to us about our humanity, for one of its most important aspects is the 
manner in which we give meaning to things. 
It would seem, however, that Bakhtin's primary interest in the character's 
position within the chronotope is completely different from Barthes's assertion that a 
character is just an agent within a 'sphere of action'. For Bakhtin, the worlds created by 
novels do not exist for their own sake, or for the sake of plot development; they are 
clearly there to be populated by literary characters (human beings), because it is only 
human beings that can ever really interest us (Bakhtin, 1996a, 107). According to 
Bakhtin, we live in an anthropocentric world, and we always ask that our own picture to 
be reflected back at us; we demand that the image shown bears some relation to that 
unfinished, puzzling, real historical world in which we live and to our role in it. And 
good literature plays the role of the Ocean in Lem's Solaris: it creates images that 
recreate our deepest fears, guilt, passions and longings, it confronts us with the world in 
which we live and which we sometimes refuse to see. 
And although Barthes did not believe that literary characters can reveal much 
about our humanity, he still believed in the need to examine our position in the world 
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and to approach the historical and social relations in which we find ourselves with a 
sense of responsibility. To some extent, this was a result of Sartre's influence on 
Barthes, but it was also something that Barthes retained as a principle throughout his 
life. The sense of historical and social responsibility is another concern that Barthes and 
Bakhtin shared; and the question of what one says and writes formed a large part of it. 
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Chapter 2: Silencing and Voicing Ideologies 
An interest in ideology (broadly defined as a view of the world) and the way in which 
language expresses the speaker's ideological position runs like a thread through the 
works of Barthes and Bakhtin. 
They were both deeply concerned with the way mythological and authoritative 
thought and word stifles the true life and possibilities of a culture and its language, 
which they both linked with cultural and social diversity, contradiction, and conflict. 
Barthes wrote extensively about the dominance of the French bourgeois ideology, its 
grip on everyday life and the use of the French language, and the difficulty of escaping 
that grip and writing literature which would be free from or subversive towards myth. 
Both Barthes and Bakhtin placed the creation of the superior or most desirable form of 
verbal creation (for Bakhtin, the novel, for Barthes, 6criture) at the point where a 
culture loses its mythical sense of unity, with a new voice appearing or simply insisting 
on being heard. For Bakhtin, the shattering of the mythological thought and word is 
always the starting point for the birth or the rebirth of the novel as a genre; whereas 
Barthes saw the revolution of 1848, and the appearance of the new, proletarian voice 
and consciousness, as the turning point in French culture, after which the (bourgeois) 
writer could no longer assume that they spoke for, and from the position of, universal 
humanity. 
They both also saw an urgent need to find the appropriate methodology for 
studying verbal diversity, which would not be purely descriptive in a linguistic sense, 
but would be linked to the study of the society and culture of which that diversity is a 
part. 
The thought of my two subjects does not always meet or even share a common 
ground, but even where their ideas seem very different, the differences enable us to see 
different sides of the same problem: how we see the world and in what terms we express 
our vision; and also, how literature makes use of different ideologies and their linguistic 
expression. 
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Mythologies Barthes's View of Bourgeois Ideology 
Barthes's most popular, accessible and widely read work was originally written as a 
series of articles for Les Lettres nouvelles between 1954 and 1956, and published by 
Seuil in 1957 under the title Mythologies. This book is probably one of the main reasons 
why Scholes speaks of Barthes as 'certainly the most sociologically oriented of the 
literary structuralists' (Scholes, 1974,149), and why Calvet sees Barthes's work as an 
exemplary politically oriented version of serniology (Calvet, 1973). 
The essays are small analyses of French bourgeois ideology as it manifests itself 
in newspaper articles, advertising, beliefs and objects in everyday life. The variety of 
phenomena in which Barthes convincingly illustrated the presence and the mechanism 
of French bourgeois myth could only lead him to one conclusion: myth is everywhere, 
there is hardly any element of language and culture which is not influenced, distorted 
and even created by it. Barthes argues that the French bourgeoisie, as a ruling class and 
a class that defines French society, has imposed itself and its own values and 
'mythology' on every aspect of life, from eating to marriage to travel writing. 
However, what is peculiar about this omnipresence of bourgeois ideology is that 
its bourgeois origins are not felt by those who are consumers of bourgeois myth. 
Barthes claims that the bourgeoisie can be defined by its tendency to lose its name, to 
become anonymous on an ideological level: it is clearly present where the economy is 
concerned (capitalism is openly professed), it starts to disappear where politics are 
concerned (Barthes claims that the French bourgeoisie politically hides itself behind the 
idea of 'nation'), and when it comes to ideology bourgeois man likes to see himself as 
the Universal, Eternal Man, and his own beliefs as eternal and universal values and 
truths (Barthes, 1957,703-5). 
Barthes stresses several times that bourgeois myths are historical entities, 
products of historical circumstances, as much as the elements of life and culture around 
which they are created. But what characterises bourgeois myth is precisely its tendency 
to strip everything of its historicity, and to see it in those lofty terms of Eternity, 
Universality and Essence. Through myth, things lose their memory of their own origins 
and changes that they have undergone. This concept of myth is a clear reflection of 
L&vi-Strauss's distinction between a historian's and a politician's evocation of the 
French Revolution: 
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... que fait Phistorien quand il 6voque la R6volution frangaise? Il se r6f&re A une suite 
d'Mnements pass6s, dont les cons6quences lointaines se font sans doute encore sentir A 
travers toute une s&rie, non-r6versible, d'&6nernents interm6diaires. Mais, pour 
Fhornme politique et pour ceux qui Ncoutent, la R6volution frangaise est une r6alit6 
d'un autre ordre; s6quence d'6v6nements pass6s, mais aussi schýme dou6 d'une 
efficacit6 permanente, permettant d'interpr6ter la structure sociale de la France actuelle, 
les antagonismes qui s'y manifestent et d'entrevoir les lin6aments de Nvolution future. 
(L6vi-Strauss, 1958,23 1) 
In L 6vi-Strauss's interpretation, the French Revolution by becoming myth does not 
stop being a historical event, but it, more significantly, becomes a blueprint of France as 
such. Its historicity is pushed into background in order to accommodate present political 
interests which are hidden behind the Revolution as a model of the way things are. 
According to Barthes, bourgeois ideology installs itself into every sphere of life, 
and the essays in Mythologies illustrate this persuasively. As Scholes puts it, Barthes 
'finds meanings that are cultural, collective, almost involuntary' where the subject in the 
bourgeois society is concerned (Scholes, 1974,162). Eve Tavor Bannet has noted 
(1989,54) that, the way Barthes describes the picture of the black soldier saluting the 
French flag (immediately recognisable as a symbol of French Imperiality), the flag is 
not actually in the picture itself; Barthes just assumes that it is there. 49 The alarming 
aspect of this is that the consumer of the myth (the role Barthes plays in recognising the 
meaning of the photograph as that of 'French imperiality' and how lovely it is we are all 
in it together) not only immediately recognises the meaning of the photograph, but the 
assumed meaning projects onto the mythical form that which is not actually there. 
Thody has probably given us the most unforgiving (the other word for it would 
be 'intolerant') critique of Mythologies. His main argument is that: 
... there was an element of fair comment 
in the frequent remark that Barthes himself 
was guilty of inventing the greatest myth of the lot. He had, after all, ascribed the most 
alienating features of modem mass communications to a nefarious but ill-defined 
conspiracy entitled the bourgeoisie and had never paid his readers the compliment of 
" See also: Moriarty, 1991,26. 
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saying who the bourgeoisie actually were, where they got their money from, and where 
the supposed plethora of Wes reques was actually to be found. (Thody, 1977,50) 
The instinctive reaction to this would be to say that to demand the proof for the 
existence of the bourgeoisie more than a century after Marx clearly indicates an 
elementary political deafness. Leak (1994,32), however, restrains himself from this 
knee-jerk reaction, and notes that although 'the suggestion that Barthes should have 
supplied the names and addresses of the conspirators is irresistibly ludicrous, Thody 
nevertheless does have half a point'. This is being truly generous, as Thody throughout 
his book refuses to recognise that, if nothing else, it certainly proved the overwhelming 
existence of bourgeois values and myths in French society. Leak's criticism is a lot 
more subtle, as it asks what kind of bourgeoisie Barthes had in mind: petty bourgeoisie, 
or the 'grand' bourgeoisie, or both? For Barthes sometimes presents the 'grand' 
bourgeoisie as the ideological oppressor of everyone else, including the petty 
bourgeoisie (who confuse their own interests with the interests of the 'grand' 
bourgeoisie), but sometimes the petty bourgeoisie are presented as a far more politically 
dangerous (and almost grotesque) side of the bourgeois class (Leak, 1994,32-38). 
Another criticism which needs to be addressed here comes from Michael 
Gardiner, who claims that 
Barthes himself makes no apologies about the fact that he is exclusively concerned with 
the analysis of the internal organisation of cultural texts. As such, the premise of 
serniology is that there is no need to refer to socio-historical context to comprehend 
myth, insofar as what is of crucial importance is not so much what texts mean as how 
they mean. (Gardiner, 1992,149) 
This could not be less true of Mythologies; one need only cite the essay 'Saponides et 
d6tergents', which ends on the note that behind the 'epic battle' between Persil and 
Omo lie the interests of a single company which produces them both (Barthes, 1957, 
586). After all, the whole point of Barthes's essays in this volume is to unmask the myth 
by showing the political and social reality behind it. Leak stresses that 'Barthes means 
something quite specific by 'le politique'; it refers to the deepest (and most hidden) 
level of social reality: the relations of production, and resulting power structures, which 
form the base of any given society' (Leak, 1994,29). 
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The Semiology of 'Le Mythe, 'aujourd'huil' 
Te Mythe, aujourd'hui' is the theoretical postscript added to the essays, and it is 
generally seen as the first example of Barthes's use of Saussure's and Bjelmslev's ideas, 
which he is believed to have discovered in 1956 (Dosse, 1998,1,74-76), the point 
which Barthes himself made in the famous interview with Jean Thibaudeau (1971b, 
1315). And, yet, Calvet in his biography of Barthes quotes Greimas as saying that 
Barthes discovered Saussure between 1949 and 1950, while he was working on his book 
on Michelet (Calvet, 1990,124). This would also mean that Barthes had read Saussure 
before finishing his book Le Degr6 z6ro de 1'6criture (which was published in 1953), 
and this would imply that the terms 'langue' and 'parole' together with 'ecriture' and 
6 style', in Le Degr6 z6ro de 1'6criture do not function just as a set of private terms, but 
as a reworking of Saussure's terminology. I shall, however, discuss this earlier work 
later and return for the moment to Mythologies and Te mythe, aujourd'hui' in 
particular. 
A possible argument for using the year 1956 as the year of the 'discovery of 
Saussure' would be the impression that Barthes's awareness of Saussurean terminology 
was very fresh and recent when he wrote 'Le Mythe, aujourd'hui'. This freshness is 
reflected in the apparent terminological confusion contained in the titles of the first two 
paragraphs of the essay: 'Le mythe est une parole', says the first; 'le mythe comme 
systeme s6miologique' is the definition proposed by the second (Barthes, 1957,683- 
85). The opening sentences are full of contradictory statements which would make any 
good Saussurean weep. 50 Without any explanation for this terminological 
capriciousness, Barthes flips between the idea that myth is 'speech', 'message', and the 
idea that it is 'a system of communication', 'mode of signification' and 'form'. As the 
difference between message and code is one of the most important and the most clear 
theoretical distinctions Saussurean linguistics makes, it is difficult to tell why Barthes 
made such an elementary mistake in merging the two in his definition of myth. This 
confusion (or apparent confusion) is probably one of the most problematic aspects of 
Mythologies, as well as the most revealing. 
50 As did Georges Mounin, 1970. 
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And it is not one which has been left without comment. Although Andrew Leak 
in his 1994 monograph Mythologies (which deals exclusively with that text) fails to 
mention it, Steffen Nordhal Lund and Louis-Jean Calvet do raise the issue. However; 
they both simply attribute the confusion to the very freshness of Barthes's knowledge 
and to the bad assimilation of his Saussurean lesson (Lund, 1981,39; Calvet, 1973,67), 
which may also explain why so many other authors ignore the issue: Barthes simply got 
it wrong at the beginning of his structuralist adventure, so it would be better and more 
polite not to mention it. Thus, Umberto Eco and Isabella Pezzini (1982) praise Barthes 
for showing the way for a general serniology which would go beyond linguistics, but 
fail to mention that he was at that stage so badly acquainted with the basic terminology 
of the discipline whose boundaries he was expanding. Similarly, on the topic of 
Mythologies, Hawkes claims that Barthes was 'one of Saussure's most powerful 
interpreters in the matter of serniotics', without any mention of the misunderstanding 
present in that interpretation (Hawkes, 1977,130). 
Michael Moriarty, on the other hand, suggests that the combination of the terms 
'system of communication' and 'message' in the definition of myth is only 
6superficially contradictory, but in practice perfectly clear: a myth is not just any 
message, but a message produced by a certain signifying mechanism' (Moriarty, 1991, 
22). He has also suggested to me in a private conversation that the confusion might be 
due to the function of the French definite article, which could mean either 'a myth'-or 
$myth in general'. So it would make sense to say that a myth is a message produced by 
the system of communication which is myth in general. However, I shall opt for the 
troublesome reading that insists on the presence of the confusion, for I believe that such 
a lectio difjlcilior could yield some more interesting results. 
The third definition Barthes offers brings us a step closer to the solution of the 
puzzle: here, Barthes defines myth as a 'second[ary] serniological system' (Barthes, 
1957,687); it is a language built upon a natural language, using its signs as its 
signifiers. According to Barthes, in the words of natural language myth sees nothing but 
its own primary material; thus once they enter into this second serniological system, the 
signs of natural language become itsform. In a manner identical to the structure of the 
sign of natural language, theform is linked to a concept (the term Barthes uses for the 
second system's signified), and together they form myth's signification (that is, myth's 
own sign). 
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This model, as Leak (1994,18-19) points out, is an elaboration of Hjelmslev's 
distinction between denotation and connotation. At the end of his Prolegomena to a 
Theory ofLanguage, Hjelmslev envisages a 'connotative serniotics', which rests on the 
observation that certain 'sign classes are expression for the connotators as content' 
(Hjelmslev, 1961,118); 'not for nothing', adds Hjelmslev, 'does the national language 
stand as "symbol" for the nation, the local dialect as "symbol" for the region, etc' (196 1, 
119). 
At the same time, Barthes's concept of a second serniological system is 
remarkably similar to Soviet sernioticians' slightly later concept of secondary modelling 
systems. 51 As we have seen, Lotman in The Structure of the Artistic Text defines 
secondary modelling systems in pretty much the same way that Barthes defines his 
second semiological system, and explicitly includes myth amongst them. According to 
Lotman (1977,9), secondary modelling systems not only use natural language as their 
primary material (as their signifiers), but are constructed on the model of language. 
Apart from being an interesting conceptual coincidence in French serniology and Soviet 
semiotics, 52 Lotman's use of this concept in relation to literature can help us understand 
why Barthes used those first two, at a first glance contradictory, definitions of myth. 
As we have seen, according to Lotman, every language is not just a sign system 
used in communication, but also a modelling system: it models reality in a particular 
way. Thus, the language of chemistry models the world in a different way to the 
language of physics, and differently again from the language of sociology. In a way, the 
relationship of these more or less specialised languages (or, to be more precise, of their 
users) to the reality they model is a pragmatic one: if I want to describe the world in a 
particular way, I choose the language that is best suited to my purpose. And if my 
purpose is to describe the way our world is made up of atoms and molecules, there 
would be little purpose in my choosing the languages of astrophysics or sociology, as 
the language of chemistry is best suited to the task. The role of natural languages (as 
opposed to the artificial languages of science) is rather different (as the Soviet 
serniotician V. V. Ivanov pointed out), in'that the natural language possesses a certain 
51 A rather amusing account of how the term 'secondary modelling systems' was coined is quoted in 
Emerson, 1997,41. 
52 For, as far as I am aware, the Soviet group arrived at the concept of secondary modelling systems 
independently from Barthes. It is also interesting that they made much greater use of that concept than 
French sernioticians did; perhaps this was the result of the Soviets' greater readiness to work in with each 
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semantic fluidity and complexity which makes it possible for one and the same word to 
be used in different contexts, or, as Ivanov puts it, 'in which a sign or word functions as 
the family name for an entire complex of heterogeneous objects' (Ivanov, 1988,29). In 
most languages, words with complex meanings coexist together with the words of more 
strictly defined meanings in everyday, poetic and scientific languages. 
The result of this semantic complexity and fluidity is natural language's ability 
to 'describe the entire diversity of human experience'. Capable of dealing with any 
subject matter, natural language (as Ivanov puts it) 'remains the fundamental 
interpretation for all the formalised languages constructed upon it' (Ibid. ). In other 
words, formalised languages (such as, for example, scientific languages), constructed 
upon natural language and deriving their semantics from it, are in no way divorced from 
natural language, but represent its continuation and, although constantly developing, can 
ultimately be translated back into natural language. 
To go back to Lotman, literature, as well as other secondary modelling systems 
like religion and myth, uses natural language (and often even artificial languages, like 
the scientific ones) as its primary material. And just as with natural and artificial 
languages, in literature it is possible to differentiate between message and code, between 
literary language and individual utterances in that language (between, for example, the 
language of European Romanticism and individual Romantic works). However, 
whereas in relation to natural language and artificial languages the differentiation can be 
fairly consistently maintained throughout, in literary language this is not quite so. In the 
conceptual context of Lotman's and most other Soviet semioticians' ideas, the clear 
separation between langue andparole in relation to natural and artificial languages is 
easy to understand. As natural language is capable of describing 'the entire diversity of 
human experience', there is no friction between the world (as experienced by human 
beings, which is the only world known to us) and that particular modelling system. As 
for artificial languages, their pragmatic 'take it or leave it' relationship to the world they 
model again makes that relationship fairly unproblematic. In both cases, language is a 
transparent modelling system; what is said in that language creates its own meaning. 
This is not so for secondary modelling systems. As Lotman points out, 'when a writer 
chooses a certain genre, style or artistic school, he is also choosing the language in 
other on joint projects and write joint papers, so that once a useful term would be put into circulation, they 
would all start using it almost immediately. 
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which he intends to address his reader' (Lotman, 1977,18). The choice of a language is 
at the same time the choice of a particular model of the world, and determines the 
general categories within which the message (the literary text itself) will be formulated. 
Thus the choice of the language already carries meaning; as a matter of fact, as Lotman 
puts it, 'the most important information is that which arises when a type of artistic 
language is selected' (Ibid. ). This is a very similar point to the one Barthes made in Le 
Degrj zjro de V&riture; we shall return to this point later. 
Although Lotman here talks about this phenomenon of langue and parole 
collapsing into one as a distinctive feature of literary texts (verbal works of art), it 
would probably be true to say that the same applies to all secondary modelling systems. 
If one takes the example of religion as one of the secondary modelling systems, it is 
quite obvious that the choice of a particular religious language will to a large extent 
determine the characteristics of the world described by or referred to by any message 
created in that particular language. 
As the same can be said of myth and ideology, this brings us back to Barthes and 
his use of the terms 'speech' and 'semiological systems' in his first two definitions of 
myth which at first glance seemed to do such great violence to Saussurean distinction 
between langue and parole. The third definition of myth as a secondary semiological 
system, if considered through the conceptual framework of Soviet semiotics, puts this 
apparent terminological confusion into an entirely different light. Where secondary 
semiological (or secondary modelling) systems are concerned, the choice of the system 
(language) will determine in its most general outlines the content of the world portrayed 
in that language and, with it, the content of the message uttered in it. Thus it becomes 
possible to collapse the notions of serniological system (language) and speech within a 
single definition of myth: myth as a semiological system not only makes it syntactically 
possible to create meaning (the way primary, natural language does), but also carries 
meaning itself The very choice of a particular language of myth (say, the use of words 
like 'bogus asylum-seekers' for whom 'Britain is a soft touch') is already a message in 
itself (so that, in this case, the words: 'we want to keep them out, although that goes 
against the International Declaration Of Human Rights', need not be said). 
If we look at the concept of natural language as understood by Barthes, the 
distinction between the way natural language (which he simply calls langue as opposed 
to mythe) and second semiological systems create meaning will become even clearer. 
117 
According to Barthes, the arbitrariness of language's signs means that the signifier on 
its own is 'empty', that is, empty of meaning; the sign, on the other hand, is full, that is, 
it has a meaning (Barthes, 1957,686). From this it also follows that there is no friction 
between the world and the word: since the signifier is unmotivated by any a priori 
interpretation of the thing it denotes (and thus is, as Saussure said, arbitrary), meaning 
here is transparent, and allows us to see the thing itself and our relationship with it, and 
not simply our view of it. As Barthes puts it, it is precisely the arbitrariness of the sign 
that stands as the basis of natural language's 'sanity' (Barthes, 1957,695); natural 
language with its transparency does not project a world-view back onto the world itself. 
It is very important to note that the world of which Barthes is talking is historical 
and political in a very broad sense of those two words: things that constitute it change 
with time and are more often than not a product of human activity and intentionality. 
Barthes here adopts Marx's thesis that every object (even the most natural one) contains 
in itself a trace of the human activity which produced, influenced, used or rejected it 
(Barthes, 1957,708). Natural language reflects this active and changing relationship 
between man and the world. For this Barthes uses the example of the word 'tree' as 
used by a woodcutter: for a woodcutter the word 'tree' is not an image, but the meaning 
of his action (709). But if I am not a woodcutter, for me a 'tree' is nothing but a fixed 
image, an instrument of my language (709-10); it in no way reflects my active role in 
the world, but only my view of it, in which 'trees' play a certain part (for example, as 
something that represents pure Nature, or as a symbol of bravery before the elements, or 
as a symbol of rootedness in one's environment). 
And this is precisely what happens with myth, that secondary serniological 
system. 
in myth, according to Barthes, words are stripped of their historical and political 
meaning, leaving nothing but a fixed, de-historicised and de-politicised image behind. If 
in natural language the signifier is empty of meaning, once a sign from a natural 
language enters myth as its form, it is emptied of its own historical, political meaning in 
order to 'serve' myth's concept as its signifier. But unlike language's signifier, which is 
arbitrary and unmotivated, myth's form is chosen precisely because its relationship to 
the concept is to some extent motivated. 'To some extent' are operative words here, 
precisely because myth takes from the sign's meaning only what suits its concept, and 
abandons the rest. What is specific about myth as a second serniological system is that it 
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does not 'kill off' the meaning a sign has in natural language, but just puts it at a 
distance, making it possible for it to be recalled at any time, except that this never (or 
hardly ever) happens. According to Barthes, it is in myth's interest to keep the sign's 
primary meaning alive, because its own life depends on it; at the same time it is also in 
myth's interest to keep that meaning hidden, out of view, because it is only then that it 
can be fully successful (Barthes, 1957,689-90). 
Genette notes how morally engaged Barthes as a semiologist is, how eager he is 
to uncover the unalienable meaning of things with which natural language left to itself is 
still in touch. But he also notes that material intimacy, access to the 'essence of things" 
is seen as a 'lost paradise' (Genette, 1966,201-4). Genette does not say this, but there is 
a good deal of romanticising of natural language at play here. As Leak puts it: 
The (serniological) theory of myth is itself balanced precariously atop an unexploded 
myth: the myth of object-language, or denotation as a 'natural state of language'. (Leak, 
1994,70) 
In connection with this, and with particular reference to the wood-cutter's 'pure' use of 
the word 'tree', Leak also suggests that Barthes shares a striking similarity with Sartre, 
insofar as 'the latter also harboured an inferiority complex towards the proletariat: the 
worker was felt to enjoy direct access to the stuff of reality, and this lent him a solidity, 
a real-ness to which the intellectual, who was always working at one remove from 
reality, could not hope to accede' (Leak, 1994,69). 
There are a few additional points that need to be made here. 
Firstly, there is the notion, inherited from Saussure, that, in natural language, the 
relationship between the signifier and the signified is arbitrary (Saussure, 1995,67-8). 
But is it? Although Saussure says that there is no internal connection between the idea 
('sister' and the French or English sequence of sounds which acts as its signal (67), he 
also says that the 'two elements are intimately linked and each triggers the other' (66). 
Benveniste took issue with this obvious contradiction by saying that 'the argument is 
falsified by an unconscious and surreptitious recourse to a third term which was not 
included in the initial definition. This third term is the thing itself, the reality' 
(Benveniste, 1971,44). According to Benveniste, the arbitrariness of the sign exists 
&only under the impassive regard of Sirius or for the person who limits himself to 
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observing from the outside the bond established between an objective reality and human 
behaviour and condemns himself thus to seeing nothing in it but contingency' (Ibid. ). 
Benveniste stresses that the link between the signifier and the signified is far from being 
arbitrary; on the contrary, it is necessary (45). As he puts it 'the mind does not contain 
empty forms, concepts without names'; the two are, as Saussure himself said, intimately 
connected (Ibid. ). According to Benveniste, the only arbitrary relationship we can talk 
about where the linguistic sign is concerned is that between the sign and, as he puts it, 
the element of reality to which it is applied; but even then, we would only be pointing 
out the real problem and leaving it aside for the time being, because this is 'indeed the 
metaphysical problem of the agreement between the mind and the world transposed into 
linguistic terms', as yet unsolvable by linguistics itself (46). 
Barthes, who in later years wrote with great respect about Benveniste (see 
Barthes, 1974b and 1976), may not have read him when he was writing Mythologies. It 
was only from 1964 that he started referring to him (I 964b); he praised him (I 974b, 30) 
for showing us that 'le language ne se distingue jamais d'une socialite', which is similar 
to the kind of praise that has been given to Barthes himself, even by such reluctant 
'admirers' as Michael Gardiner, who says that 'Barthes's recognition of the specifically 
political implications of the 'power to signify' is probably the crucial insight that 
structuralism has brought to a critical theory of ideology' (Gardiner, 1992,148). But 
even if Barthes had not noted Benveniste's critique of the notion of the sign's 
arbitrariness, his wholesale acceptance of Saussure still remains somewhat problematic. 
Besides, it seems to me that even after reading Benveniste Barthes remained convinced 
of the validity of the notion of arbitrariness, although Barthes (1966c, 63-64) notes the 
importance of Benveniste's article on the arbitrariness of signs. In Critique et virit6, 
while arguing that it is not the frequency with which an element of a literary work 
appears, but its position in the overall structure which makes it significant, Barthes 
repeats the argument which is linked to the notion of arbitrariness, namely that a word 
signifies through its difference with other words. Although the opposing term to 
'difference' here is not 'referentiality' but 'repetition', Barthes illustrates the claim with 
the statement that in French the word 'baobab' has neither more nor less meaning than 
the word 'ami' (1966a, 45). 53 This, however, is so obviously wrong (and wrong it would 
be, I imagine, for most languages) that I find it difficult to believe that Barthes really 
53 1 do wonder whether he was thinking of Le petit prince when he chose those two words as his example. 
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meant it. The word 'friend' certainly possesses more cultural, social and emotional 
meaning than the word 'baobab', and they cannot be all put aside under the heading 
6connotation', much less could it be said that a native speaker would feel that the link 
between the sound pattern and the meaning was arbitrary and based on pure difference. 
Ivanov's idea that natural language can be applied to the full diversity of human 
experience not by the arbitrariness of its sign but by the dynamism and fluidity of its 
semantics provides us with an important modification of Barthes's theory as laid out in 
'Le mythe, aujourd'hui', so that we can say that, in natural language, the living context 
of the speech act modifies the meaning of the words used to suit the context and the 
speaker's intention, but the underlying potential for meaning still remains flexible 
enough to be used to a different effect in another context and with different intentions. 
This, as we have seen, is also the view of the 'practical' use of language that Barthes 
puts forward in Critique et veriti. Myth, on the other hand, locks the meaning of a word 
or a phrase into an ideological position from which the semantic complexity cannot be 
recalled. In other words, myth petrifies language. 
Bakhtin, Myth, the Epic and the Authoritative Word 
In 'Discourse in the Novel' Bakhtin defines mythological thought and belief in magic as 
characterised by the 'absolute fusion of word with concrete idelogical meaning' 
(Bakhtin, 1996a, 369). Whereas Barthes observed the phenomenon of mythological 
thinking in the contemporary French society, Bakhtin claimed that the 'absolute 
hegemony of myth over language as well as the hegemony of language over perception 
and conceptualisation of reality are of course located in the prehistorical (and therefore 
necessarily hypothetical) past of language consciousness' (Ibid. ). Although it is clear 
that Bakhtin uses the term 'mythology' in its classical sense, to refer to tales about gods, 
the creation of the world and man., and so on (i. e., the mythology of, say, ancient 
Greece), he still stresses that, in principle, as long as the word and its ideological sense 
are inseparably 'grown into' each other, we are still dealing with mythological thought. 
And from there it is not difficult to see the similarity of Bakhtin's definition of 
mythological thought with Barthes's use of the term in relation to the way in which 
French bourgeois ideology seeps into all aspects of language and everyday life. And 
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although Bakhtin claims that the 'absolute hegemony of myth over language' died with 
the beginning of the historical era, he still points out that the mythological aspects of 
language are maintained (in the high poetic genres, for example) through their 
connection with a unified, canonical national language and national myth, which is 
precisely what Barthes studied. The remnants of mythological thought can remain 
present in a culture long after the absolute power of myth over language has 
disappeared. 
The epic, for example, takes as its subject the 'absolute past' of the national 
myth; its purpose is to talk of the nation's defining moments, its origin and glory. 
According to Bakhtin, there is an absolute, 'epic', distance between the 'absolute past' 
of the nation and the contemporary world of the epic's singer and his listeners. Thus, the 
world represented by the epic is closed, complete and almost static, - and any of its 
segments can represent the whole. The epic world is in no way linked to the complexity, 
conflict and sheer historical and social messiness that the listeners of the epic inevitably 
find themselves in. it is perfectly possible for The Iliad to take up just a short episode of 
the Trojan war (Achilles' rage and its consequences) and use it to represent the whole of 
the war and the whole of the world in which that war was fought. And although the plot 
of Yhe Iliad is likely to strike one as being somewhat randomly chosen out of the whole 
of the story of the Trojan war (its in medias res approach can be seen as somewhat 
abrupt, and its ending as rather open as far as plot is concerned), the world in which it is 
situated is complete and closed. Things happen in that world, but they do not alter its 
essence; events do not bring about change, but represent the perfection and 
completeness of the world in which they happen. And this world is the world of heroes, 
gods and demigods, the world of the past national glory. The epic world is always 
presented as immeasurably better than the present, contemporary world; at the same 
time it is absolutely removed from it, and whereas the contemporary world is open to 
change and exists through ideological and social dissonance and diversity, the epic 
world is ideologically unified, complete and static. The man in that world is, as Bakhtin 
puts it, deprived of any ideological initiative (1996a, 35). The epic knows just one, 
unified, complete, unchallenged and unchangeable view of the world, which is shared 
by both the author and all the heroes. Thus, when an epic man acts, he does it not out of 
conviction and individual ideological and psychological motivation, but because his 
actions are fully determined by the role he plays in the world he inhabits. Thus, a hero 
fights and kills and loves because that is what a hero does, and a slave slavishly serves, 
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because that is what a slave does, and a faithful wife is fully and absolutely faithful and 
there is no doubt that that is what she is. Epic man is fully transparent to himself and 
others, and there can be no split between his private and public person. A hero in the 
battlefield can never be a coward at heart, a faithful wife who patiently waits for her 
husband for twenty years could never secretly doubt that she could be better off 
marrying someone else. All of them live in the same ideological universe, and none of 
them have any individual ideological motivation for any of the things they do. They act 
in a certain way because the way they act is an expression of what they are, and not a 
manifestation of their personal ideological beliefs and intentions. 
According to Bakhtin, all the high genres, and not just the epic, suffer from a 
certain blindness where ideological and verbal diversity is concerned. Tragedy, for 
example, does not differ much from the epic in this regard, and poetry, according to 
Bakhtin, can be defined through its treatment of language as a transparent medium 
through which can be seen the true nature of the things themselves. 54 According to 
Bakhtin, in poetry words 'dive into the limitless richness and contradiction and diversity 
of the thing itself, into its 'virginal' and still 'unuttered' nature' (Bakhtin, 1996a, 278). 
This definition could not fail to remind us of the one offered by Barthes, but there is a 
clear difference in the role poetry plays in the theoretical systems of the two men. For 
Barthes, poetry's search for the inalienable meaning of things is a noble and necessary 
task. The fact that its blindness to ideological meanings and interpretations of things 
makes it an easy prey for the French bourgeois ideology which turns it into yet another 
bourgeois myth is only to be lamented, but it is not a basis for a criticism of poetry. 
Bakhtin, on the other hand, although he loved and studied poetry all his life, believed 
that by concentrating purely on the search for the 'virginal' and 'unuttered' nature of 
things, poetry necessarily does violence to the human language and its inner dialogism. 
The term 'dialogism' is, of course, one of the key terms in Bakhtin's writing, 
and the notion of dialogue probably the key notion of his thought. As he says at the 
beginning of 'Discourse in Poetry and Discourse in the Novel', traditional stylistics 
recognises only the obstacles which things themselves put before the words which 
denote them, that is, the word's inability to reduce the meaning of the thing to its own 
meaning. There will always be aspects of the thing which are not covered by the 
meaning of the word which denotes it, and this signifying gap is an aspect of 
' See also Man, 1989 
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signification 55 which Barthes recognised as one of the reasons for the creation of myth. 
What Bakhtin says about it, though, is that there are aspects of signification traditional 
stylistics failed to look at, and which are far more important: these are the obstacles 
which words put before each other. Between the word and the thing (the referent), 
according to Bakhtin, there is an 'environment of other, alien words about the same 
subject' which others have uttered about the subject, which is sometimes difficult to 
penetrate (1996a, 276). A living word (utterance) has to find its own way through the 
veritable forest of previous utterances, evaluations, interpretations; it has to take them 
into account, respond to them and predict possible responses to itself. Any living 
utterance, which comes from and addresses a particular social and historical 
environment, cannot fail to take part in the dialogical relations existing in that 
environment; all is needed is an awareness of the diversity which inevitably exists in 
any society, and an awareness of its contemporaneity, that is, of its changing, unstable, 
historical nature. It is extremely important to note Bakhtin's use of the word 'living' in 
this context; according to him, an utterance which fails to take its own historicity (and 
with it, the dialogic nature of its environment) into account will always sound its own 
death knell. 
However, although pure myth died with the prehistorical era, the epic outlived it 
for a great many centuries, keeping some of its tendencies alive. The same is true of any 
authoritative utterance which finds its sole legitimacy in the past, and in the present 
exists only as 'remote' and 'inert', demanding blind acceptance rather than persuading 
us of its validity and inner coherence (Bakhtin, 1996a, 342-3). An authoritative 
utterance 'enters the artistic context as an alien body, there is no space around it to play 
in, contradictory emotions - it is not surrounded by an agitated and cacophonous 
dialogic life, and the context around it dies, words dry up' (344). The authoritative word 
kills the inner dialogism of language, and we can sense that for Bakhtin this is the same 
as killing the diversity and the richness of life itself. 
According to Bakhtin, mythological thought and the authoritative word are 
anachronistic and ahistorical; they deny the social and verbal diversity which 
unavoidably exist in any historical human society. They are embodied in dead literary 
genres (like the epic), they stifle the true life of a culture and avoid the questions of 
55 'Signification' is used here in the sense of the 'signifying process', and not in the special sense of 'the 
myth's sign' that Barthes gave it. 
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social contradiction, conflict and change. Bakhtin had not that much to say about myth 
beyond this, yet the similarity between his general observations about it, and Barthes's 
much more detailed study of it, is quite striking. One reason why Bakhtin did not say 
more about authortative utterances (which he illustrated with the examples of biblical 
language in the novel) and mythological thought may lie in the nature of his 
environment; the Soviet Union, especially during Stalin's era, was not really the place 
to expand on this too much. And, yet, Barthes's comments about the political myths of 
the Left may shed an interesting light on an additional meaning of Bakhtin's comments 
about the authoritative utterance. Barthes felt that only the political Right has the ability 
to create the living, all-encompassing and all-penetrating myths, whereas the myths of 
the Left are always limited to a few political notions and figures, which are then 
deprived of their historical life by the use of dogmatic phrases and formulaic epithets. 
These myths are, as Barthes puts it, 'poor' and 'dry'; they are unable to develop and 
breed other myths and they always remain too literal and static; they always turn into a 
'litany' (Barthes, 1957,709-11). Or, as Bakhtin put it, 'the context around it dies, words 
dry up'. For Barthes, the myths of the Right are able to become a part of life, distorting 
it and falsifying many of its aspects, but still a part of it; the myths of the Left exist 
outside of everyday life, they are limited and barren. If Bakhtin had some of the Soviet 
myths in mind as well when writing about the effect of the authoriatative utterance on 
the artistic discourse, it seems that he would have agreed with Barthes on the essential 
poverty of, say, the Stalin myth. At any rate, Barthes's comments on the Leftist myth 
and Bakhtin's on the authoritative discourse are quite similar. 
Where there is social diversity and conflict, the myth deals with the issues of 
universal human origins and destiny; where concrete historical problems should be 
pointed out, the myth can only contemplate the question of man's relation to god(s) and 
the universe. In the essay 'La grande famille des hommes', Barthes wrote how the 
exhibition of photographs of the same title aimed to give human actions and events 
(such as birth, death, food preparation, work and so on) a universal, ahistorical nature, 
trying to convince the spectator of the world's immobile and unchangeable nature; 
poverty, war and injustice are just the way things are; any desire for change would be 
futile (Barthes, '1957,669-71). Both Barthes and Bakhtin saw a clear danger in this 
avoidance of the concrete and the historical, this turning of history into nature; both felt 
that our vision of the world is substantially impoverished and even falsified whenever 
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we gave in to the mythical thought and its denial of the particular, the social and the 
historical. 
Barthes: Myth and How to Subvert It 
As we have seen, myth, according to Barthes and to a great extent by Bakhtin, can be 
defined through its insistence on keeping the (historical and political) complexity of 
meaning at a distance, and its tendency to submit the words of natural language to the 
rule of its own concept. Barthes also notes that every mythical concept can take on 
different forms without changing its own essence: thus, the myth 'French imperiality' 
can be presented by a photograph of a black soldier in a French uniform, or by one of a 
white teacher standing in front of a classroom of attentive black children, or by one of a 
French general presenting a Senegalese cripple with a medal (Barthes, 1957,696). 
However, what interests me here is not so much the variety of guises under 
which bourgeois myth appears, but the possibility for revolt against them as envisaged 
by Barthes. 
Firstly, Barthes claims that language itself does not offer much resistance to the 
creation of myth. In most cases language's signs do not posses a meaning which is 
present in its fullness, but rather as an abstraction. A concept like that of a 'tree' is 
vague enough to allow for room for varying interpretations of it and thus even for a 
possible mythological one (696-700). If we recall Ivanov's notion of natural language's 
signifying complexity and fluidity which allowed for a same word to be used in 
different contexts, we shall also recall that Ivanov considered this to be language's 
strength, rather than its weakness. A natural language which consisted of signs which 
carried a 'full' denotative meaning with them would seem not only impossible to Ivanov 
(since then there would have to be a word for every conceivable concept in every 
conceivable context, rather than a relatively limited number of 'vague' words which 
could be used in various contexts), but also undesirable. The signifying fluidity of 
natural language's signs is precisely what makes it possible for natural language to 
describe that entire diversity of human experience, even when it comes to previously 
unknown situations and concepts. If those signs possessed a denotative fullness of 
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meaning which did not allow for any connotative meanings, then language would 
become a very rigid structure, possibly highly unsuited for the human brain. Obviously, 
the bad news in all this for Barthes is that language's vulnerability in relation to myth 
seems to belong to language's very structure and way of functioning. Since all signs in 
natural language are 'vague' (according to Barthes) or 'fluid and complex' (according to 
Ivanov), the possibility of a mythological interpretation will always be there. 
But is this such a bad thing? Are all myths really so constricting and oppressive 
as Barthes claims? Paul Ricoeur, according to Gardiner, 'strongly censures Marxism for 
assuming that ideology is a purely negative phenomenon - that it is defined solely in 
terms of the legitimating or obfuscating function it performs for the ruling class' 
(Gardiner, 1992,124). He quotes Ricoeur saying that ideology is linked to 'the necessity 
for a social group to give itself an image of itself, to represent and to realise itself, in the 
theatrical sense of the word'. Thus, Gardiner concludes, 'ideology is a form of "social 
memory"' (Ibid. ). However, Gardiner also notes that the way ideology functions can 
bring about negative results: 
Ricoeur suggests that ideology functions as a simplifying and schematic code or grid 
which provides an explanatory framework for understanding social existence and 
human history, and which sacrifices intellectual rigour and coherence in the interests of 
social efficacy. This schernatisation - which Ricoeur refers to as the doxic character of 
ideology - facilitates its legitimising function, and it allows a group's self-image to be 
idealised and manipulated in the service of political domination. (Gardiner, 1992,125) 
We can see that this is very similar to Barthes's idea of 'myth' (and the term doxa 
comes from his later work to denote a system of commonly held opinions; or, as Coste 
defines it (1998,82), 'money, morality based on Christianity, the Right - general 
opinion whose values permeate everyday life'). Andy Stafford suggests that Barthes 
himself was aware of this, when he says that 'the nature of human alienation and social 
mythology was such that he must have a dialectical love/hate relationship with these 
myths, what he called "dialectique d'amour"' (Stafford, 1998,42). 
But how can myth be silenced; or at least, how could one counteract its tendency 
to silence social and historical meanings of words? 
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If we take our cue from Lotman, one possibility of doing this would be through 
literature, that secondary modelling system which, like Barthes's myth, takes natural 
language as its primary material. 
As we have seen, Lotman defines a literary text as a complex hierarchical 
structure which operates on many levels: from the level of phonology, meter, rhythm, 
syntax and small textual units (like line in verse) to the levels of plot, character, 
organisation of time and space, and of ideas. What is specific to literature as a 
secondary modelling system is that 'a complex interweaving takes place' (Lotman, 
1977,21) where different elements take on different functions (say, semantic or 
syntagmatic) as they move through (or are observed from) different textual levels. 
Furthermore, Lotman (much like Tynianov or Bakhtin) does not see a literary text as 
existing as an isolated entity. On the contrary, a literary text, which is 'a message in the 
language of art, simply cannot exist apart from that language, just as it cannot exist 
apart from all other languages of social communication' (Lotman, 1977,50). As 
Lotman says unreservedly: 
[Literary text's] meaning is extremely distorted for the reader who is trying to decipher 
the work with the help of arbitrary, subjectively chosen codes; but it has no meaning 
whatsoever for the man who would like to deal with the text totally apart from all its 
extra-textual relations. (Ibid. ) 
In contrast to myth, in literature, where, as Lotman puts it, fa sign models its 
content' (1977,21), the change of every element of the literary structure would change, 
however slightly, the relations within that structure, and thus the meanings that form a 
part of it. And so, if myth has the tendency to keep the political and historical meaning 
of words at a distance, literature should be able to recall all those meanings and draw 
them back into view. 
But things are not so simple, according to Barthes. Poetry in particular has a 
rather peculiar status in relation to myth. He defines poetry as a 'search for the 
unalienable meaning of things' (Barthes, 1957,719), and sees modem poetry as trying 
to go beyond words in order to discover the meaning of things themselves. In its search 
for natural and not human meaning, poetry should be immune to the appropriating and 
distorting tendencies of myth, but it suffers the same fate as Barthes claims scientific 
languages do: its very search for the purity of meaning is turned into a myth of pure 
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poetry. Instead of transcending the meaning of words and approaching the meaning of 
things themselves, poetry, taken over by myth, simply becomes a form which signifies 
nothing but poetry itself (Barthes, 1957,700-1). 
At the end of Te mythe, aujourd'hui', Barthes said that the mythologist, through 
his critical relationship to myth, puts himself in the position of exclusion in relation to 
the society (1957,717-19). His cynical attitude to the mythologies of the society to 
which he belongs detaches him from it and its everyday workings, and he finds himself 
condemned to a 'theoretical society' which alone is able to share in his counter- 
mythological project. In the bare (and barren) universe in which he finds himself, the 
mythologist does not even have a revolution to hope for, and any attempts to overthrow 
the present state of things would only arouse his suspicion that 'the truths of tomorrow 
would only be the lies of today in reverse' (Barthes, 1957,718). Excluded from society 
by his refusal to participate in the mythological game, the mythologist cannot even 
claim that he belongs to the pre-ideological reality which he professes to defend, as his 
theoretical project is dedicated to language alone, and not to the things themselves. 
Barthes draws a conclusion that, faced with the overwhelming mythological 
interpretation of the world, one is faced with two alternatives. One can either choose to 
regard the world as unavoidably shaped by historical circumstances and seen through a 
historical interpretation, or one can choose to see it is impenetrable by and irreducible to 
history, and try to reach its unalienable meaning through poetry. Barthes notes that both 
these approaches are excessive; one is about voicing and the other is about silencing 
ideology; and he concludes that, as yet, he does not see a possibility of the synthesis 
between the two (1957,719). 
Combating Myth and Le Degre zero de Picriture 
It was in Le Degre zero de Ncriture (1953) that Barthes already described the way in 
which traditional French literature (especially realist prose) created its own mythology. 
Certain conventions of writing (like the simple past tense and the third person singular, 
or a particular style of writing) established a text as literary; thus, writing became a 
myth's signifier and Literature its signification. Barthes argues that these literary 
conventions of Belles-Lettres offer to its (bourgeois) consumers the security of a 
credible fiction which is nevertheless continuously presented as false (Barthes, 1953, 
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157). At the same time, these conventions (the pass6 simple in particular) give a sense 
of an ordered, clear, closed world, whose events are neatly chronologically arranged: a 
pure bourgeois dream of world, comforting and reassuring. 
Barthes's thesis is that since the revolution of 1848, in which the proletariat 
appeared as a class (and a voice) separate from and in conflict with the bourgeoisie, 
French literature found itself disjointed from the society which consumed it. Plagued by 
bad conscience, French writers realised that bourgeois ideology had lost its status as the 
ideology that expressed universal human values, and that French society had become 
ideologically divided. As the Novel had been the incarnation of that bourgeois ideology 
of universal values and Eternal Man, its myth and mythology needed to be subverted. 
One could no longer simply write, and expect to be perceived by all as a voice of 
universal humanity; writers could not believe in the transparency and innocence of their 
writing and choice of words any more. To write suddenly meant having to choose 
between different types of writing, each representing a particular morality; words could 
no longer be used innocently, and writers became aware that their literary choices were, 
as Lotman put it, a message in themselves (Barthes, 1953,139). And so, since Flaubert 
French writers have been trying to destroy that myth of Literature with a capital V. 
Modernity started when writers began consciously subverting literary conventions and, 
with them, the bourgeois ideology of order and universality. 
For Barthes, one of the ways of dealing with one's own feeling of distrust and 
loathing for bourgeois myth was to create myths of a second order, as Flaubert did in his 
Bouvard et Ncuchet (Barthes, 1957,702). In this novel, the two main characters 
embark upon a series of attempts to acquire knowledge of various subjects (agriculture, 
arboriculture, garden architecture, chemistry, anatomy, etc. ); their attempts to master 
any of these disciplines are constantly frustrated, as their knowledge remains bookish 
and completely divorced from the reality which those disciplines are meant to study. As 
Barthes points out, the discourse of Bouvard and P6cuchet is already a myth in itself, it 
certainly has a meaning, but this meaning is just a form for the myth's concept, which 
he defines as technological insatiability, and we could call the hunger for cncyclopaedic 
knowledge. Flaubert then used this myth as a form for the myth of his own creation, and 
that is the myth of Bouvard-and-P6cuchet-ism. Barthes pointed out that the strength of 
the myths of the second order lies in their ability to turn the myths of the first order into 
an observed naivete; the myth of the second order is in fact a counter-myth. 
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The other way of subverting myth is to create a literary language which 
renounces literary traditions and approaches journalistic language in its insistence on the 
indicative mode of writing. Barthes called this type of writing 'le degre z6ro de 
I'6criture', and defined its effect as being one of neutralising, silencing ideology, as that 
kind of writing rejects all pathetic forms. It is a writing without style; it places itself 'in 
between cries and judgements' (Barthes, 1953,179), while renouncing both. In essence, 
it is a writing which approaches silence, and as such, as Barthes claims, preserves its 
own innocence. Nevertheless, Barthes also warns that that type of writing can very 
easily become automated, imitated, created into a recognisable style of writing, and thus 
be turned into yet another myth (1953,179-80). In Barthes's own words, nothing is 
more unfaithful than this kind of 'white writing'; we could even say that after Camus's 
L'Etranger (which inaugurated that kind of 'transparent speech'), every subsequent 
work written in that manner can be accused of mannerism. With this in mind, it is 
difficult to say why Barthes chose to name the whole book after that precarious type of 
counter-mythical writing, if not to underline the difficulty, the near impossibility of the 
anti-ideological literary project. For Barthes is fully aware that mythology (ideology) is 
one of the main tissues of which our world is made. 
However, in the penultimate chapter of Le Degrý z&o de V&riture, entitled 
V&criture et la parole', Barthes proposed another way of approaching ideology in 
writing. Whereas writing degree zero establishes its innocence and its responsibility of 
thought by renouncing every utterance of passion or judgement and remaining purely 
indicative, and thus stays away from both literary and spoken language, this other kind 
of writing bases itself on the spoken, everyday language (Barthes, 1953,181-83). 
According to Barthes, French writers have mostly ignored the fact that there is more 
than one way of speaking French. Even at times when they included dialects, argot or 
jargon into their writing, these variants of the French language served merely as 
picturesque linguistic quotations, rather than as languages whose purpose is the 
expression of emotion or thought. Proust was probably the first French writer who used 
these different ways of speaking French not just as an amusing seasoning to his writing, 
but as a way of structuring his characters. Almost everything about a character can be 
expressed through the language he or she uses: their profession, class, fortune, even 
their biology. Barthes notes that by reproducing faithfully the languages spoken in a 
certain society, a writer also reproduces the social relations which exist in that society. 
Moreover, as a way of literary description, the faithful reproduction of a language 
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spoken in reality is for a writer Tacte litt6raire le plus humain' (Barthes, 1953,182). 
However, Barthes does not elaborate on this note, and the reason why this may be so 
should perhaps be looked for elsewhere, namely in the work of Mikhail Bakhtin., 
Mikhail Bakhtin, Myth and the Novel 
At the beginning of his essay 'The Two Stylistic Lines of Development in the European 
Novel', Mikhail Bakhtin claimed that the novel as a genre is the expression of 'the 
Galilean perception of language [verbal consciousness], one that denies the absolutism 
of a single and unitary language'; it represents 'a verbal and semantic decentering of the 
ideological world' (Bakhtin, 1996a, 366-67). This is obviously immediately 
recognisable as one of Bakhtin's main ideas, and he repeated it many times throughout 
his work, always giving it new nuances and new implications. In this essay, Bakhtin 
looked at the development of the European novel through the opposition of its two 
types, dialogic and monologic. In the introductory passages to the essay, he looked at 
the relationship between myth and the novel, and we have already seen what he had to 
say about myth. Let us now see what he said about the novel. 
According to Bakhtin, the novel as a genre starts at the point when a culture 
loses its one and unified language, when it becomes aware of other languages and other 
cultures. A closed social class, aware only of its own world and of its own language, 
could never produce a novel; a possibility for an appearance of the novel as a genre 
arises when classes in a society become actively aware of each other, when the social 
system loses its fixed, centralised hierarchy. A nation closed upon itself, according to 
Bakhtin, could not write a novel either; it would need first to become aware of other 
nations, languages and cultures. Furthermore, in order for the novel to come into being, 
a culture must not just become aware that a variety of languages exists both inside and 
outside of its national language, but it must also become aware of the importance of this 
fact, it must accept that all those other languages are also vehicles for the expression of 
thought and feeling, that they are also bearers of an another, different, view of the 
world. In short, the novel appears at the moment when culture loses its sense of its own 
language as of an absolute form of thinking, that is, when mythological consciousness 
loses its grip on the verbal consciousness (Bakhtin, 1996a, 367-8) . 
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In defining the bourgeois as the man who is unable to imagine the Other, 
Barthes (1957,714) attributed to him the monological consciousness that sees the whole 
world as one and unified, and that can hear no other voice but his own. We can see the 
similarity of Bakhtin's model for the birth of the novel with Barthes's claim that the 
modem novel starts at the point when the bourgeois writer, going against the 
consciousness of his own class, loses the faith that his voice is the voice of universal 
humanity, and that there is a social class within France whose interests are opposed to 
those of his own class. 
According to Bakhtin, however, the change started to happen much sooner; 
together with the start of the historical era, and thus with the beginning of writing and of 
the possibility of preserving individual voices from a culture's past, the grip of 
mythological language and system of thought over collective consciousness is 
considerably loosened. Until this happens, the novel cannot be written, although certain 
elements of the novelistic genre will exist in (from the point of view of high culture 
marginal) popular dialogic genres. 
All in all, for Bakhtin, the novel is always the child of the 'disintegration of 
stable verbal-ideological systems' and of the strengthening of verbal and ideological 
plurality and diversity (1996a, 371). It is important to note that words 'intention' and 
'intentionality' are present throughout Bakhtin's writing about the language of the 
novelistic genres, 'The Two Stylistic Lines of Development in the European Novel' is 
no exception. We have already said that, for Bakbtin, an active and full grasp of the 
plurality and diversity of languages will always be more than a mere realisation that 
totber people speak differently from me/us'. If language's polyphony is to be fully 
comprehended and faithfully represented, this awareness of the linguistic difference 
must also be an awareness of an intentional difference. The word 'intention' in 
Bakhtin's writing tends to refer to more than just an immediate intention of the speaker 
of an utterance ('why did he/she say that at that particular moment? '), but it also 
includes the notions of the presence of a value-system and of ideological understanding 
of the world that shapes that utterance. The novel is bom at the moment when literature 
stops believing that its role is to represent things themselves, but chooses instead as its 
subject the play of light and shade that surrounds things, that is, the different voices 
with their different intentions (evaluations, interpretations, intentions in the narrower 
sense of the word) that shed different light on the world. 
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, If Bakhtin's definition of the novel is that it is 'a diversity of social speech types 
(sometimes even diversity of languages) and diversity of individual voices, artistically 
organised' (1996a, 262), and if it can only come into existence at times when there is a 
clear awareness of the inner diversity of both the social and verbal universe, then one of 
the high genres that is most clearly opposed to it is the epic. 
The man who inhabits the novelistic universe is, according to Bakhtin, of an 
entirely different kind to the epic man, and the novelistic universe is completely 
different to the epic one. The epic world is, as we have seen, the world of the absolute 
past, static, complete, heroic and remote from the contemporary world of change and 
uncertainty. The novelistic world is precisely that contemporary world of change and 
uncertainty, of diversity and conflict. In the novel, time is open, relations change, 
characters are never static and transparent, there is a split between the public and the 
private sphere of life. And, what is more, there are splits in the ideological 
understanding of the universe portrayed, and the author and the characters often belong 
to entirely different ideological worlds. 
Apart from being an 'artistically organised social and verbal diversity', the novel 
according to Bakhtin (1996a, 332) has as its main subject 'the speaking person and his 
discourse'. Furthermore, this man is a truly social man, historically concrete and 
defined, and his utterance is social speech and not an 'individual dialect' (Ibid. ). The 
man in the novel is always to some degree an ideologue (1996a, 333), and his words 
always carry with them a certain ideological understanding of the world and of his own 
role in it. When a novelistic man acts, he does so for some ideological reason, his action 
is always connected with his speech, it is an embodiment of a certain ideological 
position. Here we have a very persuasive alternative to narratology's main thesis that the 
main aspect of the narrative is the story; Bakhtin sees the function of the hero as 
decisive in determining what type of narrative we have in front of us. If Achilles kills 
Hector, he does it because he is a Greek hero, and as such he is meant to kill as many 
Trojan heroes as possible - this is an epic. But if Dostoevsky's Raskolnikov kills an old 
woman, he does so because he believes in a particular brand of Nietzschean philosophy 
which provides him with an ideological motivation and justification for his action - this 
is a novel. 
The novel, according to Bakhtin, is the only literary genre which allows us to 
look at the ideological and verbal diversity of the language(s) we speak, and, through it, 
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at the social diversity which makes up the changing, uncertain, historical world in which 
we live. Talking about the presence of the authoritative word in the novel, Bakhtin 
claimed that it can never exist as an organic part of the novelistic discourse. All the 
attempts at painting an official and authoritative picture of virtue and justice in a novel 
will always fail (without citing concrete texts, Bakhtin offered Gogol's and 
Dostoevsky's texts as an example of this); any inclusion of an authoritative utterance in 
a novel will only show up that utterance as remote, static and inert, nothing but a dead 
quotation (for example, the quotations from the Gospels in Tolstoy's 'Resurrection') 
(Bakhtin, 1996a, 344). 
And thus, far from wishing to prevent language from superimposing ideological 
interpretations onto the world (as Barthes often did), Bakhtin believed that the only way 
to represent a living language and to do justice to its historical nature in a literary work 
of art is to represent its inner polyphony and dialogism, and the many ways in which 
language allows us to understand and interpret the world around us. After all, according 
to Bakhtin, it is only through dialogue that we can ever approach anything resembling 
the truth; only by taking another's point of view into account can we act as ethical 
beings. One can even say that, since social and ideological diversity, whether perceived 
or not, is an ever-present part of human society, dialogue and polyphony always exist as 
an integral part of human language and culture, even when they are not taken into 
account. When talking about the conditions in which the novel as a genre can appear 
(and which resemble Barthes' account of post-1848 French writing), Bakhtin talked not 
so much of a material social change, but of the change in the way a society or its 
individual members see themselves. After all, since the historical epoch began, and 
with it the possibility of recording individual utterances, we know that there is more 
than one way of interpreting the past and the present; very few societies or cultures or 
social classes ever existed in an absolute isolation from others, but they often chose to 
ignore the fact that others existed alongside them - as Barthes persuasively argued the 
French bourgeoisie in 1950s France did. As soon as diversity is recognised, and with it 
the importance of its discovery (there is more than one way of interpreting the world, 
there is more than one way of talking and living), language's inner dialogism comes to 
the fore; and the novel can be born. 
We could argue that Barthes himself denied the plurality of French culture and 
society when he denied that everybody in France is under the influence of bourgeois 
myth, but we have seen in Leak's critique that Barthes in fact proposed that the 
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bourgeoisie itself is split between the 'grand' and the petty bourgeoisie. Rylance (1994, 
60-65) also puts forward a very reasonable additional criticism of Barthes's denial of a 
separate existence of the working class culture, and contrasts Mythologies with Richard 
Hoggart's The Uses ofLiteracy, which came out the same year. Linked to this is Andy 
Stafford's comment that: 
There was an irony here: Mythologies is famous for its unrelenting critique of bourgeois 
ideology's static, tautological and essentialist view of the world. There is nothing more 
'immobile', anti-historical or essentialist than to believe that the masses have actually 
swallowed all the myths of bourgeois society. (Stafford, 1998,82) 
At the same time, we have seen that in 'L'6criture et la parole' Barthes did at least 
acknowledge an existence of different types of speech in France, as well as the fact that 
they reflect social division in the French society. He devoted an essay to a further 
exploration of this idea, in an instance of almost absolute agreement with Bakhtin's later 
work. 
'The Problem of Speech Genres' and 'La linguistique du discours' 
Bakhtin's essay 'The Problem of Speech Genres' (1999a) is probably the most coherent 
of the essays published in Speech Genres and Other Late Essays, as the others retain 
more of their nature of 'private jottings', often consisting more of what seem like 
intimate reminders to think thoughts through than of actual ideas that have been worked 
out. " 
In 'The Problem of Speech Genres' Bakhtin proposes the foundation of a new 
discipline, which would cover the ground that Saussure abandoned: namely, speech and 
its genres. Somewhat ironically for those who cite Bakhtin as a critic of Saussure, the 
essay bases its argument on Saussure's distinction between language and speech, and 
even reinforces that distinction with considerable militancy. Admittedly, it is also partly 
based on a critique of some of Saussure's ideas, namely, his notion of speech 
communication. 
56 A good example of this can be found in Bakhtin, 1999a, 148. 
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As Bakhtin points out, in Saussure's 'frequently present graphic-schematic 
depictions of two partners in speech communication', the speaker is perceived as the 
active party, while the listener is merely passively replicating in his brain the thoughts 
of the speaker. But, Bakhtin says, although this does reflect 'certain aspects of reality', 
we must not take it to be the truth of speech communication, as the listener not just 
passively perceives and understands the speaker's words, but also actively responds to 
them, agreeing or disagreeing, continuing the speakers' argumentation, applying it to 
other material, and so on (Bakhtin, 1999a, 68). Furthermore, 'sooner or later, what is 
heard and actively understood will find its response in the subsequent speech or 
behaviour of the listener' (69). And the speaker is aware of this, as he or she tailors his 
or her speech to the possible and predicted reactions of the listener and their 'actively 
responsive understanding'. The speaker is also responding in their own right to the 
words of those who spoke before them; as Bakhtin puts it, 'any speaker is himself a 
respondent to a greater or lesser degree. He is not, after all, the first speaker, the one 
who disturbs the eternal silence of the universe' (Ibid. ). 
But what the speaker also brings into their utterance, and this is something that 
the listener is also aware of, are the various speech genres forged by all those who spoke 
before. Although each speech situation is to a larger or lesser extent individual and 
particular, negotiated between the speaker and the listener involved, in most cases the 
speech genre(s) deployed are well established and sometimes even quite rigid (like 
military orders, for example). Unlike Saussure, who saw speech as a purely individual 
and subjective application of the rules of the language, Bakhtin claims that speech, too, 
is codified, divided into genres with their own rules and norms, which are often as 
mandatory as the rules of the language itself (80-81). 
'Quite understandably', says Bakhtin, the diverse areas of human activity 
command the use of different forms of language, which are 'just as diverse as are the 
areas of human activity' (60). 
Language is realised in the form of individual concrete utterances (oral or written) by 
participants in the various areas of human activity. These utterances reflect the specific 
conditions and goals of each such area not only through their content (thematic) and 
linguistic style, that is, the selection of the lexical, phraseological, and grammatical 
resources of the language, but above all through their compositional structure. (Ibid. ) 
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According to Bakhtin, those three aspects - content, style and composition - are 
'inseparably linked to the whole of the utterance and are equally determined by the 
specific nature of the particular sphere of communication'. Each of the spheres 'in 
which language is used develops its own relatively stable types of those utterances'. 
These relatively stable types of utterance are what Bakhtin calls 'speech genres' (Ibid. ). 
Bakhtin places a special emphasis on the extreme heterogeneity of speech 
genres, which reflect the heterogeneity of human activities; as the latter are potentially 
boundless, so are the former. However, it would be fair to say that Bakhtin overuses the 
idea of boundlessness and inexhaustibility, as it is fairly clear from the rest of the essay 
that, although many and complexly interrelated, speech genres at any particular point in 
history are, as he put it earlier, relatively stable: 
Even in the most free, the most unconstrained conversation, we cast our speech in 
definite generic forms, sometimes rigid and trite ones, sometimes more flexible, plastic 
and creative ones (everyday communication also has creative genres at its disposal). 
(Bakhtin, 1999a, 78) 
Furthermore, Bakhtin argues that we learn their rules of combination and application at 
the same time and in similar ways that we learn our native language: 
We are given these speech genres in almost the same way that we are given our native 
language, which we master fluently long before we begin to study grammar. We know 
our native language - its lexical composition and grammatical structure - not from 
dictionaries and grammars but from concrete utterances that we hear and that we 
ourselves reproduce in live speech communication with people around us. We 
assimilate forms of language only in forms of utterances and in conjunction with these 
forms. (Ibid. ) 
However, although connected, the forms of language and generic forms of speech are, 
according to Bakhtin, essentially different, in that the forms of language are, just as 
Saussure argued, 'stable and compulsory (normative) for the speaker', while generic 
forms are 'much more flexible, plastic and free'. Once again, one should not 
overestimate the freedom and flexibility of speech genres, since in many of the 
everyday genres (like greetings and so on) the speaker often has little choice and this 
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choice is sometimes limited only to different styles (Bakhtin suggests the examples of 
high, official, respectful, intimate, familiar, and other styles). In other genres, say the 
literary ones, there is far more flexibility and room for individual variations. But the 
distinction between the different genres does not end for Bakhtin with varying degrees 
of flexibility; early on in the essay, he divides the genres between primary (simple) and 
secondary (complex) ones, in a manner resembling Lotman's distinction between 
primary and secondary languages (Lotman, 1977,7). Bakhtin lists 'novels, dramas, all 
kinds of scientific research, major genres of commentary, and so forth' as examples of 
secondary speech genres and he defines them as follows: 
During the process of their formation, they [secondary speech genres] absorb and digest 
various primary (simple) genres that have taken form in unmediated speech 
communication. These primary genres are altered and assume a special character when 
they enter into complex ones. They lose their immediate relation to actual reality and to 
the real utterances of others. (Bakhtin, 1999a, 62) 
To go back to the difference between language forms and speech genres, it is important 
to stress that Bakhtin says at the very beginning that the existence of different generic 
forms 'in no way disaffirms the national unity of language' (60). However, the generic 
forms are of a different order from language forms and Bakhtin illustrates this with an 
example of those who 'have an excellent command of a language', but nevertheless 
'often feel quite helpless in certain spheres of communication precisely because they do 
not have a practical command of the generic forms used in the given spheres': 
Frequently a person who has an excellent command of speech in some areas of cultural 
communication, who is able to read a scholarly paper or engage in a scholarly 
discussion, who speaks very well on social questions, is silent or very awkward in social 
conversation. Here it is not a matter of an impoverished vocabulary or of style, taken 
abstractly: this is entirely a matter of the inability to command a repertoire of genres of 
social conversation, the lack of sufficient supply of those ideas about the whole of the 
utterance that help cast one's speech quickly and naturally in certain compositional and 
stylistic forms, the inability to grasp a word promptly, to begin and end correctly 
(composition is very uncomplicated in those genres). (80) 
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So what exactly is the difference between the generic forms and the language forms? 
The main difference is that a language is a self-contained formal system (pretty much as 
Saussure defined it), while generic forms, and the utterance as their smallest unit, refer 
to a particular content and speech situation, assume a certain specific context in which 
they are to be used, they are applied to a particular reality and they evoke a response 
(Bakhtin, 1999a, 74,84). The language units do not do any of this. 
There is also a difference in the internal organisation of utterance as the 
significative unit of speech communication as opposed to the significative language 
units: 
The sentence as a language unit is grammatical in nature. It has grammatical boundaries 
and grammatical completedness and unity... When the sentence figures as a whole 
utterance, it is as though it has been placed in a frame made of quite a different 
material... One exchanges utterances that are constructed from language units: words 
phrases, and sentences. And an utterance can be constructed both from one sentence and 
from one word... but this does not transform a language unit into a unit of speech 
communication. (74-75) 
The utterance, although it can consist of one word or of one or more sentences, is 
internally organised as a unified whole in a very distinctive way, and its outer 
boundaries are marked by the change of speakers. According to Bakhtin, there are three 
aspects which determine the 'finalised wholeness' of an utterance, and those are: the 
semantic exhaustiveness of the theme, the speaker's plan or speech will, and typical 
compositional and generic forms of finalisation, all of which are not just a part of the 
speaker's consciousness of his own utterance, but are also present in the mind of the 
listener, enabling him or her to respond. Bakhtin wams over and over again that we 
should not confuse the utterance (the smallest significative unit of speech) with the 
grammatical concept of the sentence. 'The first and foremost' characteristic of the 
utterance (as opposed to the sentence) is, according to Bakhtin, 'the possibility of 
responding to it' (76). The grammatical sentence on its own, without a reality to which 
it would refer and a context of a whole utterance to which it would belong, is 'devoid of 
expressiveness' (85), and 'lacks the capability of determining the directly active 
responsive position of the speaker'. 
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The utterance, on the other hand, is used by the speaker to respond to the speech 
situation, it expresses a certain intention and emotion, its is directed towards the listener 
and responds in advance to their active understanding and possible reaction. Speech 
genres, says Bakhtin, are impersonal, and so are the words' generic expressions; 
nevertheless, 'words can enter our speech from other's individual utterances, thereby 
retaining to a greater or lesser degree the tones and echoes of individual utterances' 
(88). 
As we have seen, in the notes made in 1970-7 1, Bakhtin considered that 'various 
kinds and degrees of otherness of the other'sý word and various forms of relations to it 
(stylisation, parody, polemics and so forth) as well as various methods of expunging it 
from speech life' belong to 'the area of metalinguistics' (Bakhtin, 1999a, 133). Barthes, 
by a strange coincidence, in 1970 published a short article entitled Ta linguistique du 
discours' in which he proposed that various speech genres (he lists folklore, literature 
and written or spoken discourse of mass communication) should. be studied by what he 
calls a linguistics of discours or translinguistics or, preferably, metalinguistics (1970c, 
968). 
Barthes explains that the object of linguistics is a 'finality of pure 
communication' (I imagine that by this Barthes is referring to that speech schema 
criticised by Bakhtin), but that discourse also possesses other functions, for example, 
persuasion or distraction, the aesthetic function, and so on, which are codified by 
society, and which need to be studied by a different discipline from linguistics. His 
definition of the object of translinguistics is as follows: 
Toute 6tendue finie de la parole, unifi6e du point du vue du contenu, 6mise et structur6e 
A des fins de communication secondaires, culturalis6e par des facteurs autres que ceux 
de la langue. (Barthes, 1970c, 969) 
Following Benveniste's assertion in 'Levels in Linguistic Analysis' (1971,101-12) that 
linguistics ends on the level of the sentence, Barthes suggests that translinguistics will 
take us beyond the sentence (Barthes, 1970c, 969). 
One of the main object of translinguistics, according to Barthes, would be to 
structurally situate the utterance in its context, and to enable analysis of the relationship 
between the two, by identifying the integrative levels within the utterance. Barthes 
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suggests that such a study might change the traditional distinction between genres 
(1970c, 971). The context of the utterance is, as Barthes puts it, of extra-linguistic and 
intra-serniological nature, and translinguistics should, just like the old rhetoric, start by 
identifying at least some of the discursive situations. Furthermore, the study of context 
and the search for the principles of integration bring us closer to identifying the point at 
which the system of discours begins to be articulated 'sur la praxis sociale et 
historique'. Barthes finishes by concluding that: 
Une s6miotique respectueuse du principe d'int6gration a toute chance de coop6rer 
efficacement avec des disciplines extra-s6miologiques, comme I'histoire, la psychologie 
ou 1'esth6tique. (972) 
We can see that the idea is very similar to Bakhtin's. We have encountered in both of 
them the idea that different social languages organise the world in different ways, and 
that they represents the ideological position of the speaker. We have also seen that both 
of them place the creation of the most honest and desirable form of writing at the time 
when a society becomes aware of the Other, and of the Other's voice. And it is also very 
fitting that all this talk of verbal stratification within a society should bring us to our 
next topic: intertextuality and dialogism. 
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Chapter 3: Intertextuality vs. Polyphonyq Heteroglossia and Dialogism 
Velasques spoke and said: 'I have tried in vain to concentrate all my attention on the 
gypsy chief's words but I am unable to discover any coherence whatsoever in them. I do 
not know who is speaking and who is listening. Sometimes Marques de Val Florida is 
telling the story of his life to his daughter, sometimes it is she who is relating it to the 
gypsy chief, who in turn is repeating it to us. It is a veritable labyrinth. I had always 
thought that novels and other works of that kind should be written in several columns 
like chronological tables'. 
Jan Potocki, The Manuscript Found in Saragmaý7 
Julia Kristeva: a Case of Clever Repackaging? 
Soon after arriving from her native Bulgaria to Paris at the end of 1965, Julia Kristeva 
became a star, a new muse of French structuralist thought. In his short article from 1970 
entitled V 6trang6re', Roland Barthes stressed as one of her great achievements the 
introduction of the notion that the science of languages is a necessarily dialogic 
endeavour, thinking of itself as simultaneously science and writing, analysing itself and 
its own critical procedures as it analyses different types of languages (1970b). Linked to 
this was the monumental event of Kristeva's introduction of Mikhail Bakhtin's thought 
and critical terminology into French structuralist discourse; after all, the very term 
dialogic belongs to the Bakhtinian legacy. Barthes was present when that happened, as 
Kristeva first presented Bakhtin's ideas in his seminar in 1966, and, as Frangois Dosse 
points out in his History of Structuralism, 'one listener who was particularly seduced by 
Kristeva's presentation was none other than Roland Barthes himself' (Dosse, 1998,11, 
54). This presentation was later published as a paper in Critique, and then included in 
Kristeva's book Sjmiotik6: Recherches pour une simanalyse under the title 'Le mot, le 
dialogue et le roman'. According to Dosse, Kristeva chose to present Bakhtin, because 
she 'had immediately understood structuralism's historical limitations and intended to 
palliate these shortcomings with Bakhtin, and lend "dynamism to structuralism"' 
(Dosse, 1998,55). And, as Dosse shows, the French structuralist scene was ripe for that 
" Jan Potocki, The Manuscript Found in Saragossa, translated by Ian Maclean (London; Penguin, 1995), 
p. 316. 
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kind of shake-up; what Kristeva carefully tried to avoid, however, was the 
reintroduction of another dirty word, 'the second element that structuralism had 
repressed': the subject. As Dosse rightly remarks: 
The dialogue between texts that she considered fundamental could serve to address the 
subject,... reintroduce it as a part of the theme of intersubjectivity, much in the manner 
of Benveniste. But in 1966, things had not yet evolved that far and Kristeva avoided the 
issue of the subject, preferring to use a new notion that was immediately successful: 
intertextuality. (Ibid. ) 
Or, as Kristeva herself put it in an interview with Dosse: 'It was at that point that I 
created the gadget called intertextuality' (Ibid. ). The new term was introduced to replace 
Bakhtin's own notion of dialogism, and the conceptual change which accompanied this 
terminological change is probably one of the great intellectual repackaging and 
marketing schemes in recent history. It served the double purpose of helping Kristeva 
establish herself as a voice to be reckoned with in the French structuralist circles, as 
well as introducing those same circles to the world of Bakhtinian thought. 
The term intertextuality itself soon caught on not only as a useful terminological 
tool in structuralist and post-structuralist thought, but also as a term in the newly born 
Western European Bakhtinian scholarship (or, to be more precise, in the discourse of 
those literary theorists who acquainted themselves with Bakhtin's thought). At the time, 
and for some years afterwards, the full implications of how Kristeva's reading of 
Bakhtin conditioned the Western European reception of Bakhtin, as well as the course 
of Western European literary theory, were not fully grasped, and 'intertextuality' as a 
term was sometimes embraced somewhat uncritically. Tzvetan Todorov in his book 
Mikhail Bakhtine: le principe dialogique even suggested that Bakhtin's own term 
dialogism, which he found too imprecise to be helpful, be replaced by Kristeva's term 
'intertextuality' as a the most general and inclusive term for the relations between 
different utterances, leaving the term dialogism to refer to the actual verbal exchange 
between two interlocutors, and to Bakhtin's conception of human personality (Todorov, 
1981,95). 8 
58 It needs to be said that Todorov's presentation of Bakhtin's thought is on the whole much more faithful 
to Bakhtin than to Kristeva's notion of intertextuality. 
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Although his suggestion has not been fully accepted, one often finds the terms 
dialogism and intertextuality presented as synonymous. For example, Judith Still and 
Michael Worton, editors of a collection of essays published under the title 
Intertextuality: Theories and Practices, in their 'Introduction' present Bakhtin's ideas 
very much through Kristeva's reading of him, and for them their main term exists as 
'dialogism/intertextuality' (1990,17). Although they stress that Kristeva 'privileges the 
term 'text' in order to remove any apparent bias in Bakhtin toward the spoken word' 
(1990,16), from which one could conclude that, perhaps, the 'text' in 'intertextuality' is 
meant to serve the same purpose, they never assess the full implications of this 
terminological merging of two perhaps slightly different concepts. 
Robert Stam (1988,132) cites Bakhtin as 'one of the source thinkers of the 
contemporary discussion of 'intertextuality", which was as a term 'introduced into 
critical discourse as Julia Kristeva's translation of Bakhtin's conception of the 
'dialogic'; the choice of words here would suggest that Kristeva simply changed 
Bakhtin's word but that the concept remained the same. 
I propose here to examine the notions behind Bakhtin's terms 'dialogism', 
'heteroglossia' and 'polyphony' and Kristeva's term 'intertextuality' and to assess not 
just the faithfulness of the latter to at least the first of the former, but also to examine the 
'usefulness' of the term 'intertextuality' in literary studies. I also believe that there is an 
entire world of methodological assumptions and possibilities contained in the 
distinctions between the Bakhtinian and Kristevan terminology, and this needs to be 
examined as well. It is quite convenient that a comparison between 'pre-Kristevan' and 
(-post-Kristevan' Barthes will be very useful for this purpose. 
What Is Meant by Intertextuality? 
if we look at some of the dictionaries of literary terms, which, I believe, can be most 
telling indicators of terminological use and misuse, we find that, for example, Gerald 
Prince's A Dictionary ofNarratology defines intertextuality as 'the relation(s) obtaining 
between a given text and other texts which it cites, rewrites, absorbs, prolongs, or 
generally transforms and in terms of which it is intelligible', adding that 'the notion of 
intertextuality was formulated and developed by Kristeva (inspired by Bakhtin)' 
(Prince, 1991,46). This dictionary also has 'dialogic narrative' as one of its entries, 
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describing it as 'a narrative characterised by the interaction of several voices, 
consciousnesses, or world views, none of which unifies or is superior to (has more 
authority than) the others', equating it thus with polyphony (1991,19). 59 'Dialogic 
narrative' is opposed to 'monologic narrative' (which forms a separate entry in the 
dictionary) and both are, naturally, attributed to Bakhtin; however, the extent to which 
Kristeva's notion of 'intertextuality' was inspired by Bakhtin is not explained. So, 
although Prince's small but useful dictionary did not set out to explain these 
distinctions, one cannot avoid feeling that if it does not create confusion by merging 
Kristeva's and Bakhtin's concepts together, it does nothing to dispel any existing 
presuppositions. After all, a simple reference from the definition of Kristeva's notion of 
'intertextuality' to Bakhtin's 'dialogic narrative' would clearly show that her rendering 
of Bakhtin's term changed its meaning quite considerably. Not creating confusion is 
not, however, something that Laurie Henry's The Fiction Dictionar refrains from y 
doing, as it defines intertextuality as 'a term variously attributed to French critics Julia 
Kristeva and Mikhail Bakhtin, used widely by critics in the last twenty years to refer to 
the presence of aspects of one or more texts within some other work' (Henry, 1995, 
139). Apart from conveying the impression that Bakhtin was French, it clearly presents 
intertextuality as his own term (although one is not sure how to read the comment about 
it being 'variously attributed' to Kristeva and Bakhtin: is there a debate about sources 
going on that we are not aware of? ). 
Fortunately, Katie Wales' excellent Dictionary of Stylistics treats separately 
those three of Bakhtin's main terms which are often seen as more or less synonymous 
(i. e. dialogue, heteroglossia and polyphony), linking them to Kristeva's intertextuality 
and very clearly explaining the differences between them. Wales has a clear sense that 
there is a great deal of confusion surrounding the use of these terms, and she openly 
addresses this problem. Concerning the terms 'dialogue', 'dialogic', and 'dialogization' 
she explains: 
59 Unfortunately, Prince is not quite right in equating dialogism with polyphony; as a matter of fact, his 
definition of dialogic narrative is closer to Bakhtin's concept of polyphony, than to his concept of 
dialogism, although the notion of polyphony implies the notion of dialogism. Dialogism is the much 
broader term of the two, describing the way language, human relations, search for the truth and ethical 
considerations function (see Wales' definition of the dialogic principle on page 5 of this chapter). 
Polyphony, on the other hand, according to Morson and Emerson (1990,232) 'has to do with the position 
of the author in a text'; far from being an attribute of all novels (as is often assumed), for Bakhtin 
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What has come to be known as the dialogic principle informs much of Bakhtin's 
philosophy of language. Every utterance, every sentence (and hence even monologue) is 
oriented towards an anticipated implied response, is in 'dialogue' with utterances that 
have already been made, and also interacts with the social situation around it. In the 
novel, a special kind of dialogization is its main characteristic: the interrelation of social 
styles and voices (characters and narrator, for instance). (Wales, 1989,122-33) 
Here Wales refers her reader to 'heteroglossia', 'intertextuality' and 
'polyphony'. Heteroglossia is equally clearly defined as follows: 
A translation of Bakhtin's coinage raznorechie in the 1930s, heteroglossia (Gk 
'different tongue') refers to the internal differentiation or stratification of language. 
There is the interaction of different varieties: social and regional dialects; the jargon of 
different occupational and social groups; the conjunction of archaic and innovatory 
tendencies, etc. Bakhtin emphasises that there are no 'neutral' words or tones in 
language, and that language itself is not single-voiced. 
For Bakhtin, part of the particular fascination of the novel as a genre compared with 
poetry is the ready incorporation of heteroglossia as a principle of its structure. The 
alien voices of different social groups are all present, as well as different sub-genres, 
and the voices of the narrator and the different characters. The discourse of the novel 
is essentially heterogeneous and interactive, and manifestations of this polyphony 
include the double voice of free indirect speech, coloured narrative and character 
zone. (Wales, 1989,218) 
All the emphasised words in this paragraph are references to further related 
entries in the dictionary, half of which are Bakhtin's own terms, which makes this quite 
an impressive coverage of Bakhtin's terminology. As for 'polyphony', Wales says: 
Polyphony is particularly associated with the work of Mikhail Bakhtin and his writings 
on Dostoevsky translated into English in 1973 (1" published 1929). Bakhtin argues that 
novels like Dostoevsky's challenge the traditional novel with its authoritarian authorial 
voice (i. e. monologic) by pennitting the points of view and the ideologies and voices of 
the characters to have free play. 
Tostoevsky was the first polyphonic writer, and although there have presumably been others, the 
phenomenon is still relatively rare'. 
147 
Polyphony is sometimes used as a synonym for dialogic (q. v. ), another of Bakhtin's key 
terms (see Bakhtin 1981); but the latter is best used to cover a more complex notion 
involving the sense not only of a dialectic but also of language engaging with 
anticipated responses. Polyphony would therefore refer simply to the potential plurality 
of idiolectal or sociolectal voices and consciousness so characteristic of the novel as 
genre. (Wales, 1989,364) 
Apart from the final claim that polyphony is characteristic of all novels (see footnote 3), 
the rest of Wales' treatment of Bakhtin's terminology is a rhapsody of precision; 
furthermore, it manages in these few short paragraphs quoted to give the reader a 
glimpse of the richness of Bakhtin's thought, something that sometimes even the 
specialist Bakhtinian scholarship fails to do . 
60 The sentence: 'Every utterance, every 
sentence (and hence even monologue) is oriented towards an anticipated implied 
response, is in "dialogue" with utterances that have already been made, and also 
interacts with the social situation around it' succeeds in conveying Bakhtin's concept of 
what Simon Dentith called 'the Janus face of the speaking subject, immersed in a 
multiple past, speaking a language bearing ineradicable and pervasive traces of that 
past, yet turned towards the future, towards an interlocutor whose response cannot be 
guaranteed' (Dentith, 1995,86), while at the same time giving a clear indication that the 
context in which Bakhtin's dialogue takes place is socially and historically specific. 
But what of 'intertextuality'? Wales says that it 'was introduced first into 
French criticism in the late 1960s by Kristeva (see 1969) in her discussion and 
elaboration of the ideas of Bakhtin, especially his general dialogical principle' (Wales, 
1989,259), and she defines it as follows: 
Basically, it can be defined as utterances/texts in relation to other utterances/texts. So 
even within a single text there can be, as it were, a continual 'dialogue' between the text 
given and other texts/utterances that exist outside it, literary and non-literary: either 
60 At least where Bakhtin's own texts are concerned, as these are often reduced to one or two basic 
principles which are then supposed to inform the whole of his work (see for example the role of Bakhtin's 
ethics in Clark and Holquist, 1984). 
On the other hand, a mechanical and misleading diversity and 'richness' is often imposed on him, by 
adding Medvedev's and Voloshinov's texts to his name (Clark and Holquist again), and thus enabling the 
critic to write, for example, that 'there are, it should be pointed out, many Bakhtins; there is Bakhtin the 
revolutionary, Bakhtin the Marxist, Bakhtin the anti-Stalinist, Bakhtin the populist, and Bakhtin the 
crypto-Christian', without offering any clear proof for any of the above, but turning Bakhtin into 
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within that same period of composition, or in previous centuries. Kristeva argues, in 
fact, that no text is 'free' of other texts. (Ibid. ) 
It seems to me that Wales presents 'intertextuality' as a much vaguer term than either 
Bakhtin's dialogue, heteroglossia or polyphony: it applies to all kinds of relations 
between texts, whether past or present, without defining these relationships in any 
greater detail. What is clear is the notion that most aspects of Bakhtinian dialogism, 
heteroglossia and polyphony are gone: there is no underlying differentiation in the 
language itself, no relationship between the narrator and the characters, no clear social 
and historical context, no mention of ideologies and points of view. Prince (199 1) seems 
to add further to the sense of vagueness that 'intertextuality' as a term seems to breed, 
as adds to its basic definition a comment that 'in its most general and radical acceptation 
(Barthes, Kristeva), the term designates the relations between any text (in the broad 
sense of signifying matter) and the sum of knowledge, the potentially infinite network 
of codes and signifying practices that allows it to have meaning' (Prince, 1991,46). 
What Kristeva Claimed and What Bakhtin Really Said 
But is this accusation of vagueness fair on Kristeva, and, perhaps for the purposes of 
this work more importantly, on Barthes? Let us now have a closer look at Kristeva's 
famous essay Te mot, le dialogue et le roman' from the point of view of Bakhtinian 
scholarship, rather than as an 'autonomous' piece of literary theory; considering that 
this was the text which introduced Bakhtin to the West, and which for many has served 
as a personal introduction to his theory, it is important to assess how faithful it is to 
Bakhtin's own ideas. 
Firstly, it is important to note that Kristeva's presentation of Bakhtin's ideas was 
based on two of his most important works: the book on Dostoevsky and the book on 
Rabelais. Kristeva mentions in her first footnote to 'Le mot, le dialogue et le roman' 
that Bakhtin was at that point working on his book on speech genres. To what extent she 
was at that point familiar with the essays which were later published in Voprosy 
somebody suffering from multiple personality disorder, rather than a rich and inspiring thinker (Stam, 
1988,116). 
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literatury i estetiki (in 1975) is difficult to tell, but she probably had at least some idea 
of what was contained in them, at least judging by her references to Bakhtin's 
differentiation between the novel and the ep iC. 61 Nevertheless, even if she had no access 
to any of these essays, the books on Dostoevsky and Rabelais would have given her a 
very clear idea of most of Bakhtin's main concepts, such as dialogism, polyphony, 
ambivalence and carnival. As the latter two belong to the book on Rabelais, I shall 
mostly leave them aside, and concentrate specifically on how Kristeva defined 
Bakhtin's dialogue and polyphony. 
In the opening paragraphs of Te mot, le dialogue et le roman', Kristeva puts 
Bakhtin in the context of Russian Formalism and the later Structuralist development of 
that school, with the claim that he was one of the first to replace a static structural 
analysis of texts with a more dynamic model 'oU' la structure litt6raire West pas, mais ou, 
elle s'61abore par rapport A une autre structure' (Kristeva, 1969,83). In this model the 
literary word, as the smallest analytical unit, is not a point of fixed meaning, but the 
cross-roads of 'textual surfaces', a dialogue of different '6critures': that of the writer, 
the addressee (or the character) and of cultural context, past or present (Kristeva, 1969, 
82-83). 
According to Kristeva, by establishing the word as the smallest unit of literary 
structure Bakhtin places texts within history and society, which are themselves seen as 
texts which the writer 'reads' and within which he places himself by rewriting' them in 
his texts. Thus, the diachronic transforms itself into the synchronic, and this, according 
to Kristeva, means that the 'linear history' appears as an abstraction. The only way a 
writer can participate in history is by transgressing this abstraction by the act of 
simultaneous reading and writing, that is, by creating a signifying structure which is a 
function of and an opposition to another structure. Thus, the poetic word transgresses 
the logic of the codified discourse, and can only realise itself on the margins of the 
official culture, which is why the carnival is so important for Bakhtin (Ibid. ). 
The above paragraph is an almost word-for-word paraphrase of Kristeva's 
exposition of her main thesis about the significance of Bakhtin's theories for 
contemporary structuralist thought. There are several points that become obvious at 
once: the first one is the privileging of the word 'text', which, as we have already seen, 
was noted by Michael Worton and Judith Still as a strategy for removing 'any apparent 
61 'Epic and Novel' appeared in the 1975 collection, but was written in 194 1. 
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bias in Bakhtin towards the spoken word'. But it also serves a much larger purpose, as 
writers, readers, cultural contexts, history and society, all appear as 'texts' and 'textual 
surfaces', but without any clear definition of what in this context the word 'text' might 
mean; as Dosse remarked, Kristeva also carefully avoids the word 'subject'. As Clayton 
and Rothstein note (1991,18), Kristeva 'transforms Bakhtin's concepts by causing them 
to be read in conjunction with ideas about textuality that were emerging in France in the 
mid-sixties'. According to them, 'this textualisation of Bakhtin changes his ideas - 
changes them just enough to allow the new concept of intertextuality to emerge'. More 
precisely, a Deffidian notion of 'writing' 'supplies a dimension that was not present in 
Bakhtin originally, the dimension of indeterminacy, of diffýrance, of dissemination' 
(Clayton and Rothstein, 1991,19). 62 In addition to this, they emphasise that 'Kristeva's 
conception of intertextuality opens several lacunae' not present in Bakhtin, the most 
important being 'a vagueness about the relation of the social to the literary text' 
(Clayton and Rothstein, 1991,20). 
As for the reintroduction of the notion of history into the French structuralist 
context (which, as we have seen, was one of her main motivations in talking about 
Bakhtin), it seems to me that this is conceptually a very limited notion of history: again, 
it appears only as a form of 'textuality', and the only way in which writer can 
participate in it is by transgressing the abstraction of linear history by an act of 6criture- 
lecture. 63 In any case, her claim that she is here paraphrasing Bakhtin does not have 
much validity; as far as I am aware, Bakhtin never said anything about history or society 
being nothing but 'textual surfaces', nor about the writer as only being able to 
participate in history by an act of reading-as-writing (or vice versa). For Bakhtin, 
language represents contradictions and conflicts in a society, but that does not mean that 
society itself is turned into a text. Clayton and Rothstein justly note (1991,20) that 
'Bakhtin's emphasis on the historical uniqueness of the context of every utterance 
distances his terms from the endlessly expanding context of intertextuality. In Kristeva's 
usage, the intersection of textual surfaces in a literary word can never be circumscribed, 
is open to endless dissemination. ' 
62 For a more detailed exposition of the link between Kristeva's and Derrida's ideas, see also Rajan, 199 1. 
63 Rajan (1991,66) says that 'the absence of a reader [in Kristeva's theory] makes it difficult to construct 
that bridge between textuality and history that seems the goal of Kristeva's theory'. I still think that the 
problem is much more in Kristeva's concept of history itself as 'textuality'. 
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Apart from that, Kristeva's claim that by positing the status of the word as the 
smallest structural unit, Bakhtin turned the diachronic into the synchronic, is not only 
logically flimsy, but also bears no resemblance to what Bakhtin really had to say about 
the relation between writing and history. Bakhtin did, however, claim that the word is 
the smallest unit to which a dialogical analysis can be applied, and for him the word is 
not an isolated point in the verbal universe, but a cross-section of different social 
languages and their uses, each of them bearing a different shade of meaning, intention 
and accentuation to that word: 
The way in which the word conceptualises its object is a complex act - all objects, open 
to dispute and overlain as they are with qualifications, are ftorn one side highlighted 
while ftorn the other side dimmed by heteroglot social opinion, by an alien word about 
them. And into this complex play of light and shadow the word enters - it becomes 
saturated with this play, and must determine within it the boundaries of its own 
semantic and stylistic contours. The way in which the word conceives its object is 
complicated by a dialogic interaction within the object between various aspects of its 
socio-verbal intelligibility. (Bakhtin, 1996a, 277) 
Thus, with her differentiation between the word as a point with a fixed meaning and as 
a crossroads of different 'textual surfaces', Kristeva is partly right, or not right enough, 
for she disregards the social aspect of Bakhtin's theory. Although she seems to claim 
from time to time that society and history provide us with at least some of the 'textual 
surfaces', without a rather radical understanding of what the word 'text' here might 
mean, that claim seems far from Bakhtin's own repeated insistence that every word and 
every utterance in a language bears with it the echoes of other words, other meanings 
that word might have in a different ideological, historical, social and intentional context. 
For Bakhtin, words can be a powerful social force, and they are certainly a powerful 
reflection of the conflicts and differences in the society to whose language they belong: 
At any given moment of its historical existence, language is heteroglot from top to 
bottom: it represents the co-existence of socio-ideological contradictions between the 
present and the past, between different epochs of the past, between different socio- 
ideological groups in the present, between tendencies, schools, circles and so forth, all 
given a bodily form. (Bakhtin 1996a, 29 1) 
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In a way, literature has a privileged position amongst social languages, because it (or to 
be more precise, the novel, and more precisely still, the polyphonic novel) is the only 
verbal genre capable of representing fully the differentiations, conflicts, voices and the 
inherent dialogism of language, which the other speech genres tend, for'practical 
purposes, to ignore. 
Kristeva, on the other hand, rather misrepresents this extremely complex picture 
by giving as examples of Bakhtin's concept of dialogism in language the relationship 
between the syntagmatic and the paradigmatic (which she calls 'systematic') axes of 
language, as well as the relationship between langue and parole (Kristeva, 1969,87-88). 
It might well be that it could be interesting and important, as Kristeva claims, to study 
the relationship between 'syntagmatic' and 'systematic' dialogic relations as a basis for 
'ambivalence' in the novel, but that is nevertheless a completely different theoretical 
project from the one Bakhtin himself had in mind. It is also difficult to imagine how one 
could conceive of dialogic relations between the langue and the parole, and between the 
syntagmatic and the paradigmatic axes of language, unless a completely new definition 
of the word 'dialogue' is proposed, one that would not contain any reference to the 
actual verbal exchange between two interlocutors. 
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Furthermore, Kristeva's claim that by defining the literary text as a 'mosaic of 
quotations', as an 'absorption and transformation of another text' Bakhtin replaced the 
concept of 'intersubjectivity' with the concept of 'intertextuality' (Kristeva, 1969,85), 
is again somewhat misrepresenting matters. Even if we just stick to the textual (i. e., 
written) side of the exchange (leaving other types of language use aside), it needs to be 
said that, firstly, for Bakhtin, a literary text is not a mere mosaic of quotations, not even 
an absorption and transformation of another text or texts; it seems to me that both of 
these descriptions of relations between texts imply a certain passivity. If literary process 
is one of dialogue, than every new text can only be an active response to other texts, and 
an anticipation of texts yet to come. 
Also, it can hardly be argued that it was Bakhtin who invented 'intertextuality', 
since the problem of relations between texts was one of the main to occupy the Russian 
Formalists since the mid-1920s. According to Boris Eikhenbaum, as 'the Formalists 
original endeavour to pin down some particular constructional device and trace its unity 
64 in drawing attention to Takhtin's need to describe dialogue in the language of encounter, Hirschkop 
noted (1998,186) that it indicated ' some recognition of the fact that the good stuff one gets from 
dialogue, the political and social payoff, depends upon the "presence" of multiple speakers'. 
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through voluminous material had given way to an endeavour to qualify further the 
generalised idea, to grasp the concrete function of the device in each given instance', the 
cconcept of functional value gradually moved out to the forefront and overshadowed our 
original concept of device'(Eikhenaum, 1971b, 29-30). For example, Tynianov 
discussed the contexts in which a work needs to be looked at for its function to become 
clear: other works by the same author, other works from the same literary period, other 
works of the same genre. All these interrelations will not only help a critic understand a 
function of an element, but can also make the registration of its 'tactical' effacement 
possible (like the effacement of a specific meter or plot structure) (Tynianov, 1971b). 
Furthermore, moving away from purely literary relations, Boris Eikhenbaurn talked 
about the importance of our knowledge about the 'literary environment' in which a text 
was produced and perceived for our understanding of that text, but argued that 'the 
relations between the facts of the literary order and facts extrinsic to it cannot simply be 
causal relations but can only be relations of correspondence, interaction, dependency, or 
conditionality' (Eikhenbaum, 1971a, 61). 
Quite the contrary of what Kristeva claims, Bakhtin's true contribution to the 
already existing theories of 'intertextuality' concerns what we could call 
'intersubjectivity', should we really insist on replacing Bakhtin's own term 'dialogism' 
with another term. 
Hearing Voices: What Else Bakhtin Said 
After all, it was Bakhtin who devoted much of his work to the study of how different 
voices function in a literary text (and primarily in the novel). For example, in the 
'Heteroglossia in the Novel' section of his essay 'Discourse in the Novel', Bakhtin 
(1996a) talked not just of different social languages which make up the novelistic verbal 
diversity, but also of different voices within the narrative texture and of the way they 
relate to one another: 
The language used by characters in the novel, how they speak, is verbally and 
semantically autonomous; each character's speech possesses its own belief system, 
since each is the speech of another in another's language; thus it may also refract 
authorial intentions and consequently may to a certain degree constitute a second 
language for the author. (Bakhtin, 1996a, 315) 
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He particularly stressed the importance of 'double-voiced' constructions, where one 
voice takes on the speech and the language of another (as contained in, for example, the 
relationship between the author and the narrator, or the narrator and the character) 
(Bakhtin, 1996a, 313-14). According to Bakhtin, in such cases it is important to note the 
two different intentional levels which operate within the construction; if one fails to do 
so, one is also likely to fail to understand the basic underlying structure of the literary 
work, not to speak of the work itself . 
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But even if we take into account that Kristeva probably had not read the essay 
mentioned above, we still cannot ignore the fact that one of the two Bakhtin's works she 
based her essay on was Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics, in which Bakhtin postulates 
that Dostoevsky's great achievement is the creation of the polyphonic novel, a form 
whose 'dominant' is the self-aware and self-knowing hero (Bakhtin, 1979,58,68). 
Considering that the polyphonic novel, according to Bakhtin, brought about a revolution 
in the novelisticform, with its own structuring artistic logic (as opposed to bringing in 
new content), and that he used the notion of the 'dominant', which belongs to mature 
Formalism, it can certainly be claimed that Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics engages 
in a (rather amicable) dialogue with the Formalists (Jakobson, 1996,41-46). The new 
element in this dialogue is precisely Bakhtin's notion of the self-aware hero, who is not 
presented to us 'as he is', in his finished essence (as are Tolstoy's heroes, regardless of 
their complexity), but in the dynamism of his self-knowledge and self-awareness and in 
his dialogue with other consciousnesses and their knowledge of others and of 
themselves. As Bakhtin claims, there is nothing that Dostoevsky the author would know 
about the character that the character would not be aware of himself. Dostoevsky's 
characters are not, as Bakhtin says, presented to us as finished visual images, but as 
4pure voices', expressing their own vision of the world and of themselves (Bakhtin, 
1979,62). Furthermore, each of these characters is an ideologue, driven on by some 
idea; however, as Bakhtin stresses several times, the ideas that Dostoevsky uses in his 
novels are not invented by Dostoevsky himself, but were very much present in the 
political, religious and philosophical debates of his time. Bakhtin (1979,103) says of 
Dostoevsky that he was able to 'listen to his epoch as to a great dialogue', he never 
65 As would, for example, a student who failed to notice that Milan Kundera's novel 'The Joke' was told 
by four different narrators, each of whom had a different status and a different relationship to the (covert) 
authorial voice. 
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'invented' any of the ideas expressed by his characters, but he always brought them into 
his novels from the social reality around him. Each of the ideas in Dostoevsky's novels, 
according to Bakhtin, was fully socially and ideologically relevant, and for many of 
them there exist clear prototypes in the public polemics, philosophical and religious 
tracts and newspaper articles of his day (Bakhtin, 1979,103-4). Thus, it is not the ideas 
themselves which are interesting and new in Dostoevsky's novels, but the way they are 
incorporated into the new polyphonic novelistic form. Dostoevsky, according to 
Bakhtin, never presented ideas in the monologic form in which their journalistic or 
philosophical prototypes appeared; he never saw them as 'subjective individual- 
psychological formations with a 'permanent place of residence' in a person's head': 
No, the idea is interindividual and intersubjective, its sphere cannot be the individual 
consciousness, but dialogical relations between different consciousnesses. The idea is a 
living event, which performs on the point of the dialogical meeting of two or more 
consciousnesses. In this sense the idea is similar to the word... Like the word, the idea 
wants to be heard, understood and 'answered ' by other voices from other positions. 
Like the word, the idea is in its nature dialogic, and the monologue appears only as the 
necessary form of its expression. (Bakhtin, 1979,100) 
Thus, a character in a Dostoevsky novel is hardly ever able to present his (or her) ideas 
without having an immediate response from other characters; the only negative example 
that I can think of is the religious tract by Father Zosima in The Karamazov Brothers, 
which is presented to us in its full length and original state as written by Father Zosima 
himself; but even that is a response to Ivan Karamazov's story about the Great 
Inquisitor and the suffering of children. Raskolnikov's article about the justified crime, 
however, we get to know first through Porfiry Petrovi-h's (intentionally provocative) 
rendering of it, and only then from Raskolnikov himself, but in a dialogue in which 
several characters react to and comment on Raskolnikov's ideas (Bakhtin, 1979,99- 
100). 
Furthermore, ideas are presented in Dostoevsky's novels not just in their 
dialogic relationship with each other, but as fully merged with the characters which 
have 'adopted' them. We have already said that Bakhtin claims that every one of 
Dostoevsky's characters is an ideologue, and the fiill significance of this is not just that 
they believe in a certain idea or set of ideas, but that their every thought or action is 
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determined by that idea or set of ideas. The idea a character believes in cannot be 
detached from their personality, as we can do quite easily with Tolstoy's characters; 
Pierre Bezukhov, for example: a jolly nice chap, but prone to believe in and do all sorts 
of nonsense; his true goodness always shows through, though. Dostoevsky's 
Raskolnikov, on the other hand, kills because he believes in a rather radical form of 
Nietzscheanism; Sonia follows him to Siberia not just because she loves him, but also 
because she believes in a rather radical form of Christianity. Dostoevsky's heroes live, 
kill, love and die for the idea they believe in, and the result of this is the polyphonic 
novel, populated by characters-ideologues, who all participate equally in the great 
dialogue that is the Dostoevsky novel, with Dostoevsky's own authorial voice being just 
one of the equal participants in the dialogue. Far from claiming that the author in the 
novel becomes 'un anonymat, une absence, un blanc, pour permettre A la structure 
d'exister comme telle'(Kristeva, 1969,95), Bakhtin simply demands from the novelistic 
author not to submit his characters' voices to his own (for which he severely criticises 
Tolstoy) but to allow his characters an equal say about themselves and the world they 
inhabit. Dostoevsky's great achievement, in Bakhtin's view, is not that he turned 
himself into an 'absence' in his novels, but that he allowed the artist to win over the 
publicist in him (Bakhtin, 1979,106); however, we shall look more closely at the 
6author problem' in chapter 4 of this thesis. 
if we compare Bakhtin's extremely complex and vibrant theory of dialogism, 
heteroglossia and polyphony to Kristeva's vague and unclear notion of 'intertextuality' 
as the absorption and transformation of texts by texts, somehow the latter does not seem 
to do much justice to the former, unless we are prepared to radically redefine the 
meaning of the word 'text' to include speech, intersubjectivity and a much clearer sense 
of historical and social languages. 66 As a term which has been offered as an alternative 
to Bakhtin's own, intertextuality falls rather short of its promise. As Celia Britton says, 
'the idea of a dialogic text depends upon an extension of the meaning of 'dialogue", 
67 and she identifies three stages of this extension (Britton, 1974,55). The first is that of 
the most common notion of dialogue, where 'each of the 'voices' taking part belongs to 
66 Laurent Jenny notes that Kristeva enlarged the notion of 'text' to the point where it refers to literary 
works, oral use of language, and social or unconscious symbolic systems (Jenny, 1976,261). He is right 
in the sense that it is only thus enlarged that Kristeva's use of the term 'text' makes sense; I do not think, 
however, that she herself gives it explicitly this broad definition. Even if she did, it would still remain true 
that history and society cannot be ftilly reduced to it. 
67 1 am grateful to Karine Zbinden for pointing this paper out to me. 
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someone present and is the expression of his point of view'. The more abstract 'use of 
the term' conceives of 'these points of view' as, 'so to speak, disembodied: each voice 
is assignable to a particular reference point which is no longer a person, but a fairly 
coherent set of principles, interests and attitudes'. In the final stage, 'the dialogue 
consists solely of the interplay of various unattached voices, perceptibly different, yet 
whose various distinctive features do not add up to a particular body of opinion - but, 
instead, to a rather more diffuse original context' (Britton, 1974,56). 
Britton notes that Bakhtin's notion of the dialogic text 'contains all three of 
these levels of dialogue' (Ibid. ). Kristeva's reading of him takes just the third meaning 
into account, diffusing further the notion of context. Instead of 'levels' of dialogism, we 
are left with 'textual surfaces'. Kristeva's rendition of Bakhtin's theory strips it of its 
third dimension, not allowing for the vertical consideration of levels in which dialogism 
manifests itself Her attempt to 'market' Bakhtin to French intellectual circles was 
compromised by her willingness to 'shape' his thought to accommodate their interest in 
textuality and reluctance to talk of intersubjectivity or history. 
In a sense, I believe that Kristeva, was more interested in trying to 'fit in' than 
truly to subvert the current trends in French thought. That at least, is the cynical view; 
Susan Stanford Friedman gives a more generous interpretation of events by saying that 
, feminist critics might readily recognise the gender inflection of Kristeva's self- 
authorising strategy, one she uses often: to propose her own theories, she presents a 
6reading' of some (male) percursor or fellow writer, a re-reading in which her 
attribution of ideas to a male master screens the introduction of her own ideas... 
Intertextuality was paradoxically born under the guise of influence' (Friedman, 1991, 
147). Although I have nothing against productive misreading, I believe that the 
'strategy' employed in Kristeva's essay on Bakhtin not only does not produce a very 
useful version of Bakhtin's thought but also does not do much for feminism. A woman 
who appears not to be able to logically follow and accurately present somebody else's 
argument cannot be doing very much for the reputation of the rest of us. To stealthily 
present one's own ideas under the guise of somebody else's is not a feminist strategy, it 
is just simple misrepresentation. 
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Kristevals Uses of Intertextuality 
Kristeva developed the term 'intertextuality' in more detail in Le texte du roman 
68 (1970), where, as Leon S. Roudiez points out in his 'Introduction' to Desire in 
Language (1980), she performed 'an analysis of the birth of the novel in late medieval 
times', using Bakhtin's notion of 'genre', and seeing 'what we call the novel as a 
narrative texture, woven together with strands borrowed from other verbal practices 
such as carnivalesque writing, courtly lyrics, hawker's cries, and scholastic treatises. 
She also showed... how this texture is intertwined with something akin to what Michel 
Foucault has called episteme, for which she coined the neologism "ideologeme"' 
(Roudiez, 1980,2). This is all quite Bakhtinian. However, although in 'Discourse in the 
Novel' Bakhtin talks of different types of stylised spoken or written types of narration 
and speech as being part of the novelistic discourse (Bakhtin, 1996a, 262), it is easy to 
see that the project of showing how a late medieval novel is 'woven together' from 
different late medieval verbal practices is closer to what Bakhtin did in Rabelais and 
His World69 than to his concept of polyphony in the book on Dostoevsky. This could 
also partly explain the vision of the anonymous writer in the concept of 'intertextuality', 
since Bakhtin sees the voice in the carnivalesque text as collective voice of the 'people', 
with Rabelais as merely a medium (admittedly, the best and most representative 
medium) through which this voice finds expression. Kristeva herself says something 
similar, when she explains that she chose the texts of Antoine de la Sale to illustrate her 
point not for the importance of the author or for the texts' aesthetic value but 'par leur 
anonymat, ou si Fon veut par leur 'insignifiance' que ces 6crits m6ritent notre attention 
comme lieu d'un changement structural' (Kristeva, 1970,20). For Kristeva, however, 
the birth of the novel in late medieval times is not linked to the collective voice of the 
people, but to what she calls 'the cult of the book' (1970,146). The novel came into 
existence as a sort of 'book of books' (1970,149), where the best known books of the 
times would be confronted, where a dialogue between them would be staged, or where 
they would be neutralised (1970,147). 
68 Morson and Emerson refer also to an article by Kristeva entitled 'The Ruin of a Poetics' (1970), which 
is Kristcva's introduction to the French translation of the Dostoevsky book. It basic arguments are quite 
similar to those in 'Le mot, le dialogue et le roman', so I am leaving it aside (Morson and Emerson, 1990, 
4). 
69 See for example 'The Language of the Marketplace in Rabelais', pp. 145-196. 
159 
'Ideologeme', on the other hand, as Kristeva herself points out (1970,12-13), 
and as Toril Moi acknowledges (Kristeva, 1986,62), is actually Medvedev's term from 
The Formal Method. I find it difficult to pinpoint exactly what Medvedev means by 
'ideologeme', because he never defines it very clearly. It is generally used as a term 
relating to the intersection between the ideological horizon and the literary work as a 
whole, but the example he uses to illustrate what he means by it does not help fully in 
its clarification. The term itself would suggest that it refers to the smallest element of 
the text which links it to an ideology or which expresses an ideological position 
(whether a character's or author's own). However, Medvedev's example refers to 
Bazarov in Turgenev's novel Fathers and Sons as an 'ideologeme of a raznochinets'. 
Bazarov, along with all other novelistic characters, is 'not at all a social type in the strict 
sense, but is only the ideological refraction of a given social type' 'in the social 
consciousness of a definite social group' to which Turgenev belonged (Medvedev, 
1978,2 1). 70 The problem with this example is that Bazarov is a character with a well 
defined ideology of his own, and one would think that he could be thought of as a 
bundle of different ideologemes before we could conceive of him as being an 
illustrative ideologeme of Turgenev's social class. 
I do not necessarily find Kristeva's definition of ideologeme that much clearer., 
She uses the same definition of the 'ideologeme' in 'The Bounded Text' (Le texte 
clos') as in Le texte du roman (Kristeva, 1969,52-81; 1970,12-13; 1980,36-59), and 
says that it as 'the intersection of a given textual arrangement (a semiotic practice) with 
the utterances (sequences) that it either assimilates into its own space or to which it 
refers in the space of exterior texts (semiotic practices)' and as 'that intertextual 
function read as 'materialised' at the different structural levels of each text, and which 
stretches along the entire length of its trajectory, giving it its historical and social co- 
ordinates' (Krsteva, 1980,36). Just a few sentences later, she uses the phrase 'text as 
ideologeme' (1980,37), which does not help matters either. Are 'semiotic practices' 
texts or textual arrangements; and are ideologemes 'intertextual functions', 
'intersections' or texts themselves? The use of all of these terms remains unclear and 
vague, and Roudiez does not make it any clearer by saying of 'intertextuality' that it 
'has been generally misunderstood' and defines it as having nothing to do with 'matters 
of influence by one writer upon another, or with the sources of a literary work', but 
10 See also Medvedev, 1978,17,21-25. For Bakhtin's use of the term see Bakhtin, 1996a, 333. 
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involving 'the components of a textual system such as the novel' (Roudiez, 1980,15). 71 
In Revolution in Poetic Language Kristeva herself remarked on the 'danger' of using 
the term 'intertextuality' to refer to influences and sources rather than to the 
'transposition of one (or several) sign system(s) into another', and replaced it with the 
term 'transposition' (Kristeva, 1984,59-60). 
It seems to me that the term remains vague even after all these attempts at 
clarification. As Clayton and Rothstein amusingly put it, 'the face of 'intertextuality', as 
a new master term, is less a simple, single, and precise image, a bronze head by Rodin, 
than something shattered, a portrait bust by an avid exponent of analytic cubism too 
poor to afford a good chisel'(Clayton and Rothstein, 199 1,11). 
Simon Dentith (1995) makes a similar point. It is interesting that most of the 
chapter 'Bakhtin and Contemporary Criticism' in his book is dedicated to Kristeva's 
understanding of Bakhtin, and Dentith is very clear about pointing out the importance of 
Kristeva's influence where the reception of Bakhtin in the West was concerned and the 
weak spots of her understanding of Bakhtin, as well as insisting on what amounts to the 
greater usefulness and wisdom of Bakhtin's own theoretical model. His first point is that 
Kristeva's interest 'remains a predominantly epistemological one, concerned to show 
the impossibility of the "truth speaking" authorial voice escaping the same 
deconstructive considerations which afflict all language'. Bakhtin's focus, on the other 
hand, 'is at once ethical and social, in which the objection to the monologic "discursive 
hierarchy" is that it represents a politically unacceptable arrogation of authority'. 
Furthermore, Dentith suggests that 'the alternative, the valued other, is very different 
also'. 
For the Bakhtin of the Dostoevsky book, the alternative to monologism is of course 
polyphony, which does not mean a simple celebration of the other's word but a 
responsible engagement with it - though of course with no attempt to arrogate the final 
word. Even the Bakhtin of the book on Rabelais, who might be thought to be nearest to 
endorsing a 'revolution of the word', celebrates the upturnings and discrownings of 
carnival not in the name of some abstract Oedipal principle but because of their popular 
character and their historically prepared particularity. (Dentith, 1995,94) 
71 Jonathan Culler argues that Kristeva's practical use of 'intertextuality' moves away from the notion's 
anonymous, general nature, and leads her instead into a hunt for particular, identifiable sources (1981, 
106-7). 
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I believe that Dentith is absolutely right in stressing the importance of active ethical and 
social concerns in Bakhtin, as opposed to the more abstractedly epistemological 
interests of Kristeva. Although she does emphasise the subversiveness of the 
'polyphonic novel' (and she lists the novels of Kafka, Joyce and Bataille as the modem 
exponents of the polyphonic novel, and rather confusingly Sade as one of the older ones 
- surely not! ), it is not clear where that subversiveness would 
lie, as the Bakhtinian 
model of interpersonal relations and active social languages does not appear in her 
version of his theory. She even goes as far as to talk of the Socratic dialogue as of the 
'annihilation de la personne', with the explanation that 'Ies sujets de discours sont des 
non-personnes, des anonymats, cach6s par le discours qui les constitue, with the 
discourse revolving around the shared, dialogical search for the truth (Kristeva, 1969, 
102). However, Kristeva simply cannot have it both ways, as Bakhtin's concept of 
polyphony insists precisely on the fact that it allows individual characters their own 
voice and their own point of view, which does not square very well with the concept of 
anonymous speech of a non-person. Britton rightly asks 'whether there is much left of 
Bakhtin's theory once one has eliminated the suspect psychologism', considering that 
he 'defines characters exclusively in terms of their consciousness' (Britton, 1974,58). 
When Bakhtin says in the book on Dostoevsky that we do not see the Dostoevsky hero, 
but that we hear him and that he exists in his words (Bakhtin 1979,62), this does not 
mean that that hero is 'hidden' by his words, but that he is revealed in them and through 
his own self-awareness which they express. Polyphony is there to give freedom to the 
character and his voice, and not to annihilate the subject; at any rate, how would a 
dialogue ever be possible between non-persons and 'anonymats'? 
As Dentith says, Kristeva's notion of intertextuality can be 'pulled in two 
opposite directions', one of which is 'towards 'source study", either with the 
supposition of equality between texts or with the idea that there is 'some relationship of 
competition' 'between any text and some 'precursor' text'. As he puts it, 'there is 
nothing wrong with this kind of criticism except that it does not go nearly far enough'. 
On the other hand, 
in the opposite direction lies the notion of 'textuality'. This seeks to do away with our 
common-sense ideas of authors and texts, and replace them with a sense of the 
underlying productiveness of writing itself; from the perspective of 'textuality' any 
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actual text is merely a particular density among a myriad codes and discourses, whose 
origins cannot be traced and which stretch to the horizon in all directions. (Dentith, 
1995,94-95) 
As Dentith says, Bakhtin's notion of heteroglossia is radically different from these two 
alternatives (I quote at length, but Dentith's point is as clear and as concise as it could 
possible be): 
It [heteroglossia] radically transforms the question of sources, making them a matter not 
just of individual influences or borrowing, but of the socially located languages that 
each and every text manages in its own particular way. And the social location of 
heteroglossia equally undoes the unstoppable indeterminacy of 'textuality'. This is in 
part because... Bakhtin is prepared to retain a notion of reference, of the text's relation 
to the world around it, which must, at the very least, act as a kind of anchor for any 
utterance, giving it some location in time and space. More importantly, however, 
Bakhtin, by means of the notion of heteroglossia, locates the utterance in the to and fro 
of active social forces, pulling back and forth in competition with each other and 
expressing their antagonisms in and through language. What grounds the aesthetic 
utterance is not finally its relation to the world beyond it, but the fact that it is always 
already in that world, acting in its own manner with the materials - the socially marked 
languages - appropriate to it. (Dentith 1995,95)72 
Dentith sees in Kristeva's reading of Bakhtin a tendency 'to take one possible emphasis 
from Bakhtin and draw its implications provocatively' (Ibid. ). By denying any 
theoretical importance to the notions of the subject and of any real social and historical 
grounding of the literary text (such, that is, which would not turn history and society 
into that rather vague notion of 'textuality'), Kristeva 'draws upon what is genuinely 
there in Bakhtin but develops it in directions which are uncongenial to his thinking - or 
at least, towards a terminus which is negative rather than positive' (Dentith, 1995,96- 
97). By depersonalising the utterance and by denying history and society the active role 
they have in Bakhtin's thought, Kristeva turns a theory of verbal responsibility, dialogue 
and equality between utterances into 'a hall of mirrors', 'a vertiginous sense of 
72 We can also recognise in this Edward Said's claim that the literary text is always in and of the world; 
see, for example, the title chapter in The World, the Text, and the Critic (London: Vintage, 199 1). 
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unstoppable regress', in which 'the word is never your own word, but always in part the 
word of another, for whom in turn the word is never their own' (Dentith, 1995,96). 
So, to return to an earlier point, why does Kristeva privilege the word 'text' over 
Bakhtin's own choice of words, and why do Worton and Still talk about the 'apparent 
bias in Bakhtin towards the spoken word', presuming it in advance to be something 
theoretically fruitless and, one feels, almost embarrassing, without assessing its role (if 
it exists in the first place) in Bakhtin's theory? Why this Derridian bias towards the 
written word, even if it brings with it a distortion of a literary theory which comes from 
another context and operates with a different set of conceptual tools and 'binary 
oppositions'? As far as I can tell, the opposition between the written and the spoken 
word does not play any significant role in Bakhtin's theory, so any bias towards either 
of these in the context of that theory would not make much sense. A very important 
distinction Bakhtin does make, and which could by an inattentive reader be confused 
with the spoken word - written word distinction, is the distinction between every-day 
rhetorical transmission of the words of the other (in court, newspapers or in political 
debate - which could then be both spoken and written), and their artistic-novelistic 
representation. According to Bakhtin, rhetorical genres often represent the words of the 
other (for example, a political opponent or accused in court) dialogically, presenting 
them, answering to them and commenting on them (Bakhtin, 1996a, 353). Furthermore, 
as Bakhtin observes, a large part of our every-day conversations consists of talking 
about other people's words, in reporting on what other people had said and in answering 
to and commenting on their words (1996a, 338). We seem to be perpetually obsessed 
with what other people are saying, but in reporting on their words we tend to present 
them as the words ofjust that one individual who uttered them, as characteristic for that 
individual. In every-day discourse, a speaker (or writer) reports on the words of another 
individual, framing them in his or her own discursive context which colours the words 
of the other to a greater or lesser degree with the speaker's own interpretation and 
intention. But regardless of the dialogism of such 'discursive practice', the emphasis is 
on the individual utterance of an individual, and not on the retaining of the background 
noise of the language's diversity and internal dialogism. 
In the artistic representation of other people's words (and here Bakhtin thinks 
primarily of the novel), however, the emphasis is precisely on leaving that powerful 
mass of social languages making itself heard in the background of each individual 
utterance. In the novelistic genres, the possibility of another voice, another intention and 
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ideological position is constantly present and set against the actual voice and its 
discourse. Language's internal dialogism and the social-historical diversity of languages 
past and present, changing and coming into being, this is the picture the novel paints 
(Bakhtin 1996a, 418-22). According to Bakhtin, 'the man who speaks and his words' 
are the subject of verbal and artistic representation in the novel; that man is always a 
real social man, historically concrete and specified, and his discourse is a 'social 
language', and not an 'individual dialect' (I 996a, 332-33). We can add to this Bakhtin's 
insistence that the character in the novel (and not just Dostoevsky's novel) is always to 
a certain degree an ideologue, his language is a 'specific opinion taking on a social 
significance'. And even when a character in the novel does not talk much and acts a lot 
more, his actions are always connected with social discourse, they always originate 
from a certain ideological position (Ibid. ). 
Again, the picture that emerges from Bakhtin's various writings on the voices 
and the languages represented in the novel is a very complex one: the character is an 
ideologue, his or her actions are fully motivated by the ideas he or she believes in; these 
ideas are not something which is mechanically grafted onto the character, but are 
(dialectically) taken up by the whole of their 'personality'; his or her words and ideas 
enter into dialogical relations with the words and ideas of other characters and those of 
the author, and, as a result, the character is, much like the human subject, always open 
to change and never truly finalised; furthermore, behind this interpersonal and 
intersubjective dialogue, the broader cultural and social dialogue of different social 
languages takes place and the perpetual buzzing of the human beehive (constantly 
reporting and interpreting each other's words) can be constantly heard in the 
background; and all of this enters into a dialogue with the reader, future and present, 
and with their own dialogic relationship of the heteroglossia in which they live, and 
their own personal, social and historic point of view with which they approach both life 
and the literary text before them. It is because of all this, claims Bakhtin, that of all 
literary genres the novel is the least likely to become a contentless verbal game of 
aesthetic forms (Bakhtin, 1996a, 333). 
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73 Here we have an example of an obvious call for criticism that Bakhtin's texts, illuminating and 
insightful as they are, sometimes provoke with their categorical theoretical projections. An example of a 
novel that could be called 'a verbal game of aesthcticised form' is Miodrag Pavic's Khazar Dictionary, 
written in that typical baroque, and yet remarkably monotonous, style that is Pavic's trademark, and 
practically devoid of any social concerns or historical concreteness (although one could claim, if one 
particularly wanted to, that certain historical awareness can be found on the novel's metaphorical level). 
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But what is the reason for Kristeva to change Bakhtin's theory and insights 
almost beyond recognition, by removing their underlying assumptions of 
intersubjectivity, social and ethical concerns, verbal and historical responsibilities? 
Although at the point when she was writing about Bakhtin Kristeva had only recently 
arrived from the Eastern Bloc and was thus culturally closer to Bakhtin than to her then 
new French structuralist colleagues, it seems that she was able to absorb the intellectual 
atmosphere of the 1960s Paris with a remarkable speed, and to know just how to market 
Bakhtin in such circumstances. And I believe that Dentith is, once again, justified in 
remarking: 
Kristeva's use of Bakhtin to develop the notion of intertextuality thus provides the 
occasion for some instructive contrasts between the attitudes of the Russian intellectual 
and those of his counterparts in the West - or at least Paris in the late 1960s. For the 
contrast is not so much one of scholarly method or conclusions, as of the whole 
philosophical, even political attitudes which inform those methods and conclusion. For 
Kristeva and Barthes, textuality and intertextuality provide opportunities for a peculiar 
notion of liberation, in which the deadening certainties of bourgeois culture, tying books 
to authors, words to their singular meanings, subjects to their unitary subjectivities, can 
be at least momentarily lifted, in favour of the joyful deferments of sense made possible 
by the endless switching of one code to another... (But for Bakhtin), the unfinishedness 
which acts as a value in his writing is ultimately historical; it is a window onto the 
future. The historical process is never finished or completed, and as a result he does not 
need to imagine a version of liberation which takes you out of the historical process 
altogether. (Dentith, 1995,97-98) 
Dentith's conclusion agrees to a large extent with my point about the difference 
between the French and the Eastern European structuralisms, in that, culturally, Eastern 
Europeans have a much stronger belief in the vital importance of literature for the life of 
a nation (even to the point where certain aspects of the national literature inspire and 
motivate nationalistic movements and tendencies), and, perhaps less alarmingly, for 
one's own definition as a human being in a certain historical period. Clearly expressed 
in Shk1ovskii's idea of ostranenie (defamiliarisation), as the method for 'making the 
stone stony', is the belief that literature (and art in general) are there not to take us out 
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of our world and out of our own skin, but to intensify and clarify the perception and 
experience of the world and of life itself. This belief is implicitly present in Bakhtin's 
own notion of the artistic use of language, which releases us from the practical necessity 
of speaking in a monological manner, and opens our eyes and ears to the underlying 
dialogism of language, and with it the diversity and complexity of the world in which 
we live and of our own lives. 
However, although I agree with Dentith's general statement and with his critique 
of Kristeva's use (or distortion) of Bakhtin, I find it more difficult to agree completely 
with his inclusion of Barthes' name in this context. Nevertheless, Dentith rightly claims 
that 'Kristeva has been very influential, not least on Roland Barthes, whose SIZ is 
undoubtedly the single most extended, and virtuoso, attempt to locate a piece of writing 
in the multiple codes that make it up'. The problem is, however, that SIZ is just one of 
many works written by Barthes that tackle 'Bakhtinian' problems, written both before 
and after Kristeva's introduction of Bakhtin in France; besides, I believe that even in 
S/Z Barthes comes closer to the original Bakhtin that to Kristeva's reading of him. 
Connotation and Infinitude in SIZ 
As SIZ is one of Barthes's best known works, its basic premises are quite familiar even 
to those who have not read the book itself, for it is here that Barthes makes the famous 
distinction between the lisible (classic realist) and the scriptible (avant-garde) text, and 
performs the ground-breaking analysis of 'Sarrasine', a rather strange and atypical 
Balzac story. 
SIZ begins with a critique of the ambition of the 'first analysts of narratives' 
(presumably, including himself) to view all the stories of the world in a single narrative 
structure, and so it is often seen as a turning point of Barthes's thought, a move from 
structuralism to poststructuralism. However, it needs to be noted that 'poststructuralism' 
was not the term Barthes himself used; the classification of SIZ as post-structuralist 
came later and the term itself belongs more to Anglo-American theoretical framework. 
Barthes himself defined the analysis in SIZ as 'textual', as opposed to 'structural', and 
several critics have noted the influence of Kristeva's notion of semanalysis and 
Derrida's writing on Barthes's work in the new phase. Annette Lavers discusses the 
significance of Derrida and Kristeva's 'new theory of signification' (Lavers, 1982,169- 
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75). Claude Coste, too, sees Barthes's move away from 'hard structuralism' and its 
study of 'immobile figures' towards the opening and the polysemy of textual analysis as 
connected to the work of Kristeva, and situates it around the year 1968, linking it with 
'The Death of the Author' (Coste, 1998,13). Steven Ungar notes (1983, xii) that 'SIZ 
and The Pleasure of the Text were read as denials of the formalist project Barthes had 
promoted in the name of structural analysis during the previous decade', and he argues 
that 'when Barthes returns to the study of narrative in SIZ some two to three years after 
the 'Introduction', his notion of structural analysis will have evolved to accommodate a 
non-scientific approach that asserts the mobile structuration of meaning in the text' 
(1983,41). 
However, as Jonathan Culler points out, the break with the structuralist model is 
not as radical as is often claimed, since many of the basic structuralist assumptions still 
inform the theory behind the analysis of 'Sarrasine' (Culler, 1990,87-90). Talking of 
the opening paragraphs of SIZ, George Wasserman notes (1981,79) that Barthes still 
defines literary structure as 'a general model that reflects the common features of a 
specific class of individual texts', and says that for Barthes the real task now becomes 
the analysis of the ways in which a text differs from itself, these differences being 
created in the reader's perception through repeated reading. 74 Lavers notes that 'to a 
layman, a work like SIZ still looks forbiddingly 'structuralist' and sufficiently remote 
from traditional ways of tackling a text to make the break imperceptible'(Lavers, 1982, 
26), but she argues for a different kind of continuity from the one which links SIZ to 
structuralism: 
It is a mistake to view the themes of this period as entirely new, not, however, on the 
grounds of a structuralist hegemony but, on the contrary, because the third period often 
involves a return to some of Barthes's basic attitudes, visible in his first phase before 
the great scientific dream took complete hold. (Lavers, 1982,27) 
Moreover, Lavers maintains that 'Barthes never really was a structuralist in the field of 
literary analysis. In deprecating those who account for all the world's stories by a single 
structure,.. - 
he did not include himself among them' (Lavers, 1982,175). This view 
would be quite difficult to maintain, and Lavers immediately contradicts herself by 
7' Wasserman also says that this critical theory of rereading is 'an essentially revolutionary activity' - 
surely not. 
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saying that 'he had made a major contribution to the elaboration of a machinery for the 
study of those larger units of discourse which are obviously relevant to literature', and 
that by the time he came to write SIZ, 'his reputation as a serniologist-in-chief was so 
well established that those who had interpreted SIZ as part of the same attempt were 
quite mystified by an apparently sudden conversion to something he called 'textual 
analysis', a practice said to be the exact opposite of structural analysis' (Ibid. ). The 
difference between the textual and structural analysis is defined by Lavers as follows: 
Where structural analysis hoped to extract a universal scheme for narrative from such a 
corpus, textual analysis seeks to 'infinitize' a single text by treating each of its elements 
as a point of departure for an infinite 'drift' of meanings. (Lavers, 1982,177) 
Still, she notes that 'in practice this distinction is not so clear-cut', as 'structural 
analyses often bear on a single text' referring to the different meanings produced by the 
text (Ibid. ). 
Even Michael Moriarty, who claims that Tarthes's reading in SIZ departs 
substantially from the assumptions and methodology of structuralism', nevertheless 
says that 'the text is still conceived as structured' and that 'meaning is not intrinsic to 
individual elements, but is still a function of correlation: this fundamental structuralist 
assumption is preserved'(Moriarty, 1991,120). 
Moriarty sees Barthes's departure from the structuralist theory and methodology 
in that, firstly, the text and its meaning are not seen as completely autonomous, but are a 
product of correlations with elements both within and outside of the text itself, 
secondly, these correlations are determined by the 'codes' of the text, which themselves 
are not closed structures, but 'perspectives opened up by the text'; and thirdly, in 
abandoning the idea of the integration of different textual levels into a single unity of 
structure (Ibid. ). In the context of French structuralism, all of these points are perfectly 
justified, and SIZ can indeed be seen as a departure from the structuralist model. 
However, seen from the Russian and Eastern European side of affairs, the three points 
are part of the mainstream structuralist project. In the 1920s, Jakobson and Tynianov 
claimed that the study of the literary text in isolation from the literary and broader 
cultural (even social) 'series' is an 'impossibility', and can only lead to a 
miscomprehension of the structure of the literary text. Iurii Lotman later repeated this 
observation, by saying that 'the entire sum of historically determined artistic codes 
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which make a text meaningful is related to the sphere of extra-textual relations' 
(Lotman, 1977,50). In Bakhtin's theory, none of the social languages are ever 
'finalised', as they are constantly turned not just to the past but also towards the future, 
and thus always open to change. And as for the levels of the literary text which, 
according to Barthes of the 'Introduction A Fanalyse structurale des r6cits', only 
contribute to the creation of meaning in a literary text through 'their capacity to be 
integrated into a higher level' (Moriarty, 1991,120), this concept takes on a completely 
different meaning in Lotman's theory of the literary text's hierarchy and its different 
levels. According to Lotman, the very complexity of the literary text's structure (and 
with it the possibility of diverse interpretations) is founded on the elements' ability to 
take on different functions depending on the level at which they are being perceived, 
and to create diverse configurations of meaning, depending on which of the levels are 
taken into account (Lotman, 1977,20-25). After all, Lotman claimed that 'differences in 
the interpretation of works of art are common and, despite general opinion, do not arise 
from attendant and easily obviated causes, but rather are organic to art' (Lotman, 1977, 
24). 
Thus, if seen from the point of view of late Russian Formalism and Soviet 
Semiotics, SIZ is almost a model of structuralist analysis. At the same time, as we have 
seen in Chapter 1, all the assumptions about the text's ability to produce multiple 
secondary meanings are already there in Barthes's 'high structuralist' phase (say, in Sur 
Racine), and are even hinted at at the end of 'Introduction A Vanalyse structurale des 
r6cits'. 
, The five codes Barthes uses to reveal the structuring forces in 'Sarrasine' are a 
neat mixture of both literary and extra-literary codes, cultural and social ones. These are 
not, however, according to Barthes, the same codes which would be relevant for all 
literary texts, and the list proposed need not be exhaustive: these are simply the codes 
which are seen as appropriate for the analysis of this particular text (Barthes, 1970d, 
567-68). 
Two of the codes can be seen as belonging to a more conventional narratology 
(by Western standards), as they refer to the construction of the plot and its presentation 
in the text. The hermeneutic code is made up of the textual elements which constitute 
and solve an enigma (which in 'Sarrasine' is: who is the old man?, or elsewhere: who 
killed all those people on the Orient Express? ), while the proairetic code is, as Moriarty 
puts it, 'the code of actions, organised into sequences (kidnapping, assassinations), by 
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the logic of reading (the dija-lu) as much as by the logic of life (the d6ja-fait)' 
(Moriarty, 1991,122). 
The semic code is 'that of the connotative signified', 'of the concept evoked by a 
given sign' (Moriarty, 1991,121); it enables the reader to recognise the references to, 
for example, social status or gender (for example, in the opening sentence of 
Dostoevsky's Crime and Punishment, Raskolnikov is first seen leaving 'his little room 
at the top of the house in Carpenter Lane' - the small room at the top of a house in St. 
Petersburg denoting (or connoting) poverty, even misery, as small rooms on tops of 
houses in Paris often do in Balzac as well). The cultural or referential code consists of 
references to popular wisdom or (often vulgarised) science (popular psychology for 
example); the statements such as 'Women are weak and faint often,,, while men are 
strong and never faint' would belong to the cultural code. The symbolic code operates 
the processes of 'transformation and substitution' (Moriarty, 1991,121; Barthes, 1970d, 
567), which create symbolic relations between the elements; this code is responsible, for 
example, for establishing the antithesis between the garden and the salon as the symbols 
of death and life in the opening paragraphs of 'Sarrasine' (Barthes, 1970d, 568). 
These codes, as we can see, are not all purely literary in a traditional sense (the 
cultural code, for example, comes from a larger cultural space than literature itself), 
although Barthes himself talks of the code as being 'une perspective de citations, un 
mirage de structures', 'renvoyant a ce qui a 6t6 ecrit, c'est-A-dire au Livre (de la culture, 
de la vie, de la vie comme culture), il fait du texte le prospectus de ce Livre' (Barthes 
1970d, 568). However, especially in the light of what Bakhtin had to say about these 
matters, I believe that it is better and more productive to assume that the word Tivre' 
here is to be taken metaphorically (the capital letter would, at any rate, point to that), in 
the same way that it is sometimes said that 'the whole world is a stage', rather than 
insist on the literality of having to take into account only what has previously been 
written. After all, there have been and there are still many societies whose cultural 
existence depends on the oral tradition, and yet their own cultural code, although maybe 
different in content, functions and influences their verbal art in ways not completely 
dissimilar from those of literate societies. 
Furthermore, as Clayton says, Barthes often gives the impression that he refuses 
the notion of referentiality outside of the 'intertextual network' (Clayton, 1991,52), it is 
difficult to see how his notion of the code as something based on the 'deja lu, VU, fait, 
v&cu' can be sublimated under the notion of 'textuality' alone. Wasserman asserts that 
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tour sense of the real is strongly literary, and we expect this literary version of the real 
to be reinforced.... In other words, the world has become a sort of a book for us, and 
every subsequent attempt to refer to the world is in fact a reference to the books that 
have already coalesced around it' (Wasserman, 1981,83). 75 But who are 'we', and is the 
world really a book for us? Our sense of the real may be mediated through the culture to 
which we belong and the language which we speak, but it would be an exaggeration to 
claim that it is literature alone which guides us; what about films, television, political 
discourse, cultural framework in a larger sense? When Clayton and Rothstein claim that, 
according to Barthes, 'Balzacian realism is effective ... because of its continuous 
reference to anonymous textual codes that are always already read' (Clayton and 
Rothstein, 22), 1 believe that they take too seriously something that Barthes must have 
meant metaphorically, or otherwise he was wrong. If you replace 'textual codes' with 
4cultural codes' and put the 'read' in 'already read' in quotation marks, the sentence, 
and the notion expressed in it, start making more sense. Robert Scholes present things in 
a more useful way when he says that 'for Barthes, there is no such thing as a pure 
context. All contexts come... already coded, shaped, and organised by language, and 
often shaped in patently silly ways. The great error of the 'realist' in literature or in 
criticism is to assume that he is in touch with some ultimate context, while in reality he 
is simply transcribing a code' (Scholes, 1974,150). Scholes adds that 'Barthes, going to 
the cultural codes explicitly, finds meanings that are cultural, collective, almost 
involuntary as far as the reader is concemed(Scholes, 1974,162). Literature and 
'textuality' are just one of the aspects of culture and society, not the unique sites of their 
existence. 
Together, the five codes establish the plurality of 'Sarrasine', 76 and Barthes 
insists that there is no hierarchy between them (SIZ, 23). However, as Lavers says, one 
still gets the impression that 'the symbolic code is more equal than the others' (Lavers, 
1982,201). It is the symbolic code which determines the great 'themes' of the work: life 
and death, sex, gender, castration. 
75 Wassermann links this to Kristeva's notion of 'intertextuality' as a mosaic of citations, and puts an 
equal sign between her concept of the text and Barthes's concept of the code (84-5). 
76 Philip Thody (1977,116) objects that Barthes does not even seem to consider the main implication of 
his own remark that 'the meaning of a text can be nothing but the plurality of its systems, its infinite 
(circular) transcribability': that to provide only five codes for an infinitely meaningful text is a shade 
miserly'. He seems to miss the point that 'Sarrasine' is not an example of the scriptible, but of a simply 
plural text. 
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The plurality of 'Sarrasine', according to Barthes, is of a limited kind, based and 
dependent on connotation, on the closure of the Western culture and its signifying 
system; classic realist texts (the lisible, of which 'Sarrasine' is an atypical example) 
operate within that closure, although their (limited) plurality can vary (Barthes, 1970d, 
559-60). It is through the act of interpretation which does not 'make sense' of a text, but 
determines the extent of its plurality, that the 'readable' texts can be further 
differentiated (Barthes, 1970d, 558-9). This limited plurality is not what Barthes finds 
desirable, however, as he posits as his value the absolutely plural, scriptible text, that 
which would be based on the infinite play of the world and on the infinitude of 
languages themselves. The 'would' here is crucial, as such a text is still to be written: 
Le scriptible, c'est le romanesque sans le roman, la po6sie sans le po&me, 1'essai sans la 
dissertation, 1'6criture sans le style, la production sans le produit, la structuration sans la 
structure. Mais les textes lisibles? Ce sont des produits (et non des productions), its 
fornient la masse 6norme de notre litt6rature. (Ibid. ) 
The description of the scriptible text is to a large extent a kind of a Utopian literary 
manifesto: this is what we do not yet have, but wish would one day be created, and we 
shall strive towards it; that much is clear. As Wasserman (1981,81) puts it, 'the 
writerly, then, like the zero-degree of 'writing', is an unrealisable ideal, experienced in 
reading only fleetingly or perhaps accidentally'. It rests on Derrida's notion of 
infinitude, which Barthes mentioned in 'L'analyse structurale du recit' (1970a). 
According to Barthes, Derrida posits that all writing refers to and springs from other 
writing without the final signified, and thus signs can be multiplied indefinitely 
77 (Barthes, 1970a, 856). This is similar to Bakhtin's late assertion about 'semantic 
depths, which are as bottomless as the depths of matter', and about the 'infinite diversity 
of interpretations, images, figurative semantic combinations, materials and their 
interpretations' (Bakhtin 1999a, 140), except that Bakhtin's assertion lacks the 
implication of non-referentiality contained in Barthes's Derridian notion. However, 
Bakhtin still retains a strong sense that the cultural and social context, even in their 
open-endedness, matter very much for all kinds of discourse, including literary texts. 
For both Bakhtin and Lotman, the time and place in which the literary text is written 
77 Sec also: Derrida, 1970. 
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and read provide specific contexts for interpretation and analysis. And although these 
contexts and interpretations can change quite radically throughout human history, 
'infinitude' is there more as a metaphor for the vastness of the logosphere, than as a 
concrete principle which should guide literary analysis. 
Lavers rightly notes that 'what is most striking in SIZ is the 'structuration' part, 
since literary studies had until then always stressed the structure' (Lavers, 1982,199). 
And yet she asks: 'Can a structuration not produce a structureT (Lavers, 1982,201) The 
problem lies in the question of how truly equal and un-hierarchical the codes are, and 
she notes that 'the way in which he deals with [the codes]... shows a progression from 
the two codes in which the arrow of time cannot be stopped or reversed - the code of 
actions and that of riddles - towards those which deal with truth about the world and the 
person, leaving no question that the symbolic code is more equal than the others' (Ibid. ). 
Bearing in mind that 'Sarrasine' is not a scriptible text, but a text which has been 
submitted to a textual analysis designed to bring out its signifying plurality, the reading 
of it we get is still centred around the great themes offered by the symbolic code: life 
and death, sex and gender, art, and castration. In insisting on the equality of the codes, 
Barthes tries to emulate the two-dimensional nature (or shallowness) of Kristeva's 
notion of 'textual surfaces', but the fact that the codes nevertheless arrange themselves 
in a hierarchical manner adds the third dimension to his theory; speaking only half- 
metaphorically, it gives it a depth. 
What could be seen as genuinely new in SIZ is precisely the fact that it does not 
look at the intertextuality of the Balzac story on a purely literary basis, but takes into 
account all those unconscious, collective assumptions we bring into the reading of a 
literary text. How do we recognise social status? How do we see women? How do we 
follow a story? In this questioning of what we take for granted, Barthes, as Lavers has 
noted, goes back to his old interests and 'basic attitudes'. SIZ can be seen as the 
continuation of Barthes's exploration of the assumptions that guide the daily lives of the 
French in Mythologies to literary studies. 
Regardless of how we decide to solve the problem of the scriptible and its 
usefulness or validity as a theoretical notion, it is the insights and the subtlety of the 
literary analysis in SIZ that really matter from the critical point of view; the literary 
manifesto of the scriptible should remain what it was probably intended to be: a 
beautiful and inspirational dream. 
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After Kristeva and Barthes: A Few Examples of Uses of Intertextuality 
Vague as Kristeva's notion of 'intertextuality' was, the tenn itself sounded far too 
useful not to be employed further, and, indeed, it was soon taken up in reference to what 
literary scholars had been doing for quite a while: comparing texts with other texts and 
with their contexts (however broadly understood). 
Laurent Jenny in his essay Ta strat&gie de la forme' (1976) brought the debate 
back to where one of its origins lay, quoting Tynianov and his work on literary parody 
and literary system in general (Jenny, 1976,261). He also connected the theme of 
intertextuality with Lotman's notion of literature as a secondary language, defining it as 
an 'intertextual field of reference' (Jenny, 1976,257). The literary work, he repeated 
after Tynianov, is unthinkable outside the literary system, which presupposes a literary 
competence on the part of the reader. 
78 Furthermore, Jenny noted that intertextuality can 
be implicit and explicit, i. e., due either to the usage of a shared code or of the very 
matter of the text (Jenny, 1976,257). Apart from being formal, intertextuality can also 
be linked to the content of literary works (as in parody) (Ibid. ). Nevertheless, Jenny 
notes that it is sometimes difficult to tell whether a text's intertextual relations with 
another text are direct or indirect (i. e. mediated through a shared code), because, as 
Lotman puts it, in the secondary language of literature the notions of message and code 
are interchangeable, and sometimes the choice of the code is the most important part of 
the message. Thus, the analyst has to be careful when it comes to establishing links 
between texts - two texts might not be directly 'related' but could simply be sharing the 
same code (Jenny, 1976,279). Jenny also maintains, contrary to Kristeva, that the 
proper study of intertextuality cannot neglect the study of sources (1976,262), and that 
the notion of the central text or of archetypal models of literature which other texts 
realise, transform or transgress, and against which they are defined, is very useful in 
literary studies (1976,257). 
Jonathan Culler took up Jenny's article in the 'Presupposition and 
Intertextuality' chapter of his book The Pursuit of Signs, and claimed that 
'intertextuality' has a double focus: 
78 Jonathan Culicr also proposed a model of literary competence (1975,113-30). 
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On the one hand, it calls our attention to the importance of prior texts, insisting that the 
autonomy of texts is a misleading notion and that a work has the meaning it does only 
because certain things have previously been written. Yet in so far as it focuses on 
intelligibility, on meaning, 'intertextuality' leads us to consider prior texts as 
contributions to a code which makes possible the various effects of signification. 
(Culler, 1981,101-18) 
The notion of intelligibility takes Culler back to Kristeva's and Barthes's notions of 
intertextuality, defining it as 'the sum of knowledge that makes it possible for texts to 
have meaning', that is 'everything that enables one to recognise pattern and meaning in 
texts'(Culler, 1981,104). Culler notes that in comparison to 'Barthesian space of 
infinite and anonymous citations' (1981,108), Harold Bloom's notion of intertextuality 
as a relation 'between a text and a particular precursor text, between a poet and his 
major predecessor' (1981,107) can be positively more tempting, because it is so much 
better defined. 'Theories of intertextuality', notes Culler, 'set before us perspectives of 
unmasterable series, lost origins, endless horizons' (198 1,111). 
No wonder, then, that each critic has to redefine the term to suit their own 
purposes, often limiting the meaning that Kristeva gave it, and establishing 
intertextuality as the notion which helps us anchor the meaning of a text, rather than 
disseminate it. 
Virgil Nenoranu, for example, having defined intertextuality as 'interaction and 
interplay' (1992,3) suggests that 'religious intertextuality provides the kind of historical 
and specific referentiality that literary works need in order to preserve their own 
autonomy and dignity'(1992,13-14). He claims that religion provides us with a reliable 
context for literature, and that comparative religion should serve as a basis for 
comparative literature (Ibid. ). 
In an essay on the problems of editing Old English, A. N. Doane uses 
intertextuality 'to mean the editor's ability to refer outside a given text as it appears in a 
manuscript to two intertextual resources: a primary text or 'hypertext' constructed from 
a wide variety of Old English sources as a concordance; and a secondary intertext 
consisting of all previous editorial conjunctures about a given text'. Thus, 
'intertextuality bestows upon the editor the ability to make selections of variant 
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'readings' where the actual manuscript tradition of particular texts provides no basis for 
such choice, where there are, in fact, no variants' (Doane, 1991,76). 
On the other end of the spectrum, employing a broader notion of intertextuality, 
Susan Stewart defines as 'intertextual' the relationship between the domains of common 
sense and nonsense, specifying that it 'varies according to situation; to members' 
biographical situations, to the traditional stock of knowledge at hand, and to the 'larger 
situation', the ongoing concept of society in general'. The nature of the relationship 
between the domains is 'determined by the interpretative work of members in an 
ongoing social process' (Stewart, 1978,16). 
Still, there is a problem that no one who uses the term in a specific context can 
escape: that of the limits within which a particular intertextual net is cast. Jay Clayton 
notes that 'the intertextual network is 'open' in a way that the relation of influence is 
not'. According to Clayton (1991,50), 'influence is unidirectional, flowing from an 
earlier to a later author, whereas intertextuality establishes a flexible relation among 
texts'. He locates the 'direction' of the relation in the reader, 'shaped by individual 
interests and experiences', 'conscious and unconscious desires, literary training, 
religious background, nationality, familiarity with popular culture, class, gender, race, 
the accidents of everyday life, world-historical events - these are some of the variables 
that determine the connections the intertextual reader draws among texts' (Ibid. ). Some 
of these points of reference, as we can see, are not purely 'textual' but point out to the 
wider world of what he calls 'external reference'. Clayton notes that 'most theories of 
intertextuality... dismiss the importance of external reference... Barthes, too, denies the 
possibility of reference to a reality beyond the intertextual network' (Clayton, 1991,52). 
Clayton claims that 'these visions of literature' not only 'stand at odds with many 
writers' sense that they are responding to a world outside of textuality', but also are 'not 
susceptible to empirical verification' (1991,53). This brings us again to the problem of 
Kristeva's initial definition: for her, everything is 'textuality', while Bakhtin's notion of 
heteroglossia and dialogism can be said to represent extra-linguistic reality: they 
represent, for example, the contradictions and conflicts in a society. Bakhtin does not 
pretend, though, that society can thus be turned into a text, or into a linguistic or even 
trans-linguistic system. Intertextuality can be a useful concept, as long as it does not 
pretend to provide answers to all questions of how a literary text creates its meaning for 
us, or of how we create its meanings for it; which, I believe, is what Kristeva wants to 
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claim for her concept of intertextuality, by enlarging the notion of the 'text' to such 
gigantic proportions. 
Still, if we are aware of its limitations, I believe that the term is of great use, 
either as a general term describing any type of relation between texts or as a more 
narrowly defined Barthesian type of 'relationship between a text and the various 
languages or signifying practices of a culture and its relation to those texts which 
articulate for it the possibilities of that culture' (Culler, 1981,103). 
David Cowart demonstrates this quite well when he takes on the notion and the 
term in his book Literary Symbiosis: The Reconfigured Text in Twentieth- Century 
Writing (1993). Although he notes that the notion of 'intertextuality' is not new, still, 
according to him, 'contemporary writers engage in a kind of 'epistemic dialogue with 
the past, meanwhile forcing readers into a recognition of the historical or diachronic 
differences between the voice of one literary age and another' (Cowart, 1993,1). He 
terms this contemporary form of 'intertextuality' 'literary symbiosis', defining a 
6symbiotic' work as 'a special type of literary work that attaches itself remora-like to its 
source in seemingly parasitic dependence' (Ibid. ). For Cowart, literary symbiosis is a 
type of 'intertextuality', but he nevertheless notes that Kristeva, Barthes and Genette (in 
his Palimpsests) all 'refer by this term to the way linguistic usage - in literature or 
otherwise - constantly echoes prior linguistic usage' (1993,3) . 
79 This type of 'routine 
intertextuality', which consists of the 'weave implied etymologically in the word text', 
according to Cowart, 'requires a fine Barthesian instrument to be seen' (1993,7). Other 
types of relations between texts are more obvious and more robust, and Cowart suggests 
six basic types within his 'symbiotic spectrum': translation (either from language to 
language or from one genre to another), symbiotic texts proper (characters and actions 
appriopriated and reshaped, epistemic dialogue, deconstruction), texts incorporating 
extensive parts of other texts, allusion, ordinary intertextuality, and the rather mythical 
seýf-begotten texts (Cowart, 1993, ch. 1) As we can see, Cowart uses intertextuality to 
refer to the broad relation that literature has with 'prior linguistic usage' (ordinary or 
routine intertextuality), while at the same time recognising that any particular type of 
relation between texts has to be dealt with in a more refined and specific manner. The 
interesting thing is that, in Cowart's theory, intertextuality as defined by Kristeva 
becomes a particular type of relation that a text has with 'prior linguistic usage', 
79 A brief discussion of Genette can be found pp. 3-5. 
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excluding better defined types of relations between literary texts, while at the same time 
retaining its 'extremely broad' (Cowart, 1993,16) meaning, covering every type of 
relation in his 'symbiotic spectrum' (apart from the self-begotten text). Which brings us 
to an earlier point: having been bom with this broadness of meaning, 'intertextuality' 
will have to be, as a ten'n, constantly redefined, and, as a notion, refined and startified, 
with each new usage. 
Division of Languages 
And yet, not everything was 'unmasterable series, lost origins, endless horizons' for 
Roland Barthes, as we can see in his own version of the concept of heteroglossia. In 
1973 Barthes wrote an article entitled Ta division des langages', 80 opening it with the 
question: is our (that is, French) culture divided? His immediate answer was negative, 
on the grounds that everyone in France was (and is) capable of understanding a 
television programme or an article in France-Soir. What is more, everybody, apart from 
a small group of intellectuals, consumes these cultural products, and from that point of 
view France is as homogenous and 'cemented' as a 'small ethnographical society' 
(Barthes, 1973a, 1599). 
However, Barthes immediately made a distinction: although consumption is 
general and collective, production is not; and although everyone understands the same 
cultural language, languages that they speak are different. This primarily manifests itself 
on the level of taste, which remains divided and varied between individuals and in the 
society in general: some people love classical music and some crave boulevard 
comedies; very often, one love starts where the other ends, and there is no 'continuum 
of taste' across the culture. Thus, Barthes postulates a distinction between the collective 
language of cultural understanding and consumption, and the language of active cultural 
participation, or the language of desire (Ibid. ). According to Barthes, it is the language 
of desire which remains irreducibly and inescapably divided, posing a problem of 
scientific description and artistic representation of this division. 
Where artistic representation is concerned, Barthes says that the novel, at least 
since it became realist, has certainly found it necessary to represent different collective 
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languages of different social groups. However, most realist prose represents these 
languages as if in a frame, closed, and more often than not as spoken only by secondary 
characters, whereas the main heroes would continue to speak an atemporal, transparent 
and neutral language which would serve as a signal for their universal humanity 
(Barthes, 1973a, 1600). Barthes quotes Balzac's novels as perfect examples of this type 
of verbal mimesis: whenever Balzac represents social languages he presents them as a 
piece of social folklore, as verbal caricatures. However, Barthes suggests that there is 
another, more interesting type of social-verbal mimesis in Balzac's texts, and that is the 
representation of the codes of popular opinion (the cultural code of SIZ) which are often 
present even in Balzac's authorial comments to his narratives, as well as in the voices of 
his characters, although Balzac himself rarely seems to be aware of the true ideological 
nature of those comments (Ibid. ). 81 Flaubert, according to Barthes, cannot be charged 
with suspicions for this kind of naivety (or, adds Barthes, vulgarity), for in his writing 
and in the voices of his characters are present not only the linguistic quirks of different 
social groups, but also the moral and ideological values that are intrinsic to those social 
languages. At the same time, Flaubert's own authorial position amongst these languages 
and the subtle value judgements expressed by them can never clearly be determined. 
Flaubert never appears to place himself definitively outside of those languages, so that 
whenever he speaks the language of the bourgeoisie it is difficult to say from what 
position he is speaking: ironic, critical, distant? Barthes claims that this is precisely the 
point through which Flaubert so closely approaches modernity: the awareness that 
language is a space which has no exterior. In Proust's writing, however, the rich and 
varied verbal mimesis in his novels still looks at all the languages it represents from the 
outside. Idiolects, languages of social groups, various types of verbal 'contamination' of 
one language by another are framed, and the authorial (or narrative) voice remains 
outside it. And although the division of languages is represented with a clarity which 
can only be envied by sociolinguistics, the description does not involve the language of 
the describer (Barthes, 1973a, 1601). Using a scientific metaphor taken from Einstein's 
theory of relativity (which, incidentally, or perhaps not so incidentally, was used as a 
methodological metaphor by Bakhtin as well) (Bakhtin, 1996a, 84), Barthes says of 
Proust that his observer of these social languages fails to reveal his own positioý in the 
8' See also: Andrew Brown, 1992,210-235. 
81 See alSO Barthes, 1953,156-159. 
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observation, and 'the division of languages stops at the one who describes it' (Barthes, 
1973a, 1601). And so, when, for example, Frangoise speaks, nobody in the book 
responds to her words, and (here Barthes uses the term which does indeed sound 
suspiciously Bakhtinian) the observed language remains monologic, and these different 
languages are seen as little else than idiolects, and not as parts of a 'total and complex 
system of the production of languages' (Barthes, 1973a, 1602). 
But what is the nature of this division of languages? Barthes claims that 
languages are divided along the class lines, and, as he puts it, the division of labour 
engenders the division of vocabularies. However, this division is not so much on the 
level of the national language (langue), which is, as we have seen, shared and 
understood by all as the language of mass culture, but on the level of discourse; in other 
words, there exists a complete lack of curiosity for the other which prevents different 
social classes from speaking to each other. Everybody in French society, says Barthes, 
sticks to their own kind and their own professional and class language with a neurotic 
persistency. Barthes claims that, regardless of the fact that division of languages is not 
just a simple reflection of the division of labour but is much more complex than that 
(although he does not qualify precisely in what ways), France, compared to other 
countries which are not necessarily more democratic, has a strong awareness of identity 
and 'proprietariness' in relation to language. Thus, the language of the other is often 
seen only as a 'jargon', a caricature, and the closed language of the other is often 
perceived with mocking irony, and not simply as another language (Barthes, 1973a, 
1602-3). 
So how should this division of languages be described scientifically? 
Barthes claims that sociolinguistics has failed to realise the full importance of 
the division of languages, and that it continued to look at different languages purely 
empirically ('languages are divided so let us describe them'), rather than as a sign of 
deeper social divisions, and a result of historical and cultural circumstances. Linguistics 
itself only looks at vocabularies of different historical epochs, but is not interested in 
social languages. However, what is the main fault with these scientific descriptions, 
even when they do take into account the division of languages as a social and verbal 
fact, is that they are, as Barthes put it, still at their Newtonian phase, and have yet to 
undergo their own Einsteinian revolution. The only way forward that Barthes can see 
for a linguistic description of the division of languages is to take the verbal and social 
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position of the observer into account when describing verbal diversity (Barthes,. 1973a, 
1604). 
The obvious question is: why should that be necessary? And Barthes's answer is 
precisely that since sociolects (social languages) are spaces with no exterior, there is no 
way of approaching them from without. The only way for an analyst to preserve the 
scientificity of his approach is to declare openly the verbal and ideological space from 
which his own utterance and analysis comes. In other words, as an analyst will always 
speak in a certain sociolect and approach the division of languages from the ideological 
position expressed and represented by that sociolect, he must not assume a false position 
of disinterestedness and pretend that the language he speaks is a metalanguage. And 
this, according to Barthes, means that an analysis will always have to start- with a 
political and ideological evaluation of the social languages under consideration. A 
(necessarily false) assumption of non-differentiation and equality between different 
social languages would only disguise the fact that there exist a conflict and a 
contradiction in the social body, as well as deny the 'fracture of the knowing subject' 
('la fracture du sujet savant'), its implication in that conflict and contradiction (Barthes, 
1973a, 1605). 
Thus, as Barthes stresses, no scientific description of social languages can start 
without a founding political evaluation. The political evaluation Barthes himself 
proposes divides social languages into two groups: the languages in or inside of power 
(or in the shade of power) and the languages outside of or without power. Following 
Aristotle's division of logical proofs between those that are interior to an art and those 
that are exterior to it, Barthes refers to the languages inside of power as encratic 
(encratique) and those outside of power as acratic (acratique). 
As we have seen in Barthes's analysis of the French bourgeois ideology (whose 
language is undoubtedly an encratic one) in Mythologies, the discourse in power rarely 
manifests itself directly and obviously; as Barthes notes, only a tyrant will openly 
declare: 'the King orders that... '. The example Barthes uses of this is the power of the 
law, which is mediated through a whole juridical culture, whose ratio is accepted by 
almost everybody (Ibid. ). And we have seen in Mythologies that the ruling ideology and 
its language can very easily and imperceptibly seep into all aspects of everyday life, 
even when they seem to have nothing to do with politics and ideology (like children's 
toys, for example - Barthes showed that they are often designed to turn children into 
good little bourgeois consumers with fixed perceptions of social and gender roles). 
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On the other hand, the acratic discourse does not necessarily have to declare 
itself against power, or have anything to do with a political or ideological critique of the 
social order; it is sometimes enough that it goes against the commonly accepted views 
or current opinions. Using Aristotle's terminology again, Barthes suggest that his term 
doxa (general opinion or belief, as opposed to truth) should be redefined as 'a cultural 
(or discursive) mediation through which power (or non-power) speaks' (Barthes, 1973a, 
1606). The inclusion of non-power here seems confusing, until we remind ourselves of 
the one of main points put forward in Mythologies: that the power of bourgeois ideology 
rests precisely in its ability to penetrate into everyday life and speech, and enter the 
language of those who are essentially alien to and remote from the true sources of 
bourgeois power. As Barthes put it, the great triumph of bourgeois ideology comes at 
the point when a typist on a meagre salary recognises herself (Barthes does not say: her 
own dreams or aspirations, but herself) in a lavish bourgeois wedding (Barthes, 1957, 
704). - when the difference between one's actual social standing and one's beliefs and 
allegiances is not perceived as an absurdity and a contradiction, but as an expression of 
eternal human nature, which is, naturally, a bourgeois one (lavish weddings being a part 
of that human nature). 
In this contcxt, Barthcs offirs his sccond dcfinition of the encratic discoursc, as 
one which conforms itself to doxa (to the culture and the system of belief belonging to 
the ruling ideology), while the acratic discourse is redefined through its opposition to it 
(and thus becomes, in Barthes's terms, para-doxal) (Barthes, 1973a, 1606). Tbus one 
can say-about, for example, psychoanalytic discourse, which is not in any way directly 
related to the critique of power or bourgeois ideology (at least, Barthes adds, in France), 
that it is an acratic discourse, precisely because it goes against what the doxa has to say 
about 'human nature' (Barthes, 1973a, 1605). And it is here that Barthes stresses again 
the 'osmotic' nature of doxa, the omni-presence of the ruling ideology which was one of 
the main topics of-Mythologies: doxa is a diffused discourse, present in all social rituals 
and common beliefs, in the whole of the 'socio-symbolic sphere' (Barthes, 1973a, 
1606). What is more, it reffises to admit to its own ideological nature, but instead 
presents itself as Nature, as common sense, universality, clarity, and an opposition to a 
systemic understanding (and, naturally, 'impoverishing') of the world offered by such 
(acratic, paradoxal) discourses as psychoanalysis, structuralism or Marxism. "Further 
still, doxa is a 'full' discourse, it contains no room for*another, for anything that does 
not belong to it; thus its ideological and verbal body has a tendency to pervade all 
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aspects of life, language, and society, leaving no room for anything foreign or opposed 
to it. It is an 'unmarked' discourse, present everywhere yet difficult to pin down. To 
paraphrase a comment Barthes made in his essay 'Grammaire africaine'(1 957,647-5 1) 
('pour le gens de droite, la Politique, c'est la Gauche : eux, c'est la France'), according 
to the logic of doxa, it is the others who are ideological, doxa herself is nothing but a 
voice of Nature and common sense. 
Barthes claims that it is the acratic discourse which is easier and more 
interesting to study, as these languages find themselves outside of doxa, rejected by it 
under the name of jargons; encratic discourse itself, on the other hand, is predictable, 
and in analysing it one can almost know in advance what one will find. The challenge of 
acratic discourses, however, lies in the fact that they ordinarily belong to the very 
intellectuals who would undertake that kind of ideological analysis, to structuralists, 
Marxists, psychoanalysts and social scientists themselves; and thus the need to include 
the observer in the observation acutely presents itself. Doxa, the discourse in power, 
never undertakes that kind of introspective analysis of its own workings (and, if we 
follow its own logic, why would it? ); but for acratic discourse's analysis of acratic 
discourse, the necessity for an Einsteinian revolution is obvious. 
But what is the relationship between doxa and paradoxa, between encratic and 
acratic languages? Going back to Aristotle again, Barthes says that for him the art of 
rhetoric was about persuasion; in the times which cultivated it, discourse would openly 
display its power, and an encratic discourse could openly declare itself as its intention 
was to persuade or to win over, and not to present itself as the Voice of Nature. Once 
doxa starts to pretend that its own language is perfectly transparent and 'natural', the 
study of its rhetoric becomes implicitly forbidden or 'forgotten': for, how can one study 
the rhetorical functioning of something which is not trying to persuade anybody, but is, 
plain and simple, the voice of reason and nature? (Barthes, 1973a, 1607). 
However, instead of the rhetoric of persuasion, says Barthes, modem discourses 
in democratic societies, both acratic and encratic, function according to the logic of 
intimidation. Sociolects offer a sense of security and belonging to those who speak 
them; to adopt a sociolect means at the same time to be adopted by a social group 
which speaks it; those who do not speak the same language are rejected and intimidated. 
There is, however, a difference between encratic and acratic discourses in the methods 
of intimidation. Encratic discourses, with their sprawling omnipresence, tend to oppress 
others; acratic discourses, on the other hand, with their subjection to the discourse in 
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power, use the methods of open confrontation and force - they can do nothing but rebel 
and openly intimidate the other. Barthes claims that this difference stems, yet again, 
from the relationship these two types of discourse have with systematic thought: 
encratic discourse prefers to befog its own systemic nature, allegedly putting 'lived 
experience' (as it, 'unthinkingly', sees and defines it) before any kind of system; acratic 
discourse, on the other hand, bases its 'violence' on an openly declared system of 
thought. Thus the relationship between these two discursive systems (for, to stress it 
once again, there is no doubt in Barthes's mind that doxa, for all its protestations, is as 
much of an ideological system as is, for example, Marxism) can be defined through the 
opposition of the hidden and the patent (Ibid. ). Doxa, omnipresent yet invisible, quietly 
oppresses; paradoxa, pushed out to the margins, openly and aggressively declares its 
opposition and rejection of it. 
No wonder, then, that, according to Barthes, there is no dialogue among the 
different sociolects and social groups in the French society. 
82 However, as Barthes put it 
in another paper of the same year (1973b), it is not so much the division of languages 
that is the problem. According to Barthes, division itself is the function of language's 
natural tendency to produce synonyms: once there is more than one way of saying pretty 
much the same thing (allowing for the slight differences in the nuances of meaning 
which can always be detected amongst synonyms), these different ways will be used in 
different contexts, with different intentions and/or by different social groups. We have 
already seen that Bakhtin also believed that the division of languages in a society is 
something of a 'natural phenomenon', albeit not as the result of synonymy but as a 
perfectly logical consequence of the divisions in the society itself, not just into different 
social, ideological, religious and ethnic groups, but also simply between different 
individuals with different life-experiences and world-views. This for Bakhtin does not 
pose any other problem than the problem of the full realisation of this unavoidable fact 
and its adequate artistic representation; Barthes, on the other hand, claimed that the 
division of languages in the French society had taken a nasty turn towards conflict, and 
that simple difference had become a war of languages (hence the title of the paper, 'La 
guerre des languages'). Furthermore, Barthes claims that each of the acratic discourses 
intimidates not just those who do not belong to it, but also those who do, by committing 
11 However, Andrew Brown argues that, if there is to be a state of war between languages, they must 
communicate 'as enemies locked in conflict' (1992,212). 
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them to use certain standard phrases and stereotypes, systemic figures and types of 
representation. 
It is worth noting that several critics have noted that there is a problem in 
Bakhtin's theory of dialogism, precisely in that he does not recognise the acuteness of 
the social conflict which lies or may lie behind the stratification of different social 
languages. 
Aaron Fogel, in his 1989 essay 'Coerced Speech and the Oedipus Dialogue 
Complex', says that 'revelatory and intimate I-Thou conversation, of the kind the 
greatest characters in Austen, Eliot, Lawrence, and Forster reach toward, does usually 
occur between those who belong to a high, even an ideal, spiritual class, who can master 
difficult rules... They are the 'winners' in the conversational scene: an elite of 
sympathetic imagination, who can even overcome the flaws and limits in conventional 
ideas of "sympathy". ' Below them is the 'natural' speech of 'ordinary people'. And yet, 
notes Fogel, 'novelistic dialogue... doesn't begin and end with free, natural lower-class 
speech and freely achieved upper-class mutual sympathy. Most real speech between 
classes is probably not conversational' (Fogel, 1989,174-5). Fogel uses Conrad's 
novels to illustrate the coercive nature of dialogue that Bakhtin seems to ignore. The 
&coercive disproportion' which is, according to Fogel, in the nature of most, if not all, 
dialogue, is termed the 'Oedipus dialogue complex', refrerring to Oedipus 'as the 
coercive interrogator or speech-forcer whose interrogations reveal his own guilt and 
bring about his own punishment' (Fogel, 1989,180). Fogel notes that 'Bakhtin tried to 
revive the New Testament Greek term anacrisis for the scene of making the other speak. 
For him it referred to the whole field of devices, mostly subtle, for getting the other to 
talk... but the dictionaries remind us that in its origins it refers more often to 
examination by extreme physical torture' (Fogel, 1989,188). 
Michael Andr6 Bernstein, in his 1989 essay 'The Poetics of Ressentiment' also 
notes 'how abstract and idealized Bakhtin's notion of a full dialogue really is, and how 
unlikely its chances are of ever being realized anywhere except - and even that merely 
rarely - in the specialized discourse of the work of art' (Bernstein, 1989,200). 
Barthes's own theory of the division and the war of languages can also be seen 
as an interesting critique of Bakhtin's theory of dialogism, quite apart from being an 
interesting theory in itself. 
if we take all of this into account, it is no wonder that Barthes found it so 
tempting to propose a type of writing which would take him (and us) out of such a 
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dreary situation, where all utterance is nothing but either oppression or intimidation of 
the other. The Utopian scriptible is not, however, the only such model proposed by 
Barthes. 
At the end of 'La guerre des languages' Barthes proposes a rather Bakhtinian 
project for opposing the war of languages: 
Seule Ncriture, en effet, peut assurner le caract6re fictionnel des parlers les plus 
s6rieux, voire les plus violents, les replacer dans leur distance th6itrale; je puis, par 
exemple, emprunter le parler psychanalytique dans sa richesse et son 6tendue, mais en 
user in petto comme d'un langage romanesque. 
D'autre part, seule P 6criture peut m6langer les parlers (le psychanalytique, le marxiste, 
le structuraliste, par exemple), constituer ce qu'on appelle une h6t6rologie du savoir, 
donner au langage une dimension carnavalesque. (Barthes, 1973b, 1612-3)83 
It seems that Barthes simply did not believe that the different social groups in 
France can ever be made to talk to each other in good faith. And, yet, I am not so sure 
that Bakhtin was really that guilty of ignoring the conflicts in his own culture and 
society; he stressed often enough that in most cases we do not take into account the 
point of view of the other in our speech. He simply saw the novel (or more precisely, 
Dostoevsky's novels) as one of those rare sites where real conversation is possible. 
What is quite opposed to this Bakhtinian vision in Barthes is his final remark that it is 
only the 6criture which is capable of presenting itself as atopical, without an identifiable 
source or origin, that can subvert or oppose the war of languages. For Barthes, the 
atopia of 6criture is what enables desire to circulate freely, without fear of domination. 
What this also implies, however, is that no lines of responsibility can be traced through 
the text; the engagement with the different social languages remains 'merely' playful, 
and its very freedom and lack of discursive commitment (which was - commitment, that 
is - fully displayed, according to Bakhtin, by Dostoevsky's characters) prevents the text 
from offering the possibility of true dialogue between different social groups and 
languages. It still seems to me that it is only Bakhtin's notion of novelistic dialogism 
which would be the true alternative to the abysmal situation perceived by Barthes. 
831t is worth noting that h6tirologie is the word Tzvetan Todorov used as his translation of Bakhtin's term 
4raznorechic' (diversity of types of discourse) (Todorov, 1981,88-89). 
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After all, in Le degri ziro de Vicriture (1953), Barthes opposed the concept of 
'dcriture' to those of 'speech' (parole) and style. He defined speech as a 'horizontal 
structure', whose 'secrets are on the same line as its words'. Speech is fully open, 
destined to an immediate consumption. Style, on the other hand, is vertical, it comes 
from the depths of the personal history, intimate memory and biology of an individual 
(Barthes, 1.953,146). Behind both lies the language as a horizon and a limit of what is 
possible, and in it the writer finds the 'familiarity of History' (Barthes, 1953,147). If 
Greimas is right and Barthes had read Saussure while writing Le degri zero, then this is 
a rc-working of Saussurean terminology, with an introduction of the notion of style as 
the purely subjective form of speech, as opposed to speech proper, which is purely 
practical. However, even if Greimas got his -dates wrong, - Lavers-- (1982,50) points out 
that one need not have read Saussure to be familiar with it, as Merleau-Ponty cites it, 
without reference to Saussure, in his Phenomenology of Perception (1945), to which 
Barthes alludes in Le degri ziro. 
Ecriture itself is defined as 'an act of historical solidarity', a 'relation between 
the creation and-the society', a 'literary language transformed by its social destination', 
a 'form caught in its human intention and thus- linked to the great crises of History' 
(Barthes, 1953,147). Moreover, dcriture is defined as a necessary compromise between 
freedom and historical memory, and a compromise between general and literary history. 
According to Barthes, literary forms cannot shake off their past functions simply at 
command, and words have an ability to mysteriously retain the memory of their past 
meanings, regardless of the present usage. 
It seems to me that this early concept of what dcriture might do and mean, with 
its notion of historical responsibility and the need for negotiation between freedom and 
constraint, is much closer to Bakhtin than Barthes's post-Kristevan work. - And that, in 
the context of this work which to a large extent aims to read Barthes through Bakhtinian 
eyes, is a great pity; had Bakhtin's work been brought into the context of French 
structuralism in a more radical and uncompromising way (that is, without wanting to 
court the. less- productive- strands of French structuralism), the. influence- on-Barthes 
perhaps could have been more interesting and fruitful. 
There are, however, certain aspects of the Barthes - Bakhtin relationship which 
have been opened in this discussion but have not been developed fully, and the question 
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of the role of the author seems to me to be one of the main ones. It is a problem, 
however, which deserves a separate discussion, and a chapter of its own. 
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Chapter 4: The Role of the Author 
The Return of the Author 
Barthes and Bakhtin both wrote about the role of the author - or the lack of it - in the 
creation, perception, and functioning of the literary text. Standing on their own, their 
ideas on authorship can be seen as rather different, but what unites them in this thesis is 
their role in the discussion about the practice of literature as a weaving of different 
voices and social languages. The basic background questions to this discussion are: 
What is an author and how does he or she participate (if at all) in a intertextual, or 
dialogic, or polyphonic text? Does the author exist (if at all) as an individual voice in 
the text or as a structuring force? Is the private person at all relevant to our 
understanding of the figure of the author we find in the text? Do we need the figure of 
the author in the text and would it matter if there was none? Is the author a part of the 
structure of the text (and if yes, how? ) or just an agent in its creation (and if yes, to what 
an extent? )? 
At first, the answer to these questions seems very simple where Barthes and 
Bakhtin are concerned: Barthes announced the death of the author (so that's the end of 
that discussion), while Bakhtin thought that the author participated to a certain extent 
but was at his best when least heard and seen (this would be a beginner's definition of 
6polyphony'). My aim is to show that things are not that simple, and that the different 
guises under which the notion of the 'author' appears in the work of Barthes and 
Bakhtin reveal the underlying issues of the nature of the structure of the literary work 
and the role of ideology in it, and Barthes's and Bakhtin's various approaches to these 
issues. 
As a little preface to the discussion, it needs to be mentioned that in some of the 
recent discussions of authorship, inspired by Barthes's controversial manifesto 'The 
Death of the Author' as well as by the critical reactions to it, the ideas (or, sometimes, 
the instincts) of some of the 'anti-authorial' theorists are examined for the traces of the 
4auteurism' they attack (Burke, 1992,20,52-53)* Sean Burke, for example, criticises the 
uncritical and over-enthusiastic reception of Barthes's 'The Death of the Author', 
arguing that the essay (as well as other, similar arguments by Foucault, Derrida and de 
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Man) can in no way be read as a straight-forward 'proof that the 'Author' was 'dead' 
and irrelevant (Burke, 1992,16-8). Furthermore, Burke argues that not even the critics 
who took up the notion of the death of the author with enthusiasm fully believed in it. 
He cites the scandal caused by the discovery of Paul de Man's youthful articles for the 
Belgian collaborationist newspaper Le Soir as his main example (Burke, 1992,1-7). 
After the articles were discovered, Burke argues, suddenly, the question of authorship, 
one which 'critical theory thought to have dispensed with' (Burke, 1992,1), was 
brought back centre-stage. What is more, it was raised about an author like de Man, 
who, as Burke puts it, had throughout his career 'denied that the writer's life in any way 
bore upon the interpretation of his or her work', and insisted that 'an author's 
personality and life history disappear irretrievably in the textual machine' (Burke, 1992, 
2). Burke notes that 'not surprisingly, since his Le Soir articles have come to light, 
many commentators have seen factors beyond those of textual epistemology urging this 
flight from the self' (Ibid. ). He adds: 
De Man's denial of biography, his ideas of autobiography as de-facement, have come to 
be seen not as disinterested theoretical statements, but as sinister and meticulous acts of 
self-protection, by which he sought to (a)void his historical self ( ... ) The Le Soir 
articles have now put into play their own history, and the 'retrospective self- 
examination' de Man professes foreign to his nature has been practised on his behalf 
. (Burke, 
1992,2-3) 
The articles were impossible to ignore, and even the 'luminaries of the deconstructive 
movement' had to in some way interpret de Man's intentions when writing them, and to 
postulate some kind of relationship between them and de Man's later work (whether 
seeing the latter as a sophisticated extension the former, or seeing the former as a 
'lamentable aberration in de Man's thought, one which his subsequent work did its best, 
on an implicit level, to retract and justify' (Burke, 1992,3). Burke identifies six 'loci of 
traditional author-centred criticism' that reappeared through this debate: 
1. Intention: what were the intentions of young de Man in Le Soir articles and how (if 
at all) are they different from the intentions of his later work? 
2. Author-ity: as Burke puts it, 'the fact that de Man became an authority within 
literary theory and a certain philosophy of language means that it matters what he 
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said, wherever and whatever, at whatever stage of adult development, and in 
whatever circumstances' (Burke, 1992,4). And, Burke adds, precisely since he was 
a philosopher, any link he might have had with National Socialist ideology is of 
greater importance than it would have been if he was a musician or a chess 
grandmaster. 
3. Biography: the importance of the biographical context is brought to the foreground. 
How old was de Man when he wrote the articles; did he have any dependants; was 
he a member of the Nazi party or of any resistance groups; did he ever express any 
anti-Semitic notions in conversations: all of these factors, and more, are 'privileged 
whether offered up in exonerative or incriminatory contexts' (Burke, 1992,5). 
4. Accountability: Burke notes that the belief that 'de Man must be held to account for 
what he had written [was] accepted by all parties in this controversy'. Nobody tried 
to argue that 'Paul de Man' as an author was just 'a fiction or trace of language' and 
that 'in the reality of text 'Paul de Man' signs and signifies nothing'. Furthermore, 
the fact that many of his fellow theorists have defended him as a person, often with 
great passion fostered by friendship and respect, according to Burke, 'confirms that, 
firstly, the signature 'Paul de Man' is something greatly in excess of a textual effect 
and secondly, his signature ties de Man ethically and existentially to the texts he has 
written' (Ibid. ). 
5. Oeuvre: should the Le Soir articles be included in the de Man corpus or not? Burke 
notes that the fundamental concept behind the question, the notion of authorial 
oeuvre, was not called into question in the context of this debate. 
6. Autobiography: with the discovery of the articles, the rest of de Man's corpus was 
suddenly seen as essentially autobiographical in nature, either trying to theoretically 
erase the youthful writings and 'obliterate his own history', or as an almost 
confessional warning against the 'ideological mystifications' to which he had 
succumbed in his youth (Burke, 1992,6). 
Burke argues that the controversy around Paul de Man's writings highlights 'the return 
of the author as it inevitably and implicitly occurs in the practice of anti-authorian 
criticism; and the return to the author that poststructuralism in general has yet to make 
at the level of theory despite its failure to circumvent subjectivity at the level of its 
readings' (Burke, 1992,7). 
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Similarly, Susan Stanford Friedman notes (1991,152) that there is something 
incongruous in the position of those, authorised by Kristeva's own remarks, who 
complain that the term 'intertextuality' has been abused (Leon S. Roudiez, for 
example). Kristeva herself, in her vision of 'intertextuality' as an 'anticolonialist 
resistance to the concept of hegemonic influence', 'eliminated the author as the agent' 
of the active negotiation between different voices. So, according to Friedman, the 
complaint of terminological abuse (Roudiez, 1980) not only 'reflects the wish for 
intellectual clarity and precision in terminology, but it also engages in a desire to 
maintain a fixed meaning, a signified, for intertextuality'. It insists on the faithfulness to 
Kristeva's authorial meaning 'in the dissemination of her concept in its original form on 
"both sides of the Atlantic"' (Friedman, 1991,154). Kristeva. may have expelled the 
author and his or her intentions from the intertextual process, but her authorial intention 
where the meaning of the term 'intertextuality' is concerned, according to Roudiez and 
Kristeva herself, is to be respected and not 'abused'. And, yet, Friedman also notes that 
respecting the authorial meaning is not the principle Kristeva followed in her 
presentation of Bakhtin's ideas. By 'suppressing the idea of influence', Kristeva's 
notion of intertextuality 'in effect allows Kristeva to erase the influence of her precursor 
[Bakhtin] to whom she is seemingly crediting the concept and from whom she borrows 
(masculine) authority' (Friedman, 1991,159). Thus, the liberties Kristeva took with 
Bakhtin's concepts are, or would be according to Friedman, theoretically excused in the 
very notion of intertextuality. Which gives both Kristeva and Roudiez even less reason 
to complain of the liberties others have taken with Kristeva's 'intertextuality'. 
Before we look at Barthes and Bakhtin, I propose a brief examination of the 
concepts of authorship in the past hundred or so years which seem pertinent to the ideas 
Barthes and Bakhtin had on the subject. After all, the 'death of the author' is not 
something Barthes was the first to announce; others have put forward the same or 
similar ideas before, although not in quite the same dramatic manner. In many cases, the 
argument that the author was irrelevant was, as for Barthes, a reaction against literary 
positivism and its near obsession with the author's psychology, life and circumstances. 
At the same time, other notions of what an author is and what he or she does have 
appeared, trying to get away from both the positivist over-stressing and the anti- 
positivist denial, and to find a way to incorporate the question of the author into the 
question of the nature of the literary text. A surprising middle-ground example I want to 
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look at in particular is the Russian Formalism, which offered some interesting ways of 
looking at the problem of the author, while still insisting on the primary importance of 
the literary text in literary studies; I also believe that their ideas are not that different 
from Bakhtin's. So, more in the form of snapshots than as a detailed history of the 
problem, I shall now look at the author, his discovery and disappearance. 
A Short Historv of a Discoverv and Death 
In 1923 Boris Tomashevskii, one of the most prominent Russian Formalists, in his essay 
'Literature and Biography' asked the question: 'do we need the poet's biography in 
order to understand his work, or do we noff (Tomashevskii, 1971,47). His essay, along 
with the whole of the Formalist movement, was to a large extent a reaction against 
traditional, positivist literary history, which based its analysis of literary works on the 
figure of the author, his biography, psychology, historical and social circumstances 
which surrounded him, and on his literary intentions. However, from the point of view 
of the contemporary literary theory, positivism can be seen almost as some kind of a 
mythological monster, remembered for its horrors (through the essays that described 
them), but by now extinct, irrelevant and unread. So irrelevant, in fact, that in Burke's 
excellent anthology Authorship: From Plato to the Postmodern, positivism is only 
mentioned once, in Barthes's essay 'The Death of the Author' (Burke, 1995,126). 
Jack Stillinger, however, lets us catch a glimpse of what positivist criticism or 
biographical study was really like. In his book Multiple Authorship and the Myth of 
Solitary Genius, Stillinger briefly charts the history of biographical criticism in English 
literary studies, from its late-eighteenth-century start with Johnson's Lives of the 
English Poets, through the Romantic period when it 'became the principal method of 
writing about literature' and the Victorian period when it became a 'large element in the 
formal study of literature when English departments and curricula were instituted in 
colleges and universities toward the end of the nineteenth century' (Stillinger, 1991,6- 
7). According to Stillinger, at the beginning of the twentieth century 'biography had 
actually replaced the works as the main focus in lectures, critical essays 
("appreciations"), and even literary histories' (Ibid. ). He uses Charles Grosvenor 
Osgood's at the time widely used 1935 book The Voice ofEngland as an illustration: 
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Osgood's six hundred pages of agreeably readable humanisation [of the 'greater figures 
in English literature] recount the lives in detail and the works hardly at all: Paradise 
Lost receives just a page of descriptive commentary (beginning 'Paradise Lost is the 
greatest single poetic achievement in the language'); The Rape of the Lock is 
summarised in four sentences (concluding with the remark that the poem is 'an 
imperishable treasure of fun and wit that never stale, and of beauty that never fades') 
Hamlet and King Lear and Keats's odes are merely mentioned by title. (Ibid. ) 
As Stillinger notes, many critics reacted against this type of literary scholarship: T. S. 
Eliot (with his idea that 'the progress of an artist is a continual self-sacrifice, a continual 
extinction of personality') (1995,76), 1. A. Richards ('What concerns criticism is not 
the avowed or unavowed motives of the artist'; 'Whatever psycho-analysts may aver, 
the mental processes of the poet are not a very profitable field for investigation') (1976, 
20), and of 'The Intentional Fallacy' by Wimsatt and Beardsley Wimsatt, 1954), all of 
whom insisted on the shift of emphasis away from the author and onto the text alone. 
Still, it needs to be said that T. S. Eliot, when speaking of 'depersonalisation', was 
referring primarily to poetic practice. While the others simply insisted, from a critic's 
point of view, that the question of the author's motives and intentions was, as Wimsatt 
and Beardsley put it, 'always illegitimate' (Stillinger, 1991,8), T. S. Eliot's primary 
argument was that the poet himself erases the traces of his personality in his poetic 
work, and from there it can only follow that 'to divert interest from the poet to the 
poetry is a laudable aim: for it would only conduce to a juster estimation of actual 
poetry, good and bad' (Eliot, 1995,80). 
However, Sean Burke claims that T. S. Eliot's essay is a continuation of a second 
strand of the Romantic thinking about the author which co-existed with its glorification 
of the poet's personality (Burke, 1995, xxiii). This second strand is exemplified by: 
Keats's idea of negative capability - an emphatic act which requires the empty-ing out 
of all personal concerns in poetic composition - as well as in Coleridge's insistence that 
'to have a genius is to live in the universal, to know no self... '. It is also a central edict 
in the later German romantics such as K. W. F. Solger for whom artistic creation is 
requisitely objective, ironic and impersonal. (Burke, 1995, xxii) 
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Burke explains the coexistence of these 'seemingly contradictory impulses - towards 
subjectivity on the one hand, and impersonality on the other' as two reactions to Kant's 
subjective idealism, and its extension into aesthetics by Fichte and Schelling. He claims 
that the translation of Kant's notion that 'the world we perceive is only made possible to 
us through the operations of a transcendental ego which imposes the a priori categories 
of space, time and causality upon the ultimately inaccessible objects of experience' into 
the aesthetic realm 'served to problematise the mimetic subordination of the author to 
nature', while creating a 'model of imagination as shaping and (re)creating the world in 
poetic language' (Burke, 1995, xx). One response to this is the notion of strong 
subjectivity and the poet as genius who by the power of his imagination creates new 
worlds, and this is transformed into a vivid curiosity about poets' lives and psychology. 
The other response, according to Burke, comes out of the anxiety about the 
4potentially nihilistic implications of Kant's subjective idealism, and attempts to 
preserve something of the Enlightenment notion of disengaged reason in an era which 
could no longer see truth as mimetically grounded or divinely sanctioned' (Burke, 1995, 
xxii). Burke adds: 
Impersonality, like disinterestedness, would seem to arise as a reflex or defence in 
simultaneously acknowledging the ascendance of subjectivity while guarding against its 
more destabilising ramifications. (Burke, 1995, xxiii) 
Burke claims that 'this very same need to defend against the subjectivist turn in 
modernity informs modernist reactions against personality' (Ibid. ). We shall see that the 
Kantian model is very important for Bakhtin's theory of authorship, but that at the same 
time he manages to avoid both the obsession with the personality of the author and the 
denial of his importance as an agent. 
The notion of literature as a 'revelation of personality' resulted in the type of 
criticism which flourished in the second half of the nineteenth century (i. e., the literary 
positivism of the kind illustrated by Stillinger and reacted against by 1. A. Richards and 
the Formalists, and, later, Barthes) and which saw no contradiction in 'uncovering an 
author's personal life at the same time as lauding that author's transcendent genius' 
(Ibid. ). But the strongest reactions against it (like that of Eliot) 'reclaim the higher 
romantic ground in the process of declaring their anti-romanticism. Burke concludes 
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that 'no less than within romanticism, the reaction against subjectivity once more shows 
that its terms are governed by the era of subjectivity' (Ibid. ). 
Considering that the denial of the importance of the author has been going on ever 
since the author was proclaimed to be the sole or the most important originator of the 
literary text, and that from the 1920s onwards some of the most influential schools of 
criticism have refused to give the author much attention and insisted on dealing with the 
literary text alone (the Russian Formalists, New Critics, as well as, in Germany, Emile 
Staiger, Wolfgang Kayser and Leo Spitzer) (Petrovid, 1972,56-66), it is somewhat 
strange that Barthes's 1968 article, announcing the death of the author, could have 
caused such a great storm of approvals and disapprovals. The answer probably lies in 
the fact that, as Stillinger wrote in 1991, 'a great deal of literary study as it is routinely 
carried on from day to day continues to be fundamentally biographical in approach' 
(Stillinger, 1991,8). Whatever literary theory for the most part of the twentieth century 
may have been doing, 
The preponderance of critical interpreters are still trying to recover, explain, and clarify 
the author's meaning in a text, and thus are engaged in biographical work; and so too 
are the preponderance of textual scholars, trying to recover, preserve, purify, and re- 
present a text according to the author's intentions. Both kinds of work involve 
reconstruction of the life and mind of an author, and they are judged successful to a 
greater or lesser degree according to the amount of information that the scholar can 
discover about these essentially biographical matters. (Stillinger, 1991,8-9) 
Although discovering the author's meaning does not necessarily mean having to study 
his or her life, the positivist critic as a type appears to be eternal and indestructible, as 
the Yugoslav critic Svetozar Petrovii wrote in 1963 (PetroviC', 1972,76). A similar 
observation probably lies behind a fair part of the anti-positivism in Sur Racine and 
Critique et V&W; and earlier on, in Mythologies, Barthes criticised and mocked the 
popular and media obsession with the personality of the author (V6crivain en 
vacances' and 'Romans et enfants'). Ta mort de Fauteur' is simply the highest 
expression of the frustrated and prolonged anti-positivist and anti-biographical 
sentiment. The section in which Barthes mentions positivist criticism reads as follows: 
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L'auteur r6gne encore dans les manuels d'histoire litt6raire, les biographies d6crivains, 
les interviews des magasins, et dans la conscience meme des litt6rateurs, soucieux de 
joindre, grAce A leur journal intime, leur personne et leur oeuvre; l'image de la 
litt6rature que l'on peut trouver dans la culture courante est tyranniquement centr6e sur 
I'auteur, sa personne, son histoire, ses goCits, ses passions... (Barthes, 1968b, 49 1) 
. The frustration is certainly understandable. 
However, Sean Burke claims that the 
straight-forward denial of the role of the author tends to get stuck into the frame of mind 
which it is trying to react against. The alternative, as suggested by Burke, may lie in a 
development of an earlier, Medieval notion of the author, discussed in particular by 
Minnis (1984). Burke notes that Biblical exegesis, which saw Scripture as being 
divinely inspired, considered authorial intention (intentio auctoris) to be 'at most a 
concause in the texts, coming into being'. Nevertheless: 
Christian exegetes developed sophisticated and intricate critical apparatuses to allow for 
a complex interplay and multiple determinants - including the role of the auctor - in the 
constitution of the Scriptural text. Seen from this vantage, the contemporary 
deployment of the various declensions of 'otherness' developed within theory - the 
unconscious, cultural and political forces, 6criture, difference, etc. - distinguishes itself 
from the Medieval tradition mainly through an inability or unwillingness to 
acknowledge the overdetermination of a textual scene which encompasses alterities and 
the participant role of the author. (Burke, 1995, xvii) 
Taking this as the basic guiding principle of this chapter, and before we take a closer 
look at Barthes's famous essay, let us examine some alternative views on the anti- 
authorial notion of literature within Russian Formalism itself. We have already seen that 
not all Formalists were 'formalist' in a dogmatic sense, and that they did not believe that 
literary texts should be studied in isolation. Here I aim to show that the author was not 
entirely banished from their notion of literary studies; in this respect, they also come 
closer to Bakhtin than it is sometimes believed. 
Tomashevskii and the Author's Biography 
From the moment Shklovskii declared that verbal art was a combination of literary 
devices (and not an expression of the author's inner soul), Fon-nalism put forward the 
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idea that it is the work itself and not its origin in the writer's life and mind which is of 
interest to the literary historian (Shklovskii, 1929). This decision, however, came not as 
a reaction against the Romantic notion of literary genius, but as a practical decision to 
find a firm base for a scientific study of literature, as opposed to the earlier situation in 
literary history which Jakobson famously described as follows: 
... 
historians of literature act like nothing so much as policemen, who, out to arrest a 
certain culprit, take into custody Oust in case) everything and everyone they find at the 
scene as well as any passers-by for good measure. The historians of literature have 
helped themselves to everything - environment, psychology, politics, philosophy. 
Instead of a science of literature, they have worked up a concoction of home-made 
disciplines. They seem to have forgotten that those subjects pertain to their own fields 
of study - to the study of philosophy, the history of culture, psychology, and so on, and 
that those fields of study certainly may utilise literary monuments as documents of a 
defective and second-class variety among other materials. (Eikhenbaum, 197 1 b, 8) 
However, in a context where some Formalists (like Shklovsky) were more prepared to 
ascribe total autonomy to the literary work than others, Tomashevskii could probably be 
considered as one of the 'moderates'. The main principle which guided him in offering 
an answer to the question of whether we need to take into account the author's 
biography in order to understand the work was that 'we must remember that creative 
literature exists, not for literary historians, but for readers, and we must consider how 
the poet's biography operates in the reader's consciousness' (Tomashevskii, 1971). In 
the light of this, the immediate answer proposed by Tomashevskii is that the role of the 
author's biography in shaping the reader's understanding of a literary work depends on 
the literary-historical period: for most of European literary and cultural history the arts 
displayed 'a great tendency toward anonymity' (Tomashevskii, 1971,47-48) which only 
gradually shifted towards the 'individual isation of creativity' and 'an epoch which 
cultivated subjectivism in the artistic process', which he places at the time of the great 
writers of the eighteenth century (the 'cult figure' of Voltaire being one of the most 
striking examples). Before that, claims Tomashevskii, 'bits of gossip and anecdotes 
about authors did penetrate society, but these anecdotes were not combined into 
biographical images' (Ibid. ). The notion of the 'biographical image' is crucial here, as it 
is precisely this, and not the actual biography of the author, that, according to 
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Tomashevskii, plays a part in the reader's understanding of a literary work. This 
'biographical image' is very often fashioned by the writer himself (Rousseau and his 
Confessions), sometimes as a backdrop for his work (as in the case of most of the 
Romantic poets). 
To use Tomashevskii's example, in the case of Pushkin's southern poems 'the 
reader had to feel that he was reading, not the words of an abstract author, but those of a 
living person whose biographical data were at his disposal' (Tomashevskii, 1971,50). 
And in order to achieve this Pushkin had to make use of his own biography; however, as 
Tomashevskii puts it with a certain amount of delicacy, 'we must assume that Pushkin 
poetically fostered certain facts of his life' (Ibid. ). Pushkin needed the figure of a young 
exile suffering from a hidden and unrequited love, 'set against the background of 
Crimean nature', as a frame for his southern poems, and he created this image both 
through the poems themselves and through his letters and conversations (Ibid. ). 
According to Tomashevskii, this biographical legend is a part of Pushkin's 
literary work, it serves as a background for his poetry. Moreover, in order for a 
'biographical' literary work to be properly understood, says Tomashevskii, it is very 
important that legends about authors' lives are preserved in their original 'canonical 
form' as they are 'a premise which the author himself took into account during the 
creative process' (Tomashevskii, 1971,51-52). The real biography is of less, if any, 
importance for the process of understanding of a literary work (Tomashevskii, 1971,50- 
5 1). The writer knows that the reader will be familiar not with the actual life, either his 
own or that of his heroes (if he is using historical figures as his characters), but with its 
anecdotal representation, with the rumours and legends surrounding that life. It is the 
cultural representation and not historical truth that should concern a literary historian 
when it comes to relating a literary work to a biography; furthermore, that biographical 
legend must in some degree be present in the work itself in order to be relevant for its 
understanding. 
All in all, as far as literary history is concerned, says Tomashevskii, there are 
writers with biographies and writers without biographies; it is only the literary 
biographical legend created by the author himself or taken into account by the author at 
the moment of creation which is of relevance for the literary historian. 4 Only such a 
legend is a literaryfact' (Tomashevskii, 1971,55). 'Documentary biographies', that is, 
the real facts of a writer's life, 'may be considered only as external (even if necessary) 
reference material of an auxiliary nature' (Ibid. ). 
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This could be seen as a rather dubious claim, stating that the questions of 
writers' education, broader historical circumstances of their life or the type of audience 
they had are irrelevant in literary studies. Of course, the Formalists, even though they 
broadened their definition of literary studies by 1928, were great believers in the 
primary importance of literary texts and literary facts (albeit, quite broadly defined; on 
this, see Eikhenbaum, 1971a). Apart from that, it seems to me that by 'biography' 
Tomashevskii means simply a 'life story' (or more precisely, the stuff gossip is made 
of), and I would not say that he sees the above questions as being a part of strictly 
biographical considerations. 
It is interesting that Wellek and Warren in their Theory of Literature (1976) 
repeated many of Tomashevskii's arguments, and it is probably very likely that they 
were aware of his essay on literature and biography. 84 After all, Wellek was a member 
of the Prague Circle and we have seen the influence (and maybe even cross-fertilisation) 
the Formalists had on the Prague Circle. Wellek and Warren make the same distinction 
between poets with biographies and poets without them, and this distinction as carried 
out as being both historical (the person of the author being a fairly recent object of 
interest) and typological (some writers are more autobiographical than others). 
However, they dismiss the importance of biography even for the more autobiographical 
writers, and do not suggest even that anything as literary and text-oriented as a 
'biographical legend' could ever be of any importance. In their strong defence of the 
intrinsic approach (in this sense this book is very much an example of New Criticism) 
they claim that 'even when a work of art contains elements which can be surely 
identified as biographical, these elements will be so rearranged and transformed in a 
work that they lose all their specifically personal meaning and become simply concrete 
human material, integral elements of a work' (Wellek and Warren, 1976,78). Thus all 
reference to biography is dismissed as completely irrelevant; and when we remind 
ourselves of Tomashevskii's stance that criticism should take into account the real role 
an author's biography plays in the understanding of his work, we can only regret that, if 
Wellek and Warren had really read Tomashevskii's piece, they had not learned more 
from it. 
84 Tornashcvskii is mentioned three times in this book, so they certainly knew of him. 
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Roman Jakobson and the Death of a Poet 
In 1930, Vladimir Maiakovskii, one of the poets Tomashevskii mentioned in his essay, 
took his own life, and a year later an essay on him, written by Roman Jakobson, was 
published. Although the essay, entitled 'On a Generation That Squandered Its Poets', 
covers some similar ground to Tomashevskii's 'Literature and Biography', its tone is 
very different, and its interest in the subject of a personal rather than of a scholarly 
nature. It reads like a cry of despair and a confession of guilt, both emotions caused by 
the tragic balance sheet of those years and by the many deaths of poets: 
Gumilev (1886-1921) was shot, after prolonged mental agony and in great pain; Blok 
(1880-192 1) died, amid cruel privations and under circumstances of inhuman suffering; 
Khlebnikov (1885-1922) passed away; after careful planning Esenin (1895-1925) and 
Maiakovskii (1894-1930) killed themselves. And so it happened that during the third 
decade of this century, those who inspired a generation perished between the ages of 
thirty and forty, each of them sharing a sense of doom so vivid and sustained that it 
became unbearable. (Jakobson, 1991,274-75) 
As Jakobson says, a generation of great poets was thus 'squandered', amidst a mixture 
of idolatry and neglect, as had happened, Jakobson stresses, in Russia before. He talks 
of the 'feeling of sudden and profound emptiness' following those deaths, of 'an 
oppressive sense of an evil destiny lying heavily on Russian intellectual life'(Jakobson, 
1991,296). But he also talks of the voices of abuse and vicious gossip surrounding the 
life and death of Maiakovskii, as well as of the incredulity and shock which followed 
his suicide. Jakobson remarks with pain that both the abuse and the incredulity finally 
revealed that 'these men of letters have forgotten or so misunderstood All That 
Maiakovskii Composed'. For, as Jakobson masterfully demonstrated earlier in the essay, 
the idea of suicide is by no means alien to Maiakovskii's poetic thought, and is in fact 
one of its recurring motifs. According to Jakobson, Maiakovskii 'nurtured in his heart 
the unparalleled anguish of the present generation' (Jakobson, 1991,289); 'the 
hopelessness of his lonely struggle with the daily routine became clearer to him at every 
turn' (Jakobson, 1991,289-90). The motif of suicide as the only means of escaping the 
'stagnating slime' of the everyday 'continually recurs in the work of Maiakovskii' 
(Jakobson, 1991,289). 
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The crucial questions for Jakobson are: why was everyone so surprised at 
Maiakovskii's decision to take his own life? Has everybody really misread everything 
that he ever wrote - or, perhaps even more alarmingly, 'was there a general conviction 
that all of it was just "composed, " only inventedT (Ibid. ). He adds: 
Sound literary criticism rejects any direct or immediate conclusions about the biography 
of a poet when these are based merely on the evidence of his works, but it does not at all 
follow from this that there is no connection whatsoever between the artist's biography 
and his art. (Ibid. ) 
And Maiakovskii, according to Jakobson, understood very well the close connection 
between poetry and life; it was he who said that after Esenin's suicide poem, Esenin's 
death became a literary fact, one that 'would bring to the bullet or the noose many who 
had been hesitating' (Jakobson, 1991,292). 
And when he approached the writing of his own autobiography, Maiakovskii remarked 
that the facts of a poet's life are interesting 'only if they became fixed in the word'. 
Who would dare assert that Maiakovskii's suicide was not fixed in the word? 'Don't 
gossip! ' Maiakovskii adjured us just before his death. Yet those who stubbornly mark 
out a strict boundary between the 'purely personal' fate of the poet and his literary 
biography create an atmosphere of low-grade, highly personal gossip by means of those 
significant silences. (Ibid. ) 
Thus for Jakobson it is a part of the tragedy of the poet's life and death 'that the people 
around Maiakovskii simply did not believe in his lyrical monologues'. 
They took his various masquerades for the true face of the man [ ... ] They stamped and 
whistled at this routine Maiakovskian artistic stunt, the latest of his 'magnificent 
absurdities', but when the theatrical cranberry juice of the puppet show became real, 
genuine, thick blood, they were taken aback: Incredible! Inconsistent! (Ibid. ) 
It is perhaps difficult to reconcile these passionate words with the image of Jakobson as 
a man obsessed with poetic parallelisms, who perhaps 'has made an important 
contribution to literary studies in drawing attention to the varieties of grammatical 
figures and their potential functions', but whose town analyses are', unfortunately, 
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tvitiated by the belief that linguistics provides an automatic discovery procedure for 
poetic patterns' (Culler, 1975,74) . It is also worth noting that in this essay Jakobson 
criticises 'the simplistic Formalist literary credo professed by the Russian Futurists' 
which 'inevitably propelled their poetry toward the antithesis of Formalism - toward the 
cultivation of the heart's 'raw cry' and uninhibited frankness'. As he puts it: 
Formalist literary theory placed the lyrical monologue in quotes and disguised the 'ego' 
of the lyric poet under a pseudonym. But what unbounded horror results when suddenly 
you see through the pseudonym, and the phantasms of art invade reality. (Jakobson, 
1991,293) 
This is perhaps one of the most striking remarks of this passionate essay, and one of its 
few attempts at 'theorising': the realisation that the Formalist doctrine about the 'mask' 
of the authorial voice (here, that of the lyrical poet) led a whole literary movement to 
use it as an alibi for complete sincerity, in the belief that nobody will think or dare take 
the monologue of the 'lyrical self' for the true voice of the man behind the mask of that 
self. However, Jakobson does not comment further on this curious product of the inter- 
penetration of poetry and literary theory, as the real interests of this essay lie elsewhere, 
in exposing the guilt of his generation for the abuse and misunderstanding of those very 
same poets who gave a voice to that generation. It is with this despairing note that he 
ends his tribute to Maiakovskii: 
As for the future, it doesn't belong to us either. In a few decades we shall be cruelly 
labelled as products of the past millennium. All we had were these compelling songs of 
the future; and suddenly these songs are no longer part of the dynamic of history, but 
have been transformed into historico-literary facts. When singers have been killed and 
their song has been dragged into a museum and pinned to the wall of the past, the 
generation they represent is even more desolate, orphaned, and lost - impoverished in 
the most real sense of the word. (Jakobson, 1991,300) 
But what are we to make of Jakobson's treatment of the role of the author as exposed in 
this essay, if we leave aside the anguish and the pain of the occasion which brought it 
about? Furthermore, what kind of light does Jakobson's lament over the dead poet shed 
onto Tomashevskii's essay? 
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Jakobson himself says that the Formalist doctrine was to disregard the real living 
person of the author for the sake of his (or her) authorial voice as presented in the text of 
their creation; and occasionally, as in the more literal version of this notion taken up, 
according to Jakobson, by the Russian Futurists, to disregard the author altogether and 
to view the literary text as fully autonomous. As Jakobson stresses, Maiakovskii himself 
took the view that the author's life becomes of relevance for his work only if it is 'fixed 
in the word', the way Esenin's suicide became a literary fact because his last poem is at 
the same time his suicide note; this view would not be far from Tomashevskii's notions 
which we examined above. It seems to me that in the essay on Maiakovskii Jakobson is 
to a certain extent asking the question: 'in trying to understand the poet as a man, do we 
need his poetry, or do we notT This reads like the reversal of Tomashevskii's question: 
'do we need the poet's biography in order to understand his work, or do we noff For 
Tomashevskii the question of authorship is whether the figure of the author as a person 
enters into or contributes to our understanding of their work; for the Jakobson of the 
Maiakovskii essay, the question is partly how much of the author's work should 
contribute to our knowledge of them as a person. However, this knowledge is not the 
knowledge of a biographer or literary historian, but the knowledge of an acquaintance or 
friend; to express bitterness over the lack of seriousness with which Maiakovskii's 
poetry was taken by those who claimed to know him intimately is not the same thing as 
demanding that biographers or literary historians base their accounts of poets' lives on 
their literary writings alone, or to use them as an indication of the 'journey of the soul'. 
As such, the question is of a personal rather than theoretical nature, and Jakobson 
himself explicitly states that 'sound literary criticism rejects any direct or immediate 
conclusions about the biography of a poet when these are based merely on the evidence 
of his works'. Nevertheless, he adds, it does not follow from this that there is no 
connection between a writer's biography and his literary work, it is just that we very 
often go about establishing that connection with the wrong kind of interest in our hearts. 
Tomashevskii and Jakobson both seem to believe very strongly that it was 
4gossip' which plagued many a Russian writer, and prevented both their readers and 
their acquaintances from understanding them and their poetry fully. Tomashevskii 
protests against biographers' excessive curiosity about the intimate details of Pushkin's 
life and claims that it very often destroys the core aspects of his literary work and of the 
context in which it is meant to be read (i. e. the 'unknown woman' in his biographical 
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legend) Tomashevskii, 1971,50-5 1). Jakobson, too, presents the public's obsession with 
the gossip which surrounded Maiakovskii as one of the main reasons why his poetic 
6mythology' was not taken as seriously as it should have been. What Tomashevskii 
seems to suggest is that in Pushkin's case, the biographical legend about unrequited love 
was to a large extent maintained under the poet's control, and 'gossip' only started 
when his biographers could not control their own curiosity. In Maiakovskii's case, 
gossip seemed to be much louder than his own poetry, and prevented the poetry from 
being careftilly read. 
Furthermore, for Jakobson, the problem of understanding or not understanding 
Maiakovskii the man through his poetry is to a large extent the question of how 
seriously poetry as such (and literature in general) is taken. He quotes with warmth 
Maiakovskii's question about the purpose and role of literature: 
'Why', he asked, 'should literature occupy its own special little comer? Either it should 
appear in every newspaper, every day, on every page, or else it's totally useless. The 
kind of literature that's dished out as dessert can go to hell' (from the Reminiscences of 
D. Lebedev). (Jakobson, 1991,280) 
Had Maiakovskii's audience believed that poetry is not just a 'dessert' to be 'dished out 
at the end' and that it not something 'just "composed", only invented', maybe they 
would have believed in Maiakovskii's poetry more than they believed his advertising 
slogans. Had they not been so busy inventing and collecting gossip about him, perhaps 
they would have read his poetry more carefully, and taken it more seriously, regardless 
of whether the poet committed suicide in the end or not. 
For both Tomashevskii and Jakobson, whatever the critic or the general reader 
needs in order to understand a writer and his literary work is there, 'fixed in the word' 
of the work itself and, occasionally, in the biographical legend of the writer. Still, both 
of them are treading a very fine line. For both, the concept of the author is very much 
that of the biographical person, and it is just the question of what kind of biography we 
are to take into account: one fostered by the writer himself and fixed in the word, or one 
surrounding the writer in the form of gossip and springing from an obsessive interest in 
their personal life. Both Tomashevskii and Jakobson embrace the former, and this to a 
large extent is due to their dislike of vulgarisation that 'gossip' brings with itself and 
from their respect for poets and their poetry. Ultimately, it can be sensed that both 
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believe that Pushkin's poems would not and should not become less beautiful or 
Maiakovskii's poetry less powerful if we discover that Pushkin had no particular society 
woman or women in mind when writing his love poems, or that Maiakovskii had no 
actual intention of driving a bullet through his head when he wrote about his despair. It 
is their poetry that matters, and the poets matter (and matter very much) because of their 
poetry. Even Jakobson's mourning for Maiakovskii shows not just grief for a friend, but 
also (and perhaps even more) grief for a lost poetic voice which perhaps could have 
continued to speak for its generation with such force, and such honesty, had his poetry 
met with more real recognition and understanding. The generation that gossiped and 
undermined its poets ended up 'squandering' them; in the end, and by nobody's fault 
but its own, it remained lost without its voice. And as for the real link between writing 
and biography, the issue that the early Formalists started discussing, and to a large 
extent dismissing, so confidently in the beginning, showed its painful side when 'the 
phantasms of art invaded reality' and when 'the theatrical cranberry juice of the puppet 
show became real, genuine, thick blood'. For Jakobson at least, it became difficult to 
talk about the role of the author and its importance for the understanding of the work of 
art when real writers were dying. The only important thing for him became the need not 
to gossip, not to cause even more pain and anguish, not to make the situation even more 
unbearable. 
As we can see, at least some of the Formalists were able to discuss the problem 
of the author with a great deal of focus and understanding, even though they were the 
great advocates for the primary importance of the literary text in literary studies. 
Tomashevskii's and Jakobson's view of literary-historical evolution considered the 
author as one of the agents acting within a tradition, and Jakobson at least considered 
their individuality as well as the context in which they worked as relevant for the 
understanding of their work. Their approach to the question of authorship offers us a 
more moderate, balanced viewpoint which can serve as an alternative to the more 
radical views of Barthes and Foucault which I intend to look at next. Jakobson and 
Tomashevskii, together with Sean Burke's presentation of the Kantian notion of the 
author, also serve as a background for Bakhtin's theories of the author which I shall 
look at later. 
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Fast Forward: The Death of the Author 
Roland Barthes and the Death of the Author 
As we have seen, Barthes was prompted into writing his essay on the death of the author 
by the annoyance with positivist authorial obsessions; his description of it being not that 
very different from that which had caused Shklovskii's and early Jakobson's formalist 
rebe ion. 
H. L. Hix compared Barthes's announcement about the death of the author to 
Nietzsche's 'proclamation of the death of God', noting that the latter is more in nature 
of an obituary, while the former is, in fact, a suicide note, coming as it did from 
somebody who was an author in his own right (Hix, 3). Burke calls this essay 'the 
central point for an era of theory', in which Barthes reached 'the zero-degree of the 
impersonating tradition' (Burke, 1995,69). 
However, Burke also argues that Barthes's main point is somewhat different 
from that of the Formalists or the New Critics, who, according to him, simply reacted to 
biographical positivism and decided to more or less ignore the question of the author as 
an agent in literary creation for practical reasons. According to Burke, 'as enounced by 
Barthes, Foucault and Derrida, the removal of the author is not to be seen as a strategy, 
a means towards an end, but as the primary claim in itself' (Burke, 1992,15). Burke 
notes that the mixture of phenomenology and structuralism which informed Barthes's 
(as well as Foucault's and Derrida's) thought 'produced an iconoclastic and far-ranging 
form of antisubjectivism', questioning of the idea that 'man can properly possess any 
degree of knowledge or consciousness'. He argues further: 
Barthes, Foucault and Derrida were not content with simply sidelining the authorial 
subject as in earlier formalisms. A phenomenological training had taught them that the 
subject was too powerful, too sophisticated a concept to be simply bracketed; rather 
subjectivity was something to be annihilated. Nor either could they be content to see the 
death of the subject as something applying merely to the area of literary studies. The 
death of the author must connect with the general death of man. (Burke, 1992,14) 
This, as we shall see, may not be entirely true of Barthes. In addition, Burke says that 
the anti-authorial discourse is so presented as to present the reader with a choice 
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between either accepting it as the unquestionable truth or 'to turn back nostalgically 
upon a humanism no longer tenable within this age of theory' (Burke, 1992,17). The 
discourse of the death of the author presents an 'all or nothing' discourse that is difficult 
to approach from a different angle. Again, Barthes's is a slightly different case, as his 
pronouncement on the death of the author has more of a rhetorical than an 
epistemological purpose. The rhetorical nature of 'La mort de Fauteur', its intended 
provocativeness, need to be kept in mind. 
'Barthes's essay on the death of the author is one of his easiest pieces to 
misread', cautions Michael Moriarty on the second page of his Roland Barthes (1991, 
2). It also one of the easiest pieces to be appalled by; and with the awareness of the 
twentieth-century history of writers murdered, tortured and disappeared, it can become 
very easy to get on a moral high horse and claim that the matters of life and death of 
authors are not to be trifled with for the sake of some dubious sensationalism where the 
choice of words in a title is concerned. But let us take Moriarty's advice and proceed 
slowly, with the old-fashioned belief in authorial intention, towards the possibility of 
discerning Barthes's true meaning in his short essay Ta mort de Fauteur'. 
Barthes restates some of the arguments which we have seen put forward by 
Tomashevskii and Wellek and Warren: the author is a relatively new literary 
phenomenon, not much older than English empiricism, French rationalism and the 
discovery of the individual (1968b, 491). But, at the same time, the argument is also 
slightly different, as Tomashevskii was talking more of the novelty of the concept of the 
author as a biographical image, and not as the agent in the creation of a literary text. We 
have already mentioned that the author as an agent was well known to the later 
Medieval exegesis, and it would be difficult to deny that both Plato and Aristotle 
discussed the poefs role in the creation of a poetic work. Apart from reacting to literary 
positivism, Barthes is, as Burke argues, making a general point 'that there never could 
be an author in the first place'(Burke, 1992,16), and noting that, at least since 
Mallarm&, French literature has been shifting towards the idea (expressed by Mallanne) 
that in a literary text it is not the author who 'performs', but language itself (Barthes, 
1968b, 492). It is precisely this idea on which Barthes bases his definition of icriture in 
Ta mort de Fauteur', as he defines it as the space which, once entered, makes the 
written word forget where it came from; 'la voix perd son origine, Fauteur entre dans sa 
propre mort, Ncriture commence' (Barthes, 1968b, 491). Barthes here makes a 
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reference to the role of the 'singer of tales' (to use Parry and Lord's phrase) in what he 
calls 'ethnographic societies' (that is, oral cultures): there, the singer is not perceived as 
the creator or the author of what he sings or narrates, but as a mediator; his skill is 
judged not on the basis of his 'genius', but through his knowledge of the narrative (or 
poetic) code (Ibid. ). And this is very close to what Barthes expects the 'scripteur 
moderne' to be able to do: enter into the space in which he will not speak as himself and 
from within his own person, but will let the cultural code speak through him instead. 
Burke notes that this is Barthes's nod towards the Medieval notion of authorship; 
however, he also stresses that it serves not to re-examine the notion of authorship, but to 
6celebrate the void of the abolished humanist author', remaining locked in the argument 
of auteurism as its reverse (Burke, 1995, xviii). 
Firstly, it needs to be stressed that Barthes uses the term 'author' to refer not just 
to the individuals who write and publish, but much more broadly: the Author can turn 
out to be society, history, psyche or liberty, anything which gives the literary text a limit 
beyond which it must not signify. He claims that the Author (the capital 'A' hinting at 
authority which is almost divine in its rights, and even more in its demands) is often 
perceived as 'the past of his own book' (Barthes, 1968b, 493). First there was the 
Author (as God), and then came the word; first there was the Author (the Father) and 
then came the work (the son). But this is, according to Barthes, misleading, as the writer 
(scripteur) is 'bom at the same moment as his text'; there is no 'before' (i. e.: the author 
lived, felt and suffered) and 'after' (and then he wrote his book), nothing but 'here and 
now'. The writer does not 'express' himself through his works, he simply inscribes, and 
the only origin of his writing is language itself. Consequently, writing is not a message 
but 'un espace A dimensions multiples, oii se marient et se contestent des 6critures 
variees, dont aucune West originelle: le texte est un tissu de citations, issues des mille 
foyers de la culture' (Barthes, 1968b, 493-94). Like Flaubert's Bouvard and P6cuchet, 
the scripteur can only copy what exists already, imitate someone else's gestures, he can 
only set different writings against each other and observe the results, but he can never 
'express himself'. If he attempts to do it against all odds, he should at least be aware 
that the 'thing' inside him which he would like to 'translate' into words is nothing but a 
dictionary, already composed, in which each word can only be defined through other 
words: - 
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Succ6dant A I'Auteur, le scripteur n'a plus en lui passions, hurneurs, sentiments, 
impressions, mais cet immense dictionnaire oii il puise une 6criture qui ne peut 
connaltre aucun aff8t: la vie ne fait jamais qu'imiter le livre, et ce livre lui-meme West 
qu'un tissu de signes, imitation perdue, infiniment recul6e. (Barthes, 1968b, 494) 
H. L. Hix picks up on Barthes's parallel between the Author and God, and, using Erich 
Frank's distinction between Christian and ancient Greek notions of creation, notes that 
Barthes's model of literary creation follows the ancient Greek model of creation 
according to which the world has its beginning in itself, springing up from the original 
matter, while the Christian model of creation implies that God created the world ex 
nihilo (Hix, 57-58). Although Burke also comments on the 'co-implication of the writer 
and divinity, one which tacitly expatiates and enlivens Barthes's essay' (Burke, 1992, 
23), he also notes that the Author as God never really existed in that grandiose way. 
According to Burke Barthes creates the notion of the Author with a capital A at the 
same time as he is announcing his death. The author who 'is to his text as God, the 
auctor vitae, is to his world: the unitary cause, source and master to whom the chain of 
textual effects must be traced, and in whom they find their genesis, meaning, goal and 
justification' never really existed (Ibid. ). 
Burke also notes that it was very much in the tradition of the New Criticism, 
Russian Formalism and Prague Structuralism to 'distance their activities from any form 
of theocentric auteurism', so in that sense 'Barthes's essay might well seem aimed at a 
target that had long since retreated out of range' (Burke, 1992,25). But also, the 
positivism Barthes is so critical about does not necessarily imply the notion of 
'theocentric auteurism': 
Indeed, even in terms of the French man-and-his-work criticism institutionalised by 
Lanson, it is still difficult to see how the author is sacralised. Certainly, positivist 
researches of this kind are rigidly centred upon the author, but in accordance with 
principles of factuality rather than those of a theology of authorship. Even if this 
movement is traced back to the nineteenth-century positivism of Hippolyte Taine, the 
author is neither the original nor the final form of analysis, but the opening to the race, 
the milieu, the moment -a process in which the role of the author is largely in bridging 
(rather than creating) text and history. (Burke, 1992,26) 
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Burke suggests that Barthes's essay 'does not so much destroy the 'Author-God', but 
participates in its construction. He must create a king worthy of the killing'(Ibid. ). As 
Burke stresses one more time: 
That the author can only be conceived as a manifestation of the absolute Subject, this is 
the root message of every authorcide. One must, at base, be deeply auteurist to call for 
the Death of the Author (Burke, 1992,27) 
Nevertheless, according to Barthes, the rule of the Author in literary studies was at the 
same time the rule of the Critic, as the one who was especially authorised to interpret 
literary works. Thus, if the author is dead, trying to decode a literary text is a futile 
business, for without the figure of the Author, there is no original and ultimate meaning 
which the critic must labour hard to uncover. As Barthes puts it, to give an Author to a 
literary text is effectively to close it. Without the Author as the final limit of its 
signification, the literary text is free to produce meanings ad infinitum, to weave its web 
of cultural citations without a signifying centre. As Barthes puts it, icriture is a space to 
be walked about and passed through, and not to be pierced in the attempt to reach its 
secret core which is the Author. By refusing to assign the ultimate meaning to a literary 
text, &riture 'lib6re une activit6 que l'on pourrait appeler contre-th6ologique, 
proprement r6volutionnaire, car refuser d'arr8ter le sens, c'est finalement refuser Dieu 
et ses hypostases, la raison, la science, la loi' (Barthes, 1968b, 494). 
And the one who, according to Barthes, profits from such a state of affairs is not 
the author any more, but the reader. If the literary text is a multi-layered structuration of 
different quotations from different cultures that enter together into a dialogue, or a 
parody, or a conflict, then the space of their coming together is the reader, who is able to 
take them all in and recognise them. The 'death of the Author' is simply the price we 
have to pay for the birth of the reader (Barthes, 1968b, 495). As Moriarty put it, 
tessentially, the concern of 'La mort de l'auteur' is to combat the attempt to set a priori 
limits on interpretation: what is at stake is not just authorship, but authority' (Moriarty, 
1991,2). The unity of a literary text, according to Barthes, is not in its origin but in its 
destination, and this destination is the reader. However, Barthes seems particularly 
careful not to say 'reader's consciousness', as for him there is nothing 'personal' in the 
reader thus conceived: 'le lecteur est un homme sans histoire, sans biographie, sans 
psychologie; it est seulement ce quelquun qui tient rassembl6es dans un meme champ 
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toutes les traces dont est constitu& Ncrit' (Barthes, 1968b, 495). However, there is 
something unsettling in this image of the impersonal reader without history, biography 
and psychology, especially as Barthes claims that it is precisely the rights and the 
freedom of the reader that are to be won by the death of the author. If Barthes is right in 
his remark that 'classical criticism' is wrong to proclaim itself on the side of humanism 
and for the rights of the reader, when the only man it ever knew was the one who wrote 
(Ibid. ), then the reader whose rights Barthes champions is in no better position, as he is 
allowed to be just a 'someone' in whom codes and quotations can be reassembled, but 
without any history or identity of his own. A's such, he is not any more 'alive' than the 
scripteur who comes into being only at the moment of writing and who is there only as 
a mediator who allows the flow of different cultural codes to pass through him. 
The Author and His Work 
In another short piece, entitled 'De l'oeuvre au texte' (1971a), Barthes proposes a 
conceptual distinction between the terms 'work' and 'text', which is very similar to his 
distinction between the lisible and the scriptible, and outlines it perhaps a bit more 
clearly than in SIZ. This essay also discusses the role of the author in the work and in 
the text. 
According to Barthes, the concept of the work belongs to the old, 'Newtonian' 
tradition of literary studies (Barthes, 197 1 a, 1211), and the first distinction he makes is 
that the work can be held in the hand or found in a bookshop, that it is a concrete object 
(we might add, a concrete cultural object, present in the culture even when nobody reads 
it), while the text is a 'methodological field', existing only in language, and experienced 
only as activity and production. The text is also characterised by its crossing over of the 
genre boundaries; it is unclassifiable; as such, it goes against the doxa, and challenges 
common assumptions as to the rules of enunciation: it is always, in one way or another, 
paradoxal (Barthes, 197 1 a, 1212). Furthermore, the text is experienced in relation to the 
sign, whereas the work closes itself on a signified. The text opens up a play of 
signification, it defers the final signified, whereas the work always has the ultimate 
meaning which can be reached if we go deep enough into it. The text is closer to the 
workings of language; as Barthes puts it, it is structured, but decentred and without 
closure (Barthes, 1971a, 1213). The work, on the other hand, can always be closed off 
with the ultimate meaning. This also brings us to the point that the text is plural; not 
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only does it have several meanings, but it 'achieves a plurality of meaning' which is 
irreducible. It is conceived from different cultural languages, past and present, which 
pass through it; as such, it is also profoundly intertextual, but without clear references to 
any origins. The work, on the other hand, is 'in the process of filiation', with three 
strands of this process taking place: a determination of the work by the outside world, a 
succession of works among themselves, and an allocation of work to its author (Barthes, 
1971a, 1214-15). In this context, the writer is regarded as the father and owner of his 
work, and his will is to be respected, his intentions uncovered. If the metaphor used for 
the description of the workings of the work is one of an organism (with the implications 
of growth and development), the text can be best described as a network. The author 
inscribes himself into this network, but he can only exist there as one of its aspects, and 
not as a unifying force and the locus of truth. The author stops being the 'father' of his 
work, but becomes just one of the participants in the text. His is not the final authority, 
and the text's meaning(s) cannot be pinned down to his intention, either professed or 
assumed. Furthermore, while the work is designed to be consumed by a passive reader, 
the text can only be experienced in an act of production, pulling down the distinction 
between the acts of reading and writing. And, finally, while works certainly offer 
pleasure to their readers, it is the passive pleasure of consumption, as the reader knows 
that he can never rewrite the work he is reading; the text, on the other hand, offers much 
more: it offers jouissance, 'pleasure without separation' (Barthes, 1971 a, 1217). 
The distinction between 'texts' and 'works' does not function as a way of 
classifying literature itself, it is more of a distinction between different tendencies which 
can be contained in a single text/work. In a way, it is a description of critical or 
analytical attitudes and experiences of reading. 
The interest in breaking up the work's unity belongs to the later stage of 
Barthes's work. In Sur Racine Barthes discussed the way in which the work of an author 
can be seen as a systematic unity, both on the level of the signifier (i. e. asking the 
question: what is relevant for the meaning of the work; what should we take into 
account as the relevant, signifying aspect of it: a word, a verse, a single play or poem, a 
successful phrase? ) and the signified (the biography of the author? his historical 
situation? his subconscious? the society in which he lived? ) (Barthes, 1963,1097-98). 
Barthes suggests that where the signifier is concerned, all of the author's works should 
be taken into account in order to create, following Goldmann, a coherent signifying 
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system, like language, in which the significance of an element lies not in the frequency 
of its occurrence, but in its place within the system. 
As for the signified, that is, the meaning of the work, Barthes argues that, just 
like any other sign, the work can generate several parallel meanings, all of which have a 
relevance and a truth of their own (Barthes, 1963,1098); he even explicitly says that, 
regarding Racinian interpretations, he admires many of them, and does not have any 
quarrel with the studies he quotes (Barthes, 1963,1103). An interpretation always has to 
stop and anchor its search for meaning somewhere in order to build its own coherence. 
However, the problem arises when an interpreter starts believing in the 'innocence' of 
his own choice of the anchoring point, and even more when that choice is led by a belief 
in the essentially imitative and analogic nature of art, namely, when a critic searches for 
concrete historical, biographical and psychological models for literary characters and 
situations. Barthes argues that imagination deforms, that it uses not just real-life 
persons, situations, images and psychological states, but also impulses, desires, 
resistances (Barthes, 1963,1100- 1). To study the work of an author historically, 
according to Barthes, means systematically to study his language, technique and 
collective mentality exposed and represented in his work, not the personality behind it 
(Barthes, 1963,1100-3). The work should be allowed its multiple signifieds, and each 
interpretation should openly declare its vantage point and the critical engagement that 
lies behind it; the author is there only to give a unity to the work, not to provide us with 
its psychological, biographical, historical sources. As Barthes said in the introductory 
note to his Michelet, to study a writer means to give a coherence to the man, to study the 
structure of his existence and his obsessions; not to search for biographical or historical 
sources of his work (1954,245). 
We can see from this that already in Sur Racine Barthes believed that an 
author's work can produce multiple interpretations without creating the ultimate truth 
about the author and his work; to repeat, even in SIZ he claimed that the lisible text is or 
can be plural. The author was there as an axis around which a signifying system could 
be recreated, but that signifying system could be different from one reading to the next. 
For the Barthes of 1971, in the work the author functions as the source of unity 
and 'genuine truth', whereas in the text he can only participate as one of the elements, 
6as a guest' or 'another figure sewn into the rug', never as a privileged voice which we 
must trust and respect. Between Sur Racine and Te Poeuvre au texte', the notion of the 
author had changed for Barthes. It had become a combination of the negative notion of 
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the author as a critical limitation (i. e. the personality and its environment which are the 
origin of the work and lie behind its truest interpretations) and the previously positive 
notion of the author as the language and the obsessions organised around the author's 
'I'. The entire concept of the author had become negative; it seems as if Barthes had 
grown to believe that as long as we have the figure of the author there at all, the literary 
text will centre itself around that figure, regardless of whether we define it in purely 
serniotic or in positivist terms. In 1971, Barthes has lost his interest in things coherently 
systematic, and is coming closer to that Medieval notion of authorship Burke proposes 
as the real alternative to the author as the Kantian subject. 
Michel Foucault and 'What Is an Author? ' 
Stillinger could not restrain himself from noting that, a year after the publication of 
Barthes's pronouncement on the death of the author, Foucault, 'an author apparently 
alive enough to look across town and see what Barthes was doing, addressed the Soci&6 
frangaise de Philosophie' on the 'recent absence' of the author. It is important to look at 
this essay by Foucault because he pushes Barthes's argument further, and not as a 
provocative rhetorical exercise (which Barthes's text to a large degree was), but as a 
serious epistemological project. I aim to show some of the problems behind the general 
notion of the 'death', or disappearance, or irrelevance of the author, in contrast to 
Bakhtin's views, but also in contrast to the more moderate, 'Medieval' version of 
authorship as proposed by Burke. 
One of Foucault's main arguments in 'What Is an AuthorT is that 'today's 
writing has freed itself from the dimension of expression', that it has become 'an 
interplay of signs arranged less according to its signified content than according to the 
very nature of the signifier', and that 'the author's disappearance ..., since Mallarm6, 
has been a constantly recurring event' (Foucault, 1979,145). 85 It is not any more 'the 
point to manifest or exalt the act of writing, nor is it to pin a subject within language; it 
is rather a question of creating a space into which the writing subject constantly 
disappears' (Foucault, 1979,142). We can see here what Burke points out: that Foucault 
85 This is the second version of a text which was first published by Bulletin de la Soci&h Franpise de 
philosophie, 63,1969. 
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is not just intent on sidelining the issue of authorship in literary studies, but that 'the 
death of subject must connect with a general death of man'(1992,14). 
Foucault sees 'the death of the author' very much as a concluded business; there 
is no question of trying to revive him, but only of examining what it is that we are left 
with now that he is gone. However, in his discussion on the function of the author's 
name, the impression one gets is that the author and his work still seem to be very much 
alive - at first only nominally. Referring to John Searle's analyses, Foucault points out 
that the name of the author functions as all names do: more than just a pure reference, it 
is 'the equivalent of a description'(Foucault, 1979,146). In the very name of the author 
we already have a certain image (Stanley Fish would say that it is a certain 
interpretation) of the author and his work, one that is handed down to us by our cultural 
and scholarly tradition. Even where the real origin of a text is essentially unknown (as 
with Homer's epics), the author's name continues to perform its classificatory function, 
putting those texts together in the relationship of 'homogeneity, filiation, authentication' 
(Foucault, 1979,148). As Burke points out (1992,93), although Foucault begins his 
essay by asking 'What does it matter who is speaking? ' and ends with the conclusion 
that it does not or should not really matter, the rest of the essay 'provides the most 
extreme example of why it does matter'. 
For example, Foucault suggests that writers, who from the end of the eighteenth 
century became secure in their ownership of their texts and thus started participating in 
the 'system of property that characterises our society', 'compensated' for their secure 
status by 'rediscovering the old, bipolar field of discourse, systematically practising 
transgression and thereby restoring danger to a writing which was now guaranteed the 
benefits of ownership' (Foucault, 1979,149). What Foucault does not say, however, is 
whether this relatively new, intentional kind of transgression carried the same risk of 
sanction as before. For, if it did and does, then the distinction between the author and 
the private individual of the same name is not as strong as he repeatedly claims it to be, 
since punishment for transgression (and I am taking the word 'punishment' literally, as I 
imagine Foucault intended it to be taken) cannot be carried out on the abstract entity of 
the author, but only on the individual himselL Furthermore, this would also mean that 
the author is personally responsible for his writing and for its transgressiveness, and 
that, therefore, writing cannot be just a free game which keeps breaking its own rules 
and which creates a space 'into which the writing subject constantly disappears'. It 
seems to me that Foucault here creates a similar kind of confusion to that of Julia 
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Kristeva in her essay 'Le mot, le dialogue et le roman', as both announce the 
disappearance of the subject of writing, and define literary discourse as a free game of 
signification, but at the same time declare writing to be transgressive and subversive. It 
seems to me that without a strong sense (which we do find in Bakhtin) of the social and 
ideological significance of literature, and of every word we utter, there can be no real 
subversiveness and transgression in a literary text. There can hardly be any real 'danger' 
for the writer if all he is doing is just playing the game of free signification and of 
combining different cultural codes, and if all he is transgressing are the rules of that 
game. 
On the other hand, Genette, although not talking about transgression and 
punishment, nevertheless refuses to discuss the notion of the author as divorced from 
the private and historical individual with the same name. In Nouveau discours du ricit, 
Genette questions the usefulness of the notion of the implied author, and says that 'un 
r6cit de fiction est fictivement produit par son narrateur, et effectivernent par son auteur 
(r6el); entre eux, personne ne travaille, et toute esp6ce de performance textuelle ne peut 
We attribu&e qu'A Fun ou A I'autre, selon le plan adopt6' (Genette, 1983,96). He 
concludes by saying: 
L'auteur impliqu6, c'est tout ce que le texte nous donne A connaltre de Fauteur, et pas 
plus que tout autre lecteur le po6ticien ne doit le n6gliger. Mais si l'on veut 6riger cette 
We de Pauteur en 'instance narrative', je Wen suis plus, tenant toujours qu'il ne faut 
pas les multiplier sans n6ccssit6 - et celle-ci, comme telle, ne me semblant pas 
n6cessaire. Il ya dans le r6cit, ou plut6t derri6re ou devant lui, quelqu'un qui raconte, 
clest le narrateur. Au-delA du narrateur, il ya quelquun qui 6crit, et qui est responsable 
de tout son en degA. Celui-IA, grande nouvelle, c'est Pauteur (tout court), et il me 
semble, disait d6jA Platon, que cela suffit. (Genette, 1983,102) 
Genette is addressing a practical narratological problem, rather than an epistemological 
one, but his argument seems more logical. The problem of authorial responsibility, 
however, is not really resolved in Foucault, and it would seem that the danger of 
literature, and its liberation, as Foucault sees it, consists of literature's capacity to create 
meanings endlessly and limitlessly. For Bakhtin, on the other hand, the issue is not so 
abstractly epistemological, but of deeply rooted social and ethical significance. For him, 
literary texts, often very directly, address social, cultural and ideological issues - they 
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participate in the great dialogue of their time, and have the unique privilege of being 
able to represent that dialogue fully and faithfully. 
Foucault himself, by suggesting that authors intentionally cultivate danger and 
transgression in their writing, makes a step towards the Bakhtinian position, but then 
quickly retreats back into pure epistemology, and into the claim that it is the author (or 
the author-function) that puts limits to the dangerous and transgressive proliferation of 
meaning. But the problem has already been created: a writer cannot be at the same time 
the originator of and the limitation to the proliferation of meaning (if that is really 
Foucault's definition of transgression). Moreover, Foucault's claim at the beginning of 
this essay that 'the author's disappearance [ ... ], since Mallarm&, has been a constantly 
recurring event', leaving the literary text to be the space of the free play of signification, 
creates an additional problem. Firstly, although Mallarrn&'s texts may be marked by the 
absence of the authorial voice, his name is still within the more recent French culture 
attached to the phenomenon of the disappearance of the author (with both Foucault and 
Barthes contributing additionally to that perception), thus defining his writing and to a 
certain extent limiting its freedom of signification; and secondly, it is unclear where the 
change in the mode of writing can be situated. For a moment, it would seem that 
Foucault might accept that this is due to a change in writers' literary intentions; if they 
could decide to bring danger back into literature, why not decide to create their own 
disappearance within the body of the literary text? Even if it is not the writers who 
originated the change, than that change could only have happened at the cultural level: 
Western European (or French) culture at one point (around the time of Mallann6) 
decided that it did not need the authorial voice and intention any more, and decided to 
regard literary discourse as free of any origins which come from an individual human 
subject. But then how can that same culture be still so attached to the institution of 
authorship and so stubborn in retaining the limits of signification that that institution 
brings with it, and be so afraid of accepting the proliferation of meaning that it was so 
ready to embrace? 
This problem might only serve as an illustration of how author-based our 
cultural and literary perception is, that even the critic who speaks out so strongly against 
the limitations of the institution of authorship cannot escape the thought that thinks 
within those limits. And Foucault to some extent admits this, by saying that 'it would be 
pure romanticism... to imagine a culture in which the fictive would operate in an 
absolutely free state, in which fiction would be put at the disposal of everyone and 
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would develop without passing through something like a necessary or constraining 
figure' (Foucault, 1979,159). Nevertheless, he proposes a programme which would 
enable us to gradually stop thinking in those terms, and maybe eventually even get rid 
of them altogether. He suggests that we start by asking the following questions: 
What are the modes of existence of this discourse? Where has it been used, how can it 
circulate, and who can appropriate it for himself? What are the places in it where there 
is room for possible subjects? Who can assume these various subject-functionsT And 
behind all these questions, we would hear hardly anything but the stirring of an 
indifference: 'What difference does it make who is speaking? (Foucault, 1979,160) 
And this final question is the same one with which he started his essay. And although 
the essay comes full circle in the rhetorical sense, as Burke has pointed out, there are 
still several things in it that remain unresolved. One of the most important is the idea 
that transgression or the possibility of transgression is 'an imperative peculiar to 
literature', and that writers were and perhaps still are subject to possible punishment for 
the transgressiveness of their writing. It seems to me that this idea opens up a gap in 
Foucault's argument, which, as it stands, is very much based on the firm belief in the 
death of the subject and in the firm belief that modem writing can be nothing other than 
the infinite deferral of meaning. For, if writers can practise transgression intentionally 
and if they can be held accountable for it, this puts them in a very 'Bakhtinian' position, 
where they enter into a dialogue with their own society and culture. Then we could 
regard them as other than just authoritarian principles in what should be a free game of 
signification, but as active and responsible voices in the cultural dialogue. What this 
also means is that the power of which Foucault speaks is not writers' alone: they may 
have the power to limit the signifying process of their texts, but the society has the 
power to accept or reject the meanings thus created, and to accept or to discipline the 
writers themselves. 
And then it would still very much matter who is speaking. 
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Back to Bakhtin: The Problem of the Author in Bakhtin's Thouaht 
In the chapter 'Bakhtin and Contemporary Criticism' of his book Bakhtinian Thought: 
An Introductory Reader, Simon Dentith presents the authorship problem as one of the 
central issues around which the debate about Bakhtin's ideas and their dialogue with 
contemporary criticism revolves. Setting it against structuralism and the primacy it has 
given to langue, rather than to parole, Dentith remarks that the debate about authorship 
'is the question of whether, in considering the history of writing, you afford primacy to 
large, relatively impersonal and intersubjective phenomena such as "codes" or 
"discourses", or to the agents who use them' (Dentith, 1995,90). According to Dentith, 
this debate rather resembles 'the opposition between what Voloshinov described as 
"abstract objectivism" and "individualistic subjectivism"' (Ibid. ), and he places 
Bakhtin's own position somewhere in the middle of those two extremes, with the 
authorial position not lost but distributed through different languages within a single 
text (does this not remind us of Barthes's position in 'De Foeuvre au texte'? ). 
'Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity' 
Although Bakhtin probably wrote his early philosophical essays between 1919 and 
1924, almost all of them, bar a very short one, were published after his death. Even 
Michael Holquist, whose reverence for Bakhtin is quite formidable, had to admit that 
'these texts... are extremely difficult and make demands on the reader's erudition, 
powers of synthesis, and sheer patience not encountered in the books that have defined 
Bakhtin's achievement in the recent past' (Holquist, 1990, ix). If we add to this that one 
of the texts, the long treatise entitled 'Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity', contains 
in its title three old-fashioned concepts such as 'author', 'hero' and 'aesthetics', the 
difficulty, admits Holquist, is considerable. Nevertheless, he believes that these essays 
are extremely important, not just because Bakhtin held on to them for most of his life 
(although he was 'notoriously cavalier about his manuscripts' (Holquist, 1990, xvii) - 
one of which he famously smoked during World War Two), but also because they 
contain 'many, if not most, of the ideas he would spend the rest of his life exploring, 
revising, or even contradicting... Any opinion of Bakhtin formed on the basis of his 
previously published work must now be modified or discarded' (Ibid. ). We shall return 
to this idea in the course of our discussion on Bakhtin's theories on the relationship 
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between the author and the hero, and examine to what an extent it may be considered 
justified; but first, a few further remarks on the style and the method of 'Author and 
Hero in Aesthetic Activity'. 
As Holquist hinted, the style of the text is rather dry and stilted, and, heavily 
backed-up as it is by Neo-Kantian notions and terminology, does require quite a lot of 
patience from the reader. However, the greatest difficulty lies probably in its method, 
which is almost purely deductive and furnished with comparatively few examples from 
literary texts or art-works themselves. There are hardly any examples of the brilliant 
'close reading' analyses which make Bakhtin's later work such a joy to read, and the 
reader is for the most part left to provide his or her own examples. The theory of the 
relationship between the author and the hero is entirely deduced from Bakhtin's theory 
of human personality and of perception of that personality (heavily based, as Palmieri 
(1998,47) stresses, on Kant), and, due to this, the conclusions, and occasionally 
premises as well, have a somewhat dogmatic ring to them. Nevertheless, Holquist is 
right: this stage of Bakhtin's thought is quite important for understanding his later ideas 
on the human subject; however, not only because it contains the seeds of the later work, 
but because it underlines much more clearly the great theoretical leaps accomplished by 
the later work. 
The theory of human personality which forms the basis of Bakhtin's thinking 
about the relationship between the author and the hero in aesthetic activity, and at the 
same time represents the most interesting and exciting part of the essay, rests on two 
basic terms: 'I-for-myself' and 'the other'. Examined through their differences in their 
spatial and temporal form (i. e. how the 'I' perceives itself and the other in space and 
time), these two terms also carry in themselves Bakhtin's concern as to how unity and 
wholeness can be achieved in a work of art. 
Bakhtin argues there exists an enormous difference in the human being's 
experience of his or her own body and their perception of the body of the other. The 
difference is partly one of the point of view; and that oft quoted sentence of Bakbtin's 
sums it up quite beautifully: 'As we gaze at each other, two different worlds are 
reflected in the pupils of our eyes' (Bakhtin, 1990,23). We always have an 'excess of 
seeing' in relation to the other, we always see something they do not see, we always see 
something about them that they cannot see themselves (and, to be sure, they always see 
something about us that we cannot see ourselves). But, apart from that, there is also a 
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necessary and essential difference in the way I-Jbr-myseýf experiences its own body and 
the way in which it experiences the body of the other: 
My own exterior is not part of the concrete, actual horizon of my seeing, except for 
those rare cases when, like Narcissus, I contemplate my own reflection in the water or 
in a mirror. My own exterior (that is, all of the expressive features of my body, without 
exception) is experienced by me from within myself. It is only in the form of scattered 
fragments, scraps, dangling on the string of my inner sensation of myself, that my own 
exterior enters the field of my outer senses, and, first of all, the sense of vision. But the 
data provided by these outer senses do not represent an ultimate authority even for 
deciding the question of whether this body is or is not mine. That question is decided 
only by my inner self-sensation. (Bakhtin, 1990,28) 
In a curiously Lacanian way, Bakhtin talks of the self's real perception of its own body 
as lacking the sense of unity and finitude, as being (visually) fragmented, whilst any 
visual information it gets about its visual 'expressedness' does not coincide with the 
self's own feeling of its own body. If we look at ourselves in a mirror, says Bakhtin, 
what we see is still just our reflection and not ourselves in terms of our outward 
appearance (Bakhtin, 1990,32). The body of the other, however, is perceived in its 
unity, as a closed and finished entity, whose outward expressedness can tell us about 
their inner feelings and thoughts. That is why it is only through the eyes of an artist that 
we can see ourselves: 'Our portrait [ ... ] is indeed a window into a world in which I 
never live; this is truly a seeing of oneself in the other's world through the eyes of a 
pure and whole other human being' (Bakhtin, 1990,34). 
Not just the outward appearance of the body of the self and the other is different; 
the context in which they are perceived is different as well. The self sees itself as 
existing in the world without boundaries and closures: it cannot see the boundaries of its 
own body (and even if it does see them, it cannot relate to them as real), and it cannot 
see its own environment, only its horizons. This is a very important distinction for 
Bakhtin: it is the environment surrounding, explaining and causing the other to be what 
he or she is that we can see, but for ourselves we can only see our horizons, places we 
can go to and not necessarily the places which surround us. We perceive ourselves and 
our relation to the outside world as open, unfinished and without boundaries; the other 
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we see as exactly the opposite: closed, finalised and enclosed within his or her 
environment (Bakhtin, 1990,39). 
Furthermore, the self's inner sensation of itself, the 'inner body', as Bakhtin 
calls it, consists of a jumbled mass of desires, needs and sensations, whose outward 
aspect 'is fragmentary and fails to attain independence and completeness'(Bakhtin, 
1990,47). Once again, and without the intention to elaborate the parallel further (it is 
probably a subject for a separate work), I would like to point out some similarities with 
the ideas of Jacques Lacan, especially where it concerns the difference between the Real 
and the Imaginary, as the difference between the inner experience of one's own body as 
fragmentary, uncontrollable and open, and its visual representation (as perceived in a 
mirror) as closed, unitary and finalised. 
This difference in the perception of one's own body and that of the other has as 
its consequence the difference in the perception of their value. According to Bakhtin, 
one cannot perceive one's own value in the same way as we perceive the value of 
others; we cannot love ourselves in the same way we love the other. Love, says Bakhtin, 
can only come to us from the outside, from the recognition and acceptance of our value 
which 'descends upon me from others like a gift, like grace, which is incapable of being 
understood and founded from within myself (Bakhtin, 1990,49). And he continues: 
In fact, as soon as a human being starts to experience himself from within, he at once 
meets with acts of recognition and love that come to him from outside - from his 
mother, from others who are close to him [ ... ]Words of love and acts of genuine 
concern come to meet the dark chaos of my inner sensation of myself- they name, 
direct, satisfy, and connect it with the outside world. (Bakhtin, 1990,49-50) 
Thus, according to Bakhtin, it is love which comes from the other that 'shapes a human 
being from outside throughout his life', as well as making him aware not so much of his 
value but of his potential value which can only be realised by the other (Bakhtin, 1990, 
51). 
The temporal dimension of human personality has a similar effect on the 
distinction between the experience of one's own self and of the other. As Bakhtin points 
out, my own birth and death do not play any part in my own experience of my self and 
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of my own life, they are always perceived by others. In that sense, my own life, for 
myself, is not self-contained, but open-ended, without temporal boundaries, and cannot 
be experienced as a unified whole (as can the life of the other). In terms of the 
experience of the inner life, Bakhtin elaborates these differences further through the 
distinction between the soul and the spirit: 
I experience the inner life of another as his soul; within myself, I live in the spirit. The 
soul is an image of the totality of everything that has been actually experienced - of 
everything that is present-on-hand in the soul in the dimension of time; the spirit is the 
totality of everything that has the totality of meaning -a totality of all the forms of my 
life's directedness from within myself, of all my acts of proceeding from within myself. 
(Bakhtin, 1990,110) 
As the spirit is defined as 'directedness', and not as something 'present-on-hand', 'the 
spirit cannot be the bearer of plot or story-line, for the spirit is not present, it does not 
exist - at every given moment it is set as a task, it is yet-to-be' (Ibid. ). The soul is 
finalised (by me, for the other), while the spirit is open, always in the process of 
becoming. 
This, again, has implications for the value my own self can have, compared to 
the value of the other; as Bakhtin puts it quite beautifully, 'a gradual coming to 
perfection (an aesthetic category) occurs in the other; in myself, only new birth is 
possible' (Bakhtin, 1990,122). 
As soon as I attempt to determine my selffor mysetf (and not for and from the other), I 
find my self only in that world, the world of what is yet to be achieved, outside my own 
temporal being-already-on-hand ... ]I find only my own dispersed directedness, my 
unrealised desire and striving the membra disiecta of my potential wholeness; 
whereas that which could assemble these membra disiecta, vivify them, and give them a 
form - namely, their soul, my authentic I-for-myself - that is not yet present in being, 
but is set as a task and is yet-to-be. (Bakhtin, 1990,123) 
Thus we arrive at the concept of human personality as radically different for the self and 
the other. I myself, according to Bakhtin, experience my own body as a totality of 
desires, needs and sensations which have no unifying force in the shell of my outer 
body, for I do not experience my own body as closed and enveloped in its own flesh and 
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the environment which surrounds it, but as spilling out into the world which is 
boundless and which my own body strives to embrace. Correspondingly, I experience 
my own life as an open-ended mixture of tasks and possibilities, as a constant demand 
for change, 'a life that is directed ahead of itself toward the event yet-to-come, a life that 
finds no rest within itself and never coincides with its given presently existing make-up' 
(Bakhtin, 1990,16). The body of the other, on the other hand, as seen by me and by 
other others, is closed and fully representative of the soul which is contained in it, 
surrounded by an environment which conditions and causes him or her to be what they 
are, and whose life-story is clearly delineated between the two set points of his or her 
birth and death. If we add to this Bakhtin's concept of the author's role and activity, we 
shall soon arrive at the significance of such definitions of human personality for 
Bakhtin's early account of the creative process. 
According to Bakhtin, in our everyday relationship to others, we round them off 
as personalities, and try to predict their future behaviour on the basis of what we know 
of their past and of their environment. However, this consummating activity is 
fragmentary and involves only those aspects of the other's person and life which are of 
special interest to us, but do not involve the whole of their being. 
in the creative process, on the other hand, the consummating activity of the 
author is directed towards the whole of the other: that is how the hero is created 
(Bakhtin, 1990,4-5). Moreover, Bakhtin defines the world of artistic vision as follows: 
Man is the organising form-and-content centre of artistic vision, and, moreover, man as 
a given human being in his axiological present-on-hand existence in the world. The 
world of artistic vision is a world which is organised, ordered, and consummated - 
independently of what-is-yet-to-be-achieved and independently of meaning - around a 
given human being as his axiological surroundings or environment. (Bakhtin, 1990, 
187) 
Thus, the spatial and temporal aspects of the world gain aesthetic significance only in 
their relationship to the hero. It is this relationship to the whole of the other as present- 
on-hand and as an 'essentially determinate entity' (Bakhtin, 1990,140) that guarantees 
the unity of a work of art; as man is the subject (the only interesting and possible 
subject), the 'form -and-content centre of artistic vision', it is only he who can give 
unity to that vision and to the work itself. 
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The author always sees more than the hero, he has an 'excess of seeing' in 
relation to him, and it is precisely this excess that enables the author to consummate the 
hero (Bakhtin, 1990,189). Although we all possess an excess of seeing in relation to the 
other ('As we gaze at each other, two different worlds are reflected in the pupils of our 
eyes'. ), the author possesses an excess which is absolute in relation to the hero. He not 
only sees what the hero cannot see, but also all that the hero does see; whereas in 
everyday life I can see what the other cannot, but not all that that they do see. 
Thus, for the author, the hero is the form-and-content centre around which his 
artistic vision shapes itself. The hero is the absolute other, finalised, consummated and 
present-on-hand, and the author has the absolute excess of seeing in relation to him. The 
author is the creative spirit, and the hero is the created soul. But how does Bakhtin 
define the author himselP 
Firstly, it is important to note that here, as well as throughout his work, Bakhtin 
makes a strong distinction between the person of the author and the author as creator. 
He also warns against 'trusting' author's own interpretations of their work: 'it is not just 
the heroes created who break away from the process that created them and begin to lead 
a life of their own in the world, but the same is equally true of their actual author- 
creator' (Bakhtin, 1990,8). The author-person changes, he (or she) may see their work 
differently in different stages of their life, and as for the artistic process itself, they can 
have no real insight into it (Bakhtin, 1990,6). 
Bakhtin stresses: 
An author is the uniquely active form-giving energy that is manifested not in a 
psychologically conceived consciousness, but in a durably valid cultural product, and 
his active, productive reaction is manifested in the structures it generates - in the 
structure of the active vision of a hero as a definite whole, in the structure of his image, 
in the rhythm of disclosing him, in the structure of intonating, in the selection of 
meaning-bearing features. (Bakhtin, 1990,8) 
This is a definition of the author (as he manifests himself in the work) Bakhtin will 
return to over and over again, and one can find direct echoes of it throughout his work. 
It is curious, however, that Bakhtin rejects psychological analysis of the creative process 
from his investigation at the beginning of 'Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity', but 
then proceeds to explain the relationship between the author and the hero through a 
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psychology of seeing, which could well be said to form a part of the psychology of 
aesthetic creation. Thus the initial distinction between the author-person (a 
psychological entity) and author-creator ('active form-giving energy') gets a bit blurred 
by the end of the essay. Nevertheless, if we take the above quote as it stands, it is worth 
noting that the separation between the author as a person and author-creator, and the 
exclusion of the psychological conditions of the creative process from literary study, 
very much belong to both the Formalist and Structuralist schools of thinking. 
According to Dentith, the notion of a strong authorial position assumes the 
existence of a unitary and finalised subject; it is precisely this idea that is criticised in 
Bakhtin's writing and to which the following alternative is offered: 
The author is the indispensable starting-point for Bakhtin's considerations on writing, 
but he or she is not conceived in a unitary way. In later writing, this splitting of the 
author within the author will become a matter of the various languages competing with 
each other even within the apparently unitary self. Bakhtin will not abandon the author, 
in the manner of some versions of structuralism, but he will radically socialise the way 
the author needs to be conceived. (Dentith, 1995,91) 
However, it seems to me that the starting point is quite different from the later work; 
and that the notion of the author and his role changes with the discovery of polyphony. 
In his early work, Bakhtin's idea of the author is very close to the notion of the author 
as creator of which Burke speaks and which Barthes criticises so much. According to 
Giovanni Palmieri, Bakhtin's 'early writings belonged to the Symbolist and romantic 
school of aesthetics', with its Tromethean conception of a demiurge with a god-like 
capability of creation'(Palmieri, 1998,45). Ruth Coates (1998,40) also speaks of the 
concept of the author 'as the divine Creator' in Bakhtin's 'Author and Hero in Aesthetic 
Activity'. 
But once the notion of polyphony is introduced, things become so different that 
Morson and Emerson note that 'polyphony is often criticised as a theory that posits the 
absence of authorial point of view', although Bakhtin himself 'explicitly states that the 
polyphonic author neither lacks nor fails to express his ideas and values'. Morson and 
Emerson also emphasise that Bakhtin maintains that a work without 'an authorial 
position [... ] is in general impossible' and that 'the issue here is not an absence of, but a 
radical change in, the author's position' (Morson and Emerson, 1990 232-33). 
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Between the notion of the author as the divine Creator or Promethean demiurge 
and the author that becomes so hard to find that that Bakhtin becomes suspected of 
being a theorist of his absence, something truly radical must have happened. 
However, for Bakhtin the definition of the relationship between the author and 
the hero will soon be radically revised, at least as far as one writer is concerned; and 
here we turn to Bakhtin's book on Dostoevsky. 
Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics 
We have seen that in 'Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity' Bakhtin talks of the way 
'I' sees the other, and of the way the author sees the hero. The whole argument is 
centred around the gaze which guides our perception of ourselves and of the other. 
In Bakhtin's book on Dostoevsky, however, Dostoevsky is presented as the 
author who, instead of looking at his heroes, as all previous authors had done, started 
listening to them. 86 According to Bakhtin, Dostoevsky's hero is not an 'objective 
image', but 'pure voice'; he is heard much more clearly than seen (Bakhtin, 1979,62). 
The hero interests Dostoevsky, not as an objective part of the world and an agent in it, 
but as a specific point of view regarding that world. As Bakhtin puts it, it is not 
important for Dostoevsky how the hero appears to the world and acts in it, but how the 
world and his own self appear to him; the world itself gains importance only insofar as 
it enters into the hero's consciousness (Bakhtin, 1979,54). Furthermore, the voice of the 
Dostoevsky hero is the voice of a man (or woman) fully conscious of himself (or 
herself) and of the opinion others have of him (or her); as such, their dominant 
characteristic is their self-awareness and self-knowledge. According to Bakhtin, there is 
nothing Dostoevsky knows about his heroes that they do not know themselves; in this 
respect, there is no 'excess of seeing' (or, in this case, excess of hearing) which the 
author possesses over the hero. Unlike Gogol's characters of poor clerks, seen purely 
from the outside in their pathetic little lives, unaware of their own image in the eyes of 
the other, Dostoevsky's anti-hero of Notesfrom Underground is represented as a reader 
86 1 shall be using not Problemy Ivorchestva Dostoevskogo (Problems of Dostoevsky's Creative Art) of 
1929, but its revised 1963 version Problemy poetiki Dostoevskogo (Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics). 
This has no bearing, however, on the core of the argument in the chapter on the relationship between the 
author and the hero. 
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of Gogol and full of self-consciousness and resentment of how his sort is portrayed by 
Gogol (Bakhtin, 1979,55-56). 
And this is precisely what Bakhtin calls 'Dostoevsky's Copernican Revolution': 
the moment when the hero becomes 'aware' of the author's consummating and unifying 
view of him or her, and rebels against it by expressing his own self-awareness. Of 
course, according to Bakhtin, the hero is still created by the author, but the mode of 
creation had changed. To put it in the language of 'Author and Hero In Aesthetic 
Activity', the author does not treat his heroes as souls which are to be consummated and 
unified by him any more, but as free spirits, with a point of view and an '1' (unfinished, 
undetermined, never coinciding fully with itself) of their own. 
In the monologic novel, the hero acts, thinks and feels within the limits of his 
own 'character'; he can never stop coinciding with his own self and with the author's 
design of him. Such a hero is a part of the author's representation of the outside world; 
he fits into that world as the other in our eyes fits into his or her environment (Bakhtin, 
1979,60). 
In the polyphonic novel, where the hero's dominant characteristic is his self- 
knowledge and self-awareness, the world cannot be anything other than the world of 
other, equal, knowing consciousnesses. It is not any more the single, 'objective', 
authorial representation of the outside world, but a multitude of representations, 
belonging to the author and his characters, all of whom are equal in their right to 
interpret themselves, the other and the multifaceted world which they all share. Each of 
these different voices (whether it belongs to the author or the hero) in the polyphonic 
novel is an 'I', unfinished, open and never fully coinciding with itself, never fully a part 
of the physical world and of the environment in which the other sees them. He or she is 
never finished, but always in the process of becoming. And the rebelliousness of 
Dostoevsky's heroes lies in their refusal to see themselves or the other as a 'voiceless 
object' of the other's 'consummating cognition' (Bakhtin, 1979,68). 
The author's own words about the hero in a polyphonic novel, according to 
Bakhtin, are not the consummating and finalising words of the monologic author, but 
they address the hero and treat him as fully present, listening and capable of responding. 
According to Bakhtin, the author's words about the hero are words about other words; 
the hero is conceived as an utterance with its own voice, and thus the author's 
relationship to the hero can only be dialogic. The author talks to his heroes, he does not 
talk of them; he treats them as equals with the right to their own point of view. Bakhtin 
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insists that this is the absolute position of the author in the polyphonic novel, and not 
one which is relative and from which the author can withdraw if he wants to make a 
point from the position of absolute authorial authority. The voices of the author and his 
heroes are and must be at all times absolutely equal (Bakhtin, 1979,74). It is interesting 
that Burke (1992,24) uses Bakhtin's 'concept of the dialogic author' as an example of a 
conception of authorship which is 'determinately anti-theological', because it is 
$constructed precisely in opposition to the univocality of epic monologism'. 
Palmieri argues that through his concept of polyphony, the author brings himself 
to a point of non-existence; the point which, as we have seen, Morson and Emerson 
deny. Nevertheless, according to Palmieri, 'the image of the author as Bakhtin intended 
it is no more or less than the indirect speech of another voice'; in the polyphonic the 
author represents himself 'dramatically as a character', and the result of it is equally 
dramatic: 
One of the more radical consequences of the use of indirect speech is the death of the 
author, of the self that is represented by his or her name and as such is the legal 
guarantor of the work of art. The dying process begins with the progressive distancing 
from his own words which the author inevitably undergoes by representing himself as a 
character; it is a short step from here to the adoption of a pseudonym, at which point the 
author points the gun at his own head. When the author opts for total anonymity, he 
pulls the trigger. (Palmieri, 54) 
There is something slightly fanciful about the rhetorical manoeuvre of this passage, and 
it is enough to remember, admittedly in a considerably more literal-minded way than 
what Palmieri had in mind, the number of authors whose pseudonyms or anonymity 
saved their lives to know that denying yourself the right to be the legal guarantor of 
your work is not the same thing as suicide. 
I also believe that Morson and Emerson are right, that polyphony does not 
automatically mean the death of the author, and Burke makes the same point: 
Bakhtin believed that this multivalent or carnivalesque countertradition - which he 
terms Menippean - reflects a dissolution of hierarchies and the emergence of an anti- 
authorian discourse. Bakhtin was not, however, led therefrom to proclaim the death of 
the author, but instead reconceived the idea and function of the author in accordance 
with the modalities and structures of the polyphonic novel. (Burke, 1992,48) 
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But how is the equality of author's and characters' voices possible? After all, Bakhtin 
still sees the author as the creator of this multifaceted, polyphonic world - how can it 
then be that he can surrender so much of his consummating authority to the other voices 
in that world? 
This is possible, according to Bakhtin, because the polyphonic novel brought 
about a new novelistic form, and not new content. The polyphonic novel is a form with 
its own structure and rules of construction. By choosing the type of hero he wants to 
represent, the author also chooses the inner logic according to which such a hero must 
be constructed. This inner logic enters into the author's intentions and executes his 
artistic design, but it cannot be influenced by his intentions nor perverted by them. The 
rules of the polyphonic novel bind the author who has chosen to write such a novel: 
once he decides that the freedom of self-awareness and self-knowledge is the dominant 
feature of his heroes, he then has to follow the structural logic of the polyphonic novel, 
and renounce any privileged position for his own voice. This does not mean, however, 
that he thus renounces his position as a creator; the author of the polyphonic novel is, in 
fact, doubly active: he is present as the form-giving energy which creates the 
polyphonic novel with its free and equal heroes, and as a voice in it. 
Furthermore, Bakhtin is also far from claiming that the polyphonic novel lacks 
unity. As Morson and Emerson point out, for Bakhtin, 'a work without some kind of 
unity would simply be a flawed work' (Morson and Emerson, 1990,23 3). In the case of 
the monologic novel, the unity is achieved through the singular, consummating and 
unifying authorial point of view; in the polyphonic novel, on the other hand, the unity is 
'of a higher order'. It is a unity of a dialogic universe with its various and often 
discordant voices and points of view. To quote Morson and Emerson once again, 'there 
is all the difference in the world between a contradictory or ambiguous truth and a truth 
that requires two or more voices. The same distinction must be drawn between merely 
expressing the monologic truth that 'others have equal rights to the truth' and actually 
embodying a dialogic truth' (1990,239). The unity of the polyphonic novel, according 
to Bakhtin, is the unity of a dialogic truth in a dialogic universe. And it perhaps says 
something about the monologic habits of our rational thought that this idea, although, to 
me at least, perfectly understandable on that level of my thoughts which is very close to 
my emotions, nevertheless cannot but sound slightly contradictory on the most abstract 
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level. However, as it was precisely this very abstract level of understanding that Bakhtin 
was most suspicious of, I suppose he would have no problem with this. 
So What is an Author to Bakhtin? 
We have seen that, for Bakhtin, the author is a 'form-giving energy' and the origin of 
the unity (whether monologic or polyphonic) of a work of art. Bakhtin insisted 
throughout his life on the distinction between the author as person and the author- 
creator; however, in 'The Problem of the Text', one of his late essays, he said that 'this 
does not mean that there are no paths from the pure author to the author as person - they 
exist, of course, and they exist in the very core, the very depths of man. But this core 
can never become one of the images of the work itself' (Bakhtin, 1999a, 110). The link, 
although existing, is invisible to the reader and difficult, if not impossible to grasp; 
besides, one can sense that Bakhtin would think it an unpardonable intrusion on the part 
of the reader to try to grasp something which belongs to the author alone. This could 
also explain why Jakobson's essay on Maiakovskii seems to remain unresolved on the 
very issue of the relationship between the author as person and the author-creator: the 
relationship remains in the core of the man, but does not enter into the work itself, and 
certainly, as Jakobson told us, not into the author's relations with other people. 
We can see that, in his insistence on the distinction between the author as person 
and the author-creator, Bakhtin very much belongs to the (Eastern) Formalist and 
Structuralist tradition. This is even more accentuated in, for example, his final notes in 
'Forms of Time and Chronotope in the Novel', where he says that one of the main 
aspects of the author's own chronotope is his literary and cultural tradition. The author 
speaks from the point of view granted to him by his own unique position in his 
gunfinished contemporaneity', but even this is defined by Bakhtin as having primarily a 
literary and cultural character (Bakhtin, 1996a, 254-57). 
Thus Bakhtin's view of the role of the author changes considerably throughout 
his life, from the concept of the author as the Creator, demiurge, or Kantian 
transcendental subject, to a notion that comes very close even to the French structuralist 
(and even post-structuralist) views. Although the author remains, as Palmieri (1998,55) 
notes, exotopic throughout, Bakhtin never gets rid of the author completely, although 
his existence becomes more and more textual, and the notion of the voice (who is 
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speaking? ), and, one might add, the responsibility of the voice, remains important 
throughout. 
Palmieri gives a very good summary of the relationships within which the author is 
considered in Bakhtin's work: 
a) the author's own world; 
b) the narrative world; 
C) the reader's world; 
d) the author's own discourse, that is, the language of the self; 
e) alien discourse, that is, the discourse of others; 
f) himself as author and living being; 
g) himself as the creator of the work; 
h) himself as a created image; 
i) himself as the image created by the reader; 
j) the characters as interacting linguistic consciousnesses; 
k) the narrator, the narrative style and the chosen genre; 
1) his own point of view (that is, a reflected moral judgement within the text) on all of 
the above. (Ibid. ) 
Whatever form the author gives to his work (monologic or polyphonic), his work enters 
into a dialogue with other works and with other voices in the culture to which it 
belongs, as well as with other cultures. And the reader is in a similar position; far from 
being obliged to submit himself to the authority of the author's voice, he is free to 
approach the work from his own personal, historical and cultural position and enter into 
a dialogue with it (Palmieri, 1998,256-57). 
Back to Barthes: the Return of the Author 
If Bakhtin's notion of the author changed substantially, Barthes's did not stay static 
either, and it changed again after writing 'De l'oeuvre au texte, and Ta mort de 
Fauteur'. In 1971 he published Sade, Fourier, Loyola, in which he announced 'un retour 
arnical de Pauteur' (Barthes, 1971d, 1044). In the preface to this text, Barthes discusses 
how one can 'live with an author', not by re-living or recreating the world and the 
actions which they describe, but by allowing their language to penetrate our own. Sade, 
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Fourier, Loyola also contains biographical notes on the lives of Sade and Fourier, 
which, however, do not try to tell the story of their lives in a narratively coherent 
manner (1971d, 1165-73). The notes (biographemes) (1971d, 1045) do not follow any 
chronological order but group together events and obsessions in the writers' lives; so, 
for Sade, Barthes tells of the concrete events of his life, but also of his love of dogs and 
his anger that, when he was transferred from Vincennes to the Bastille, he was not 
allowed to take his big pillow with him (1971d, 1170). Barthes explains in the preface 
to Sade, Fourier, Loyola that this manner of treating authors' biographies comes from a 
personal preference: 
Si j'6tais 6crivain, et mort, comme faimerais que ma vie se r6duisit, par les soins d'un 
biographe amical et d6sinvolte, A que1ques d6tails, A quelques goats, A quelques 
inflexions, disons, des 'bigraph6mes', dont la distinction et la mobilit6 pourraient 
voyager hors de tout destin et venir toucher, A la fagon des atornes 6picuriens, quelque 
corps futur, prornis A la m8me dispersion. (Barthes, 1971d, 1045) 
In his 1978 LeVon, he lists the authors he loves, listing Michelet, Benveniste and 
Foucault among them (1978,801). The author, and the interest in his life, were back. 
How did this sudden reversal come about? 
His definition of what living with an author means gives us a clear indication 
that, like Bakhtin, Barthes's focus moved from visual representation to language. 
Although Barthes never believed that literature 'represents' reality, and although he 
concentrated on language from the start, a good deal of his critical energy is spent on 
denying literature's mimetic function, which to a certain extent locked his thought into 
the debate on mimesis. But with Sade, Fourier, Loyola the focus changes, and Barthes 
starts seeing these authors not as carriers of a certain type of mimesis, but as 
87 'Logoth&tes', founders of languages. This distinction would not mean very much to 
Lotman or Benveniste for whom language represents reality - so a new language would 
be a new way of representing the world - but, for Barthes, who, like Genette, argued 
against the representative function of language, it makes a great deal of difference. 
87 Foucault elaborated a similar idea in 1979,153-54. 
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As Burke argues, Barthes's arguments against the author and against mimesis go 
hand in hand; 'what Barthes has been talking of all along is not the death of the author, 
but the closure of representation' (Burke, 1992,48). The notion of the author was 
problematic for Barthes because the author was an opening into the text's referentiality; 
one could always assume some kind of link between him and the world: 
Correspondingly, the break with the author effects a severance of the text from its 
putative referential obligations, and allows language to become the primary point of 
departure and return for textual apprehension and analysis. (Burke, 1992,43) 
So, 'if a text has been "unglued" of its referentiality, its author need not die; to the 
contrary, he can flourish, become an object of biographical pleasure, perhaps even a 
founder of languages' (Burke, 1992,47). Burke adds: 
When the scene of representation has dissolved around him, Balzac can come back, an 
author of texts, no longer a scribe of reality; his work is no more 'a channel of 
expression' but a 'writing without referent'. (Burke, 1992,48) 
Burke also notes that Barthes's objections to representation are more of moralistic than 
epistemological nature; what Barthes 'spent a writing life challenging is what we might 
call the ethics of representation, the ways in which a society transforms culture into 
nature and thereby stamps its products with the seat of authenticity' (Burke, 1992,52). 
It is his dislike of stereotypes and of the notion of the vraisembable that drives Barthes 
against the notion of representation itself, and it is probably in Levon that he states his 
position in the clearest manner. 
Here, Barthes claims that literature (it is worth noting that he goes back to using 
the term in a positive sense, as a practice, rather than as a social institution) springs from 
man's persistent attempts to represent reality through language, a task which is 
impossible because 'on ne peutfaire coMcider un ordre pluridimensionnel ge reel) et 
88 un ordre unidimensionnel (le langage)' (Barthes, 1978,806). Literature is realist in 
the sense that it has the real as the object of its desire; it is irrealist in the sense that it 
can never recreate reality the way it believes and wishes it should. From this it would 
seem that Barthes's main objection to linguistic representation is that language is not 
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mimetic enough: it can only recreate one-dimensional, singular aspects of reality, 
leaving its multiformity untouched and unaccounted for. It is in this sense that language 
is 'fasciste': it always simplifies the world to the point where the rule of stereotypes 
becomes practically unavoidable (1978,803). We are forced to identify ourselves and to 
relate to others within the limitations of the language we speak; so, for example, in 
French or Serbo-Croat it would be impossible to speak without referring to gender, 
while Finnish would allow us to refer to the third person without specifying whether it 
is a 'he' or a 'she'. 
In Leqon, Barthes redefines his literary manifesto in a manner similar to the 
penultimate chapter of Le Degr6 z6ro de 1'6criture (L'&criture et la parole') where he 
suggests that representation of different social languages and of verbal diversity in 
general is Tacte litt6raire le plus humain' (Barthes, 153,182). In Leqon, Barthes says: 
Si j'6tais 16gislateur - supposition aberrante pour quelqu'un qui, 6tymologiquement 
parlant, est 'an-archiste' -[... ] j'encouragerais [ ... ] Papprentissage simultan6 de 
plusieurs langages frangais, de fonctions diverses, promues A 6galit6. [ ... ] Cette libert6 
est un luxe que toute soci6t6 devrait procurer A ses citoyens: autant de langages qu'il ya 
de d6sirs: proposition utopique en ceci qu'aucune soci6t6 West encore pr8te A admettre 
qu'il ya plusieurs d6sirs. (Barthes, 1978,807) 
Barthes stresses his agreement with Benveniste that language is 'le social meme', and 
suggests that, consequently, the only way to counteract the fascism of language is to let 
social languages play in the space of the literary text: 
[La] foree de la litt6rature, sa force proprement semiotique, c'est de jouer les signes 
plutöt que de les d6truire, c'est de les mettre dans une machinerie de langage, [ ... ] bref 
c'est instituer, au sein m8me de la langue servile, une veritable h8teronymie des choses. 
(Barthes, 1978,808) 
Here Barthes also redefines the role of serniology one more time, this time as a practice 
of gathering the impurities of language, 'la corruption imm6diate du message: rien de 
moins que les desirs, les craintes, les mines, les intimidations, les avances, les 
tendresses, les protestations, les excuses, les agressions, les musiques, dont est faite la 
88 My emphasis. 
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langue active' (Barthes, 1978,809). The notion of an active language which is marked 
by the speakers' intentions and desires is very Bakhtinian indeed; and the notion that 
literature will represent the diversity and multiformity of the world by reflecting 
linguistic diversity is even more so. 
Conclusion 
Barthes's notion of the role of the author changed throughout his life. At first the author 
was seen as the source of a literary work's unity, as a center of themes and obsessions 
(Michelet). Not long after that, in Mythologies Barthes shows his impatience with the 
popular and media obsession with the figure of the author and the mythologies 
surrounding him (the writer works even when on holiday), as well as her (you are only 
allowed to write novels if you have had children). In Sur Racine, Barthes argues that the 
author is there to give the work a unity from which an interpretation could be attempted, 
and not to authorise a single, 'true' interpretation through psychology or biography or 
even history. In Critique et v&U6, the rebellion against the rule of the author as the 
figure of authority, setting boundaries beyond which interpretation must not go, is 
already well formulated, finding in the end its strongest expression in 'La mort de 
Pauteur'. The author 'returns' in Sade, Fourier, Loyola, having been re-defined as an 
'inventor of languages' rather than as an authority figure providing an opening into the 
text's referentiality. As Burke points out, this last move shows that Barthes was not so 
much anti-author as anti-mimesis all along. Mimesis for Barthes is inevitably corrupted 
by doxa, a socially sanctioned vision of the world, which is necessarily full of stifling 
stereotypes and prejudices. Whenever seen as a locus of a particular language and set of 
obsessions and desires that do not follow doxa, an author can be studied and even 
loved . 
89 Allowing language to move freely, to express a multitude of desires, to break 
down stereotypes and prevent their creation, is what Barthes believes literature should 
do. And it cannot do that if the author functions like a figure of authority, with his 
image set in stone and his work's referentiality preventing the free flow of both his 
text's and reader's desire. This vision of literature's ideal role is what sets Barthes apart 
from the other advocates of the author's irrelevance (like the New Critics, or even like 
Foucault). 
89 See, for example, Barthes, 1979. 
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Bakhtin's vision of the author's role changed as well. From the early notion of 
the author as creator, the supreme authority shaping his character's souls and 
consummating their lives, the author becomes a structuring force that brings into 
existence a verbal universe over which it has no ultimate authority. The role of the 
author of the novel is not to create a world over which he will have absolute control, but 
to bring forth different social languages, to follow the logic of chronotopes and genres, 
to set in motion verbal relationships and watch them unfold. This is why Dostoevsky as 
a polyphonic writer is preferable to Tolstoy, who as a monologic writer liked to have his 
characters and his represented world fully under his control. Also, in this respect, the 
author, as the medium for different linguistic genres, is not that diferent from the author 
as envisaged by the Formalists. 
In the case of both Barthes and later Bakhtin, the author is problematic if he has 
the absolute power over his text and if he projects a single authoritative view of the 
world. If he is a medium for different social languages and different viewpoints, or if, in 
the case of Barthes, he invents new languages and allows his own desire to flow freely, 
and encourages the reader's to do the same, the author is a deeply positive figure. He is 
a positive figure if he renounces the authority he could have as an author of a 
represented verbal universe (Bakhtin, Barthes), or the authority granted him through a 
society's cultural institutions and the tradition they uphold (Barthes). The author as the 
medium of languages and desires, of new and marginal viewpoints, the creator of the 
site where ideologies meet and mingle and different social languages try to speak to one 
another, is the author of the literature both Barthes and Bakhtin desired. 
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Conclusion 
Roland Barthes and Mikhail Bakhtin were two of the most interesting figures in literary 
theory that the twentieth century had. They shared a strong sense of the importance of 
language in shaping our personal and cultural identity. They both felt acutely how a 
dominant language can oppress human relations and determine the way human beings 
see themselves and each other, and looked for ways in which we can go beyond the 
context of the culture into which we were born (and, more importantly, bred). Barthes 
throughout his life kept coming back to his idea that bourgeois culture and ideology 
completely dominates every aspect of life in France, and constantly looked for ways in 
which that process can be subverted. Bakhtin, who devoted most of his life to literary 
studies, nevertheless argued for the liberation of human thought from fear and 
intimidation that the dominant ideology can inflict on it. Although written about specific 
literary issues, Bakhtin's essay on the relationship between the epic and the novel, and 
his study of Rabelais and the folk culture (to cite just two examples), have nevertheless 
been interpreted, and justly, as critiques of the Stalinist regime in Soviet Russia. 
Barthes proposed different models through which dominant ideology can be 
opposed and subverted, and all of them pointed to the literary text in one way or 
another. The earliest, writing, or &riture, was defined in Le Degrý z&o de V&riture as 
an act of responsibility towards history, and argued for a strong awareness for the 
residual meaning in words, for the consciousness of their inalienable historical memory. 
This bears strong resemblance to Bakhtin's idea that words always carry the echoes of 
meanings other people give them, and that the novel is the literary genre which is most 
faithful to the living language precisely because it acknowledges and addresses that. 
In his early work, Barthes also suggested that the most human act of a writer 
consists of a faithful reproduction of other people's speech, not as caricatures, but as 
portraits which represent not only the words but also the view of life which stands 
behind them. Later, in Leqon, he also argued for a writing which would show the 
'v6ritable h6t&ronymie des choses' by playing with signs and languages. This is very 
similar to Bakhtin's account of the novel's role in representing language, and 
particularly of the polyphonic novel (like the novels by Dostoevsky), which represent 
characters through the language they use and the ideology which stands behind that 
language. 
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According to Barthes, the decisive period in the development of the French 
novel was the year of the revolution of 1848, when the bourgeois writer realised that his 
view of the world was not the universally human one, that there was another class which 
was opposed to his own, and that he could not go blindly on writing about the human 
condition as if the bourgeois self was the only type of the self possible. In a similar way, 
Bakhtin considers that the crucial point in the creation of the novel as a genre would the 
moment when a culture recognises that its national language is not one and indivisible, 
that there are many different social languages which are spoken as a part of it, and that 
all of these languages are representative of a particular view of the world. Furthermore, 
the culture has to realise that other languages, too, are not just funny ways in which 
foreign people speak, but are also valid, to use Lotman's phrase, communicative- 
modelling systems. 
Barthes argues in Le plaisir du texte (as well as in 1973a and 1973b) that 
everyday language is made up of different, oppositional discourses, all fighting for 
dominance over each other (Barthes, 1973c, 1508). As every one of these discourses 
comes from a specific place in the social hierarchy, and has its own sociolinguistic 
reference, Barthes feels that there is a strong sense of a war-like topos which is present 
in each of them. The world of language (1a logospUre -a term used by Bakhtin as well, 
and similar to Lotman's notion of the 'semiosphere'90) behaves like an 'immense and 
perpetual conflict of paranoias' (Ibid. ). In the war of languages, Barthes suggests that 
only the text which is 'atopical', produced and read without being situated in a specific 
place in the conflict of the logosphere, can offer a moment of peace, a suspension of the 
war-like character present in the everyday language. 'Le plaisir du texte (la jouissance 
du texte) est... un effacement brusque de la valeur guerri&re' (1509); but, at the same 
time, it cannot be an avoidance of ideology. To wish for an entirely non-ideological text 
is to wish for a sterile, frigid text; as Barthes puts it, the text needs its shades, it needs 
'un peu d'id6ologie, un peu de repr6sentation, un peu de sujet' (15 10). 
For both Barthes and Bakhtin, the awareness of one's own sociolect (and not just 
idiolect), and its position in the logosphere, is the first step in a responsible attitude to 
language, both where the novelist and the language scholar are concerned. 
However, in his later work, Barthes was more in favour of the text constructed 
of different social languages without favouring any one in particular and without 
90 On this, see Mandclker, 1995. 
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elaborating their specific position amidst other sociolects. He argued that only such a 
text could counteract the terror of everyday language and its ideological blindness. At 
this point, he was wary of what he termed the 'fascism' of language, its ability to force 
us to say certain things whether we want to or not (for example, in French, to make 
reference to gender). He was also convinced that any thoroughly argued ideological 
position was bound to either oppress or intimidate (or both), that the fragmented, 
atopical writing which freely mixed languages in a 'carnivalesque' manner was the only 
possibility he saw as truly subversive of the established order. It was, as it were, a 
model of heteroglossia (coexistence of different languages) without the dialogism; 
Barthes started to believe that any dialogue was more likely to produce a conflict than to 
solve a problem. Although he noted that different social groups in France do not really 
speak to each other, he did not wish for a literature that would make them do so, but for 
a writing which would undermine the self-importance all of these different groups 
invested into their own languages. Irreverence and asocial disdain became for him the 
only way out of the 'prison-house of language'. It needs to be said however, that some 
of the more recent studies of Bakhtin have criticised him for his lack of 
acknowledgement that the dialogue can have its unpleasant sides; for example, 
Bernstein suggested (1989,199) 'that dialogism itself is not always just clement or life 
enhancing, and that the resonance of multiple voices may be a catastrophic threat as 
much as a sustaining chorale', and Fogel (1989,174-75) pointed to 'a set of great 
nineteenth-century anti-conversational, yet extremely dialogical, novels which fix on a 
more coercive and authorian dialogue regime to return it incessantly upon the reader'. 
Perhaps Barthes's insistence that heteroglossia and dialogism create a possibility for 
antagonism and not just for an exchange of thoughts between friends, is a useful 
corrective for Bakhtin's sometimes overly optimistic view of human communication 
and the nature of human language. At the same time, both Barthes and Bakhtin believed 
in the importance of literary utopias as alternatives to the oppression of the dominant 
language: Barthes had his concept of the scriptible text (which would, in a way, open up 
a dialogue between the reader and the text, in that the reader would not be just a passive 
consumer, recipient of the writer's monologue, but also an active agent who 
reconstructs the text for himselo, and Bakhtin proposed the model of the polyphonic 
novel which would represent the characters' voices as equal to the voice of the author. 
Diana Knight argues (1997,1) that 'a surprising proportion of [Barthes's) ideas are 
formulated trough an explicit vocabulary of utopia', showing an 'almost obsessive 
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thought pattern'. Knight argues that 'Barthes never stopped hypothesizing and 
fantasizing how things might be otherwise - otherwise, that is, than in his own alienated 
and class-tom society' (2), and she says that utopia as writing emerges in Barthes's 
work 'as the ultimate mediator between the literary and political dimensions of his 
work' (3). 
As has been pointed out by Morson and Emerson, Bakhtin's book on 
Dostoevsky 'is really two books, something like the gestalt 'duck-rabbit' drawing' 
(Morson and Emerson, 1990,234). It ftinctions both as a literary study of Dostoevsky's 
works and as a 'metaphilosophical work that challenges all of theoretism and semiotic 
totalitarianism by proposing a non-monologic, antisystemic conception of truth' (Ibid. ). 
Even if one was to prove conclusively that Bakhtin was wrong, and that the authorial 
voice in Dostoevsky's novels functions in the same authoritarian manner as it does in, 
say, Tolstoy's, the fact that Bakhtin elaborated the model of the polyphonic novel would 
provide us with an alternative for the present state of affairs, one which would exist as a 
critical utopia, just like Barthes's scriptible text. As Barthes put it in Roland Barthes 
par Roland Barthes: 
A quoi sert Putopie? A faire du sens. Face au pr6sent, A mon pr6sent, Putopie est un 
terrne second qui permet de faire jouer le d6clic du signe: le discours sur le r6el devient 
possible, je sors de I'aphasie ofi me plonge I'affolement de tout ce qui ne va pas en moi, 
dans ce monde qui est le mien. (Barthes, 1975,153) 
And yet, it was as if Barthes had never stopped wishing for a pure language which 
would make the world speak its true nature, whereas for Bakhtin the existence of 
different languages which described it represented the true nature of the human world. If 
the ability to 'see language' was Barthes's illness, it was Bakhtin's joy; for both, it was 
probably their greatest talent. 
Nevertheless, both of them saw the world through language, and approached 
human reality from a language-oriented point of view. The material world hardly 
interested them and they both saw literature as based almost entirely on language alone. 
Although Barthes in Mythologies did point out to the social realities which lay behind 
the bourgeois myths, he still insisted, contrary to Sartre, that literature is made of 
nothing but language and that the only possible type of engagement in literature consists 
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of a sense of responsibility towards language and not towards social reality. Neither 
Barthes nor Bakhtin believed in the role of the author as a psychological agent in a 
biographical sense, both saw him mainly as a constellation of forces belonging to the 
literary and cultural tradition. In his chronotope essays, Bakhtin defined the writer's 
contemporaneity as consisting mainly of the 'realm of literature', and, more broadly, of 
culture (Bakhtin, 1996a, 255-56). The writer writes in a dialogue with the literature and 
culture he encounters in his time, and the individual aspect of his work originates from 
his unique position in space and time in relation to that culture. 
Bakhtin developed the idea of a morality which is based on the specific position 
one occupies in time and space; he argued for a very Sartrian need for a 'non-alibi' in 
existence, and insisted that we can only act morally if we take into account the specific 
circumstances of our relationship with others, and not just act on general moral rules. 
Bakhtin also argued that we have to respect the particularity of others, and listen to their 
individual voices. As for Barthes, Gardiner (1999,266) noted the link with Bakhtin 
which could only have been the result of a peculiar likeness of temperaments, and said 
that 'Bakhtin continually emphasises the presence of what Barthes once called the 
6grain of the voice', the trace of the flesh-and-blood personality that lies behind every 
utterance'. Patrizia Lombardo, commenting on the same essay by Barthes (Te grain de 
la voix', 1972), said: 
Here lies the perfection of literature, that which makes it a song, music: the voice, 
mysteriously taken from a person, both particular to a body and anonymous like matter 
in its primordial state, this voice is integrated into what is by nature mute, the written 
page. (Lombardo, 1989,63) 
Moreover, one senses that for Barthes, too, the relationship with his own 
contemporaneity consisted of a series of repositionings and renegotiations, each 
designed to prevent him from being stuck in a single role for very long. 
And this is probably the most striking similarity between the two thinkers: 
Barthes can be seen as a model of Bakhtinian subjectivitypar excellence. 
George Wasserman remarked (1981,7) that every attempt at thinking or writing 
about Barthes regrettably reduces his writing to an oeuvre and his person to a finalised 
image, whereas 'every text he has written is, before anything else, an act of resistance to 
such closures'. 
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Barthes himself noted that he was always in a process of starting different 
projects, but never had any will to finish them. For him, this tendency to postpone 
completion was a'way of keeping interest and plans alive; since they hardly ever fully 
exhausted themselves, grand plans for the perfect book kept coming back as 'traces of 
an obsession, ready to be revived at any moment. Besides, they also offered to others 
suggestions of ideas, open to different types of development (Barthes, 1975,227-28). 
Barthes was as uncomfortable about the idea of finalisation as Bakhtin was, and he even 
defined his own intellectual progress as a series of resistances to his own ideas (1975, 
186). In the same way as he never asked for anything other than a 'privileged' 
relationship with others, one that would be marked by a difference and not by 
exclusivity or generalised equality, Barthes always kept redefining his relationship to 
different ideas, without ever fully subscribing to any of them (at least not for very long) 
(1975,144). As he disliked being qualified by adjectives and having his own image 
thrust back into his face, Barthes also disliked being defined through any one of the 
approaches he developed throughout his career (1975,127). 
Hence a very specific sense of loss which was felt by his friends and colleagues 
when he suddenly died in 1980. Tzvetan Todorov (1981,323) argued that Barthes had 
created for himself a unique and irreplaceable role in the intellectual life of France, as 
he was the one who always positioned himself towards the main discourses of the time 
with a certain distance, looked at them from a position of displacement. Every time he 
did that, the discourse thus defamiliarised would appear under a different light than 
before. Serge Doubrovsky (1981,329) remarked with deep regret that, for the first time, 
Barthes's work stopped being provisional any more, and was suddenly arrested in its 
movement of return and surprise: it became a corpus. 
I have thus committed a serious act of blasphemy, as I have looked at the work 
of Roland Barthes and Mikhail Bakhtin in the context of differences between French 
and Eastern European structuralism. I have boxed them both into a single context, by 
arguing that Bakhtin's thought can be productively studied as a part of Soviet 
structuralism (late Formalism and Soviet semiotics), with particular similarities to 
Tynianov's and Lotman's literary studies, and that structuralism was the period that 
marked Barthes's work the most. However, I have an excuse: the term structuralism, as 
it was used here, applies not only to those works of literary theory and criticism which 
deal with binary oppositions and actantial models, but also to those which argue that 
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there is a systemic (albeit very complicated) relationship between literature and culture, 
between culture and system(s) of belief, and between literature, culture and history. 
Structuralist work, like that of Iurii Lotman, usually does argue that literature is a 
system which behaves as if it were relatively autonomous, but it is also fully aware that 
literature uses material which is of an extra-literary nature, and that this material 
sometimes retains the memory of its previous, extra-literary function. As Lotman put it: 
Why, then, from a structuralist point of view, must a work be studied as a 
synchronically closed structure, and why is an immanent analysis of the text the natural 
result? Do not structuralists thereby ignore the non-aesthetic meaning in a work? 
(Lotman, 1977,32) 
I hope that that I have succeeded in convincing the reader that the kind of structuralism 
which is capable of asking such questions is far from being a rigid and rather old- 
fashioned system of thought, and that it can still offer an exciting and fruitful way of 
looking at literature and culture. 
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